Nagorno-Karabagh: Military Balance Between Armenia & Azerbaijan

[burjuin]

Re: Nagorno-Karabagh: Military Balance Between Armenia & Azerbaijan

The Armenian-Turkish border is controlled by Russian border guards

[arakeretzig]

Re: Nagorno-Karabagh: Military Balance Between Armenia & Azerbaijan

http://razm.info/5475

I always though the way the media reported these incidents sounded funny. how the hell do they know they shot 1300 bullets? why not 1400, or 1200? or 1500, or 1233?

[Spetsnaz]

Re: Nagorno-Karabagh: Military Balance Between Armenia & Azerbaijan

Barev eghbayrners!

I've been reading this thread for fun almost since it's origin, because then I was working on an academic paper about possible military scenarios in case of Azeri agression on Artsax and evaluating the unfolding of the likely events. So, I'm a long-time reader first-time poster in this forum.

I have recently found out that Armenian Army now has Russian ГАЗ-2975 «Тигр» http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GAZ-2975 . I later found out (from this video http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DvhxvQQRapY watch after 23:00) that these machines cost as much as $300,000 each! I wonder how many of these did Armenia purchase? And how much they spent on such a deal? Does anybody know?

In my view this is not the best value for money. They could have purchased loads of BTR-60s or BTR-70s for a lot cheaper, which, though old, is stll a superior machine. What's more is that US military is gradually dumping the good old HUMVEES (in favour of new BAE vehicles that are more resistant to urban insurgencies and landmines), therefore used HUMVEES are flooding the market at dirt cheap prices like $20,000-$40,000. That's why I think purchasing these Tigers was a bit of a waste. What do you think?

welcome to Forume matrixfighter

[davidoga]

Re: Nagorno-Karabagh: Military Balance Between Armenia & Azerbaijan

Barev eghbayrners!

I've been reading this thread for fun almost since it's origin, because then I was working on an academic paper about possible military scenarios in case of Azeri agression on Artsax and evaluating the unfolding of the likely events. So, I'm a long-time reader first-time poster in this forum.

I have recently found out that Armenian Army now has Russian ГАЗ-2975 «Тигр» http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GAZ-2975 . I later found out (from this video http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DvhxvQQRapY watch after 23:00) that these machines cost as much as $300,000 each! I wonder how many of these did Armenia purchase? And how much they spent on such a deal? Does anybody know?

In my view this is not the best value for money. They could have purchased loads of BTR-60s or BTR-70s for a lot cheaper, which, though old, is stll a superior machine. What's more is that US military is gradually dumping the good old HUMVEES (in favour of new BAE vehicles that are more resistant to urban insurgencies and landmines), therefore used HUMVEES are flooding the market at dirt cheap prices like $20,000-$40,000. That's why I think purchasing these Tigers was a bit of a waste. What do you think?

Any chance that you could post an excerpt/abstract of your possible military scenarios paper, if not the whole thing?

[matrixfighter]

Re: Nagorno-Karabagh: Military Balance Between Armenia & Azerbaijan

No arguement here axper. Seeing as you are knowledgeable on the subject, any news on Armenia possibly attaining S-400s in the near future?

I'm neither a journalist, nor a spy, so I don't have "news". I can only offer my prognosis based upon what military analysts (in various camps) have been saying, and, importantly, based on the developments in and around the region. As you know may already know Armenia has already shown interest in acquisition of S-400s and Smerches.

One thing to remember is that unlike that of Azeri armed forces, the Armenian army is highly secretive about it's possessions and military capabilities. When it comes to warfare, you want to always keep an element of surprise, so as to gain (or re-gain) the initiative. A good example of this is the acquisition of the S-300, which happened in 2005, but it was not until late 2010 that it was officially made a public knowledge.

