Nagorno-Karabagh: Military Balance Between Armenia & Azerbaijan

[armnuke]

Re: Nagorno-Karabagh: Military Balance Between Armenia & Azerbaijan

[Spetsnaz]

Re: Nagorno-Karabagh: Military Balance Between Armenia & Azerbaijan

Դիտակետում հայտնաբերվել է ՊՆ ժամկետային զինծառայողի մարմին

http://razm.info/82671

Ադրբեջանական կողմն Արցախի Կարմիր Խաչին հայտնել է իրենց մոտ գտնվող մեկ մարմնի մասին

http://razm.info/82673

[Joseph]

Re: Nagorno-Karabagh: Military Balance Between Armenia & Azerbaijan

Դիտակետում հայտնաբերվել է ՊՆ ժամկետային զինծառայողի մարմին

http://razm.info/82671

Ադրբեջանական կողմն Արցախի Կարմիր Խաչին հայտնել է իրենց մոտ գտնվող մեկ մարմնի մասին
http://razm.info/82673

NKR forces can certainly hit back with no mercy, at least with snipers. The Azeris will not want this to escalate. Hit them back and let them b#tch about it.

[Spetsnaz]

Re: Nagorno-Karabagh: Military Balance Between Armenia & Azerbaijan

2/2

Bellingcat can also conclude from contacts on the Azerbaijani side that the initial thrust was not as effective as anticipated. The objective had been to take villages along the frontline, as seen by news reports of victory by Azerbaijan. This was a shrewd tactic of multipronged continuous diversion attacks in the north and in the south to ensure that Karabagh’s line of defense was broken at any cost. However, from the moment that they were met with fierce resistance, Azerbaijan changed tactics, hence Aliyev’s ceasefire announcement. Aliyev was quick to announce a victory for the Azerbaijani side, with a number of videos surfacing on YouTube. For instance, a video published on April 3rd shows the heights of Talish from the Azerbaijani side, obviously taken on the day of fierce fighting when Karabagh forces were fighting for the outskirts of the village of Talish.[xvi] However, a staged victory footage that surfaced on YouTube on April 8th showed only a small glimpse of a mountaintop, with a reporter standing next to a signpost identifying the village of Talish[xvii]. We have yet to see recent confirmed footage of Talish from Azerbaijani news sources. Other heavy reporting from the hilltop of Lele Tepe also confirms Azerbaijan’s intense media campaign to show its forces as being victorious.

While the battle plans of both countries were sophisticated and well executed, the loss of personnel was greater than anticipated, especially on the Azerbaijani side. The ratio of Azerbaijani human and material loss versus territorial gain was high, especially in the light Azerbaijan only partially achieving in its goal of taking strategic posts. The defender usually suffers one-third of the casualties of the attacker, and we know that Karabagh’s superior defense tactics ensured heavy losses among Azerbaijan’s Special Forces. Based on available statistics, the Karabagh side has approximately 50 dead, over 100 injured and 18 missing in action, though this figure increases by the day with new figures reaching beyond 70. This death toll illustrates the heavy battles that raged for the retake of lost posts. It is likely that releasing the number of dead incrementally is a tactic by Karabagh to downplay the death toll. From all of this, we can deduce that the number of losses on the Azerbaijani side would be higher. Using estimates from various sources, Bellingcat concludes that there were at least 400 Azerbaijani fatalities, which means that the fatality rates publicly cited by Azerbaijan are also underestimated. Other estimates are in the thousands, though a conservative estimate by Bellingcat suggests a range of between 400 and 500.

In initiating these latest clashes, Azerbaijan has pushed Armenia away from the negotiating table, undermined the Madrid principles and forfeited any possibility of peaceful resolution. Those in Armenia who had previously advocated a return of some of the disputed territories to Azerbaijan are now advising their government that this is no longer possible, in the light of Azerbaijan resorting to war. This is an unfortunate turn of events and does not bode well for the future. Prior to April 2nd, Azerbaijan faced a flexible negotiating partner who was willing to consider a compromise agreement. Azerbaijan’s impatience and ‘all or nothing’ approach, culminating in the April 2nd attacks, have resulted in the Armenian side digging its heels and Azerbaijan is now left with little to show for except the loss of a potential compromise agreement.

karabagh
The white circle surrounding the trench illustrates the trench system upon a hill seized by Azerbaijan. The red line represents the distance between the first and second lines of trenches of the Karabagh forces, a distance of approximately 500 metres.

Any link for this Argin?

[Joseph]

Re: Nagorno-Karabagh: Military Balance Between Armenia & Azerbaijan

Any link for this Argin?

Here it is- I had posted it early yesterday already:

https://www.bellingcat.com/news/rest-of-world/2016/04/12/detailing-azerbaijans-incremental-increase-in-nagorno-karabaghs-frontline/

[Mher]

Re: Nagorno-Karabagh: Military Balance Between Armenia & Azerbaijan

Armenia's Isolation Laid Bare
Analysis APRIL 10, 2016 | 13:00 GMT Text Size



By Eugene Chausovsky

The tension in Yerevan was palpable. Overnight April 1, just a few days before I arrived in the city, fighting had broken out in the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh, home to a quasi-independent statelet backed by Armenia known as the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic. The line of contact where Karabakh fighters clashed with Azerbaijani soldiers was around 300 kilometers (186 miles) away, but in Yerevan it felt much closer. I found myself in the city amid the breakdown of a cease-fire that had largely held since 1994.



Walking the streets, I caught snatches of nervous conversation – again and again I heard people mention "Azerbaijan" and "Artsakh," the Armenian name for Nagorno-Karabakh. The emotional attachment on the part of the capital city's residents to the small breakaway republic was clearly strong. Large groups of men huddled around taxis and on street corners to listen intently to news of the conflict being played on the radio. Taxi drivers could speak of nothing else. Everyone seemed to have at least one relative or friend living in Nagorno-Karabakh.

The fighting proved to be short-lived, and within three days a cease-fire was back in place. Just like that, the conflict gave way to the uneasy peace that has predominated for over two decades. Or had it? The question still remained: Why did the conflict break out in the first place? It may have been just another historical blip, or it could presage a larger conflict to come, perhaps one involving regional heavyweights Turkey and Russia, or even Western powers. And what was the role of those powers in the current fighting?

I discussed these questions with anyone I could — government officials, political analysts, journalists and ordinary people. Their opinions varied in the details, but they generally agreed on three things. Most of them blamed Azerbaijan for initiating the fighting because the status quo is favorable to Armenia but detrimental to Baku's interests. Many also believed (correctly) at the outset of the conflict that the fighting was unlikely to spark a larger war. They noted, with anxiety, that Armenia stands alone in Nagorno-Karabakh, with no one to turn to for help.



These are all, of course, simply opinions. Moreover, they are informed by fear and national bias. But they do provide some insight into the mindset of the Armenian people. The last of them, Armenia's isolation, is particularly noteworthy because it has grounding in Armenia's current geopolitical position. The nation is located in the unstable Caucasus region, along with Georgia, Azerbaijan and the volatile Russian republics of Chechnya and Dagestan. The region is surrounded by Russia, Turkey and Iran – three massive powers with diverging interests. Tiny Armenia clearly occupies a tough position and, because of it, must navigate a complex web of relationships. Yerevan is hostile toward Azerbaijan because of Nagorno-Karabakh, and it also has a tense relationship and closed border with Turkey, which supports Azerbaijan. Georgia also cooperates closely with Azerbaijan and Turkey on energy and security matters. Iran is not a major geopolitical player in the Caucasus, at least for now.

To survive in such a volatile environment, Armenia has chosen to strategically align itself with Russia since the fall of the Soviet Union, joining both the Eurasian Economic Union and the Collective Security Treaty Organization. Armenia hosts nearly 5,000 Russian troops in the 102nd military base in Gyumri, and Russia is responsible for guarding Armenia's border with Turkey. Russia owns much of Armenia's strategic infrastructure, including energy pipelines and telecommunications firms, and the country's economy is closely tied to that of Russia.



But this loyalty is not always reciprocal. Whereas friendship with Russia is a top priority for Armenia, the relationship is not the only interest for Moscow, and Russia needs to weigh it against other strategic considerations. Its response to the recent outbreak of conflict demonstrated this. Rather than backing Armenia militarily or politically in the hostilities, Russian officials instead called for calm. Armenians were quick to point out that Russia is a major supplier of weapons to Azerbaijan, some of which were used by Baku in the recent escalation. Moscow has taken an evenhanded political approach with Yerevan and Baku, and Russian Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev visited both capitals in succession on April 7 and April 8.

Russia's balanced response may seem odd given Armenia's loyalty and Azerbaijan's often confrontational attitude toward Moscow. Baku's strategic partnership with Ankara makes it seem even stranger. Most Armenians I spoke to, however, put forward theories about Russia's response (or lack thereof). Some thought Moscow wanted hostilities to escalate in Nagorno-Karabakh so that it could intervene later and extend its influence over both Armenia and Azerbaijan. They believed Russia's military presence in Armenia was less a security guarantee in the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh than a check on the power of Turkey and the West. Others saw Russia in a more positive light but admitted that Moscow's larger struggles with Turkey over Syria and with the West over Ukraine manifest in the Caucasus and exacerbate conflicts, sometimes to the detriment of Armenia.

The latest conflict is just another reminder of Armenia's unenviable geopolitical position. Its valuable alliance with Russia has not helped in the last few days amid a flare-up in greatest threat to Armenian security. But Yerevan has no one else to turn to: Turkey is allied with Azerbaijan, and the West is not willing to risk a confrontation with Russia, as shown by its inaction in Georgia. Armenia's commercial and political ties with Iran might later prove valuable, but at the moment Tehran is in no position to play a meaningful role in the Caucasus or to challenge Russia in any capacity. Someday, though, that could change.

For now, Armenia must to a great extent fend for itself in Nagorno-Karabakh. Unless the simmering tension boils over into a full-blown conflict on par with the war of 1988-1994, the attitudes of Russia and other regional players will likely remain the same. The next steps are unclear, but the truce is shaky at best, meaning violence may flare up in the region. When it does, Yerevan will find itself unsettled and anxious once again, with little help from its allies.

https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/armenias-isolation-laid-bare

[armnuke]

Re: Nagorno-Karabagh: Military Balance Between Armenia & Azerbaijan

Armenia's Isolation Laid Bare
Analysis APRIL 10, 2016 | 13:00 GMT Text Size



By Eugene Chausovsky

The tension in Yerevan was palpable. Overnight April 1, just a few days before I arrived in the city, fighting had broken out in the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh, home to a quasi-independent statelet backed by Armenia known as the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic. The line of contact where Karabakh fighters clashed with Azerbaijani soldiers was around 300 kilometers (186 miles) away, but in Yerevan it felt much closer. I found myself in the city amid the breakdown of a cease-fire that had largely held since 1994.



Walking the streets, I caught snatches of nervous conversation – again and again I heard people mention "Azerbaijan" and "Artsakh," the Armenian name for Nagorno-Karabakh. The emotional attachment on the part of the capital city's residents to the small breakaway republic was clearly strong. Large groups of men huddled around taxis and on street corners to listen intently to news of the conflict being played on the radio. Taxi drivers could speak of nothing else. Everyone seemed to have at least one relative or friend living in Nagorno-Karabakh.

The fighting proved to be short-lived, and within three days a cease-fire was back in place. Just like that, the conflict gave way to the uneasy peace that has predominated for over two decades. Or had it? The question still remained: Why did the conflict break out in the first place? It may have been just another historical blip, or it could presage a larger conflict to come, perhaps one involving regional heavyweights Turkey and Russia, or even Western powers. And what was the role of those powers in the current fighting?

I discussed these questions with anyone I could — government officials, political analysts, journalists and ordinary people. Their opinions varied in the details, but they generally agreed on three things. Most of them blamed Azerbaijan for initiating the fighting because the status quo is favorable to Armenia but detrimental to Baku's interests. Many also believed (correctly) at the outset of the conflict that the fighting was unlikely to spark a larger war. They noted, with anxiety, that Armenia stands alone in Nagorno-Karabakh, with no one to turn to for help.



These are all, of course, simply opinions. Moreover, they are informed by fear and national bias. But they do provide some insight into the mindset of the Armenian people. The last of them, Armenia's isolation, is particularly noteworthy because it has grounding in Armenia's current geopolitical position. The nation is located in the unstable Caucasus region, along with Georgia, Azerbaijan and the volatile Russian republics of Chechnya and Dagestan. The region is surrounded by Russia, Turkey and Iran – three massive powers with diverging interests. Tiny Armenia clearly occupies a tough position and, because of it, must navigate a complex web of relationships. Yerevan is hostile toward Azerbaijan because of Nagorno-Karabakh, and it also has a tense relationship and closed border with Turkey, which supports Azerbaijan. Georgia also cooperates closely with Azerbaijan and Turkey on energy and security matters. Iran is not a major geopolitical player in the Caucasus, at least for now.

To survive in such a volatile environment, Armenia has chosen to strategically align itself with Russia since the fall of the Soviet Union, joining both the Eurasian Economic Union and the Collective Security Treaty Organization. Armenia hosts nearly 5,000 Russian troops in the 102nd military base in Gyumri, and Russia is responsible for guarding Armenia's border with Turkey. Russia owns much of Armenia's strategic infrastructure, including energy pipelines and telecommunications firms, and the country's economy is closely tied to that of Russia.



But this loyalty is not always reciprocal. Whereas friendship with Russia is a top priority for Armenia, the relationship is not the only interest for Moscow, and Russia needs to weigh it against other strategic considerations. Its response to the recent outbreak of conflict demonstrated this. Rather than backing Armenia militarily or politically in the hostilities, Russian officials instead called for calm. Armenians were quick to point out that Russia is a major supplier of weapons to Azerbaijan, some of which were used by Baku in the recent escalation. Moscow has taken an evenhanded political approach with Yerevan and Baku, and Russian Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev visited both capitals in succession on April 7 and April 8.

Russia's balanced response may seem odd given Armenia's loyalty and Azerbaijan's often confrontational attitude toward Moscow. Baku's strategic partnership with Ankara makes it seem even stranger. Most Armenians I spoke to, however, put forward theories about Russia's response (or lack thereof). Some thought Moscow wanted hostilities to escalate in Nagorno-Karabakh so that it could intervene later and extend its influence over both Armenia and Azerbaijan. They believed Russia's military presence in Armenia was less a security guarantee in the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh than a check on the power of Turkey and the West. Others saw Russia in a more positive light but admitted that Moscow's larger struggles with Turkey over Syria and with the West over Ukraine manifest in the Caucasus and exacerbate conflicts, sometimes to the detriment of Armenia.

The latest conflict is just another reminder of Armenia's unenviable geopolitical position. Its valuable alliance with Russia has not helped in the last few days amid a flare-up in greatest threat to Armenian security. But Yerevan has no one else to turn to: Turkey is allied with Azerbaijan, and the West is not willing to risk a confrontation with Russia, as shown by its inaction in Georgia. Armenia's commercial and political ties with Iran might later prove valuable, but at the moment Tehran is in no position to play a meaningful role in the Caucasus or to challenge Russia in any capacity. Someday, though, that could change.

For now, Armenia must to a great extent fend for itself in Nagorno-Karabakh. Unless the simmering tension boils over into a full-blown conflict on par with the war of 1988-1994, the attitudes of Russia and other regional players will likely remain the same. The next steps are unclear, but the truce is shaky at best, meaning violence may flare up in the region. When it does, Yerevan will find itself unsettled and anxious once again, with little help from its allies.

https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/ar...tion-laid-bare

I have to agree with this article. We are like a baby with an irresponsible mother, unfortunately.

[Mher]

Re: Nagorno-Karabagh: Military Balance Between Armenia & Azerbaijan

I have to agree with this article. We are like a baby with an irresponsible mother, unfortunately.

I like that we're on our own. Looking for protectors and patrons is what led to 1.5 million martyrs. At the end of the day, nobody cares for you but you. Get what you can, from whoever you can, but don't count on anyone. You would think we would have learned this by now given how many times we were screwed over by our various supposed allies just in the past 150 years.

[Mher]

Re: Nagorno-Karabagh: Military Balance Between Armenia & Azerbaijan

Second day in a row with a really strong impartial analysis by an Armenian. A lot of the points I tried to raise last night

What's next for Nagorno-Karabakh?
Apr 12, 2016
John Antranig Kasbarian

With Russia playing an increasingly active role in resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, now is the time for careful consideration of how Moscow can bring peace to the region without inadvertently escalating hostilities.


The escalating conflict over the unrecognized Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, a tiny mountainous enclave inhabited by Armenians but claimed by Azerbaijan, has become a diplomatic challenge for Moscow.
Since Russia is a major stakeholder in the conflict, the Kremlin recently sent Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev to defuse the situation and reconcile Armenia and Azerbaijan, while also instructing Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov to discuss the peace plan with his Azeri and Iranian counterparts.
There’s a good reason why Moscow is taking the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh so seriously: Russia’s southern frontier has become a hotbed of unrest. Growing tensions with Turkey and Ukraine come to mind, of course, not to mention the civil wars in Syria and Iraq and the continued threat of destabilization in Central Asia by radical Islamists.
Quite simply, the renewed hostilities in Nagorno-Karabakh are another reminder of how fragile peace and stability are in this region of the world.
Setting the context for the current conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh

Armenians and Azeris have been fighting over Karabakh since 1988, when the Soviet Union began to unravel. At that time, Karabakh's Armenian majority sought to secede from Azerbaijan and join neighboring Armenia, citing its right to self-determination according to the Soviet constitution.
As such, Karabakh was heralded as a test case for Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev’s emerging policies toward nationalities. However, these demands met with violent reprisals toward Armenians across Azerbaijan, and peaceful rallies and petitions were soon replaced by low-intensity conflict pitting Armenian partisans against Azerbaijan's special forces, amid the rapid demise of Soviet power.
With the fall of the Soviet Union, the Karabakh struggle quickly spiraled into all-out war. By the time a ceasefire was declared in 1994, tens of thousands had been killed and hundreds of thousands uprooted on both sides. The conflict also drew in a host of regional stakeholders – Armenia and Azerbaijan, of course, but also neighboring Turkey and Iran, as well as the U.S. and above all Russia.
Given different interests of the participants of the conflict and those who are trying to resolve it, the Karabakh issue was framed differently. For the locals of Nagorno-Karabakh, it was purely a national liberation struggle, seeking to remove foreign occupation.
For politicians in Yerevan and Baku, the region was an apple of discord. For regional powers, it was a political playing card, through which ethnic tensions could be stoked, suppressed or otherwise manipulated depending on the interests at stake. The problem, of course, is that all three levels operated simultaneously within a nest of power relations.

By the end of the war, the Nagorno-Karabakh separatists successfully ended Azerbaijani rule, driving out all military and civilian presence. Since that time, native Armenians have controlled the enclave and its borderlands, having fashioned their own de facto republic, which enjoys significant support from Armenia. Meanwhile, Azerbaijan refuses to acknowledge any change, instead seeking the Nagorno-Karabakh’s return to its full control.
Not surprisingly, Armenians have rejected Baku's territorial claims saying that the central issues – guarantees of Nagorno-Karabakh's security and, ultimately, its political status – must remain at the forefront of any negotiating process. Azerbaijan replies by stressing the disputed region’s illegitimacy as a party in negotiations, insisting it will only deal in state-to-state scenarios involving Armenia.
Since 1994, the conflict has subsided to a large extent. True, border skirmishes continued, and military preparedness remained a priority for both sides, but over time all conceded that the conflict had been effectively frozen. The war on the ground was largely replaced by a war of words, as the Minsk Group of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which involves the U.S., Russia and France, supervised ongoing talks aimed at a lasting settlement.
Meanwhile, both sides pressed for advantage at the negotiating table, while seeking to create facts on the ground to bolster their positions: Baku began pouring its oil revenue into a revamped military, while increasing its threats to retake Nagorno-Karabakh by force.
On the diplomatic front, Azerbaijan sought to paint Armenia as the aggressor, while decrying the breakaway republic’s hold over "occupied territories" bordering the enclave. Armenians replied that these are security zones, required fundamentally to maintain links to neighboring Armenia, and as a cushion against possible future attacks.
Why Azerbaijan keeps raising the stakes in Nagorno-Karabakh

On the surface, the recent flare-up in Nagorno-Karabakh was merely a variation of this longstanding struggle. Azerbaijan seems to have struck first, advancing across the entire line of contact, responding to an unspecified provocation.
Nagorno-Karabakh claims to have retaken territory seized by Azerbaijan. Within four to five days, both sides had stopped shooting, and it appeared that the previous status quo has been more or less restored.
But beneath the surface, there are some important shifts. First, since the 1994 ceasefire, border violations – mostly by Azerbaijan – have occurred on numerous occasions.
But these violations have usually been infrequent (every three to six months), localized (small skirmishes in a tightly defined area), and low-intensity (usually snipers with automatic weapons). In this light, analysts often viewed Azerbaijan’s incursions as a way to influence the negotiating process. From this point of view, Baku might have been probing for weak spots.

But knowing that a military solution was highly unlikely, Baku sought, above all, to test Armenian reflexes diplomatically: These offensives, when accompanied by propaganda, sometimes pushed Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia into a reactive position, while Azerbaijan continued to seek concessions at the negotiating table.
Second, since mid-2015, Azerbaijan’s offensives have become more frequent (every few weeks), more wide-ranging (broader areas of attack), and more intense (including medium-range artillery, tanks, and now aircraft). Evidently something has changed in Baku’s calculations. Could this escalation be deliberate, designed perhaps to provoke a military response from the Armenian side?
For a growing number of analysts, this is indeed the case, and for reasons one might not expect. The motivation may come, in fact, from Baku’s own domestic situation.
Evidently, Azeri President Ilham Aliyev’s regime is in for some rough times, as its economy – largely pegged to the price of oil and gas – has suffered a severe economic downturn in the past year. As a result, Azerbaijan already faces widespread unemployment, civil unrest, and a rise in political discontent.

Assuming that Aliyev’s top priority is to maintain his grip on power, it seems he has chosen to distract his population by invoking Nagorno-Karabakh for scapegoating purposes. This is evidenced by his latest pronouncements of victory, aimed not at the international community but at his own population. Such tactics is a tried-and-true method (not only in Azerbaijan, but in many countries) to disperse domestic grievances and promote national cohesion.
Meanwhile, Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia are in the delicate spot of trying to respond firmly to such provocations, without “crossing the line” and inviting real hostilities.
What are Russia’s options?

Native Armenians are stubbornly distrustful of Azeri authorities, and would sooner die than return to the pre-1988 status quo. Accordingly, Azerbaijan must take the fundamental steps of acknowledging Nagorno-Karabakh’s right to exist and allowing its inclusion as a side to the negotiations. No solution – no matter how clever – can work without local involvement.
A second issue, however, is perhaps even thornier: It involves the regional balance of power. Specifically, how Russia intends to react to growing instability along its southern frontier. If Russia retreats, more blood may be spilled before a solution is reached. On the other hand, if Russia remains integrally involved, it must do so with sensitivity.
For one, Russia must acknowledge the possibility of escalation – the shift from ground combat to medium-range capabilities, which could make the conflict harder to control. For another, its interventions must avoid giving the appearance of manipulation, if it is to maintain influence.
Rather, Moscow's intentions must become more transparent, aiming to build trust within a framework of regional cooperation rather than by perpetuating instability among states under its influence. Otherwise, the stalemate will continue well into the next decade.

http://www.russia-direct.org/opinion...gorno-karabakh

[armnuke]

Re: Nagorno-Karabagh: Military Balance Between Armenia & Azerbaijan

Protestors extend middle finger in front of Russian Embassy in Armenia

YEREVAN. – Participants of march protest, who demand that Russia stop the arms supply to Azerbaijan, stood by the Russian Embassy in Armenia for several minutes, extending their middle fingers.

The march ended after the protestors made an announcement, demanding Russia:

- To fulfill its obligations as a de jure ally, and respect the national interests and security of Armenia in its future decisions,

- To immediately stop selling weapons to Azerbaijan.

The Embassy building is controlled by a very large number of policemen, Armenian News - NEWS.am correspondent reports. The police didn’t allow the protestors to approach the embassy building.

The demonstrators are now continuing the protest in front of the Embassy with the chants “Sovereign Armenia,” “Free and independent Armenia” and “We demand”.

http://news.am/eng/news/322111.html