Nagorno-Karabagh: Military Balance Between Armenia & Azerbaijan

[Karabed]

Re: Nagorno-Karabagh: Military Balance Between Armenia & Azerbaijan

Can you send the link? Thanks

Spider passion by Levon Melik-Shahnazaryan

[Eddo211]

Re: Nagorno-Karabagh: Military Balance Between Armenia & Azerbaijan

Good to see you here Edojan. Welcome from me.

[KarotheGreat]

Re: Nagorno-Karabagh: Military Balance Between Armenia & Azerbaijan

I heard alot about UAV's that Armenia supposedly is producing them ... is this true??

Azerbaijan is going to produce them ...
http://www.eurasianet.org/node/63004

One of the biggest differences between the Armenian and Azerbaijani military is that our side doesn't brag about the weapons we own. I got this little theory, we show parts of our arsenal when we have acquired new weapons that are more powerful.

[ninetoyadome]

Re: Nagorno-Karabagh: Military Balance Between Armenia & Azerbaijan

Can you send the link? Thanks

Sorry about that

http://translate.google.com/translate?hl=en&sl=ru&tl=en&u=http://www.voskanapat.info/

and i think this is the forum where they talk about there service in the azeri army, i think this is the thread

http://www4.disput.az/index.php?showtopic=90907

[Federate]

Re: Nagorno-Karabagh: Military Balance Between Armenia & Azerbaijan

On Borders and Sovereignty or, One More Necessary Clarification
[ 2011/03/06 | 23:15 ] politics

According to information from the defence forces, in the period ranging from the 27th of February to the 5th of March, the cease fire was violated on the Karabakh-Azerbaijan line of contact between the opposing forces around 240 times by the other side, during the course of which more than 1200 shots were fired (NKR Defence Forces Press Service, 5 March 2011)

For diplomats, politicians, and bureaucrats, words are one of the main tools used in their work. They convey their interests and they communicate with society with the means of words. Accordingly, then, any negligence or outright mistakes are unacceptable.

The Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR) considers itself an independent state. Let it be so, even though I, for my part – taking into account the Preamble to the Constitution of the Republic of Armenia as well as the clauses in Armenia’s Declaration of Independence – consider it to be a part of Armenia. But that’s not what this is about. In either case, official statements must utilise different phrasing than what they have today.

Whether the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic is an independent country or part of the Republic of Armenia, then it does not have a line of contact with Azerbaijan but state borders. Consequently, the shots fired from Azerbaijan towards the NKR were not in violation of the cease fire at the “line of contact between the opposing forces” but were attacks on the state borders of the NKR through the means of violating a cease fire agreement.

Let us recall that, as per international law, a border is “a line which determines the limit of the territorial sphere of jurisdiction of States or other entities having an international status” [M. Bothe, Boundaries, Encyclopedia of Public International Law, ed. R. Berhardt, v. 1, Amsterdam, 1992, p. 443).

That is to say, if we are to utilise the wording “line of contact between opposing forces or armies”, then we are accepting that the line runs between two opposing territories within the same sovereignty, which happen to be under the control of two separate armed groups, as, for example, one finds today a “line of contact between opposing forces” in Libya between the pro- and anti-Gaddafi forces.

Ara Papian
Head of the Modus Vivendi Centre
5 March 2011

http://hetq.am/en/politics/a-papyan-29/

[ninetoyadome]

Re: Nagorno-Karabagh: Military Balance Between Armenia & Azerbaijan

Jane's: Azerbaijan Attack on Karabakh Unlikely -- For Now
March 8, 2011 - 2:20pm, by Joshua Kucera
The Bug Pit Armenia Azerbaijan Nagorno Karabakh
The Armenia-Azerbaijan military balance is getting a lot of scrutiny these days, and Jane's Intelligence Review has just published a good reported analysis (subscription required) by Emil Sanamyan that has a lot of interesting points. Among them:

-- "Upon closer inspection, Azerbaijan's purported 'military budget' incorporates not just the paramilitary forces outside the Ministry of Defence but also state prosecutors and even courts, with an apparent intention to inflate the overall figure for propaganda effect."

