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‘Turkey, Armenia should no longer be hostage to history’
European Stability Initiative experts Diba Nigar Göksel and Gerald Knaus
Diba Nigar Göksel and Gerald Knaus from the European Stability Initiative (ESI), a nonprofit research and policy institute, have said both Turkey and Armenia have a chance to marginalize extremist voices and enable a more reasonable debate to go forward, as the border between them remains closed but signs of a rapprochement have appeared.
In their recent report “Noah’s Dove Returns: Armenia, Turkey and the Debate on Genocide,” they explore the issue of “genocide,” which, they said, is the single topic that poisons relations between Turks and Armenians. “There are hardly any reputable scholars in the field of genocide studies who doubt that what happened to the Armenians in 1915 constitutes genocide.
However, it is also clear that modern-day Turkey is not legally responsible for genocidal acts committed nearly a century ago, and that acknowledging the genocide would not bring into question the established Turkish-Armenian border,” the report stated.
The report went on: “Armenians today face a choice: either treat Turkey as an eternal enemy or re-engage with its western neighbor in the hope of one day sharing a border with the European Union. … For their part, Armenians must accept that the recognition of the genocide will never pave the way for challenging a territorial settlement that has stood for nearly a century.”
For Sunday’s Zaman, Göksel and Knaus gave more details about the issue and the outlook of Turkish-Armenian relations.
You went to Armenia several times, lived there and talked with people from every strata of Armenian society for the report. What was the most striking part for you?
Göksel: Before traveling to Armenia, I had assumed that the descendants of the Ottoman Armenians were all in the diaspora and that the Armenians in Armenia had always been there. As a Turk, what surprised me most was how high a proportion of the Armenians I met in Armenia had come from different places in Turkey. Probably 80 percent of the people I met in Armenian villages in the middle of nowhere would be from [the eastern Turkish provinces of] Muş, Diyarbakır, etc. that made me see the magnitude of the problem.
You also talked with people with extreme views -- those who would defend such ideas as defining the current border between Turkey and Armenia illegal. Do you think this idea has a chance of survival in Armenia?
Göksel: The people in Armenia who expressed rather radical positions were quite polite to me. These were the same people who gave presentations in town meetings in Armenia about having claims in Anatolian land. But this is not the most important thing for most ordinary people in Armenia.
What is the most important thing to them?
Göksel: For most of them, meeting a Turk for the first time and being able to talk to her freely is more important. Just 10 minutes of conversation changes the entire atmosphere, and we see that more dialogue is really the only way to melt the ice -- except for the people who come up with theories about land claims and reparations. Ordinary people would not go out and demonstrate for land.
But do you think some of the opinion leaders could influence the public in a way to make that happen?
Göksel: As for land claims, no. As for 1915, Armenians believe that it was genocide and that they should be able to tell the world about it. This is a strong feeling. Expecting Armenians to give up their beliefs or their agenda in that regard is not realistic.
So they support opening the border mostly because of economic concerns?
Göksel: We found a great deal of fear in Armenia toward Turkey; a suspicion about Turkey’s intentions. This is also a result of being isolated from each other for so long. There is also extreme curiosity about what is happening in Turkey.
Are they questioning why Turkey wants to open the border?
Göksel: They question everything, from why Turkey restores the Church of the Holy Cross, the Akdamar Church, on the island of Akdamar [in the Turkish province of Van] to the real intentions of the Turkish intellectuals who launched the “apology campaign.” There is general skepticism about Turkey’s efforts to reach out to Armenia -- so Armenians wonder if it is a public relations act, a way to prevent third countries’ parliaments from passing genocide resolutions. A great amount of change has also taken place since the early 2000s, particularly as a result of increased contacts. More Turks go to Armenia, and there are more civil society contacts. So the Armenian view of a monolithic Turkey that is out to destroy Armenia is definitely cracking.
Is the economy part of the debate?
Göksel: Part of Armenian society seems to think that an open border with Turkey will solve Armenia’s economic problems. Other segments of society have started to see that maybe border closure isn’t the only problem and that the economy has some structural problems, too. There is also another dimension, like being able to go and visit the lands of their grandmothers, to see the places that their grandmothers told them about. That’s very high on the agenda. I once told a waiter that “you can just fly to İstanbul and do that,” and he said, “Look, I have a family to feed, and I cannot afford a plane ticket and then drive or travel to the east of Turkey.”
