Consequences Of Attacking Iran And Why Tehran Is Not Worried

[Armenian]

Re: Consequences Of Attacking Iran And Why Tehran Is Not Worried

Russia Lends a Hand

There were echoes of the cold war yesterday, as Iranian Defense Minister Mostafa Mohammad Najjar announced that Russia would supply his country with an S-300 air defense system, capable of shooting down aircraft, as well as ballistic and cruise missiles. The White House, of course, expressed concern about the agreement, coming at a time when it has asked for a new round of United Nations sanctions on Iran. Russia, meanwhile, hasn't acknowledged the sale. But earlier this month, Russian military cooperation chief Mikhail Dmitriev argued that defense ties between Russia and Iran "reinforces stability in the region." While there's a certain amount of nose-thumbing in Russia's position, there's also some merit. An improved Iranian air defense system could improve security in the region, particularly by deterring a unilateral Israeli attack. But while there are some upsides to Russian-Iranian cooperation on defensive systems, cooperation on offensive military equipment is something to worry about. With a 90-mile maximum range, the S-300 is similar to the U.S. Patriot system. Along with the short-range Tor-M1 surface-to-air missile system that Russia delivered to Iran earlier this year, it would modernize Iranian air defenses -- previously based largely on deteriorating 1970s American technology. And it would pretty much put the kibosh on Israel's ability to attack Iran on its own. Former Israeli Air Force Commander Eitan Ben-Eliyahu has said that the Russian missiles would make it significantly harder for Israel to attack from the air. And, even if an Iranian nuclear weapons program some day crossed a line that justified preemptive attack, the world would be far safer if there were technological and other constraints on unilateral action. Adopting these systems would also make the Iranian military somewhat more transparent and make Iran more dependent on outside sources of military goods, both of which could be positive in the long-run if U.S.-Russian relations stay warm. But those benefits are counterbalanced, though, when you move from talking about defensive military systems to offensive ones. And, indeed, Iran and Russia are in negotiations to expand military cooperation beyond air defenses, including attack helicopters and jet engines for a fleet of indigenous Iranian fighters. There have also been reports that Iran intends to purchase Russian Sukhoi Su-30 fighters. Despite the cold-war-like response to the S-300 announcement, these other negotiations have gone on without much notice. But the buildup of Iranian military capabilities is far more likely than the buildup of its air defenses to be the spark of future conflict.

Source: http://blog.washingtonpost.com/early...l?nav=rss_blog

Russia Helps Iran Keep Balance of Power

A meeting of the Russian-Iranian intergovernmental commission on military-technical cooperation took place n Tehran at the end of last week. The commission discussed leasing Russian helicopters and deliveries of modified RD-33 engines for Iranian jet fighters. Head of the Federal Military-Technical Cooperation Service Mikhail Dmitriev stated that cooperation with Iran would continue with the goal of maintaining the balance of power in the region. The engines will power multipurpose supersonic fighter jets developed in Iran to replace American F-5 models obtained in the 1970s and the Iranian modification of them, called the Azarakhsh (Lightening). The deal was discussed during Russian President Vladimir Putin's visit to Iran in October. A modification of the Ka-32 helicopter is also being considered. Iran began negotiations on the serial assembly of the Ka-32 two years ago, but those negotiations were discontinued. In 2006 and 2007, Russia supplied Iran with Tor-M1 air defense systems to defend the atomic power plant being built at Bushehr by the Russians. Talks on deliveries of S-300V air defense systems and MiG-29 and Su-30 fighter jets were also discontinued about a year ago. A delay in the U.S.-Iranian war is implied by the recent publication of a U.S. intelligence report indicating that Iran closed down its military nuclear program in 2003. Russia is clearly taking advantage of the situation to sell as many weapons as possible. Dmitriev stated that “Russia and Iran are strengthening stability in the region.” He added that “We are talking about defensive types of weapons… Iran has never asked for and Russia would never give Iran offensive weapons to encourage any, conditionally speaking, aggression against anyone.”

Source: http://www.kommersant.com/p839198/r_500/arms_sales/

Russian official: Russia, Iran should bolster all-out ties

Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Losyukov said on Thursday that Iran has a special position in Russia's foreign policy. Speaking to reporters, he said the two sides' leaders especially after the recent visit of Russian leader Vladimir Putin to Iran have called for bolstering of ties between the two countries. Iran is regarded as Russia's most important and powerful neighbor, he said, adding that Russia gives priority to expansion of cooperation with Asian countries including Iran, China, India and Japan. Mutual cooperation between Iran and Russia would help restore security to the region, he pointed out. Iran and Russia have closely cooperated in anti-drug fight and terrorism in Afghanistan, he said. On Iran's nuclear programs, he said since the two countries enjoy very close ties, Moscow has played a special role to this end. On international cooperation between Tehran and Moscow, he said the two countries have adopted close stands on international developments and are determined to pursue the same path.