-- "The combined Armenian and Nagorno-Karabakh defence army total is estimated by Jane's to be around 300 T-72s, considerably larger than the 110 officially declared by Yerevan. Azerbaijan is thought to maintain around 350 to 400 T-72s... Baku has declared only 217 tanks, although it it likely that this figure was designed to appear under the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty ceiling of 220."

-- "[F]or now it is the Azerbaijani UAV capability that provides the most immediate potential for escalation. Armenian defence officials have confirmed that Azerbaijan has begun flying its UAVs close to the Line of Contact that separates the two sides, with several such flights reported since 2008. In mid-2010, two Armenian Su-25s were dispatched to try to intercept these UAV flights."

-- "Armenian officials also claim that Armenia has begun to domestically produce UAVs and that more than a dozen have already entered service, with the aim of co-ordinating artillery fire. These have yet to be seen publicly."

But he concluded that, in the short term at least, war was unlikely. That's because Azerbaijan's ability to strike Armenian targets from a distance -- either from the air or with artillery -- is still too weak to overwhelm Armenians' defenses. The Armenian/Karabakh air defense systems are relatively good (they have S-300s, including possibly in Karabakh) and Azerbaijan has a fairly small number of ground attack aircraft (according to Jane's, 19 Su-25s) which would quickly be depleted by the Armenians' air defense. Azerbaijan's artillery, which also might be used to take out air defenses, would be vulnerable to Armenian artillery counterattacks, as the two sides are somewhat evenly matched on that front. So at this point, Sanamyan says, it's too risky for Azerbaijan to attack. For now.

http://www.eurasianet.org/node/63030

[Eddo211]

Re: Nagorno-Karabagh: Military Balance Between Armenia & Azerbaijan

No place for troops. Launcher mechanism, reloading mechanism and 12 missiles are carried inside the vehicle. Reloading is done automaticaly.
9M114 missile for Shturm is the AT-6 (NATO codename), the 9M120 Ataka missile is the AT-9. There are various versions and modifications of these missiles. I don't know which versions we use.
By the way, our Mi-24 helicopter gunships also carry these weapons.

I have heard they can move very fast. How does the launcher reload on Auto (Retract/swing over?) and how long it takes between reloads.
As a ignorant Aviator I was also wondering.....this baby is only for ground targets (tanks and such) no? or can it also hit an target in flight, since you mentioned the missiles in use can also be carried by attack chopers.

Thanks again.

[arakeretzig]

Re: Nagorno-Karabagh: Military Balance Between Armenia & Azerbaijan

[ In mid-2010, two Armenian Su-25s were dispatched to try to intercept these UAV flights."

This is great news. su-25 has AA missles, it seems our guys are not hesitant to use them

[burjuin]

Re: Nagorno-Karabagh: Military Balance Between Armenia & Azerbaijan

Air Defense Nagorno-Karabakh

Sean O’Connor

The Nagorno-Karabakh enclave, located in western Azerbaijan, remains one of the most contested pieces of real estate in what was once the Soviet Union. Nagorno-Karabakh declared independence from Azerbaijan on January 1992, based upon the desire of the ethnic Armenian population to attain autonomy from the government of Azerbaijan. Various armed conflicts took place beginning in 1992, with fighting occurring as recently as 2008. Nagorno-Karabakh is supported by the Armenian government, which itself was heavily involved in the military conflict with Azerbaijan.


The map above highlights the Azerbaijani territory under dispute. Nagorno-Karabakh itself can be seen as a C-shaped territory
in the center of the Armenian-controlled region (Wikipedia).

The current situation is one rooted in the political arena, with Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Nagorno-Karabakh negotiating for a final end to hostilities. Nagorno-Karabakh continues to exist as a de-facto independent region, having elected a President, established a government, and raised a military. Nagorno-Karabakh is not officially recognized by the outside world as an independent state, however, although it does retain offices in various capitals including that of the United States.