‘Any Armenian politician would like to preside over the opening of the border’
Would a border opening be a victory for the Armenian politicians?
Göksel: It has an economic and a symbolic meaning, as well as a psychological and a political meaning. It would be a victory for any Armenian politician to preside over the opening of the border.
Is there a chance that the current government of Armenia could be toppled depending on the result of the upcoming mayoral election in Yerevan?
Göksel: Former President Levon Ter-Petrossian will run for mayor as a candidate of the Armenian National Congress. It will largely be a symbolic act to demonstrate or challenge the election. It could increase the pressure but not topple the government per se.
The Dashnak Party recently decided to leave the government. Do you attach any significance to that?
Göksel: They are one of the four coalition partners. The government can keep on functioning. Numbers don't prohibit that. It is a blow in terms of legitimacy. It is thus all the more important that the talks with Turkey yield results without much delay. It is too early to say that the stability of the government has been threatened, but it is a warning sign and shows the red lines when it comes to the issue of genocide. It creates a politically fragile situation in Armenia.
Knaus: One good thing is that you have the government and the opposition united on the Turkey issue for the first time. The Dashnaks had less than 14 percent in the last election, which was the best result they ever had. It is important to realize that the two big blocs, both Sarksyan and Ter-Petrossian, want to improve relations with Turkey.
Do you think supporters of Robert Kocharyan [former leader of the break-away republic of Nagorno-Karabakh and the former president of Armenia] are a bigger threat to the stability of the government?
Knaus: If this dialogue [the Turkey-Armenia rapprochement] delivers anything, [Armenian President Serzh] Sarksyan and Ter-Petrossian will be vindicated. Even though the political tension in Armenia has been high in recent years, they have both been constructive. If this delivers something in the next few months, it’s really going to isolate the hard-liners. It will also isolate those who, like Kocharyan, did not believe anything would come out of the invitation to [Turkish President Abdullah] Gül last year.
So do you think something needs to happen in the near future in this process of rapprochement?
Knaus: The worst that could happen to this process is if Sarksyan and others come out and say that they were naďve, that the Turks were just playing a game because of Washington and that whatever the Turks were saying was never genuine. If the process fails, it would make the government vulnerable to attack. It would harm those in Armenia in favor of opening the border. On the other hand, if the border opens in a gradual way, if something concrete is achieved, it would really isolate the hard-liners. Ter-Petrossian favored rapprochement in the early ’90s, but nothing happened. This then allowed Kocharyan to say, “Look at what he did, and he got nothing in return.”
There is a vision, interestingly best expressed by Ter-Petrossian in a speech two years ago that Armenia as a society can only win if Turkey continues on the road to EU membership, becoming more democratic and prosperous. This would allow Armenia to move closer to the West. Indeed, it would be good if the Armenian diaspora in France sees that helping Turkey move towards the EU would be the best way to help Armenia become a Western democracy. These are the kinds of arguments that would be helpful for both sides. And as far as history is concerned, the more people talk about what happened to the Armenians, the more attention can be drawn to what happened to the Turks in the late 19th and early 20th century. Then the Turkish argument about the killings of Turks and the expulsions from the Balkans and Caucasus will be discussed more openly as well. And nobody is any longer a hostage to history.
‘Turkey’s extreme sensitivity on genocide surprising’
In the report, it seems like you are trying to make a case about the issue of genocide in regards to perceptions about it in Turkey, right?
Knaus: We were surprised by the extreme sensitivity and nervousness around this issue. Every year on the 23rd or 24th of April, all of Turkey holds its breath and waits for what happens in Washington. You get the feeling that depending on what words are being used in Washington, there will either be a huge crisis with an ally or everything will go back to normal -- until the situation repeats itself the following year.
Why do you think that is the case?
Knaus: We asked this question and found three answers. One is that the Turkish policymakers think that there was no genocide. They also say that genocide recognition is a huge insult to Turkish honor and that is anti-Turkish. But the paradox is that the countries that have passed resolutions in the last few years are actually some of Turkey’s best allies. The German Parliament that passed a resolution in 2005 was the most pro-Turkish German Parliament in history. It was the time of Fischer and Schroeder, who strongly backed Turkish accession to the EU. Or take US President Barack Obama. He is very supportive of Turkey, but still sticks to his beliefs.