Armenia getting its own S-400s in the near future (at least for the next 5 years) is highly unlikely. Why? For starters, the production cannot keep up with the demands of Russia's own security requirements. American plans in the Eastern Europe are making the S-400 a matter of necessity for Russia. Another aspect of this is how muddled up, short of expectations and protracted the S-400 program has become over the years. The likelihood is that while Russian air defense modernises with S-400, the S-500 (with strike-in-space capabilities) will come into play. Russians may want to place an S-400 in the Gyumri base just as an added defense against NATO as well as to have Georgia covered (in case of Georgian aggression against South Ossetia and Abkhazia), but I cannot see that such placement being a priority for Russia right now.

Does Armenia absolutely need S-400? Well, not really. At least it's not a matter of immediate necessity. With a radius of 400km, Armenia does not need these systems for purposes other than that of a "show-off/propaganda" and declaring whole of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Western Armenia (aka Anatolia) "a no fly zone" in case of renewal of hostilities. Though in case of Azeri agression, an S-400 would pretty much paralyse it's airforce aloowing Armenians to shoot down Azeri fighters even while on Azeri territory. Also S-400 is designed to intercept medium-range and long-range missiles, which Azerbaijan does not posess, except for Tochka-U (and countering those with S-400 is possible, but may be a bit of a waste).

What these S-300s and S-400s mean to Armenia is a way to prevent the Azeri opponent from excessing air superiority, and to keep the warfare on the ground, which is where Armenia stands a good chance of successfully defending itself.

What Armenia needs at this stage is at least a *decent* S-300. The ones that Armenia's got have a range of only 90km, while Azeri S-300 (Favorit) has a range of 200km.

Having said that, Russian priorities in the region could be changing rapidly as of this year. This depends numerous factors:
A) whether a new agreement over rental of Gabala station in Azerbajan can be reached (hitherto rented out for $7mln/year, Azerbaijan raised the rental price to astronomical $300mln/year, which is a clear message to Russia that Azerbaijan wants them out. Armenia jumped at the opportuniy and offered a deal allowing Russia to construct an upgraded version of such station on Armenian territory. Russians may then want to suplement such a system of early warning with a system of early response such as S-400)
B) Israeli airforce operating from Azeri airfields, is not something that Russians are likely to do nothing about.
C) Iran developing both its nuclear capabilities and missile capabilities, is also a factor that Russians may want to do something about.
D) NATO's "Nuclear Sharing" program, which places nuclear missiles in Turkey and, if needed, at the disposal of Turkey, is not something to be taken lightly. Russia should be bothered about it (and I think they are), just as Americans were bothered by the missiles placed in Cuba in 1962.
E) Georgian rapid rearmament. Although Georgians using their airforce extensively (if at all) in case of a new war with Russia is unlikely, Russia may want to be safe-than-sorry.

The problem that Russia will face is how to get these S-400s to Armenia? (Georgia has now officially blocked the military transit for Russia). And getting them through Iran might prove to be politically challenging.

The likely scenario is that, as Russia is phasing out the S-300 in the next 5 years Russia will upgrade the systems in Gyumri to S-400, passing the their existing S-300 to Armenians. But even if this happens in the next 2-5 years, the general public will not know until at least 2019.

In terms of the advanced weaponry what Armenia needs at this stage is a load of Tochka-U and Iskander missiles whch would work with Kroung UAVs to take out the Azeri command HQs, air defenses (especially their S-300 Favorit), Smerch rockets, as well as keep the Sangacal Terminal, pipelines, offshore platforms and communications on target. Such capability would definitely be a dramatic game-changer and would force Azeris to enter the level of arms-race, which they will not be able to afford after 2013-2014. In case if the deal over the Gabala station doesn't go through and Russians end up constructing an upgraded station on Armenian soil, they may also supply Armenia with Iskanders so that Armenians neutralise the Gabala station when the hostilities renew (Russia definitely would not want to see this powerful station to fall into NATO hands).