Source: http://www2.irna.ir/en/news/view/men...9787165043.htm

[Armenian]

Re: Consequences Of Attacking Iran And Why Tehran Is Not Worried

Iraq-Iran Shatt al-Arab treaty stands, says Iraq's presidency

The Algiers treaty under which Iraq agreed to share the waterway of Shatt al-Arab with Iran remains in force, Iraq's presidential office said on Wednesday. "The Algiers treaty has not been scrapped but still stands. The treaty can not be abrogated by one party," the office of President Jalal Talabani said in a statement received by Deutsche Presse- Agentur dpa. In 1975 the former Shah of Iran and the then Iraqi vice-president Saddam Hussein signed the Algiers treaty under which Baghdad agreed to share control over the Shatt al-Arab waterway with Tehran. In return for a share in the sovereignty over the waterway, the Shah agreed to end his military assistance to a Kurdish revolt against Baghdad. The Shatt al-Arab is a waterway created from the confluence of the Tigris and the Euphrates rivers. It provides Iraq with its an outlet on the Gulf.

The long-standing dispute over the treaty was rekindled when Talabani said Monday the treaty no longer existed. "We have refused to recognize the treaty during our visit to Tehran. All present political powers consider it void," Talabani said at a press conference in Sulaymanyah. His Sunni Arab Vice-President Tariq al-Hashimi and his Kurdish compatriot, the president of the Kurdish Autonomous Region, were present at the press conference. In response to Talabani's statement, Iran's foreign minister, Manuchehr Mottaki, said on Wednesday treaties between states remained in force even when political regimes change.

Mottaki noted that Talabani voiced his opposition to the treaty during his many visits to Iran. The Iranian minister blamed the United States for the rekindled row over the treaty. "We caution the Americans against starting off another game. They'd better learn a lesson from their past failures," Mottaki told reporters during a visit to Bahrain. There are reservations over parts of the treaty but they are open to discussions and subject to an agreement between both "friendly" countries, Talabani's statement said. All Iraqi opposition parties, be they nationalists, democrats, or Islamists, opposed the treaty when it was signed; they regarded it as a safety ring for the Saddam's regime, the statement noted.

Source: http://www.earthtimes.org/articles/show/165013.html

[Armenian]

Re: Consequences Of Attacking Iran And Why Tehran Is Not Worried

Armenia backs Iran-Armenia gas pipeline extension to Europe

Armenia is not ruling out extending the Iran-Armenia gas pipeline to Europe, the Armenian energy minister said on Monday. Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadinejad said in October that plans to extend the Iran-Armenia gas pipeline to Europe were very promising. ""If Iran and Europe reach an agreement on gas supplies and consider it possible to export gas via Armenia by the shortest and the most effective method, we'll naturally implement this project after assessing its environmental and economic aspects,"" Armen Movsisyan said. Movsisyan said that if Armenia made such a decision, ""no one will prevent us from carrying this project through as it is advantageous for the country and its economy. The Armenian Energy Ministry earlier forecast commissioning of the Iran-Armenia gas pipeline by early 2009. The first 40km (24 mile) leg of the pipeline went on stream in March, and the second 141km (87 mile) leg is currently being built. The pipeline's cost has been estimated at between $220 million and $250 million. During the first stage, Armenia will pump some 400 million cubic meters of gas annually with plans to increase the volume to 2.3 billion cubic meters.

Source: http://www.tehrantimes.com/index_View.asp?code=159921

[Armenian]

Re: Consequences Of Attacking Iran And Why Tehran Is Not Worried

Iran and Russia meet to discuss defense cooperation

Iran and Russia discussed defense cooperation, the official IRNA reported Monday, as ties between the two countries have been increasingly flourishing. Little detail was provided about the meeting. Mohammad Ali Hosseini, the spokesman for Iran's Foreign Ministry, said a joint defense committee met and both sides reviewed continued cooperation. He did not elaborate. Last week, Iranian state media said Mikhail Dmitriyev, head of the Russian Federal Service for Military and Technical Cooperation, arrived in Tehran to discuss defense cooperation with Iranian Brigadier General Ahmad Vahidi, regarded as father of country's missile program. In November, Iran did not deny reports that it aimed to order Russian Sukhoi Su-30 aircraft to bolster its air defenses. In early 2007, Iran received advanced Russian air defense missile system under a US$700 million contract signed in 2005. Russia has provided Iran with military products such Kilo-Class submarines, MIG and Sukhoi military planes and bombers in the past decades. Relations between Iran and Russia have been growing closer in recent months, climaxed by a historical visit by Russian President Vladimir Putin to Tehran in October. Russia is also putting the finishing touches on a 1,000-megawatt nuclear power plant in Bushehr, located in southern Iran. Iran received the first shipment of nuclear fuel from Russia last week, paving the way for the startup of its reactor in 2008. The United States last year called for a halt to international arms exports to Iran and for an end to nuclear cooperation with Iran to pressure it to stop uranium enrichment. Iran has refused to halt its enrichment program despite receiving two sets of U.N. Security Council sanctions.