So do you think there is a misconception on the side of Turkish government about this?
Knaus: Turks see the radical Armenian forces and the Armenian diaspora behind all of this. They also fear that this might single them out. That is an argument we heard a lot in Turkey --that calling 1915 “genocide” would make the world equate Turks with Nazi Germany. That isn’t true. [The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia] ICTY called what happened in Srebrenica genocide, and that’s the prism through which the world looks at genocide today. “Genocide” doesn’t have to translate to “Holocaust.” If you look at history and the current debate on genocide, you’ll see that a huge number of events in the 20th century alone are now considered genocide. What German colonialists did in Africa in 1904, for example -- in modern day Namibia -- is now being called the first genocide of the 20th century. But Germany today, in all surveys, is one of the most respected countries of the world. Acknowledging something that happened a hundred years ago is neither a matter of singling out Turkey or of damaging its honor.
What is the third argument?
Knaus: It’s the fear of material repercussions. We understand why the Turkish government thinks this way. Some of the Armenian organizations pushing for recognition are doing so in order to achieve something practical. But nobody -- not the German Parliament, not the French Parliament, not the European Parliament, not America -- actually believes that Armenian genocide recognition will lead to restitution, compensation or territorial claims. There is no legal basis for assuming this. In 2001, the French Parliament decided to call 1915 “genocide.” It’s a law. But where are the court cases in France? If recognition is meant to have practical consequences, why haven’t there been any? Some Armenian diaspora organizations are disappointed by this.
There is a UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. Does it have any implications for Turkey?
Knaus: No. There is one thing the Turkish public hasn’t heard enough about, and that is the opinion by the International Center for Transitional Justice commissioned by the Turkish-Armenian Reconciliation Commission in 2003. These were leading legal experts among nongovernmental organizations in New York. They said clearly that the convention cannot be applied retroactively, that no claims whatsoever can arise from Armenian genocide recognition. So it’s not a legal issue. The convention does not apply to events that took place prior to 1948; it is not retroactive.
10 May 2009, Sunday
YONCA POYRAZ DOĞAN İSTANBUL
European Stability Initiative experts Diba Nigar Göksel and Gerald Knaus
Diba Nigar Göksel and Gerald Knaus from the European Stability Initiative (ESI), a nonprofit research and policy institute, have said both Turkey and Armenia have a chance to marginalize extremist voices and enable a more reasonable debate to go forward, as the border between them remains closed but signs of a rapprochement have appeared.
In their recent report “Noah’s Dove Returns: Armenia, Turkey and the Debate on Genocide,” they explore the issue of “genocide,” which, they said, is the single topic that poisons relations between Turks and Armenians. “There are hardly any reputable scholars in the field of genocide studies who doubt that what happened to the Armenians in 1915 constitutes genocide.
However, it is also clear that modern-day Turkey is not legally responsible for genocidal acts committed nearly a century ago, and that acknowledging the genocide would not bring into question the established Turkish-Armenian border,” the report stated.
The report went on: “Armenians today face a choice: either treat Turkey as an eternal enemy or re-engage with its western neighbor in the hope of one day sharing a border with the European Union. … For their part, Armenians must accept that the recognition of the genocide will never pave the way for challenging a territorial settlement that has stood for nearly a century.”
For Sunday’s Zaman, Göksel and Knaus gave more details about the issue and the outlook of Turkish-Armenian relations.
You went to Armenia several times, lived there and talked with people from every strata of Armenian society for the report. What was the most striking part for you?
Göksel: Before traveling to Armenia, I had assumed that the descendants of the Ottoman Armenians were all in the diaspora and that the Armenians in Armenia had always been there. As a Turk, what surprised me most was how high a proportion of the Armenians I met in Armenia had come from different places in Turkey. Probably 80 percent of the people I met in Armenian villages in the middle of nowhere would be from [the eastern Turkish provinces of] Muş, Diyarbakır, etc. that made me see the magnitude of the problem.
You also talked with people with extreme views -- those who would defend such ideas as defining the current border between Turkey and Armenia illegal. Do you think this idea has a chance of survival in Armenia?