[burjuin]

Re: Nagorno-Karabagh: Military Balance Between Armenia & Azerbaijan

[Joseph]

Re: Nagorno-Karabagh: Military Balance Between Armenia & Azerbaijan

I'm neither a journalist, nor a spy, so I don't have "news". I can only offer my prognosis based upon what military analysts (in various camps) have been saying, and, importantly, based on the developments in and around the region. As you know may already know Armenia has already shown interest in acquisition of S-400s and Smerches.

One thing to remember is that unlike that of Azeri armed forces, the Armenian army is highly secretive about it's possessions and military capabilities. When it comes to warfare, you want to always keep an element of surprise, so as to gain (or re-gain) the initiative. A good example of this is the acquisition of the S-300, which happened in 2005, but it was not until late 2010 that it was officially made a public knowledge.

Armenia getting its own S-400s in the near future (at least for the next 5 years) is highly unlikely. Why? For starters, the production cannot keep up with the demands of Russia's own security requirements. American plans in the Eastern Europe are making the S-400 a matter of necessity for Russia. Another aspect of this is how muddled up, short of expectations and protracted the S-400 program has become over the years. The likelihood is that while Russian air defense modernises with S-400, the S-500 (with strike-in-space capabilities) will come into play. Russians may want to place an S-400 in the Gyumri base just as an added defense against NATO as well as to have Georgia covered (in case of Georgian aggression against South Ossetia and Abkhazia), but I cannot see that such placement being a priority for Russia right now.

Does Armenia absolutely need S-400? Well, not really. At least it's not a matter of immediate necessity. With a radius of 400km, Armenia does not need these systems for purposes other than that of a "show-off/propaganda" and declaring whole of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Western Armenia (aka Anatolia) "a no fly zone" in case of renewal of hostilities. Though in case of Azeri agression, an S-400 would pretty much paralyse it's airforce aloowing Armenians to shoot down Azeri fighters even while on Azeri territory. Also S-400 is designed to intercept medium-range and long-range missiles, which Azerbaijan does not posess, except for Tochka-U (and countering those with S-400 is possible, but may be a bit of a waste).

What these S-300s and S-400s mean to Armenia is a way to prevent the Azeri opponent from excessing air superiority, and to keep the warfare on the ground, which is where Armenia stands a good chance of successfully defending itself.

What Armenia needs at this stage is at least a *decent* S-300. The ones that Armenia's got have a range of only 90km, while Azeri S-300 (Favorit) has a range of 200km.

Having said that, Russian priorities in the region could be changing rapidly as of this year. This depends numerous factors:
A) whether a new agreement over rental of Gabala station in Azerbajan can be reached (hitherto rented out for $7mln/year, Azerbaijan raised the rental price to astronomical $300mln/year, which is a clear message to Russia that Azerbaijan wants them out. Armenia jumped at the opportuniy and offered a deal allowing Russia to construct an upgraded version of such station on Armenian territory. Russians may then want to suplement such a system of early warning with a system of early response such as S-400)
B) Israeli airforce operating from Azeri airfields, is not something that Russians are likely to do nothing about.
C) Iran developing both its nuclear capabilities and missile capabilities, is also a factor that Russians may want to do something about.
D) NATO's "Nuclear Sharing" program, which places nuclear missiles in Turkey and, if needed, at the disposal of Turkey, is not something to be taken lightly. Russia should be bothered about it (and I think they are), just as Americans were bothered by the missiles placed in Cuba in 1962.
E) Georgian rapid rearmament. Although Georgians using their airforce extensively (if at all) in case of a new war with Russia is unlikely, Russia may want to be safe-than-sorry.

The problem that Russia will face is how to get these S-400s to Armenia? (Georgia has now officially blocked the military transit for Russia). And getting them through Iran might prove to be politically challenging.

The likely scenario is that, as Russia is phasing out the S-300 in the next 5 years Russia will upgrade the systems in Gyumri to S-400, passing the their existing S-300 to Armenians. But even if this happens in the next 2-5 years, the general public will not know until at least 2019.