Source: http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/...n-Military.php

Iran plans to buy Russian copters, fighter engines

Moscow and Tehran are in negotiations for the sale of fighter jet engines and helicopters to Iran, the Kommersant daily reported on Monday, citing Russian arms industry officials. Iran wants to buy RD-33 engines for a fleet of new Iranian fighter jets, as well as an upgraded version of the Ka-32 helicopter that Tehran wants to be assembled in Iran, Kommersant said. After a meeting between Russian and Iranian officials in Tehran last week, the head of Russia's agency for military cooperation said any arms sold to Iran would be only for "defensive" purposes, Kommersant reported. The military cooperation chief, Mikhail Dmitriev, said that defence ties between the two countries "reinforces stability in the region." Last year, Russia finished supplying Iran with 29 Tor-M1 air defence systems under a USD 700-million agreement.

Source: http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/...ow/2648939.cms

Russia could build more NPPs in Iran - Iranian lawmaker

Russia will have a good chance of participation in the construction of new nuclear power plants in Iran if it completes the Bushehr nuclear power plant on time, a top Iranian official said on Monday. Tehran is expected to announce soon a tender for the construction of 19 new 1,000-mWt nuclear power plants in the Islamic Republic. "Russia may have a better chance of participation in the construction of new nuclear power plants in Iran if it fulfills its obligations on time," said Alaeddin Boroujerdi, chairman of Iran's parliamentary committee on national security and foreign policy. The completion of the Bushehr plant, currently being built by Russia's Atomstroyexport under a 1995 contract, came under threat in February 2007 when Russia complained of payment delays. Iran denied any funding problems and accused Russia of deliberately stalling the project in response to pressure from Western powers. Russia and Iran subsequently held several rounds of negotiations to settle disagreements relating to the Bushehr nuclear power plant and recently announced that the plant could be commissioned by March 2009. The $1 billion project has also been at the center of an international dispute, with Western countries who suspect Iran of developing nuclear weapons protesting against Russia's nuclear cooperation with the Islamic Republic. The project has been implemented under the supervision of the United Nations nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency. On December 16, Russia announced the start of nuclear fuel deliveries to Bushehr. Deliveries are set to continue into February 2008. Meanwhile, Alaeddin Boroujerdi said Iran had no intentions of abandoning its own uranium enrichment program and planned to build its first nuclear power plant without foreign participation by March 2017. The project stipulates the construction of a 360-mWt plant in southwestern Iran. "The [first domestic] nuclear power plant will certainly be built in Iran," the lawmaker said, adding that a nuclear fuel reprocessing facility in Isfahan and a nuclear enrichment center in Natanz could provide enough fuel for any future nuclear power plants.

Source: http://en.rian.ru/world/20071224/93958087.html

[Armenian]

Re: Consequences Of Attacking Iran And Why Tehran Is Not Worried

Russia, Iran tighten the energy noose

Foreign ministers are busy people - especially energetic, creative diplomats like Russia's Sergei Lavrov and Iran's Manouchehr Mottaki, representing capitals that by tradition place great store on international diplomacy. Therefore, the very fact that Lavrov and Mottaki have met no less than four times in as many months suggests a great deal about the high importance attached by the two capitals to their mutual understanding at the bilateral and regional level. Moscow and Tehran have worked hard in recent months to successfully put behind them their squabble over the construction schedule of the Bushehr nuclear power plant in Iran. The first consignment of nuclear fuel for Bushehr from Russia under the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards finally arrived in Tehran on Monday. "We have agreed with our Iranian colleagues a timeframe for completing the plant and we will make an announcement at the end of December," said Sergei Shmatko, president of Atomstroiexport, which is building Bushehr. At a minimum, the gateway opens for Russia's deeper involvement in Iran's ambitious program for civil nuclear energy. But nuclear energy is not the be-all and end-all of Russo-Iranian cooperation. Iran is a crucially important interlocutor for Russia in the field of energy. The Bushehr settlement is a necessary prerequisite if the trust and mutual confidence essential for fuller Russo-Iranian cooperation is to become reality. Evidently, Moscow is hastily positioning itself for the big event on the energy scene in 2008 - Iran's entry as a gas-exporting country.

Russia consolidates in 2007

In fact, how Moscow proceeds with the reconfiguration of Russo-Iranian relations could well form the centerpiece of the geopolitics of energy security in Eurasia during 2008. The dynamics on this front will doubtless play out on a vast theater stretching well beyond the Eurasian space, all the way to China and Japan in the east and to the very heart of Europe in the west where the Rhine River flows. What places Russia in an early lead in the upcoming scramble is its fantastic win in the Eurasian energy sweepstakes in 2007. But 2007 as such began on an acrimonious note for Moscow when two minutes before the clock struck midnight on December 31, Russia signed a gas deal with Belarus whereby the latter would have to pay for Russian gas supplies at full market prices on a graduated scale stretched over the next five-year period. President Vladimir Putin's critics seized the moment with alacrity to portray him as a whimsical megalomaniac.

