Regional geopolitics

[Vrej1915]

Re: Regional geopolitics

Russia lifts ban on chartered flights to Turkey
DEBKA
August 28, 2016,

In another step betokening the advancing Moscow-Ankara détente, Russia's Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev has signed an order to lift the ban for chartered flights between Russia and Turkey, while advising air companies to provide additional security measures. Last October, Moscow imposed restrictions on goods and services from Turkey after a Turkish fighter jet shot down a Russian bomber. Bilateral ties were restored on Aug, 9 when the Russian and Turkish presidents met at St. Petersburg.


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[Vrej1915]

Re: Regional geopolitics

All-out Turkish-Kurd war. Barazani goes to Tehran
Debka
29/08/2016

An all-out Turkish-Kurdish war has boiled over in northern Syria since the Turkish army crossed the border last Wednesday, Aug. 24 for the avowed aim of fighting the Islamic State and pushing the Syrian Kurdish YPG militia back. Instead of falling back, the Kurds went on the offensive and are taking a hammering. This raging confrontation has stalled the US-led coalition offensive against ISIS and put on indefinite hold any US plans for campaigns to drive the jihadists out of their Syrian and Iraqi capitals of Raqqa and Mosul.
The Kurdish militia ground troops, who were backed by the US and assigned the star role in these campaigns, are now fully engaged in fighting Turkey. And, in another radical turnaround, Iraqi Kurdish leaders (of the Kurdish Regional Republic) have responded by welcoming Iran to their capital, in retaliation for the US decision to join forces with Turkey at the expense of Kurdish aspirations.
The KRG’s Peshmerga are moreover pitching in to fight with their Syrian brothers. Together, they plan to expel American presence and influence from both northern Syria and northern Iraq in response to what they perceive as a US sellout of the Kurds.
DEBKAfile’s military analysts trace the evolving steps of this escalating complication of the Syrian war and its wider impact:
Since cleansing Jarablus of ISIS, Turkey has thrown large, additional armored and air force into the battle against the 35.000-strong YPG Kurdish fighters. This is no longer just a sizeable military raid, as Ankara has claimed, but a full-fledged war operation. Turkish forces are continuing to advancing in three directions and by Sunday, Aug. 28 had struck 15-17km deep inside northern Syria across a 100km wide strip.
Their targets are clearly defined: the Kurdish enclave of Afrin in northwest Syria and the Kurdish enclave of Qamishli and Hassaka in the east, in order to block the merger of Kurdish enclaves into a contiguous Syrian Kurdish state.
Another goal was Al-Bab north of and within range of Aleppo for a role in a major theater of the Syrian conflict. To reach Al-Bab, the Turkish force would have to fight its way through Kurdish-controlled territory.
The Turks are also using a proxy to fight the Syrian Kurds. Thousands of Syrian Democratic Army (SDF) rebels, whom they trained and supplied to fight Syria’s Bashar Assad army and the Islamic State, have been diverted to targeting the Kurds under the command of Turkish officers, to which Turkish elite forces are attached.
A Turkish Engineering Corps combat unit is equipped for crossing the Euphrates River and heading east to push the Kurds further back. Contrary to reports, the Turkish have not yet crossed the river itself or pushed the Kurds back - only forded a small stream just east of Jarablus. The main Kurdish force is deployed to the south not the east of the former ISIS stronghold.



Neither have Turkish-backed Syrian forces captured Manbij, the town 35km south of Jarablus which the Kurds with US support captured from ISIS earlier this month. Contrary to claims by Ankara’s spokesmen, those forces are still only 10-15km on the road to Mabij.
Sunday, heavy fighting raged around a cluster of Kurdish villages, Beir Khoussa and Amarneh, where the Turks were forced repeatedly to retreat under Kurdish counter attacks. Some of the villages were razed to the ground by the Turkish air force and tanks. At least 35 villagers were reported killed.
In four days of fierce battles, the Kurds suffered 150 dead and the Turkish side, 60.
DEBKAfile military sources also report preparations Sunday to evacuate US Special Operations Forces and helicopter units from the Rmeilan air base near the Syrian-Kurdish town of Hassaka. If the fighting around the base intensifies, they will be relocated in northern Iraq.
Fighters of the Iraqi-Kurdish Peshmerga were seen removing their uniforms and donning Syrian YPG gear before crossing the border Sunday and heading west to join their Syrian brothers in the battle against Turkey.
The KRG President Masoud Barazani expects to travel to Tehran in the next few days with an SOS for Iranian help against the US and the Turks. On the table for a deal is permission from Irbil for the Iranian Revolutionary Guards to win their first military bases in the Iraqi Kurdish republic, as well as transit for Iranian military forces to reach Syria through Kurdish territory..

