Re: Nagorno-Karabagh: Military Balance Between Armenia & Azerbaijan
@Vrej1915 , thanks for the welcome!
Good points there and I mostly agree. When estimating any unfolding scenario, one must guard against oversimplifications, because this is a very complex region - a point of intersection of multiple lines of interests of multiple global players.
I never said that the resulting oil price rise is going to be the main reason for external pressure, but there will be pressure (on both sides) to end military engagements as soon as possible. Just like Sarkosy championed the cease fire, so will the western powers once again try to freeze this conflict if they see that Azerbaijan is not making much progress in advancing its military objectives. That is why Azerbaijan is purchasing the kinds of weaponry to try to fight a very swift war.
Another point to note is that Azerbaijan's current government's objectives might not be a complete conquest in this war. It may opt to regain control of certain territories (Fizuli, Qubatli, Zangelan) so as to boost the morale of its army, regain better points for rocket artillery, restore the credibility with the general population, threaten Megri and unification with Nakhichevan, and hope to finish the job in another war. (Just remember the morale boost that Azeri army had when they recaptured Horadiz.) In my opinion that is why Aliyev sat at that negotiating table - trying to regain these strategically and geopolitically significant territories "through peaceful means" so as to fight an easier war afterwards, and that didn't work.
@Eddo211 , thanks for the welcome too!
Yes, aviation is of course important in modern warfare, but Armenia currently has neither the capability to build its own, nor the resources to purchase a serious fleet externally. Most it can hope for at this stage is a Georgia-Russia-2008 kind of scenario: after Russian forces lost quite a few jets to Georgian (relatively mediocre) air defense installations during the first 2 days, the rest of the engagement was kept on the ground with tactical strikes being handled (with varying degrees of success) by Tochka-U and Iskander missiles.
@Vrej1915 , thanks for the welcome!
Good points there and I mostly agree. When estimating any unfolding scenario, one must guard against oversimplifications, because this is a very complex region - a point of intersection of multiple lines of interests of multiple global players.
I never said that the resulting oil price rise is going to be the main reason for external pressure, but there will be pressure (on both sides) to end military engagements as soon as possible. Just like Sarkosy championed the cease fire, so will the western powers once again try to freeze this conflict if they see that Azerbaijan is not making much progress in advancing its military objectives. That is why Azerbaijan is purchasing the kinds of weaponry to try to fight a very swift war.
Another point to note is that Azerbaijan's current government's objectives might not be a complete conquest in this war. It may opt to regain control of certain territories (Fizuli, Qubatli, Zangelan) so as to boost the morale of its army, regain better points for rocket artillery, restore the credibility with the general population, threaten Megri and unification with Nakhichevan, and hope to finish the job in another war. (Just remember the morale boost that Azeri army had when they recaptured Horadiz.) In my opinion that is why Aliyev sat at that negotiating table - trying to regain these strategically and geopolitically significant territories "through peaceful means" so as to fight an easier war afterwards, and that didn't work.
@Eddo211 , thanks for the welcome too!
Yes, aviation is of course important in modern warfare, but Armenia currently has neither the capability to build its own, nor the resources to purchase a serious fleet externally. Most it can hope for at this stage is a Georgia-Russia-2008 kind of scenario: after Russian forces lost quite a few jets to Georgian (relatively mediocre) air defense installations during the first 2 days, the rest of the engagement was kept on the ground with tactical strikes being handled (with varying degrees of success) by Tochka-U and Iskander missiles.
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