Moscow-based critic Pavel Felgenhauer rushed to condemn Putin's "highly aggressive, unscrupulous and revengeful" mindset as a dictator, and prophesied that the "pressure on Belarus will most likely misfire ... This may undermine the Kremlin's authority ... and provoke internal high-level acrimony [within the Kremlin]". Other Western critics warned European countries not to count on Russia's dependability as an energy supplier. Much of the vicious criticism might seem in retrospect to be either prejudiced and self-interested, or downright laughable, but that didn't prevent the acrimony from setting the tone for the geopolitics of energy during 2007. Prima facie, Russia was making a transition to market prices for its energy exports, which was quite the proper thing to do if it were to integrate with the world economy in a manner consistent with the broad orientations of its liberal economic policies.

Indeed, the Kremlin had no reason to continue with the Soviet-era subsidies to former Soviet republics like the Ukraine or Belarus. Efficiency demanded that Russia allowed market forces to prevail. Actually, that was also the capitalist world's advice to the Kremlin. What incensed Western critics was that combined with the state control of oil and gas (and indeed the pipelines), the Kremlin was also maneuvering its way to a commanding position on the energy map of Europe. From its own viewpoint, Russia could claim it was merely pursuing a coordinated strategy aimed at integrating itself with European economies. But the United States viewed the implications of the Russian strategy to be very severe for trans-Atlantic relations on the whole, as it cast a shadow on the entire range of goals, strategic objectives and security policies that Washington has been pushing within the framework of the Euro-Atlantic alliance in the post-Cold War years. Plainly put, Washington fears that Europe's strategic drift may become a reality unless Russia is stopped in its tracks.

Europe's dependence on Russian energy

After much US prodding for a coordinated European energy security policy, European Union (EU) members adopted at their spring summit in Brussels an action plan for energy security for 2007-2009, which emphasized the need to diversify Europe's energy sources and transport routes. But the ground reality continues to be that Europe's dependence on Russian energy supplies is growing. In 2006, Europe imported from Russia 290.8 million tonnes of oil and 130 billion cubic meters of gas. With Europe's energy consumption rapidly rising, its import dependency on Russia is also set to increase. Europe, which imported around 330 billion cubic meters of gas in 2005, will require an additional 200 billion cubic meters per year by 2015. And Russia has the world's largest natural gas reserves, estimated to be 1,688 trillion cubic feet, apart from the seventh largest proven oil reserves, exceeding 70 billion barrels (while vast regions of eastern Siberia and the Arctic remain unexplored).

On the other hand, Europe's self-sufficiency in energy is sharply declining. By 2030, the production of oil and gas is expected to decline by 73% and 59% respectively. The result is that by 2030, two-thirds of Europe's energy requirements will have to be met through imports. In Europe's energy mix, the dependence on oil imports by 2030 will be as high as 94% of its needs, and on natural gas as high as 84%. As supply becomes concentrated in Russian hands, the Kremlin will find itself in a position to dictate oil and gas prices. There is also the possibility that the supply and demand situation itself might become less elastic - Russia's own demand for gas, for instance, is growing by over 2% annually.

Clearly, the economics of energy supply to Europe are getting highly politicized. Ariel Cohen, a prominent Russia specialist at the US think-tank, Heritage Foundation, who is closely connected with the George W Bush administration, wrote recently, "It is in the US's strategic interests to mitigate Europe's dependence on Russian energy. The Kremlin will likely use Europe's dependence to promote its largely anti-American foreign policy agenda. This would significantly limit the maneuvering space available to America's European allies, forcing them to choose between an affordable and stable energy supply and siding with the US on some key issues." Cohen warned, "If current trends prevail, the Kremlin could translate its energy monopoly into untenable foreign and security policy influence in Europe to the detriment of European-American relations. In particular, Russia is seeking recognition of its predominant role in the post-Soviet space and Eastern Europe ... This will affect the geopolitical issues important to the US, such as NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] expansion to Ukraine and Georgia, ballistic missile defense, Kosovo, and US and European influence in the post-Soviet space."

US-Russia rivalries escalate

Thus, through the past 12-month period, the Bush administration has been pressing for the development of new energy transit lines from the Caspian and Central Asia that bypass Russia. Washington has robustly worked for advancing its proposals for the construction of oil and gas pipelines linking Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to Europe across the Caspian Sea; new pipelines that would connect the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline with the Baku-Erzurum gas pipeline (making Turkey an energy hub for Europe); and the so-called Nabucco pipeline that proposes to link Azerbaijan and Central Asian countries with southern European markets. However, as the year draws to a close, it becomes clear that the Kremlin has either nipped in the bud or frustrated one way or another the various US attempts to bypass Russia's role as the key energy supplier for Europe. Indeed, Moscow's counter-strategy aims at augmenting even further Russia's profile and capacity to be Europe's dependable energy supplier and thereby forcing the European consumer countries to negotiate with Russia as a partner with shared or equal interests.

