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Re: Regional geopolitics
Radikal, Turkey
Nov 25 2015
The Crucial Trump Card Handed to Russia!
by Fehim Tastekin
[Groong note: Translated from Turkish]
Those who think that, by downing the Russian plane, they have conveyed
a message to the Kremlin, and have put a limit on Russia, are
mistaken. The final barrier holding Russia back in Syria was the
Turkish-Russian relationship. That barrier has now been demolished.
Ankara, after the "revolution" train in Syria that it has been pushing
along since 2011 ran up against the Russians, has now entered into an
effort to hold "liberated zones" based on sensitivity for the
Turkmens. This game, however, has brought the two countries into
confrontation in a bad way with yesterday's downing of the Russian
aircraft by the TSK [Turkish Armed Forces].
The "latter-day Unionists" [comparing those in charge of Turkey's
Syria policy to the late-Ottoman Committee of Union and Progress
government] may applaud this as a first step aimed at forming a
defensive line in the name of the "armed groups" supported by the trio
of the Saudis, the Qataris, and the Turks.
Those who perceive this as an effort to save face by a government
whose red lines have been repeatedly xxxxxled upon, despite defiant
fulminations of "let no one seek to test our strength," may also
emerge. Or else some people might interpret this as showing Turkish
power. And of course Ankara's immediate call for an urgent meeting in
order to put NATO into the affair does not at all detract from the
strutting pose of this arrogant interpretation, does it?!
Everyone has been holding his breath, wondering "might Russia
retaliate?", "if Russia responds militarily, what will NATO do?", and
"might war break out?" At this stage, NATO may not be immediately
brought into the affair, and it may act as if it has forgotten the
motto of "one for all and all for one." Previously, when Syria hit a
Turkish aircraft that entered its air space, Turkey's efforts to draw
NATO in did not get a response. And the Patriots [air defence
missiles] were sent with reluctance. Certainly if Russia responds, the
situation will change, but under the current conditions, there is no
basis for the alliance to implement Article Five of the North Atlantic
Treaty. Because Turkey is not a victim. Its plane was not shot down;
it shot down a plane.
NATO no doubt is obliged to convey the image of standing alongside its
ally, but the initial reaction is to the effect of the establishment
of a dialogue that would, on an urgent basis, reduce the tension
between Turkey and Russia. And the strategic ally, the United States,
does not want to get caught up in this affair. Indeed, Pentagon
Spokesman Colonel Steve Warren has said: "This is a matter between the
Russian and Turkish governments. It is not an issue in which the
United States is involved." President Barack Obama, as well, even if
he backed Ankara by saying that "Turkey has the right to defend its
air space," showed that he does not want a crisis with Russia: "Turkey
and Russia need to talk with one another and be in direct contact so
that this is not repeated. This problem involves Russia's operations.
It is targeting oppositionists supported not only by Turkey but by a
number of countries. Russia is a part of our broad coalition, and we
do not have the right to say 'we do not want Russia.' Turkey and
Russia should reduce the tension. Russia should focus more on the
struggle against ISIL [Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant] than on
supporting [Syrian President Bashar] Al-Asad." Obama is essentially
trying to say: "Let Russia get the message, and let this affair be
closed." Of course, on this point, the question of "did the United
States encourage Ankara behind the scenes?" enters into play. Some
people must certainly have had the bright idea that "no matter what,
Russia does not want its game plan in Syria to go off the rails, and
cannot risk a war with NATO." But when things become serious, the
behind the scenes instigators have generally long since scuttled away.
