Nagorno-Karabagh: Military Balance Between Armenia & Azerbaijan

[haydavid]

Re: Nagorno-Karabagh: Military Balance Between Armenia & Azerbaijan

Like my new pic?

I don't get this ^^
explain ?

[Mher]

Re: Nagorno-Karabagh: Military Balance Between Armenia & Azerbaijan

In Facing Its Adversaries, America’s Got a Hidden Lever: Armenia
Armenia

By Daniel Gaynor | 9.20.12
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(Note: The Truman Project’s Daniel Gaynor is in Armenia and Georgia this month, studying US foreign policy, energy security and democracy issues in the Caucasus region.)

Most Americans wouldn’t be shocked to learn that the largest American embassy in the world is in Baghdad, Iraq. But the second-largest is in a surprising place: Armenia. It begs the question: why?

The best explanation is a real estate mantra: location, location, location. Armenia, a landlocked country with just three million people, might be in the roughest neighborhood in the world. But in America’s eyes, it might be in the most important position of any US ally to advance President Obama’s foreign policy agenda.

What it lacks in natural resources–it has little oil, gas or xxxels–it makes up for in geography. Few countries are in better position to shape US foreign policy than Armenia.

Armenia borders Turkey, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Iran. As a part of the former Soviet Union, it relies on nearby Russia extensively for trade and military backing. The US has a significant stake in all five countries, and Armenia is now coming into view as a potentially potent lever to advance American aims.

That is, if the Armenians can be won over.

As the US tries to woo Armenia to become a stronger ally in the region, the term “geostrategic” has never been more apt. Armenia is literally at the center of a number of countries that Washington considers among its top priorities. As President Obama tries to accomplish key foreign policy objectives–like preventing Iran from attaining nuclear bombs or seeing democracy flourish in Russia–he’s got to encourage Armenia to play along.

To Armenia’s south, one such issue is unfolding in Iran’s nuclear centrifuges. Last week, a media skirmish between the US and Israel boiled over when Israel’s Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, stated publicly that America had no “moral right” to say whether or not Israel could bomb Iran to prevent it from developing a nuclear weapon. President Obama reportedly called Netanyahu at 3AM to quell tensions.

America is racing to develop every diplomatic pressure point it can on Iran, lest Israel launch a preemptive attack and embroil America in a third Middle East war in ten years. One of those pressure points goes straight through Armenia.

While the US has cut off formal relations with Iran–Washington talks through Switzerland’s embassy there–it’s no secret that it employs a variety of foreign policy crowbars to influence and destabilize Iran’s ruling regime. Some, like President Obama’s latest round of economic sanctions, are well known. Partnering with Armenia is not, but could have a major impact. Through economic and diplomatic incentives, the US is actively trying to shape Armenia into an ally. As President Obama seeks to economically isolate Iran–his sanctions have cut the value of Iran currency in half–he is trying to regionally isolate the regime, as well. Armenia is key to that strategy.

For Armenia, the game is far less simple. Partnering with the US–with whom it has a good, but not great, relationship–could alienate the few friends Armenia has left in the South Caucasus region. It wants military cooperation with Russia, but economic access to the west.

While it has tried to deepen relations with the European Union and the US, Armenia’s two best friends at the moment are arguably the US’s most challenging adversaries: Russia and Iran. That’s not necessarily because of shared ideologies, or even shared interests; it’s because Armenia doesn’t have many friends to pick from.

Of its four neighbors, two–Turkey and Azerbaijan– have have closed off their borders to Armenia. To go on a road trip, every Armenian must pass through either Tbilisi, Georgia or Tehran, Iran.

Why the frosty reception? Turkey, which the New York Times recently called “the historic nemesis of the Armenians,” is still steaming mad over the negative PR associated with Armenian Genocide. The Turks claim rogue military elements are responsible; Armenians believe the Turkish government is reluctant to take the blame.

In either interpretation, the facts are stark: about 1.5 million Armenians perished in a war with Turkey between 1915 and 1918. The Turks closed off its border in 1993, and with it, a significant chunk of Armenia’s economy disappeared. In the decades since, Armenia has pressed for international recognition of the genocide–and rightfully so–but that has only stoked the fire with the Turks.

But, while one would think that the genocide rift is what led Turkey to close off its border, it’s not. Instead, Turkey is standing in solidarity with another neighbor over a contested territory.

Azerbaijan, another fromer Soviet republic, shut its borders with Armenia after the two battled over an Armenian-populated enclave in Azerbaijan, called Nagorno-Karabakh, in the 1990′s. Today, the territory remains a “semi-autonomous” area; meaning that the Azeris want it back, the Armenians believe they control it, and the Karabakhtis has declared independence (which no country has formally recognized).