The month of May stood out as the watershed when the geopolitics of energy in Eurasia decisively turned in Russia's favor. At a tripartite summit meeting in the city of Turkemenbashi (Turkmenistan) on May 12, Putin and his Kazakh and Turkmen counterparts signed a declaration of intent for upgrading and expanding gas pipelines from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan along the Caspian Sea coast directly to Russia. The president of Uzbekistan, Islam Karimov, also signed up separately on May 9 for a modernization of the Turkmenistan-Uzbekistan-Kazakhstan-Russia pipeline. Both pipelines are components of the Soviet-era Central Asia-Center pipeline system bound for Russia. The quadripartite project essentially aims at the transportation of Turkmenistan's gas output, which almost in its entirety would be bought up by Russia for a 25-year period.

[...]

Source: http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/IL22Ag01.html

Iran-Russia trade surged 100 percent: Mottaki

Iran and Russia have surged mutual trade volume more than 100 percent over the current year said the foreign minister Manouchehr Mottaki in a meeting with his Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov. Mottaki who was in Moscow to hold the 7th joint economy commission of Iran and Russia said there are many fields prepared for expanding cooperation and the two sides have inked long-term cooperation agreement. Referring to the four visits of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Vladimir Putin during the last two years he called the visits decisive in opening new chapter of relations. "We believe the two countries' negotiations on regional and international issues in different levels can help resolving problems." Mottaki also emphasized that Moscow's supporting legal rights of NPT members for utilizing peaceful nuclear energy was of great importance. Meanwhile Sergei Lavrov in this meeting stressed that Iran's nuclear dossier must be solved under the NPT and the IAEA regulations and that Iran's right for employing peaceful nuclear technology must be preserved. "Russia favors Iran and the IAEA cooperation and this is what can result in solving all issues regarding this dossier," he added. Also regarding the two presidents' agreements made in Tehran he stated "the deals must be put into practice and that we must have close cooperation in this regard."

Source: http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/IL22Ag01.html

Russia has no intention of quitting Iran’s arms market

Russia has no intention of quitting the Iranian market of arms, the Chief Of the Federal Service for Military-Technological Cooperation, Mikhail Dmitriyev, told Itar-Tass in an interview after the 4th session of the Russian-Iranian inter-governmental commission. “We are interested in exporting military hardware to foreign clients, including Iran, just as any other arms manufacturing country,” Dmitriyev said. “We wish to access world markets and to build up our own potential.” “Iran is an integral part of the vast market of armaments, very crucial for Russia, and not only Russia. A struggle for Iran, both covert and overt, is underway, and we experience great competition. This is a very lucrative market and all countries are aware of that. We are in no mood quitting it, because getting back would be far harder.”

Source: http://www.tehrantimes.com/index_View.asp?code=159673

[Armenian]

Re: Consequences Of Attacking Iran And Why Tehran Is Not Worried

Russia starts nuclear deliveries to Iran

Russia on Monday announced the start of nuclear fuel deliveries for Iran's first atomic power station, brushing aside US and Israeli claims that Tehran harbours secret bomb-making plans. "On December 16, 2007, Atomstroiexport began delivery of the fuel for the initial installation at the future Bushehr power station," the state-run corporation said in a statement. The delivery process will take up to two months to complete, Atomstroiexport said, with the Russian-built station starting to generate electricity in approximately six months time. The still-unfinished Bushehr is the xxxel in the crown of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's nuclear power ambitions.

Iran confirmed the Russian shipment and in a fresh show of defiance toward the West, repeated that it would refuse UN demands to give up work on enriching uranium. Israel and Western governments, led by the United States, have long argued that Iran's civilian programme is being used as cover for a bomb-making project. Russia rejects this and Moscow's position was bolstered earlier this month when the US intelligence community contradicted the White House by reporting that Iran had stopped a drive for nuclear weapons in 2003. The US report provided Russia with its "final argument," Fyodor Lukyanov, at the journal Russia in Global Affairs, told AFP.

The Russian foreign ministry stressed in a statement that deliveries were made under control of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). It added that spent fuel from Bushehr would be "returned to Russia for reprocessing and storage" -- part of a plan to ensure that the fuel does not go astray. IAEA officials monitored the sealing of the nuclear fuel two weeks ago at a factory in Novossibirsk ahead of the delivery. The decision to send fuel -- which in its current state is fit only for civilian use -- marked a diplomatic victory for Russia, which has been building Bushehr since 1995. "The Russian-Iranian cooperation on the Bushehr power station visibly demonstrates that one can effectively and reliably guarantee the realisation of national plans on developing the civilian atomic energy sector," the foreign ministry statement said.

In addition to rejecting US calls for the suspension of Bushehr, Moscow has also sold Iran anti-aircraft missiles and other high-tech weapons reportedly deployed by Iran's military in defence of nuclear installations. Western powers, led by the United States, are pushing for a third UN sanctions resolution against Tehran to punish its refusal to suspend uranium enrichment -- a process that could eventually lead to weapons-grade uranium. Russia's delivery of fuel makes the possibility of passing further UN measures increasingly unlikely however, analysts said. "Russia and China, which were already against sanctions, will now be even more confident," Lukyanov said.

Iran in any case shows no sign of buckling under the pressure. The head of Iran's atomic energy organisation Gholam Reza Aghazadeh said that enrichment was needed for "a 360-megawatt nuclear reactor in Darkhoyen" in the western Khuzestan province. "The fuel for this power station must come from Natanz," the site of Iran's uranium enrichment plant, he said. Meanwhile, the Israeli daily Maariv reported over the weekend that a delegation left Israel for Washington last week "with the goal of proving to the Americans that the Iranian nuclear weapons programme is definitely still in development."

Source: http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5...KpRJ37qPnpUVGw

[Sip]

Re: Consequences Of Attacking Iran And Why Tehran Is Not Worried

Iranian Scientists Develop Country's Most Powerful Supercomputer

The system reportedly uses 216 AMD microprocessors. AMD said it has never authorized any product shipments to Iran, a country to which U.S. computer exports are prohibited.

By Antone Gonsalves
InformationWeek
December 10, 2007 05:50 PM
Link to InformationWeek

Iranian scientists claim to have used 216 microprocessors made by Advanced Micro Devices to build the country's most powerful supercomputer, despite a ban on the export of U.S. computer equipment to the Middle Eastern nation.
Scientists at the Iranian High Performance Computing Research Center at the country's Amirkabir University of Technology said they used a Linux-cluster architecture in building the system of Opteron processors. The supercomputer has a theoretical peak performance of 860 giga-flops, the posting said. A giga-flop is a billion calculations per second.

The disclosure, made in an undated posting on Amirkabir's Web site, brought an immediate response Monday from AMD, which said it has never authorized shipments of products either directly or indirectly to Iran or any other embargoed country.

"AMD fully complies with all United States export control laws, and all authorized distributors of AMD products have contractually committed to AMD that they will do the same with respect to their sales and shipments of AMD products," the company said. "Any shipment of AMD products to Iran by any authorized distributor of AMD would be a breach of the specific provisions of their contracts with AMD."

Enforcement of export bans is handled through the Office of Foreign Asset Control, which is part of the U.S. Treasury Department. Officials were unavailable for comment.

The Iranian system will be used for weather forecasting and meteorological research. Iranian scientists developed software for systems management and monitoring, but use a medium scale computer model called MM5 for creating atmospheric simulations and weather forecasts. MM5 is freely available and supported by a division of the National Center for Atmospheric Research in the U.S. Other software includes the Advanced Regional Prediction System that was initially developed at the University of Oklahoma, under a program of the National Science Foundation Science and Technology Center.

Besides weather forecasting, supercomputers are used in the oil and gas industry, drug making, computer assisted design and the aerodynamics industry, as well as in scientific research. The Iranian research center built the country's first supercomputer in 2001. Another supercomputer was built in 2003 for processing satellite images for the Iranian Space Agency.

The Iranian supercomputer falls far behind the world's fastest computers. In November, the BlueGene/L System, jointly developed by IBM and the U.S. Department of Energy was ranked No. 1 in the world with a benchmark performance of 478.2 teraflops. A teraflop equals a trillion calculations per second.

[Virgil]

Re: Consequences Of Attacking Iran And Why Tehran Is Not Worried

WMD Around the World: Nuclear Weapons

Israel has not confirmed that it has nuclear weapons and officially maintains that it will not be the first country to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East. Yet the existence of Israeli nuclear weapons is a "public secret" by now due to the declassification of large numbers of formerly highly classified US government documents which show that the United States by 1975 was convinced that Israel had nuclear weapons.

History

Israel began actively investigating the nuclear option from its earliest days. In 1949, HEMED GIMMEL a special unit of the IDF's Science Corps, began a two-year geological survey of the Negev desert with an eye toward the discovery of uranium reserves. Although no significant sources of uranium were found, recoverable amounts were located in phosphate deposits.

The program took another step forward with the creation of the Israel Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) in 1952. Its chairman, Ernst David Bergmann, had long advocated an Israeli bomb as the best way to ensure "that we shall never again be led as lambs to the slaughter." Bergmann was also head of the Ministry of Defense's Research and Infrastructure Division (known by its Hebrew acronym, EMET), which had taken over the HEMED research centers (HEMED GIMMEL among them, now renamed Machon 4) as part of a reorganization. Under Bergmann, the line between the IAEC and EMET blurred to the point that Machon 4 functioned essentially as the chief laboratory for the IAEC. By 1953, Machon 4 had not only perfected a process for extracting the uranium found in the Negev, but had also developed a new method of producing heavy water, providing Israel with an indigenous capability to produce some of the most important nuclear materials.

For reactor design and construction, Israel sought the assistance of France. Nuclear cooperation between the two nations dates back as far as early 1950's, when construction began on France's 40MWt heavy water reactor and a chemical reprocessing plant at Marcoule. France was a natural partner for Israel and both governments saw an independent nuclear option as a means by which they could maintain a degree of autonomy in the bipolar environment of the cold war.