[Vrej1915]

Re: Regional geopolitics

Le PKK syrien, nouveau dindon de la farce américaine


En dépit des divergences de fond entre Syriens et Turcs, l'urgence de la situation pourrait favoriser un rapprochement : les Kurdes en échange d'Alep.
Lina KENNOUCHE |
OLJ30/08/2016


La Turquie poursuivait hier ses attaques dans le nord de la Syrie avec de nouveaux tirs d'artillerie, au sixičme jour d'une offensive d'envergure conjuguant attaques terrestres et frappes aériennes. Au prétexte d'une sécurisation de la zone frontaličre entre Aazaz et Jarablous, Ankara se déploie sur le terrain pour tenter de reprendre des zones contrôlées par les forces kurdes et affaiblir leur influence.
Depuis juin 2016, les forces kurdes des unités du PYD, branche syrienne du PKK, commandées et formées par les officiers des Forces spéciales des États-Unis et soutenues par des raids de la coalition, avaient établi une tęte de pont ŕ l'ouest de l'Euphrate et conquis de nouvelles localités autour de Manbij. Or, dčs le départ, la préoccupation fondamentale des Turcs était d'empęcher les Kurdes de traverser l'Euphrate vers l'ouest. En les confinant ŕ l'est, ils cherchent ŕ briser la continuité territoriale des trois cantons kurdes, leur fermer l'accčs ŕ la Méditerranée et les prendre en tenailles entre les groupes syriens d'opposition et ceux de Massoud Barzani leader du Parti démocratique du Kurdistan, farouchement hostile ŕ la présence du PKK dans le « Kurdistan » syrien. Freinés ŕ l'ouest, et dans l'incapacité de progresser au sud dans les zones majoritairement arabes, cette configuration devait tuer dans l'œuf leur projet autonomiste.
Or, la montée en puissance du PKK en Syrie (PYD), qui tente d'unifier la lutte en Syrie et en Turquie, et l'importance de son dispositif militaire renforcent les inquiétudes d'Ankara. Cette situation militaire et politique a conduit la Turquie ŕ intervenir directement sur le terrain.
Ainsi, l'intensification de l'opération « Bouclier de l'Euphrate », déclenchée au moment de la visite du vice-président américain Joe Biden, traduit la priorité stratégique des Turcs. Celle-ci reste trčs éloignée de la neutralisation de la menace de l'État islamique (EI), comme l'a montré l'offensive sur Jarablous, lors de laquelle les jihadistes de l'organisation ont pour la premičre fois abandonné leurs positions sans se battre contre les troupes turques. Pour Ankara, l'objectif n'est aujourd'hui plus simplement de limiter la présence des Kurdes ŕ l'est de l'Euphrate, mais de rétablir le statut quo ante ŕ l'établissement du Rojava (région autoproclamée kurde dans le nord de la Syrie) en juillet 2012 pour enterrer définitivement leur projet d'autonomie et affaiblir durablement le PKK.

Absence de vision stratégique
Dans le cadre de la réconciliation avec Ankara, Washington a, en fin de compte, livré les Kurdes ŕ la merci de l'armée turque en offrant une démonstration éloquente de son sens des priorités : il était exclu de sacrifier des relations historiques avec Ankara, partenaire stratégique, pour satisfaire les revendications des Kurdes, leur allié tactique. Les Kurdes ont abandonné Manbij sous la pression américaine, et la déclaration dans la matinée du 24 aoűt de Ridour Khalil, porte-parole des YPG, faisant part de leur refus de renoncer ŕ cette localité stratégique contrastait radicalement avec la communication faite en début d'aprčs-midi et présentant ce retrait fermement exigé par Washington comme un départ volontaire. La fin des espoirs kurdes de contrôler cette ville stratégique de Manbij, contrepartie négociée de leur participation ŕ l'offensive de Raqqa, aura désormais pour conséquence le refus des forces kurdes de se lancer dans une opération sans précédent contre l'EI dans cette ville. Ce renversement de situation en défaveur des Kurdes n'est pourtant pas sans lien avec l'absence de vision stratégique du PKK, aujourd'hui véritable force agissante en Syrie ŕ travers le PYD, qui reproduit les paris hasardeux et répétés du mouvement national kurde. En misant exclusivement sur les Américains sans tenir compte des rapports de force régionaux, les Kurdes apparaissent une nouvelle fois comme les victimes de leurs ambitions démesurées. La confusion entre le niveau stratégique et le niveau tactique a systématiquement empęché les Kurdes de transformer leurs avantages militaires en gains politiques. Ŕ mesure que le régime s'affaiblissait et que l'opposition apparaissait de plus en plus divisée, les Kurdes ont adopté l'approche stratégique du fait accompli, percevant dans le soutien américain une nouvelle opportunité historique pour concrétiser leurs revendications nationalistes. Or non seulement les États-Unis sont en train de sacrifier la carte kurde, mais un nouvel accord entre le régime de Damas et la Turquie semble sur le point de voir le jour.

« Alep » contre les « Kurdes »
Si jusque-lŕ les Turcs avaient mis tout leur poids dans la bataille d'Alep, en renforçant leur aide logistique et militaire aux groupes d'opposition et en planifiant des attaques comme l'opération contre la faculté militaire de Ramousseh, menée par Hizb el-Islami turkistani, sous le commandement des services turcs, sur le terrain, une convergence turco-syrienne est en train de prendre forme. Le régime syrien qui, tout en multipliant les déclarations agressives ŕ l'égard de l'intervention turque, ne semble pas voir d'un mauvais œil l'arrivée de ces troupes au sol, et la focalisation sur l'affrontement avec les Kurdes de groupes rebelles d'obédience turque. Cette nouvelle donne est elle-męme liée aux avancées dans les discussions aprčs la deuxičme rencontre entre Turcs, Iraniens et Syriens ŕ Bagdad. La prochaine réunion ŕ Damas dimanche prochain et celle qui suivra ŕ Moscou devraient permettre de clarifier les contours d'un accord dont les termes semblent déjŕ : les Kurdes en échange d'Alep. En dépit des divergences de fond entre Syriens et Turcs, un rapprochement semble en cours. Les Kurdes pourraient bien ętre les grands perdants de l'accord politique sur l'avenir de la Syrie.

http://www.lorientlejour.com/article/1004370/le-pkk-syrien-nouveau-dindon-de-la-farce-americaine.html

[Vrej1915]

Re: Regional geopolitics

Russian Army convoy arrives in Aleppo
By Leith Fadel - 30/08/20165
Masdarnews

On Monday morning, local activists in the Aleppo Governorate reported that a convoy of Russian soldiers were seen traveling along the Castillo Highway to the provincial capital.

At the time, Al-Masdar was unable to verify these reports; however, after speaking to members of the Syrian Armed Forces and local journalists in Aleppo, we are able to confirm the arrival of several Russian soldiers to the city.

The Russian soldiers reportedly traveled in several vehicles from the Latakia Governorate to the provincial capital of Aleppo, where they were finally settled before nightfall on Monday.

According to a military source in the Aleppo Governorate, the convoy consisted of over 120 Russian soldiers and it included a number of armored vehicles.

The Russian personnel will likely retain the role of “military advisors” as they coordinate the Syrian Arab Army’s (SAA) battle plans in the Aleppo Governorate.

[Vrej1915]

Re: Regional geopolitics

Turkish-backed rebels attempt to hijack Kurdish gains against ISIS
By Leith Fadel - 30/08/2016
Masdarnews

Map of northern Aleppo by Faylaq Al-Sham's official media wing
Aleppo, Syria (3:30 A.M.) – The Turkish-backed “Free Syrian Army” (FSA) and their Islamist allies are attempting to capitalize on the gains made by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) against the Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Sham (ISIS) in northeastern Aleppo.

Earlier this month, the SDF managed to liberate the key town of Menbeij after a long battle with the Islamic State terrorists.

Following Menbeij’s liberation, the SDF pushed further south in a new attempt to expel the Islamic State terrorists from the northeastern countryside of Aleppo.

Now, the Turkish-backed rebels are attempting to hijack these victories from the SDF and Kurdish-led “People’s Protection Units” (YPG), leaving them with only two options: 1) leave and live or 2) fight and die.

For the Kurdish forces and their Arab allies, giving up Menbeij after sacrificing several hundred fighters to liberate it would be appalling; however, the Turkish regime could not care less about their plight.

In fact, the Turkish-backed rebels reportedly crossed the Sajur River in northern Aleppo on Monday and captured the village of ‘Ayn Al-Dadat in northern Menbeij.

The Kurdish forces are now on high-alert after the Turkish-backed rebels made their first major push towards Menbeij on Monday.

Despite the repeated threats made by the Turkish regime, the Kurdish forces remain defiant and optimistic in northern Aleppo, as they promise to defend the area from any unwanted guests.

[Azad]

Re: Regional geopolitics

As I said this before and I am saying it gain. Something is not making sense with all these Russians, Americans and turks circulating all over the place. There is definitely an agreement between the Russians and the Americans for the region (notice no complaints from each other’s presence or actions in the region). turkey is assuming Russia and the West are fighting to gain its foreign policy, thinks it is on with the big boys plans, toped with Russia lifting the travel ban to turkey. The reality, they are trying to extend the conflict into turkey, while turkey thinks it got the green light to cleans its kurdish “terrorists”.

[armnuke]

Re: Regional geopolitics

Turkey says it's ready to capture Syria's Raqqa from ISIS

http://echelon-defense.com/2016/09/07/turkey-says-its-ready-to-capture-syrias-raqqa-from-isis/

[armnuke]

Re: Regional geopolitics

Video: Turkish M60T Sabra tanks hit by ISIS ATGM near Al-Rai, northern Syria

http://echelon-defense.com/2016/09/07/video-turkish-m60t-sabra-tanks-hit-by-isis-atgm-near-al-rai-northern-syria/

[Joseph]

Re: Regional geopolitics

http://www.eurasianet.org/node/80446

Azerbaijan: Economy Riding in the Breakdown Lane

September 7, 2016 - 2:37pm Azerbaijan

Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev and First Lady Mehriban Aliyeva at a Grand Prix auto race in Baku. Azeri authorities spent tens of millions of dollars on the race, which critics derided as a vanity project that satisfied the leadership’s craving for international attention, despite indications that government finances are tight and Azerbaijan’s economy could spin out. (Photo: Azerbaijani Presidential Press Service)
Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev and First Lady Mehriban Aliyeva at a Grand Prix auto race in Baku. Azeri authorities spent tens of millions of dollars on the race, which critics derided as a vanity project that satisfied the leadership’s craving for international attention, despite indications that government finances are tight and Azerbaijan’s economy could spin out. (Photo: Azerbaijani Presidential Press Service)

Just a few months ago, authorities in Azerbaijan spent tens of millions of dollars on hosting a Grand Prix auto race, which critics derided as a vanity project that satisfied the leadership’s craving for international attention, but did not produce any tangible benefits for the general population. Now, there are several indicators that government finances are tight and Azerbaijan’s economy could spin out.

The clearest sign of Azerbaijan’s fiscal vulnerability is the late-August move by commercial banks to suspend the sale of foreign currency, specifically US dollars. In the weeks leading up to the suspension, demand for dollars spiked, thus causing the Azerbaijani currency, the manat, to slide.

The manat’s summer woes fuelled fears that the government would carry out the third devaluation of the national currency since the winter of 2015. In September 2014, the manat traded at 0.78 to the US dollar. The rate on September 7, 2016, was 1.66 per dollar. The Central Bank in late August, prior to the suspension of foreign currency sales, characterized devaluation fears as “groundless.”

Beyond the currency question, there is growing concern about the state of government finances. Over the past few years, President Ilham Aliyev’s administration has gained a reputation for being among the most repressive leaderships in Eurasia. Accordingly, it maintains tight control over the flow of information, which makes it difficult to determine the full extent of the financial crisis confronting the government.

Yet all visible signs indicate that the state budget is under tremendous strain. According to Fitch Ratings, the government has halted most spending on infrastructure and other capital projects. Authorities are also hastily assembling a privatization program in the hopes of bringing in additional revenue.

Officials have scheduled three privatization auctions this month (September 14, 20, 26) for stakes in 191 properties. No estimate has been released for the total value of these shares. In January, Finance Minister Samir Sharifov stated, though, that the government planned to bring in about 100 million manats (over $60.1 million) from the sales, news agencies reported.

The State Committee on Property Issues has launched a portal to provide information about the properties up for sale. Officials also aim to hold online auctions in the hope that doing so will facilitate foreign investors’ participation.

But the portal is difficult to navigate and it appears to raise more questions about the process than it answers. The most significant obstacle for would-be foreign investors is the fact that that portal only has Azeri-language information about the offered properties. In addition, financial information for the listed properties appears to be denominated in British pounds, not US dollars or Euros, thus creating a conversion burden for many potential foreign investors.

The source of Azerbaijan’s economic challenges is the drastic decline in energy prices, which have led to a sharp decline over the past two years in revenue generated by oil and natural gas exports. The Aliyev administration’s chief response so far to the mounting economic troubles was a decree in July to form a Financial Stability Council. But in its almost two months of operation, the council has not made noticeable progress in promoting macroeconomic stability.

In the absence of government spending, the country’s non-energy-related economic sectors contracted at a rate of 5.4 percent during the first half of 2016, compared with the same period the previous year. The inflation rate, meanwhile, is estimated at 12 percent for this year.

It is not just the government that is struggling financially. Businesses and individuals are having increasing trouble meeting their obligations. According to the State Statistics Committee, the growth rate for non-performing loans stood at 15 percent rate during the first six months of 2016, totaling 1.53 billion manats, a figure approaching $1 billion at the current exchange rate. According to some reports, the current volume of non-performing loans exceeds one-third of bank capital in Azerbaijan.

While businesses and individuals may be walking a financial tightrope without a net, the government has considerable reserve funds with which it can use to plug financial gaps, funds accumulated during the bygone era when energy exports reaped windfall profits. In addition to Central Bank reserves, authorities can also draw on the State Oil Fund of Azerbaijan (SOFAZ).

The Central Bank said its foreign exchange reserves stood at $4.19 billion as of September 1, a modest increase from the 2016 low-point of $4.02 billion the bank reported in February. However, the 2016 monthly totals are markedly less than the Bank’s reserves just a few years ago. In July of 2014, the reserves hit its all-time high of $15.19 billion. The Bank squandered much of its exchange cushion in an ill-fated attempt to prop up the manat.

The government’s fiscal troubles appears to have been a factor in draining the Oil Fund, which saw its overall value drop from $37.1 billion in 2014 to $33.6 billion at the end of 2015. SOFAZ reported $35.11 billion in assets at the end of the first half of 2016.

Ultimately, the government will be facing tough choices over the coming year. Prices for oil and natural gas, the export of which is the Azerbaijani government’s critical source of revenue, are expected to remain flat. Given that Azerbaijan is not projected to significantly raise its oil and gas production volumes, government revenue should continue to fall short of initial projections.

The best path out of the fiscal pit the country now finds itself in would be to liberalize the economy, and promote diversification with the aim of weaning it from its dependence on energy exports. But liberalization would require the Aliyev administration to make dramatic changes in its authoritarian ways, and it has yet to send any signals it is willing to do so.

[Joseph]

Re: Regional geopolitics

https://www.ft.com/content/d89d55ae-6b73-11e6-a0b1-d87a9fea034f