Meanwhile, the relationship between Armenia and Azerbaijan is sliding downhill. Last week, Azerbaijan made a deal with Hungary to extradite a convicted Azeri murderer. (The man, eight years ago, nearly decapitated a sleeping Armenian serviceman with an axe at a NATO-sponsored English class.) He was returned under the condition that he would serve at least 25 more years in jail.

Instead, as the New York Times put it, he received “a new apartment, eight years of back pay, a promotion to the rank of major and the status of a national hero.” Uproar in Armenia ensued. Armenia’s President released a statement warning, “The Armenians must not be underestimated. We don’t want a war, but if we have to, we will fight and win.”

Meanwhile, Azerbaijan is enjoying the windfall from oil exports. Israel, in particular, has strengthened relations with the Azeris, purchasing 30 percent of their oil from them, as well as selling them over $1.5 billion in military supplies. The US is also a buyer of Azeri oil. As the New York Times points out, Azerbaijan invested more money in its military than Armenia’s entire state budget last year. Hardly the sign of harmonious relations to come.

So far, Armenia’s walked a diplomatic tightrope with skill. As my Lonely Planet travel book explains, “Despite its limited resources, Armenia has become a master at geopolitics. What other country in the world can say it maintains good relations with the US, Russia and Iran?”

Given the cards they’re dealt, Armenia has been a remarkable success story. If America hopes to engender greater cooperation, it’s got to sweeten the deal–through trade agreements, offering economic reforms and encouraging private sector development in Armenia.

Armenia became independent in 1991. Two decades later, it’s still trying to find its footing in the region. It may not have gold, oil, gas or xxxels to give to the US. But, instead, it may have something more useful: a strategic position in the most critical—and potentially most dangerous—region in the world.

http://trumanproject.org/doctrine-blog/in-facing-its-adversaries-americas-got-a-hidden-lever-armenia/

[HyeFighter2]

Re: Nagorno-Karabagh: Military Balance Between Armenia & Azerbaijan

I don't get this ^^
explain ?

left is azeri and right one who laughs is armenian soldier, number means 0-1 like we gain score in karabakh war

[burjuin]

Re: Nagorno-Karabagh: Military Balance Between Armenia & Azerbaijan

The CSTO Collective Rapid Reaction Force’s “Cooperation 2012” joint multinational military exercise in Armenia.

[burjuin]

Re: Nagorno-Karabagh: Military Balance Between Armenia & Azerbaijan

The CSTO Collective Rapid Reaction Force’s “Cooperation 2012” joint multinational military exercise in Armenia.

[burjuin]

Re: Nagorno-Karabagh: Military Balance Between Armenia & Azerbaijan

[burjuin]

Re: Nagorno-Karabagh: Military Balance Between Armenia & Azerbaijan

Մեկնարկեց ՆԱՏՕ-ի «Ջորջիա 2012» ուսումնավարժությունը
23/09/2012 12:25

Սեպտեմբերի 23-ին, ժամը 10.00-ին Վրաստանում մեկնարկեց ՆԱՏՕ-ի «Ջորջիա 2012» դաշտային ուսումնավարժությունը, որին մասնակցում է նաև ՀՀ արտակարգ իրավիճակների նախարարության փրկարարական թիմը:

Ուսումնավարժության բացման հանդիսավոր արարողությանը մասնակիցներին ողջունեց ՆԱՏՕ-ի Աղետների արձագանքումը համակարգող եվրոատլանտյան կենտրոնի ղեկավար Գյունտեր Բրենդշնայդերը:

«Ջորջիա 2012» ուսումնավարժությանը մասնակցում է ՆԱՏՕ-ի անդամ և գործընկեր 24 պետություններից ժամանած քաղաքացիական և ռազմական թիմեր: Ուսումնավարժությանը հետևում են նաև տարբեր երկրներ ու միջազգային կազմակերպություններ ներկայացնող շուրջ 60 դիտորդ:

Մեր թիմի կազմում ընդգրկված է 54 մարդ, այդ թվում՝ քաղաքային որոնողափրկարարական, հրշեջ-փրկարարական, ջրափրկարարական, քիմիական, ճառագայթային ու կենսաբանական մոնիթորինգի ջոկատներ, պարամեդիկներ և շնաբաններ։


«Ջորջիա 2012» ուսումնավարժության նպատակն է կատարելագործել ՆԱՏՕ-ի անդամ և գործընկեր պետությունների աղետների արձագանքման հմտությունները և ընդլայնել նրանց միջև համագործակցությունն արտակարգ իրավիճակներում:

Ուսումնավարժության առաջին օրն անցկացվող տեսական դասընթացների շրջանակներում մեր քիմիական, ճառագայթային ու կենսաբանական մոնիթորինգի խմբի անդամները մասնակցել են թեմատիկ սեմինարի:

[burjuin]

Re: Nagorno-Karabagh: Military Balance Between Armenia & Azerbaijan

Շարունակվում է ՆԱՏՕ-ի «Ջորջիա 2012» ուսումնավարժությունը
24/09/2012 14:40

Հայ փրկարարները Վրաստանում

Մեր հարևան երկրում շարունակվում է ՆԱՏՕ-ի «Ջորջիա 2012» դաշտային ուսումնավարժությունը, որին մասնակցում է նաև ՀՀ արտակարգ իրավիճակների նախարարության փրկարարական թիմը: Ռուսթավիում է նաև ՀՀ ԱԻ նախարարի շարժական կառավարման կետը` հագեցած կապի և հաղորդակցության գրեթե բոլոր ժամանակակից սարքավորումներով, որի միջոցով էլ պարբերաբար տեղեկություններ են ստացվում ուսումնավարժության ընթացքի մասին։

Քիչ առաջ ՀՀ ԱԻՆ ներկայացուցիչը Վրաստանից հայտնեց, որ ուսումնավարժության երրորդ օրը Ռուսթավիում ծավալված վրանային քաղաքում տեսական ու գործնական դասընթացներ են անցկացվել քիմիական, ճառագայթային ու կենսաբանական մոնիթորինգի խմբերի համար, որոնց մասնակցել են Հայաստանի, Ադրբեջանի, Ղազախստանի և Միացյալ Նահանգների թիմերը։

Գործնական աշխատանքների ընթացքում ամերիկացի փրկարարներն իրականացրել են պայմանական վարակված տարածքի հետախուզություն, իսկ հայկական թիմի անդամները, հատուկ պաշտպանիչ հանդերձանքով, մտել են շինության ներսը, հայտնաբերել «տուժածներին» և նրանց դուրս բերել վտանգավոր գոտուց։

Շտաբային վարժանքներ են անցկացվել նաև տեղի իշխանությունների (LEMA), աղետի գոտում գործողությունները համակարգող կենտրոնի (OSOCC) ներկայացուցիչների և զանգվածային լրատվամիջոցների հետ աշխատող խմբի համար։ Նրանց ուսուցանվել են աղետի դեպքում միջազգային կառույցների արձագանքման մեխանիզմները։ Շտաբային վարժանքի ընթացքում մասնակիցներին ներկայացվել է պայմանական իրավիճակ, տրվել են դրանց համապատասխան առաջադրանքներ։ Հիմնական նպատակն էր նախապատրաստվել «Ջորջիա 2012» ուսումնավարժության գործնական փուլին։

Վաղը մեկնարկելու են «Ջորջիա 2012» դաշտային ուսումնավարժության գործնական աշխատանքները` ուժեղ երկրաշարժի և դրանից բխող երկրոդային հետևանքների (ջրհեղեղ, ՃՏՊ-ներ, քիմիական վտանգավոր նյութերի արտահոսք, հրդեհներ) սցենարով։

http://mes.am/index.php?obj_id=1356&nt=2

[burjuin]

Re: Nagorno-Karabagh: Military Balance Between Armenia & Azerbaijan

[londontsi]

Re: Nagorno-Karabagh: Military Balance Between Armenia & Azerbaijan

http://uk.reuters.com/article/2012/09/24/uk-bp-azerbaijan-idUKBRE88N06Y20120924

Exclusive - Output to slide further at BP's Azeri oil giant


By Tom Bergin

Baku | Mon Sep 24, 2012 7:59am BST


(Reuters) - BP will have to invest billions of dollars more than previously planned if it is to slow falling output
at an Azeri oil project that is also that country's biggest cash cow, oil executives and diplomats say.

The investments required to cut the decline at the Azeri-Chirag-Gunashli (ACG) fields are so large that it may not even be commercially viable for the companies to spend the money unless they receive sweeteners from the government, the sources told Reuters.

The problems at ACG will affect international oil supplies and come as BP faces the possibility of paying out $17 billion (10.5 billion pounds) more in fines related to the Gulf of Mexico oil spill than it has budgeted for, after the U.S. Department of Justice accused the company of gross negligence earlier this month.

ACG was supposed to produce more than 1 million barrels per day (bpd), after a third phase was completed in 2008. The prospect of so much non-OPEC crude ensured considerable western diplomatic support for the project and industry kudos for BP.