Göksel: The people in Armenia who expressed rather radical positions were quite polite to me. These were the same people who gave presentations in town meetings in Armenia about having claims in Anatolian land. But this is not the most important thing for most ordinary people in Armenia.
What is the most important thing to them?
Göksel: For most of them, meeting a Turk for the first time and being able to talk to her freely is more important. Just 10 minutes of conversation changes the entire atmosphere, and we see that more dialogue is really the only way to melt the ice -- except for the people who come up with theories about land claims and reparations. Ordinary people would not go out and demonstrate for land.
But do you think some of the opinion leaders could influence the public in a way to make that happen?
Göksel: As for land claims, no. As for 1915, Armenians believe that it was genocide and that they should be able to tell the world about it. This is a strong feeling. Expecting Armenians to give up their beliefs or their agenda in that regard is not realistic.
So they support opening the border mostly because of economic concerns?
Göksel: We found a great deal of fear in Armenia toward Turkey; a suspicion about Turkey’s intentions. This is also a result of being isolated from each other for so long. There is also extreme curiosity about what is happening in Turkey.
Are they questioning why Turkey wants to open the border?
Göksel: They question everything, from why Turkey restores the Church of the Holy Cross, the Akdamar Church, on the island of Akdamar [in the Turkish province of Van] to the real intentions of the Turkish intellectuals who launched the “apology campaign.” There is general skepticism about Turkey’s efforts to reach out to Armenia -- so Armenians wonder if it is a public relations act, a way to prevent third countries’ parliaments from passing genocide resolutions. A great amount of change has also taken place since the early 2000s, particularly as a result of increased contacts. More Turks go to Armenia, and there are more civil society contacts. So the Armenian view of a monolithic Turkey that is out to destroy Armenia is definitely cracking.
Is the economy part of the debate?
Göksel: Part of Armenian society seems to think that an open border with Turkey will solve Armenia’s economic problems. Other segments of society have started to see that maybe border closure isn’t the only problem and that the economy has some structural problems, too. There is also another dimension, like being able to go and visit the lands of their grandmothers, to see the places that their grandmothers told them about. That’s very high on the agenda. I once told a waiter that “you can just fly to İstanbul and do that,” and he said, “Look, I have a family to feed, and I cannot afford a plane ticket and then drive or travel to the east of Turkey.”
‘Any Armenian politician would like to preside over the opening of the border’
Would a border opening be a victory for the Armenian politicians?
Göksel: It has an economic and a symbolic meaning, as well as a psychological and a political meaning. It would be a victory for any Armenian politician to preside over the opening of the border.
Is there a chance that the current government of Armenia could be toppled depending on the result of the upcoming mayoral election in Yerevan?
Göksel: Former President Levon Ter-Petrossian will run for mayor as a candidate of the Armenian National Congress. It will largely be a symbolic act to demonstrate or challenge the election. It could increase the pressure but not topple the government per se.
The Dashnak Party recently decided to leave the government. Do you attach any significance to that?
Göksel: They are one of the four coalition partners. The government can keep on functioning. Numbers don't prohibit that. It is a blow in terms of legitimacy. It is thus all the more important that the talks with Turkey yield results without much delay. It is too early to say that the stability of the government has been threatened, but it is a warning sign and shows the red lines when it comes to the issue of genocide. It creates a politically fragile situation in Armenia.
Knaus: One good thing is that you have the government and the opposition united on the Turkey issue for the first time. The Dashnaks had less than 14 percent in the last election, which was the best result they ever had. It is important to realize that the two big blocs, both Sarksyan and Ter-Petrossian, want to improve relations with Turkey.
Do you think supporters of Robert Kocharyan [former leader of the break-away republic of Nagorno-Karabakh and the former president of Armenia] are a bigger threat to the stability of the government?
Knaus: If this dialogue [the Turkey-Armenia rapprochement] delivers anything, [Armenian President Serzh] Sarksyan and Ter-Petrossian will be vindicated. Even though the political tension in Armenia has been high in recent years, they have both been constructive. If this delivers something in the next few months, it’s really going to isolate the hard-liners. It will also isolate those who, like Kocharyan, did not believe anything would come out of the invitation to [Turkish President Abdullah] Gül last year.
So do you think something needs to happen in the near future in this process of rapprochement?
