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Sergei Markedonov: Iran has recently changed its position on Karabakh in Baku’s favor
02.06.2008 18:38 GMT+04:00
/PanARMENIAN.Net/ There is some progress in the Azerbaijani-Iranian relations, what was almost impossible under Heydar Aliyev’s rule, head of the interethnic relations department at the institute of political and military analysis Sergei Markedonov said in an interview with PanARMENIAN.Net.
“Iran has recently changed its position on Karabakh in Baku’s favor and relations between the countries grew warmer. They have a number of common problems: the Caspian Sea, Southern Azerbaijan. Although, politicians know that unification of Southern and Northern Azerbaijan is unreal,” he said.
02.06.2008 18:38 GMT+04:00
/PanARMENIAN.Net/ There is some progress in the Azerbaijani-Iranian relations, what was almost impossible under Heydar Aliyev’s rule, head of the interethnic relations department at the institute of political and military analysis Sergei Markedonov said in an interview with PanARMENIAN.Net.
“Iran has recently changed its position on Karabakh in Baku’s favor and relations between the countries grew warmer. They have a number of common problems: the Caspian Sea, Southern Azerbaijan. Although, politicians know that unification of Southern and Northern Azerbaijan is unreal,” he said.
Text of Full Interview
Sergei Markedonov: Kosovo phantom hovering over Caucasus
The South Caucasus states have always been in focus of Russian politicians. However, position of official Moscow on the unsettled conflicts in Nagorno Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia sometimes arouses astonishment, specifically in Armenia. The “outpost” stereotype yields to pragmatism. Head of the interethnic relations department at the institute of political and military analysis Sergei Markedonov comments to PanARMENIAN.Net on regional developments.
What’s Russia’s real stand on the Nagorno Karabakh conflict?
Russia’s role is weakening. Unlike the United States, Moscow doesn’t render financial assistance to NKR. Satisfied with contacts with Armenia, Russia doesn’t demonstrate any intention to engage Nagorno Karabakh as a full-fledged participant in the talks. After proclamation of Kosovo’s independence and its recognition by a number of states, Russia outlined its stand on Abkhazia and Ossetia but prefers to avoid Nagorno Karabakh. Meanwhile, strategy should never be restricted to recognition or silence. There are lots of approaches. I should also mention that the position of official Yerevan and unrecognized Stepanakert do not always coincide. Undoubtedly, Russia needs sustainable relations with Azerbaijan. But recognition of NKR as a party in talks is recognition of political reality but not recognition of de facto state.
Despite international community’s statements on inadmissibility of Karabakh conflict resolution by use of force, Baku doesn’t give up its warlike rhetoric and anti-Armenian hysteria…
Official Baku’s conduct should be viewed from various angles. First, it’s the forthcoming presidential election. Second, Azerbaijan is trying to insinuate itself into the international community not only as an energy supplier but also as a dynamically developing state. Be attentive to notice that oil is not mentioned in ads about Azerbaijan.
As to bellicose statements, they won’t stop. The Kosovo phantom is hovering over Caucasus. Recognition of the breakaway province’s independence was a part of realpolitik and there is no guarantee that Karabakh will not have the same fate. So, Azerbaijan’s concerns are grounded.
There is an impression that Russia doesn’t have any exact program in Caucasus. Is it really so?
Russia has failed to develop a common and distinct policy in Caucasus so far. It’s always late to react to processes in the South and North Caucasus. Relations with Georgia can serve as a vivid example.
Russia is interested in ‘frozen conflicts’. However, conflicts are not frozen but lingering. These two notions are different. Russia supports territorial integrity but it stands against the methods this principle is being pushed forth.
As for relations with Armenia and Azerbaijan, I can say that Armenia is Russia’s strategic ally while Azerbaijan is a strategic partner. With its military and economic parameters, Russia is closer to Armenia but in case of resumption of military operations our country will face a hard choice. Unfortunately, the Kosovo precedent can provoke hostilities in Karabakh.
How can you comment on Azerbaijan-Iran relations?
There is some progress, what was almost impossible under Heydar Aliyev’s rule. Iran has recently changed its position on Karabakh in Baku’s favor and relations between the countries grew warmer. They have a number of common problems: the Caspian Sea, Southern Azerbaijan. Although, politicians know that unification of Southern and Northern Azerbaijan is unreal.