ACG is so critical to Azerbaijan that the day of the signing of the Production Sharing Agreement (PSA) covering the fields -- September 20 -- has been designated as "Oil Workers Day" and each year, public celebrations are held in Baku on this date.

However, ACG has not lived up to expectations. After hitting 823,000 bpd in 2010, output has fallen.

Production averaged 684,000 bpd in the first half of this year and oil executives and diplomats said the challenge is now to keep output to around the 700,000 bpd mark.

Officials at BP and state oil company Socar say the geology of the field has fallen short of original expectations, but have cited maintenance when explaining the falls of the past 18 months.

Industry and Energy Minister Natik Aliyev denied last week that "natural circumstances in the oil field" were to blame and cited a desire to preserve production into the future.

Speaking at the sidelines of an International Press Institute conference in Baku last week, he told Reuters that, after routine repair work was completed, the field could pump at more than 800,000 bpd for years to come.

TEMPORARY BOOST

ACG is due to receive a boost of 100,000 bpd when the Chirag Oil Project, or 'COP', platform, which lies almost completed in a yard south of Baku, comes online late in 2013.

Socar deputy vice-president Vitaliy Baylarbayov told reporters on the sidelines of the same conference that this would "allow to keep stable oil output until the end of the contract (field exploitation agreement) in 2024" but declined to say what the output level would be.

Three people with knowledge of the situation said that production will have declined further by the time COP starts up and that there was no question of hitting 800,000 bpd again, or holding that level.

Executives at two of the companies involved said the primary problem was falling pressure in the reservoir.

"ACG is in decline. And that is normal. All oil and gas fields will be in decline at some stage in their lifetime," said Lars Troen Sorensen, Azerbaijan Country Manager for Norway's Statoil, which is also a shareholder in ACG.

However, two sources in Baku, not directly involved in the project but who had been briefed on it, said they believed the original design had also contributed to the sharp decline, and the need for expensive upgrades.

These sources both noted the project was designed when oil was around $10/barrel and industry margins tight, giving an incentive for the consortium to engineer the platform to be as cheap as possible.

One BP insider dismissed the suggestion the company had cut corners but accepted the economic realities of the 1990s meant the project could not be over-engineered and that this made subsequent upgrades more expensive than might otherwise be the case.

CONTRACT EXTENSION

Capital investment at ACG is already running at $2 billion a year but three people familiar with the project said the investments needed to stem the decline rate from over 10 percent per year to "mid single digits" would require the partners to spend more.

The investments are so large that it was unlikely the consortium, which also includes U.S. oil groups Chevron and ExxonMobil, would be able to recoup its expenditure within the time period left on the contract. The two companies did not comment.

It will take 2-3 years at least to built the platform extensions and other facilities required to stem ACG's decline, these sources said, leaving under a decade of enhanced output.

One source close to the matter said one way to allow the necessary work to be conducted would be for Socar or the government to cover the cost. But the source admitted this was unlikely.

More likely is that the ACG contract -- under which the government gets most of the profits and the companies are paid for all their outlays -- will be extended beyond 2024. Three people familiar with the situation said talks are already ongoing.

"An extension is needed," one diplomatic source said, adding the partners couldn't afford to wait for years to agree it.

A BP spokesman declined to give output projections or to confirm talks on contract extension. He also did not comment on the claimed need for enormous amounts of extra work on the field that cannot be done under existing contract terms. But he said there could be further cuts in output goals.

"As part of our normal continuous operations optimisation activities we are reviewing our field management plans and forecasts for ACG," he said.

Azeri officials say the country has also the potential to keep oil production up through additional new finds. But executives and diplomats said the remaining unexplored structures in the Caspian were more likely to contain gas reserves than oil.

The country is also touting its potential as an increasingly important gas producer but here as well, executives and diplomats say the country may be being too bullish.

Aliyev said this week that output at the $25 billion Shah Deniz 2 project could be 50 percent higher than the 16 billion cubic metres (bcm) a year scale BP and its partners had planned.

Baylarbayov also said that the Shah Deniz project could be expanded in further phases.

BP said the project could be expanded if necessary but that it was only planning a 16 bcm project. People close to the project said such increases would require additional gas discoveries, which may or may not exist.

"No state has an interest to be pessimistic about its resources .. It is a matter of prestige," one executive said of the comments on ACG and Shah Deniz.

The Industry and Energy Ministry was not available for comment. Socar declined to comment on the outlook for production or the need for significant work to avoid continued sharp output declines.

(Additional reporting by Dmitri Zhdannikov in Moscow; Editing by Giles Elgood)