In terms of the advanced weaponry what Armenia needs at this stage is a load of Tochka-U and Iskander missiles whch would work with Kroung UAVs to take out the Azeri command HQs, air defenses (especially their S-300 Favorit), Smerch rockets, as well as keep the Sangacal Terminal, pipelines, offshore platforms and communications on target. Such capability would definitely be a dramatic game-changer and would force Azeris to enter the level of arms-race, which they will not be able to afford after 2013-2014. In case if the deal over the Gabala station doesn't go through and Russians end up constructing an upgraded station on Armenian soil, they may also supply Armenia with Iskanders so that Armenians neutralise the Gabala station when the hostilities renew (Russia definitely would not want to see this powerful station to fall into NATO hands).

Excellent and concise. Thank you, matrixfighter.

[matrixfighter]

Re: Nagorno-Karabagh: Military Balance Between Armenia & Azerbaijan

@Federate, @Spetsnaz and @davidogha, Thank you for a warm welcome for the forum!

I'm not ready to share that article in its entirety yet. Another factor to note is that that article was addressing the realities of 2008 and a LOT has changed since then. But as I go along via my posts in this thread I will be sharing some bits of it, hopefully with updated information.

Ohanyan's reforms have had both positive and negative elements. What I'm mostly disappointed by (unless I'm wrong and missing any information) is that the K-3 riffle project has still not entered the mass-production stage. Being not just a landlocked country, but also facing a double blockage, there are numerous security issues that it should address as a matter of priority:
A) energy security,
B) food security, and
C) domestic military industrial complex,
D) population growth policy .
E) effective multiple lines of communication with the front lines

The evolution of oligarchy has seriously hampered the development of the first two (but I'm not going to talk about that). The development of domestic weapons manufacturing was largely left to the private sector, which led to some interesting and fruitful projects, but I would want to see more proactive governmental initiatives in this sphere, especially in the manufacturing of small arms, bulletproof vests (especially the ones using nano technologies), mortars and anti-tank and anti-aircraft rocketry.

The development of a domestically produced rifle around 5.45x39mm round should, in my opinion, should occupy a high priority placement. This rifle should be as reliable and as easy to operate as AK-74, and have a precision and effective range to match the British SA-80s and the Israeli Tavor TAR-21. From what I've heard the K-3 rifle was exactly that.

Contemporary battlefield is not just about firepower, but also about the "politics of statistics", and the psychological role that they play (Azeris still can't get over the 6:1 ratio). But the AK-47 was designed to address the realities of WW2 type of warfare: loads of people (mobilised from general population and often not having much training) firing as many bullets as possible. In Vietnam it proved superior to M16 because of the muddy and humid conditions and also because the Vietnamese had an interesting tactic of trying to get as close to the enemy positions as possible (so that they are actually within the short effective range of the Kalashnkov). This tactic worked in the conditions of the jungle. But in case of open terrains and mountaneous terrains (such as that of Artsakh front line) a lot more precise riffle is needed.

[davidoga]

Re: Nagorno-Karabagh: Military Balance Between Armenia & Azerbaijan

I'm neither a journalist, nor a spy, so I don't have "news". I can only offer my prognosis based upon what military analysts (in various camps) have been saying, and, importantly, based on the developments in and around the region. As you know may already know Armenia has already shown interest in acquisition of S-400s and Smerches.

One thing to remember is that unlike that of Azeri armed forces, the Armenian army is highly secretive about it's possessions and military capabilities. When it comes to warfare, you want to always keep an element of surprise, so as to gain (or re-gain) the initiative. A good example of this is the acquisition of the S-300, which happened in 2005, but it was not until late 2010 that it was officially made a public knowledge.

Armenia getting its own S-400s in the near future (at least for the next 5 years) is highly unlikely. Why? For starters, the production cannot keep up with the demands of Russia's own security requirements. American plans in the Eastern Europe are making the S-400 a matter of necessity for Russia. Another aspect of this is how muddled up, short of expectations and protracted the S-400 program has become over the years. The likelihood is that while Russian air defense modernises with S-400, the S-500 (with strike-in-space capabilities) will come into play. Russians may want to place an S-400 in the Gyumri base just as an added defense against NATO as well as to have Georgia covered (in case of Georgian aggression against South Ossetia and Abkhazia), but I cannot see that such placement being a priority for Russia right now.