Well, will Russia get the message desired to be conveyed to it? Just
on the contrary. The hitting of the aircraft, far from holding Russia
back, could lead [Russian President Vladimir] Putin to plan even
harder. From this standpoint, Turkey actually committed a serious
error and handed a major trump card to Russia. Let us make a small
observation with regard to the past two to three weeks in terms of how
this trump card might be reflected on the ground: After a Russian
passenger aircraft was brought down in the Sharm al-Shaykh region of
Egypt, Russia stepped up the intensity of the war in Syria. The
newspaper Pravda, which is the voice of the Kremlin, pointed with
regard to the downed aircraft to the countries supporting the
opposition and provided the following warning: "Qatar and Saudi Arabia
are the countries financing and organizing the terrorists. These
countries should now fear Russia a great deal." Russia's launching
ballistic missiles from its warships in the Caspian at ISIL positions
for the second time was a message to the countries that nourish the
armed groups.
Now, in contrast to the incident in Egypt, there is an incident with a
"known perpetrator," and a clear showdown. What sort of a path this
affair will put the Turkish-Russian relationship on is unknown, but a
many-sided hardening of positions now awaits the region. Russia's
response may not be aimed at Turkey directly, but rather at its Syria
plans. In this context, it may, without holding itself back, attack
the regions held by the armed groups, including the Bayir-Bujaq area
on which Turkey is very sensitive. Russia was rather cautious on the
issue of shifting the operation towards the Turkish border. In this,
it had concern for the trade partnership with Turkey, and it also did
not want the efforts launched in Vienna for a political solution to be
torpedoed.
Russia also restrained itself on another issue as well: Although it
has an abundance of documentation regarding Turkey's dealings with the
armed groups in Syria, it has not turned this into an open card to
play. And its state media has been rather cautious when it has been a
matter of Turkey. Following the downing of the civilian aircraft in
Egypt, Russia provided warnings, both in the Syria meeting in Vienna
and in the G-20 summit in Antalya, but without naming names, regarding
the countries that finance ISIL through the petroleum trade. But now
the spring is being let go all at once. Henceforth, the Russians are
not going to shrink from turning the information in their possession
into a weapon. Indeed, Putin launched the war of the dossiers
yesterday by saying: "We have been aware for a long time that large
quantities of petroleum from the regions held by the terrorists have
gone to Turkey."
The third area that this incident could impact is the negotiations for
a political solution: Russia had favoured taking the military
operations and the political process forward in parallel. It even, in
order to be able to assemble the negotiating table, displayed a more
flexible stance, at least ostensibly, towards the argument that "the
transition process must bring an end to Al-Asad." Henceforth, the
balance between the effort for a political solution and the military
operations may be upset. And the atmospherics of the dialogue that
moves the process forward may not be what they were before.
And it is inevitable that this affair is going to trigger a war of
arguments on international platforms.
The hitting of the plane came during a period when, with a high dose
of bombastic propaganda that "the Turkmens are being bombed," the
public was kept ready for likely tensions. Ankara, asserting that
Russia was bombing the Turkmen regions, is trying to portray its
action as justified. But it is not so easy to find resonance in the
international community to a cue in the form of "Turkmen villages are
being bombed, and civilians are being killed." The world does not
follow developments via the Anadolu Press Agency or the statements of
Turkmen representatives working for MIT [National Intelligence
Organization]. This incident could put Turkey not, as is thought, into
the position of "the protector of the Turkmens" but rather into that
of "the defender of the terrorist organizations" in the eyes of the
international community.
Because the things taking place in the region where the Russian
aircraft were carrying out operations do not show Turkey's story as
being all that accurate. The fact is, it is true that there are people
in the Bayir-Bujaq area east of Latakia who have taken up arms to
defend their own villages. But the fighting is taking place largely in
the mountainous areas that are very difficult to reach. And the target
of the operations is the organizations that have come together under
the umbrella of the Army of Conquest [Jaysh al-Fatah]. For one thing,
the leading organizations in the region are the Al-Qa'idah-linked
Nusra Front and Ahrar al-Sham. Nusra is continually putting on a show
by publishing images it has taken in Bayir-Bujaq. Yet another
characteristic of this region is its being an area in which foreign
jihadis who have not joined ISIL are based. Caucasian jihadis, and
particularly Chechens, are very active in the region. The Harakat Sham
al-Islam, formed by Moroccan jihadis, is also in this region.