Knaus: The worst that could happen to this process is if Sarksyan and others come out and say that they were naďve, that the Turks were just playing a game because of Washington and that whatever the Turks were saying was never genuine. If the process fails, it would make the government vulnerable to attack. It would harm those in Armenia in favor of opening the border. On the other hand, if the border opens in a gradual way, if something concrete is achieved, it would really isolate the hard-liners. Ter-Petrossian favored rapprochement in the early ’90s, but nothing happened. This then allowed Kocharyan to say, “Look at what he did, and he got nothing in return.”
There is a vision, interestingly best expressed by Ter-Petrossian in a speech two years ago that Armenia as a society can only win if Turkey continues on the road to EU membership, becoming more democratic and prosperous. This would allow Armenia to move closer to the West. Indeed, it would be good if the Armenian diaspora in France sees that helping Turkey move towards the EU would be the best way to help Armenia become a Western democracy. These are the kinds of arguments that would be helpful for both sides. And as far as history is concerned, the more people talk about what happened to the Armenians, the more attention can be drawn to what happened to the Turks in the late 19th and early 20th century. Then the Turkish argument about the killings of Turks and the expulsions from the Balkans and Caucasus will be discussed more openly as well. And nobody is any longer a hostage to history.
‘Turkey’s extreme sensitivity on genocide surprising’
In the report, it seems like you are trying to make a case about the issue of genocide in regards to perceptions about it in Turkey, right?
Knaus: We were surprised by the extreme sensitivity and nervousness around this issue. Every year on the 23rd or 24th of April, all of Turkey holds its breath and waits for what happens in Washington. You get the feeling that depending on what words are being used in Washington, there will either be a huge crisis with an ally or everything will go back to normal -- until the situation repeats itself the following year.
Why do you think that is the case?
Knaus: We asked this question and found three answers. One is that the Turkish policymakers think that there was no genocide. They also say that genocide recognition is a huge insult to Turkish honor and that is anti-Turkish. But the paradox is that the countries that have passed resolutions in the last few years are actually some of Turkey’s best allies. The German Parliament that passed a resolution in 2005 was the most pro-Turkish German Parliament in history. It was the time of Fischer and Schroeder, who strongly backed Turkish accession to the EU. Or take US President Barack Obama. He is very supportive of Turkey, but still sticks to his beliefs.
So do you think there is a misconception on the side of Turkish government about this?
Knaus: Turks see the radical Armenian forces and the Armenian diaspora behind all of this. They also fear that this might single them out. That is an argument we heard a lot in Turkey --that calling 1915 “genocide” would make the world equate Turks with Nazi Germany. That isn’t true. [The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia] ICTY called what happened in Srebrenica genocide, and that’s the prism through which the world looks at genocide today. “Genocide” doesn’t have to translate to “Holocaust.” If you look at history and the current debate on genocide, you’ll see that a huge number of events in the 20th century alone are now considered genocide. What German colonialists did in Africa in 1904, for example -- in modern day Namibia -- is now being called the first genocide of the 20th century. But Germany today, in all surveys, is one of the most respected countries of the world. Acknowledging something that happened a hundred years ago is neither a matter of singling out Turkey or of damaging its honor.
What is the third argument?
Knaus: It’s the fear of material repercussions. We understand why the Turkish government thinks this way. Some of the Armenian organizations pushing for recognition are doing so in order to achieve something practical. But nobody -- not the German Parliament, not the French Parliament, not the European Parliament, not America -- actually believes that Armenian genocide recognition will lead to restitution, compensation or territorial claims. There is no legal basis for assuming this. In 2001, the French Parliament decided to call 1915 “genocide.” It’s a law. But where are the court cases in France? If recognition is meant to have practical consequences, why haven’t there been any? Some Armenian diaspora organizations are disappointed by this.
There is a UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. Does it have any implications for Turkey?
Knaus: No. There is one thing the Turkish public hasn’t heard enough about, and that is the opinion by the International Center for Transitional Justice commissioned by the Turkish-Armenian Reconciliation Commission in 2003. These were leading legal experts among nongovernmental organizations in New York. They said clearly that the convention cannot be applied retroactively, that no claims whatsoever can arise from Armenian genocide recognition. So it’s not a legal issue. The convention does not apply to events that took place prior to 1948; it is not retroactive.
10 May 2009, Sunday
YONCA POYRAZ DOĞAN İSTANBUL