Does Armenia absolutely need S-400? Well, not really. At least it's not a matter of immediate necessity. With a radius of 400km, Armenia does not need these systems for purposes other than that of a "show-off/propaganda" and declaring whole of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Western Armenia (aka Anatolia) "a no fly zone" in case of renewal of hostilities. Though in case of Azeri agression, an S-400 would pretty much paralyse it's airforce aloowing Armenians to shoot down Azeri fighters even while on Azeri territory. Also S-400 is designed to intercept medium-range and long-range missiles, which Azerbaijan does not posess, except for Tochka-U (and countering those with S-400 is possible, but may be a bit of a waste).

What these S-300s and S-400s mean to Armenia is a way to prevent the Azeri opponent from excessing air superiority, and to keep the warfare on the ground, which is where Armenia stands a good chance of successfully defending itself.

What Armenia needs at this stage is at least a *decent* S-300. The ones that Armenia's got have a range of only 90km, while Azeri S-300 (Favorit) has a range of 200km.

Having said that, Russian priorities in the region could be changing rapidly as of this year. This depends numerous factors:
A) whether a new agreement over rental of Gabala station in Azerbajan can be reached (hitherto rented out for $7mln/year, Azerbaijan raised the rental price to astronomical $300mln/year, which is a clear message to Russia that Azerbaijan wants them out. Armenia jumped at the opportuniy and offered a deal allowing Russia to construct an upgraded version of such station on Armenian territory. Russians may then want to suplement such a system of early warning with a system of early response such as S-400)
B) Israeli airforce operating from Azeri airfields, is not something that Russians are likely to do nothing about.
C) Iran developing both its nuclear capabilities and missile capabilities, is also a factor that Russians may want to do something about.
D) NATO's "Nuclear Sharing" program, which places nuclear missiles in Turkey and, if needed, at the disposal of Turkey, is not something to be taken lightly. Russia should be bothered about it (and I think they are), just as Americans were bothered by the missiles placed in Cuba in 1962.
E) Georgian rapid rearmament. Although Georgians using their airforce extensively (if at all) in case of a new war with Russia is unlikely, Russia may want to be safe-than-sorry.

The problem that Russia will face is how to get these S-400s to Armenia? (Georgia has now officially blocked the military transit for Russia). And getting them through Iran might prove to be politically challenging.

The likely scenario is that, as Russia is phasing out the S-300 in the next 5 years Russia will upgrade the systems in Gyumri to S-400, passing the their existing S-300 to Armenians. But even if this happens in the next 2-5 years, the general public will not know until at least 2019.

In terms of the advanced weaponry what Armenia needs at this stage is a load of Tochka-U and Iskander missiles whch would work with Kroung UAVs to take out the Azeri command HQs, air defenses (especially their S-300 Favorit), Smerch rockets, as well as keep the Sangacal Terminal, pipelines, offshore platforms and communications on target. Such capability would definitely be a dramatic game-changer and would force Azeris to enter the level of arms-race, which they will not be able to afford after 2013-2014. In case if the deal over the Gabala station doesn't go through and Russians end up constructing an upgraded station on Armenian soil, they may also supply Armenia with Iskanders so that Armenians neutralise the Gabala station when the hostilities renew (Russia definitely would not want to see this powerful station to fall into NATO hands).

I saved this post on my computer. Thank you matrixfighter.

[davidoga]

Re: Nagorno-Karabagh: Military Balance Between Armenia & Azerbaijan

As for Gabala radar station, even Azeri news agency have become pessimistic at this point. However, Russian MFA has all but ruled out building another such station in Armenia, saying that they are more likely to stick with the one in Russian Armavir.