The Armenian-Turkish relations leave much to be desired. Do you think normalization of relations is possible?
In early 1990-ies Armenia was ready to normalize relations. However, the process was uncoordinated. When the Karabakh war broke out Turkey closed the border with Armenia, thus nullifying all possibilities of reconciliation. Fearing that Armenian forces can enter Nakhijevan, Ankara has taken up the policy of late President Turgut Ozal, who said that Turkey is responsible for the Ottoman heritage. True, there are politicians in Turkey who wish to normalize relations with Armenia but the strong Azeri lobby hampers the process. I should also mention that the key problem is Nagorno Karabakh but not recognition of the Armenian Genocide.
The South Caucasus states have always been in focus of Russian politicians. However, position of official Moscow on the unsettled conflicts in Nagorno Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia sometimes arouses astonishment, specifically in Armenia. The “outpost” stereotype yields to pragmatism. Head of the interethnic relations department at the institute of political and military analysis Sergei Markedonov comments to PanARMENIAN.Net on regional developments.
What’s Russia’s real stand on the Nagorno Karabakh conflict?
Russia’s role is weakening. Unlike the United States, Moscow doesn’t render financial assistance to NKR. Satisfied with contacts with Armenia, Russia doesn’t demonstrate any intention to engage Nagorno Karabakh as a full-fledged participant in the talks. After proclamation of Kosovo’s independence and its recognition by a number of states, Russia outlined its stand on Abkhazia and Ossetia but prefers to avoid Nagorno Karabakh. Meanwhile, strategy should never be restricted to recognition or silence. There are lots of approaches. I should also mention that the position of official Yerevan and unrecognized Stepanakert do not always coincide. Undoubtedly, Russia needs sustainable relations with Azerbaijan. But recognition of NKR as a party in talks is recognition of political reality but not recognition of de facto state.
Despite international community’s statements on inadmissibility of Karabakh conflict resolution by use of force, Baku doesn’t give up its warlike rhetoric and anti-Armenian hysteria…
Official Baku’s conduct should be viewed from various angles. First, it’s the forthcoming presidential election. Second, Azerbaijan is trying to insinuate itself into the international community not only as an energy supplier but also as a dynamically developing state. Be attentive to notice that oil is not mentioned in ads about Azerbaijan.
As to bellicose statements, they won’t stop. The Kosovo phantom is hovering over Caucasus. Recognition of the breakaway province’s independence was a part of realpolitik and there is no guarantee that Karabakh will not have the same fate. So, Azerbaijan’s concerns are grounded.
There is an impression that Russia doesn’t have any exact program in Caucasus. Is it really so?
Russia has failed to develop a common and distinct policy in Caucasus so far. It’s always late to react to processes in the South and North Caucasus. Relations with Georgia can serve as a vivid example.
Russia is interested in ‘frozen conflicts’. However, conflicts are not frozen but lingering. These two notions are different. Russia supports territorial integrity but it stands against the methods this principle is being pushed forth.
As for relations with Armenia and Azerbaijan, I can say that Armenia is Russia’s strategic ally while Azerbaijan is a strategic partner. With its military and economic parameters, Russia is closer to Armenia but in case of resumption of military operations our country will face a hard choice. Unfortunately, the Kosovo precedent can provoke hostilities in Karabakh.
How can you comment on Azerbaijan-Iran relations?
There is some progress, what was almost impossible under Heydar Aliyev’s rule. Iran has recently changed its position on Karabakh in Baku’s favor and relations between the countries grew warmer. They have a number of common problems: the Caspian Sea, Southern Azerbaijan. Although, politicians know that unification of Southern and Northern Azerbaijan is unreal.
The Armenian-Turkish relations leave much to be desired. Do you think normalization of relations is possible?
In early 1990-ies Armenia was ready to normalize relations. However, the process was uncoordinated. When the Karabakh war broke out Turkey closed the border with Armenia, thus nullifying all possibilities of reconciliation. Fearing that Armenian forces can enter Nakhijevan, Ankara has taken up the policy of late President Turgut Ozal, who said that Turkey is responsible for the Ottoman heritage. True, there are politicians in Turkey who wish to normalize relations with Armenia but the strong Azeri lobby hampers the process. I should also mention that the key problem is Nagorno Karabakh but not recognition of the Armenian Genocide.