In the fall of 1956, France agreed to provide Israel with an 18 MWt research reactor. However, the onset of the Suez Crisis a few weeks later changed the situation dramatically. Following Egypt's closure of the Suez Canal in July, France and Britain had agreed with Israel that the latter should provoke a war with Egypt to provide the European nations with the pretext to send in their troops as peacekeepers to occupy and reopen the canal zone. In the wake of the Suez Crisis, the Soviet Union made a thinly veiled threat against the three nations. This episode not only enhanced the Israeli view that an independent nuclear capability was needed to prevent reliance on potentially unreliable allies, but also led to a sense of debt among French leaders that they had failed to fulfill commitments made to a partner. French premier Guy Mollet is even quoted as saying privately that France "owed" the bomb to Israel.

On 3 October 1957, France and Israel signed a revised agreement calling for France to build a 24 MWt reactor (although the cooling systems and waste facilities were designed to handle three times that power) and, in protocols that were not committed to paper, a chemical reprocessing plant. This complex was constructed in secret, and outside the IAEA inspection regime, by French and Israeli technicians at Dimona, in the Negev desert under the leadership of Col. Manes Pratt of the IDF Ordinance Corps.

Both the scale of the project and the secrecy involved made the construction of Dimona a massive undertaking. A new intelligence agency, the Office of Science Liasons,(LEKEM) was created to provide security and intelligence for the project. At the height construction, some 1,500 Israelis some French workers were employed building Dimona. To maintain secrecy, French customs officials were told that the largest of the reactor components, such as the reactor tank, were part of a desalinization plant bound for Latin America. In addition, after buying heavy water from Norway on the condition that it not be transferred to a third country, the French Air Force secretly flew as much as four tons of the substance to Israel.

Trouble arose in May 1960, when France began to pressure Israel to make the project public and to submit to international inspections of the site, threatening to withhold the reactor fuel unless they did. President de Gaulle was concerned that the inevitable scandal following any revelations about French assistance with the project, especially the chemical reprocessing plant, would have negative repercussions for France's international position, already on shaky ground because of its war in Algeria.

At a subsequent meeting with Ben-Gurion, de Gaulle offered to sell Israel fighter aircraft in exchange for stopping work on the reprocessing plant, and came away from the meeting convinced that the matter was closed. It was not. Over the next few months, Israel worked out a compromise. France would supply the uranium and components already placed on order and would not insist on international inspections. In return, Israel would assure France that they had no intention of making atomic weapons, would not reprocess any plutonium, and would reveal the existence of the reactor, which would be completed without French assistance. In reality, not much changed - French contractors finished work on the reactor and reprocessing plant, uranium fuel was delivered and the reactor went critical in 1964.

The United States first became aware of Dimona's existence after U-2 overflights in 1958 captured the facility's construction, but it was not identified as a nuclear site until two years later. The complex was variously explained as a textile plant, an agricultural station, and a metallurgical research facility, until David Ben-Gurion stated in December 1960 that Dimona complex was a nuclear research center built for "peaceful purposes."

There followed two decades in which the United States, through a combination of benign neglect, erroneous analysis, and successful Israeli deception, failed to discern first the details of Israel's nuclear program. As early as 8 December 1960, the CIA issued a report outlining Dimona's implications for nuclear proliferation, and the CIA station in Tel Aviv had determined by the mid-1960s that the Israeli nuclear weapons program was an established and irreversible fact.

United States inspectors visited Dimona seven times during the 1960s, but they were unable to obtain an accurate picture of the activities carried out there, largely due to tight Israeli control over the timing and agenda of the visits. The Israelis went so far as to install false control room panels and to brick over elevators and hallways that accessed certain areas of the facility. The inspectors were able to report that there was no clear scientific research or civilian nuclear power program justifying such a large reactor - circumstantial evidence of the Israeli bomb program - but found no evidence of "weapons related activities" such as the existence of a plutonium reprocessing plant.

Although the United States government did not encourage or approve of the Israeli nuclear program, it also did nothing to stop it. Walworth Barbour, US ambassador to Israel from 1961-73, the bomb program's crucial years, primarily saw his job as being to insulate the President from facts which might compel him to act on the nuclear issue, alledgedly saying at one point that "The President did not send me there to give him problems. He does not want to be told any bad news." After the 1967 war, Barbour even put a stop to military attachés' intelligence collection efforts around Dimona. Even when Barbour did authorize forwarding information, as he did in 1966 when embassy staff learned that Israel was beginning to put nuclear warheads in missiles, the message seemed to disappear into the bureaucracy and was never acted upon.

Nuclear Weapons Production




In early 1968, the CIA issued a report concluding that Israel had successfully started production of nuclear weapons. This estimate, however, was based on an informal conversation between Carl Duckett, head of the CIA's Office of Science and Technology, and Edward Teller, father of the hydrogen bomb. Teller said that, based on conversations with friends in the Israeli scientific and defense establishment, he had concluded that Israel was capable of building the bomb, and that the CIA should not wait for an Israeli test to make a final assessment because that test would never be carried out.

CIA estimates of the Israeli arsenal's size did not improve with time. In 1974, Duckett estimated that Israel had between ten and twenty nuclear weapons. The upper bound was derived from CIA speculation regarding the number of possible Israeli targets, and not from any specific intelligence. Because this target list was presumed to be relatively static, this remained the official American estimate until the early 1980s.

The actual size and composition of Israel's nuclear stockpile is uncertain and the subject of many - often conflicting - estimates and reports. It is widely reported that Israel had two bombs in 1967, and that Prime Minister Eshkol ordered them armed in Israel's first nuclear alert during the Six-Day War. It is also reported that, fearing defeat in the October 1973 Yom Kippur War, the Israelis assembled 13 twenty-kiloton atomic bombs.

Israel could potentially have produced a few dozen nuclear warheads in the period 1970-1980, and is thought to have produced sufficient fissile material to build 100 to 200 warheads by the mid-1990s. In 1986 descriptions and photographs of Israeli nuclear warheads were published in the London Sunday Times of a purported underground bomb factory at the Dimona nuclear reactor. The photographs were taken by Mordechai Vanunu, a dismissed Israeli nuclear technician. His information led some experts to conclude that Israel had a stockpile of 100 to 200 nuclear devices at that time.

By the late 1990s the U.S. Intelligence Community estimated that Israel possessed between 75-130 weapons, based on production estimates. The stockpile would certainly include warheads for mobile Jericho-1 and Jericho-2 missiles, as well as bombs for Israeli aircraft, and may include other tactical nuclear weapons of various types. Some published estimates even claimed that Israel might have as many as 400 nuclear weapons by the late 1990s. We believe these numbers are exaggerated, and that Israel's nuclear weapons inventory may include less than 100 nuclear weapons. Stockpiled plutonium could be used to build additional

The Dimona nuclear reactor is the source of plutonium for Israeli nuclear weapons. The number of nuclear weapons that could have been produced by Israel has generally been estimated on the basis of assumptions about the power level of this reactor, combined with estimates for the number of delivery vehicles (aircraft, missiles) assigned a nuclear mission.

Information made public in 1986 by Mordechai Vanunu indicated that at that time, weapons grade plutonium was being produced at a rate of about 40 kilograms annually. If this figure corresponded with the steady-state capacity of the entire Dimona facility, analysts suggested that the reactor might have a power level of at least 150 megawatts, about twice the power level at which is was believed to be operating around 1970. To accommodate this higher power level, analysts had suggested that Israel had constructed an enlarged cooling system. An alternative interpretation of the information supplied by Vanunu was that the reactor's power level had remained at about 75 megawatts, and that the production rate of plutonium in the early 1980s reflected a backlog of previously generated material.

The constraints on the size of Israel's stockpile include several potential variables, several of which are generic to any nuclear weapons program. The Dimona reactor may have operated an average of between 200 and 300 days annually, and produced approximately 0.9 to 1.0 grams of plutonium for each thermal megawatt day. Israel may have use between 4 and 5 kilograms of plutonium per weapon [5 kilograms is a conservative estimate, and Vanunu reported that Israeli weapons used 4 kg].

The key variable that is specific to Israel is the power level of the reactor, which is reported to be at least 75 MWt and possibly as high as 200 MWt. New high-resolution satellite imagery provides important insight this matter. The imagery of the Dimona nuclear reactor was acquired by the Public Eye Project of the Federation of American Scientists from Space Imaging Corporation's IKONOS satellite. The cooling towers associated with the Dimona reactor are clearly visible and identifiable in satellite imagery. Comparison of recently acquired commercial IKONOS imagery with declassified American CORONA reconnaissance satellite imagery indicates that no new cooling towers were constructed in the years between 1971 and 2000. This strongly suggests that the reactor's power level has not been increased significantly during this period. This would suggest an annual production rate of plutonium of about 20 kilograms.

Based on plausible upper and lower bounds of the operating practices at the reactor, Israel could have thus produced enough plutonium for at least 100 nuclear weapons, but probably not significantly more than 200 weapons.

Some type of non-nuclear test, perhaps a zero yield or implosion test, occurred on 2 November 1966 [possibly at Al-Naqab in the Negev]. There is no evidence that Israel has ever carried out a nuclear test, although many observers speculated that a suspected nuclear explosion in the southern Indian Ocean in 1979 was a joint South African-Israeli test.

Source: http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/israel/nuke/index.html

[skhara]

Re: Consequences Of Attacking Iran And Why Tehran Is Not Worried

On the other hand, here is one that backs my earlier assessment:

http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1690696,00.html?imw=Y

[skhara]

Re: Consequences Of Attacking Iran And Why Tehran Is Not Worried

I don't think its a political game, dude. I think that the report in question is a from of an internal rebellion of sorts against the Neocon establishment and their subordinates in the Bush administration. You are discounting the fact that a considerable number of people in all levels of American society are beginning to see the disastrous legacy of the Bush administration. Similar situations have occurred in the past where documents have surfaced (information leaks) that have put the Bush administration in a bad light. I strongly believe that there is a power struggle going on within Washington DC.

Well this article backs your opinion on this:

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2007/12/09/wiran109.xml