Likewise, Uyghurs as well, who have been put into the field during the
recent months, are there as a new jihadi force. These groups are,
ideologically, on the Al-Qa'idah line. In other words, they are only
one shade lighter than ISIL, and that is all. As for the Turkmen
units, which are much spoken about: For one thing, their strength is
being very much exaggerated. Secondly, the Turkmens are operating in
conjunction with Nusra. For instance, the Sultan Abdulhamid Brigade,
which is very much in the forefront, is an ally of Nusra. This
organization had declared that they were defending Ottoman
territories, and were waging war against non-Muslims. And their
enemies list is identical with the official rhetoric of Turkey:
Al-Asad and the Kurds of the Rojava [Kurdish term for 'west,' used in
reference to northern Syria].
The Sultan Selim Brigade, which is one of those that has been most
heard of, made its name known in 2012 by raiding an Alawite village.
The record of these organizations, over which the alliance between the
West and the Gulf trembles, is not clean. It was these organizations
that raided Alawite villages in Latakia in 2013 and killed 200
civilians. They called the operation "Aisha, the Mother of the Ummah
[world community of Muslims]." And it was also these who seized Kasab
in 2014 and drove out the Armenians.
With this being the case, Turkey sent a letter to the UN Security
Council and made the following claim: "These deplorable attacks
against civilians cannot be portrayed as legitimate with the excuse of
'we are combatting terrorism,' because there are no groups linked to
DA'ISH (that is, ISIL), Al-Nusra, or Al-Qa'idah in the region."
Turkey speaks of "deplorable attacks against civilians," but Sultan
Abdulhamid Han Brigade spokesman Mustafa Abdullah, in a statement to
AA [Anadolu Agency], speaks of a fierce battle. He says that "hundreds
of dead, from the regime's troops, the Shi'i militias, and the
terrorists of Mihrac Ural [referring to the "Acilciler," or "Urgency
Group," a splinter faction of the Turkish People's Liberation
Party/Front, THKP/C, operating in Turkey's Syrian border provinces]
remained in Kizildag [Jabal al-Ahmar]." Opposition sources state that
Nusra sent a 500-man reinforcement force from other regions. And
sources with whom I have spoken say that even though the regime forces
have seized some locations, they are having considerable difficulties.
In other words, there is a fierce war raging there.
Do you think that the international actors are unaware of this state
of affairs in the region? The issue is not, as it has been presented,
a simple sensitivity with regard to the Turkmens. If there were
sincerity in the sensitivity regarding the Turkmens, then there would
not have been silence in June of 2014 when ISIL killed the Turkmens in
Mosul and in Tal Afar, or when the Turkmens fleeing the massacre were
trapped between Mosul and Arbil. The town of Bashir was under siege by
ISIL for months, and no one said a word. When the Turkmens in Taze
Hurmatu and Tuz Hurmatu were resisting, Turkey was not at their side.
(Last week, I listened to the Turkmens in Iraq; I am going to write in
detail the things they experienced and what they did.)
The issue is not the Turkmens, but rather relates to the calculations
in terms of who will control this area if the line between Azaz and
Jarabulus, which is in ISIL's control, should be abandoned. The issue
relates to holding the areas held by Turkish-supported groups to the
north of Aleppo and the rural areas of Idlib. Unfortunately, some
Turkmens have also been used in this game.
And in the end, what everyone had feared happened: Turkey did
something that everyone had avoided doing even during the Cold War
period, and became the first (in the last 62 years) NATO member to
shoot down a Russian airplane. And from NATO's standpoint, it ceased
to be a "predictable" country. It became an enemy of its most
important neighbour and trading partner. And as for us, we have become
unable to see the very nadir of strategic depth! [a reference to the
book Stratejik Derinlik -Strategic Depth -by Prime Minister Ahmet
Davutoglu]
[Groong note: the above was translated from Turkish]
Radikal, Turkey
Nov 25 2015
The Crucial Trump Card Handed to Russia!
by Fehim Tastekin
[Groong note: Translated from Turkish]
Those who think that, by downing the Russian plane, they have conveyed
a message to the Kremlin, and have put a limit on Russia, are
mistaken. The final barrier holding Russia back in Syria was the
Turkish-Russian relationship. That barrier has now been demolished.
Ankara, after the "revolution" train in Syria that it has been pushing
along since 2011 ran up against the Russians, has now entered into an
effort to hold "liberated zones" based on sensitivity for the
Turkmens. This game, however, has brought the two countries into
confrontation in a bad way with yesterday's downing of the Russian
aircraft by the TSK [Turkish Armed Forces].
The "latter-day Unionists" [comparing those in charge of Turkey's
Syria policy to the late-Ottoman Committee of Union and Progress
government] may applaud this as a first step aimed at forming a
defensive line in the name of the "armed groups" supported by the trio
of the Saudis, the Qataris, and the Turks.
Those who perceive this as an effort to save face by a government
whose red lines have been repeatedly xxxxxled upon, despite defiant
fulminations of "let no one seek to test our strength," may also
emerge. Or else some people might interpret this as showing Turkish
power. And of course Ankara's immediate call for an urgent meeting in
order to put NATO into the affair does not at all detract from the
strutting pose of this arrogant interpretation, does it?!
Everyone has been holding his breath, wondering "might Russia
retaliate?", "if Russia responds militarily, what will NATO do?", and
"might war break out?" At this stage, NATO may not be immediately
brought into the affair, and it may act as if it has forgotten the
motto of "one for all and all for one." Previously, when Syria hit a
Turkish aircraft that entered its air space, Turkey's efforts to draw
NATO in did not get a response. And the Patriots [air defence
missiles] were sent with reluctance. Certainly if Russia responds, the
situation will change, but under the current conditions, there is no
basis for the alliance to implement Article Five of the North Atlantic
Treaty. Because Turkey is not a victim. Its plane was not shot down;
it shot down a plane.
NATO no doubt is obliged to convey the image of standing alongside its
ally, but the initial reaction is to the effect of the establishment
of a dialogue that would, on an urgent basis, reduce the tension
between Turkey and Russia. And the strategic ally, the United States,
does not want to get caught up in this affair. Indeed, Pentagon
Spokesman Colonel Steve Warren has said: "This is a matter between the
Russian and Turkish governments. It is not an issue in which the
United States is involved." President Barack Obama, as well, even if
he backed Ankara by saying that "Turkey has the right to defend its
air space," showed that he does not want a crisis with Russia: "Turkey
and Russia need to talk with one another and be in direct contact so
that this is not repeated. This problem involves Russia's operations.
It is targeting oppositionists supported not only by Turkey but by a
number of countries. Russia is a part of our broad coalition, and we
do not have the right to say 'we do not want Russia.' Turkey and
Russia should reduce the tension. Russia should focus more on the
struggle against ISIL [Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant] than on
supporting [Syrian President Bashar] Al-Asad." Obama is essentially
trying to say: "Let Russia get the message, and let this affair be
closed." Of course, on this point, the question of "did the United
States encourage Ankara behind the scenes?" enters into play. Some
people must certainly have had the bright idea that "no matter what,
Russia does not want its game plan in Syria to go off the rails, and
cannot risk a war with NATO." But when things become serious, the
behind the scenes instigators have generally long since scuttled away.
Well, will Russia get the message desired to be conveyed to it? Just
on the contrary. The hitting of the aircraft, far from holding Russia
back, could lead [Russian President Vladimir] Putin to plan even
harder. From this standpoint, Turkey actually committed a serious
error and handed a major trump card to Russia. Let us make a small
observation with regard to the past two to three weeks in terms of how
this trump card might be reflected on the ground: After a Russian
passenger aircraft was brought down in the Sharm al-Shaykh region of
Egypt, Russia stepped up the intensity of the war in Syria. The
newspaper Pravda, which is the voice of the Kremlin, pointed with
regard to the downed aircraft to the countries supporting the
opposition and provided the following warning: "Qatar and Saudi Arabia
are the countries financing and organizing the terrorists. These
countries should now fear Russia a great deal." Russia's launching
ballistic missiles from its warships in the Caspian at ISIL positions
for the second time was a message to the countries that nourish the
armed groups.
Now, in contrast to the incident in Egypt, there is an incident with a
"known perpetrator," and a clear showdown. What sort of a path this
affair will put the Turkish-Russian relationship on is unknown, but a
many-sided hardening of positions now awaits the region. Russia's
response may not be aimed at Turkey directly, but rather at its Syria
plans. In this context, it may, without holding itself back, attack
the regions held by the armed groups, including the Bayir-Bujaq area
on which Turkey is very sensitive. Russia was rather cautious on the
issue of shifting the operation towards the Turkish border. In this,
it had concern for the trade partnership with Turkey, and it also did
not want the efforts launched in Vienna for a political solution to be
torpedoed.
Russia also restrained itself on another issue as well: Although it
has an abundance of documentation regarding Turkey's dealings with the
armed groups in Syria, it has not turned this into an open card to
play. And its state media has been rather cautious when it has been a
matter of Turkey. Following the downing of the civilian aircraft in
Egypt, Russia provided warnings, both in the Syria meeting in Vienna
and in the G-20 summit in Antalya, but without naming names, regarding
the countries that finance ISIL through the petroleum trade. But now
the spring is being let go all at once. Henceforth, the Russians are
not going to shrink from turning the information in their possession
into a weapon. Indeed, Putin launched the war of the dossiers
yesterday by saying: "We have been aware for a long time that large
quantities of petroleum from the regions held by the terrorists have
gone to Turkey."
The third area that this incident could impact is the negotiations for
a political solution: Russia had favoured taking the military
operations and the political process forward in parallel. It even, in
order to be able to assemble the negotiating table, displayed a more
flexible stance, at least ostensibly, towards the argument that "the
transition process must bring an end to Al-Asad." Henceforth, the
balance between the effort for a political solution and the military
operations may be upset. And the atmospherics of the dialogue that
moves the process forward may not be what they were before.
And it is inevitable that this affair is going to trigger a war of
arguments on international platforms.
The hitting of the plane came during a period when, with a high dose
of bombastic propaganda that "the Turkmens are being bombed," the
public was kept ready for likely tensions. Ankara, asserting that
Russia was bombing the Turkmen regions, is trying to portray its
action as justified. But it is not so easy to find resonance in the
international community to a cue in the form of "Turkmen villages are
being bombed, and civilians are being killed." The world does not
follow developments via the Anadolu Press Agency or the statements of
Turkmen representatives working for MIT [National Intelligence
Organization]. This incident could put Turkey not, as is thought, into
the position of "the protector of the Turkmens" but rather into that
of "the defender of the terrorist organizations" in the eyes of the
international community.
Because the things taking place in the region where the Russian
aircraft were carrying out operations do not show Turkey's story as
being all that accurate. The fact is, it is true that there are people
in the Bayir-Bujaq area east of Latakia who have taken up arms to
defend their own villages. But the fighting is taking place largely in
the mountainous areas that are very difficult to reach. And the target
of the operations is the organizations that have come together under
the umbrella of the Army of Conquest [Jaysh al-Fatah]. For one thing,
the leading organizations in the region are the Al-Qa'idah-linked
Nusra Front and Ahrar al-Sham. Nusra is continually putting on a show
by publishing images it has taken in Bayir-Bujaq. Yet another
characteristic of this region is its being an area in which foreign
jihadis who have not joined ISIL are based. Caucasian jihadis, and
particularly Chechens, are very active in the region. The Harakat Sham
al-Islam, formed by Moroccan jihadis, is also in this region.
Likewise, Uyghurs as well, who have been put into the field during the
recent months, are there as a new jihadi force. These groups are,
ideologically, on the Al-Qa'idah line. In other words, they are only
one shade lighter than ISIL, and that is all. As for the Turkmen
units, which are much spoken about: For one thing, their strength is
being very much exaggerated. Secondly, the Turkmens are operating in
conjunction with Nusra. For instance, the Sultan Abdulhamid Brigade,
which is very much in the forefront, is an ally of Nusra. This
organization had declared that they were defending Ottoman
territories, and were waging war against non-Muslims. And their
enemies list is identical with the official rhetoric of Turkey:
Al-Asad and the Kurds of the Rojava [Kurdish term for 'west,' used in
reference to northern Syria].
The Sultan Selim Brigade, which is one of those that has been most
heard of, made its name known in 2012 by raiding an Alawite village.
The record of these organizations, over which the alliance between the
West and the Gulf trembles, is not clean. It was these organizations
that raided Alawite villages in Latakia in 2013 and killed 200
civilians. They called the operation "Aisha, the Mother of the Ummah
[world community of Muslims]." And it was also these who seized Kasab
in 2014 and drove out the Armenians.
With this being the case, Turkey sent a letter to the UN Security
Council and made the following claim: "These deplorable attacks
against civilians cannot be portrayed as legitimate with the excuse of
'we are combatting terrorism,' because there are no groups linked to
DA'ISH (that is, ISIL), Al-Nusra, or Al-Qa'idah in the region."
Turkey speaks of "deplorable attacks against civilians," but Sultan
Abdulhamid Han Brigade spokesman Mustafa Abdullah, in a statement to
AA [Anadolu Agency], speaks of a fierce battle. He says that "hundreds
of dead, from the regime's troops, the Shi'i militias, and the
terrorists of Mihrac Ural [referring to the "Acilciler," or "Urgency
Group," a splinter faction of the Turkish People's Liberation
Party/Front, THKP/C, operating in Turkey's Syrian border provinces]
remained in Kizildag [Jabal al-Ahmar]." Opposition sources state that
Nusra sent a 500-man reinforcement force from other regions. And
sources with whom I have spoken say that even though the regime forces
have seized some locations, they are having considerable difficulties.
In other words, there is a fierce war raging there.
Do you think that the international actors are unaware of this state
of affairs in the region? The issue is not, as it has been presented,
a simple sensitivity with regard to the Turkmens. If there were
sincerity in the sensitivity regarding the Turkmens, then there would
not have been silence in June of 2014 when ISIL killed the Turkmens in
Mosul and in Tal Afar, or when the Turkmens fleeing the massacre were
trapped between Mosul and Arbil. The town of Bashir was under siege by
ISIL for months, and no one said a word. When the Turkmens in Taze
Hurmatu and Tuz Hurmatu were resisting, Turkey was not at their side.
(Last week, I listened to the Turkmens in Iraq; I am going to write in
detail the things they experienced and what they did.)
The issue is not the Turkmens, but rather relates to the calculations
in terms of who will control this area if the line between Azaz and
Jarabulus, which is in ISIL's control, should be abandoned. The issue
relates to holding the areas held by Turkish-supported groups to the
north of Aleppo and the rural areas of Idlib. Unfortunately, some
Turkmens have also been used in this game.
And in the end, what everyone had feared happened: Turkey did
something that everyone had avoided doing even during the Cold War
period, and became the first (in the last 62 years) NATO member to
shoot down a Russian airplane. And from NATO's standpoint, it ceased
to be a "predictable" country. It became an enemy of its most
important neighbour and trading partner. And as for us, we have become
unable to see the very nadir of strategic depth! [a reference to the
book Stratejik Derinlik -Strategic Depth -by Prime Minister Ahmet
Davutoglu]
[Groong note: the above was translated from Turkish]
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