The Nagorno-Karabakh enclave is home to various air defense systems, many of which were likely involved in the numerous armed conflicts with Azerbaijan. Apart from the fact that the systems are legacy Soviet-era equipment, the true origin of the Nagorno- Karabakh inventory is difficult to determine. It is unknown which systems were absorbed by the Nagorno-Karabakh military from Azerbaijani units captured or existing in the territory at the time of independence, or which systems were absorbed from Armenian units which had participated in much of the fighting in the early 1990s. Nagorno-Karabakh currently possesses an official military arm, the Nagorno-Karabakh Defense Army, but remains heavily reliant on Armenian support. Furthermore, some of the identified assets reside outside the official border of the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave, indicating that they are most likely Armenian units deployed in contested Azerbaijani areas. This analysis will focus on the disputed region as a whole, incorporating these likely Armenian units as they would impact the air defense of the region should hostilities resume.

Probable Armenian 2K11 battery near Fuzuli (Google Earth)

EW Systems
Given the small amount of territory involved, the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave features a capable early warning network. Five dedicated EW facilities have been identified, operating a mix of current and legacy equipment.

The first site, located on the eastern edge of Nagorno-Karabakh near the Armenian8 controlled city of Agdam, operates short-range EW systems. The second and third sites are located in close proximity to each other, situated south of Sardarashen. These sites operate Soviet-era P-12/18 (SPOON REST) and P-14 (TALL KING) EW radar systems.



The most significant EW system in Nagorno-Karabakh is the Russian-made 36D6 (TIN SHIELD). There are two of these systems identified in Nagorno-Karabakh, located near the towns of Nngi and Yemishjan. The 36D6 is a modern EW radar system capable of performing EW and GCI functions, but is most significant in its ability to act as an EW asset in direct support of SAM systems. Given the fact that the 36D6 radar sets are not deployed directly with SAM units, if they are employed in a SAM support role they likely serve as regimental or brigade level assets.
The 36D6 EW site near Nngi is significant insofar as it hosts one of Nagorno- Karabakh’s two modern EW radar systems, but also because of the layout of the deployment site. Between October of 2002 and July of 2007, construction of an S-300P series SAM site atop the mountain peak currently hosting the 36D6 EW radar. Given the nature of Armenian support to the region and the presence of S-300PT (SA-10A GRUMBLE) SAM systems in the Armenian inventory, it is possible that Armenia constructed the location to serve as a deployment site should the need arise in the future.



Air Defense Systems

The primary SAM system deployed in Nagorno-Karabakh is the 2K11 Krug (SA-4 GANEF). While representing an aged, Sovietera system, the 2K11 remains valuable in defense of the enclave thanks to its mobility and ability to navigate the varied terrain in the region.

Three 2K11 batteries are deployed in the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave, with a further two batteries being deployed in Armenian controlled territory near Fuzuli in the south. Each battery is deployed with a 1S32 TER and between one and three 2P24 TELs.

A solitary S-125 (SA-3 GOA) SAM battery deployed near Shushakand further enhances the Nagorno-Karabakh SAM force by providing additional coverage of the area surrounding Stepanakert.



Given the northwestern orientation of the battery, it likely represents a captured Azerbaijani asset rather than a redeployed Armenian asset.

Coverage and Capability

Deployed EW and SAM assets provide coverage of the entire Nagorno-Karabakh enclave and the bulk of Azerbaijani territory occupied by Armenia. It is not known whether these systems are integrated into a true IADS architecture, but the composition of the force indicates that the systems should be compatible if required to operate in conjunction with one another.





Despite being a SAM force comprised of Soviet-era systems, the Nagorno-Karabakh air defense units are assessed to remain capable of providing basic air defense over the territory. Both the 2K11 and S-125 possess single-target engagement capability and limited range compared to modern systems available on the world market, but batteries are deployed in a manner providing overlapping fields of fire, with the 2K11 batteries capable of rapid relocation to new firing positions should the need arise. Furthermore, additional 2K11 batteries may be held in reserve, with two SAM garrisons noted near Stepanakert.

In a modern context, the network represents a limited threat to current combat aircraft, but the air arm of Azerbaijan relies primarily on a limited number of Soviet-era combat aircraft, the exception being recent MiG-29 (FULCRUM) fighters delivered via the Ukraine. In this light, particularly given the lack of a high-intensity air war at any point during the conflict, the SAM systems deployed in and around Nagorno-Karabakh remain a deterrent to future aggression.

The success of the Nagorno-Karabakh SAM force will ultimately rest on three factors: training, serviceability, and intensity.

Properly trained crews must be available to ensure timely and effective operation of SAM batteries during hostilities.

As the 2K11 and S-125 represent aging Soviet-era systems, they must be monitored for maintenance and serviceability to ensure their availability. Fortunately, Armenian assistance could be sought in this area, as both the 2K11 and S-125 are present in the Armenian inventory. As older systems are replaced by newer S-300P series batteries, some Armenian equipment could ultimately be transferred to Nagorno-Karabakh.

Finally, while the network is capable of providing a credible defense against a limited aggressor or during a very low intensity air war, should hostilities increase to the point where Azerbaijan expands an air campaign to higher levels of activity than previously noted, the network can be oversaturated as a result of reliance on SAM systems lacking multipletarget engagement capability.

System and Facility Overview

Air Defense System:

Identified EW Assets:
P-12/18 (SPOON REST)
P-14 (TALL KING)
36D6 (TIN SHIELD)

Identified SAM Systems:
2K11 (SA-4 GANEF)
S-125 (SA-3 GOA)

Facilities:

Identified EW Positions
Legacy: 3 (Active)
36D6: 2 (Active)

Identified SAM Positions
2K11: 8 (5 Active)
S-125: 1 (Active)
S-300P: 1 (Inactive)

Identified Support Facilities
SAM garrisons: 3 (1 generic, 2 2K11)

[burjuin]

Re: Nagorno-Karabagh: Military Balance Between Armenia & Azerbaijan

Ադրբեջանական բանակում կրկին զանգվածային բռնաբարության դեպք է գրանցվել

Ադրբեջանական բանակում սպաների կողմից զինվորների նկատմամբ ծեծն ու ջարդը, նրանց տարբեր խոշտանգումների և ստորացումների ենթարկելը բազմաթիվ հանցագործությունների պատճառ է դարձել: Բանակում անցկացված մոնիթորինգները ցույց են տալիս, որ հրադադարի ժամանակաշրջանում մահացած 3500 զինվորականների մեծ մասը կյանքից հեռացել է ոչ կանոնադրական հարաբերությունների արդյունքում առաջացած միջադեպերի պատճառով:
Այս մասին գրում է «Բիզիմ յոլ» թերթը:

Թերթը հայտնում է, որ Գյոգյոլի (Խանլարի) շրջանում տեղակայված զորամասերից մեկում փետրվարի 20-ին տեղի ունեցած արյունալի սպանդից երկու շաբաթ չանցած, երբ 7 զինվոր էր սպանվել, մի զարհուրելի դեպք էլ տեղի է ունեցել Գերանբոյի շրջանում տեղակայված զորամասերից մեկում: Զորամասի սպաներից մեկը տևականորեն բռնաբարել է զինվորներին:

Հայտնի դարձած տեղեկությունների համաձայն՝ զորամասի ավագ լեյտենանտ Անար Ազիզովը երկար ժամանակ զբաղվել է նորակոչիկ զինվորների արժանապատվությունը ստորացնելու գործով: Բռնաբարության ենթարկված զինվորն այդ մասին պատմել է իր ծառայակից ընկերներին: Պարզվել է, որ ավագ լեյտենանտը զորամասում բռնաբարության է ենթարկել ևս 6 զինվորների:

Այս զինվորների ծնողները հարձակում են գործել զորամասի վրա: Զորամասի հրամանատարությունը անձնակազմի առաջ առերեսել է զինվորներին և ավագ լեյտենանտին: Զինվորները հաստատել են եղելությունը: Ավագ լեյտենանտն անմիջապես ձերբակալվել է: Բռնության ենթարկված զինվորները տեղափոխվել են տարբեր զորամասեր:

Թերթը գրում է, որ Ադրբեջանի ՊՆ մամուլի ծառայությունը հրաժարվել է տեղեկություն հայտնել իր թղթակցին` մոտավորապես մեկ ամիս առաջ տեղի ունեցած այդ ամոթալի իրադարձության մասին: