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In this tread I propose to collect, wiki cables of special interest to us.
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Re: Wikileaks
WikiLeaks: Aliyev On Why He Didn't Support Georgia Publicly in 2008
WikiLeaks: Ilham Aliyev Talks On Why He Didn't Support Georgia
Publicly in August 2008
WASHINGTON DC. September 12, 2011: The new WikiLeaks report sheds
light on Azerbaijan's position during the Russian invasion of Georgia.
The diplomatic cable from the US Embassy in Baku to the US State
Department dated August 22, 2008 shows that the government of Ilham
Aliyev refrained from publicly supporting Georgia, but covertly
supported that country to ensure its survival against the Russian
attacks. The report quotes the president Aliyev telling the US
diplomats that he had a series of tough negotiations with the Russian
leadership in order to protect the BTC oil pipeline, and the areas of
Marneuli region of Georgia which was home to significant number of
ethnic Azeris. Below is the full text of the cable:
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAKU 000790
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/21/2009
TAGS: ENRG, ETRD, PREL, AJ, RU, TR
SUBJECT: AZERBAIJANI PRESIDENT: I DIDN'T STAND BEHIND SAAKASHVILI
BECAUSE IT WOULD HAVE MADE NO DIFFERENCE
REF: ANKARA 1474
Classified By: Charge Donald Lu, for reasons 1.4 (b,d).
1. (C) SUMMARY: On August 19, President Aliyev told visiting British
Petroleum CEO Inglis that Azerbaijan is taking quiet steps to support
Georgia, although Aliyev himself did not publicly support the Georgian
President. For example, Azerbaijanis are repairing a critical rail
bridge destroyed by the Russians. Aliyev reconfirmed his western
orientation for oil and gas exports, although he acknowledged that he
would sell some gas to Russia and oil to Iran. Aliyev stressed that
gas sales to Russia would be limited, maybe 2 bcm, and that the
purpose would be to pressure Turkey to conclude gas transit talks; oil
sales to Iran are a result of current pipeline constraints. Aliyev
said that during the crisis he phoned Moscow to warn them against
attacking Azeri interests in Georgia, including pipelines, the ethnic
Azeri community and the Azeri-owned oil terminal at Kulevi. END
SUMMARY.
2. (C) On August 20, British Petroleum's Chief Executive Officer for
Exploration and Production Andrew Inglis briefed the Charge on his
one-hour one-on-one meeting with President Ilham Aliyev on the evening
of August 19. Inglis was to meet Aliyev on August 20, but the
President asked to see Inglis early before the President's meeting
with visiting Turkish PM Erdogan. Inglis said that the President
appeared "relaxed, convivial and warm."
PRESIDENT'S REACTION TO GEORGIA CRISIS
3. (C) The President told Inglis, "I didn't rush to stand behind
Saakashvili because it would have made no difference." The President
quickly added that Azerbaijan is quietly finding ways to support
Georgia. He claimed that Azerbaijan is providing more aid than anyone
by using its people within the country (Comment: a possible reference
to ethnic Azeri Georgians) to do "real things." For example, he
reported that Azerbaijanis are repairing the destroyed rail bridge
link.
4. (C) Aliyev emphasized that the events of the past few days
"reinforce the journey (towards a western orientation) and not the
need for a U-turn." He said that he is not in favor of changing his
foreign policy in response to this conflict. His foreign policy has
been to develop Azerbaijan's independence from Russia using its oil
and gas resources. This engagement continues.
5. (C) The President did probe Inglis about the timing of the Georgia
invasion in relation to the PKK attack on the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan
(BTC) pipeline. He did not explicitly endorse the following conspiracy
theory, but was interested in Inglis' reaction. Aliyev linked the
following events: -- The PKK, formerly sponsored by the KGB, attacks
the BTC. -- Three days later Russia invades Georgia. -- In a seemingly
random act, the Russians blows up a key railway bridge halting rail
export of oil. -- A stray bomb falls 10 meters from the Baku-Supsa oil
pipeline. -- Transneft reports a technical fault along the
Novorossiysk Line threatening one of the last remaining oil export
route.
PRESIDENT ALIYEV PHONES MOSCOW
6. (C) President Aliyev noted that when he learned that a stray
Russian bomb struck near the Baku-Supsa line, he rang Moscow (he
inferred that he called Putin but did not specify). He said that he
wanted to make clear that it would be considered a "major act" if
Russia took actions against Azerbaijan's interests. He specifically
complained about the bombing of a military airfield in the ethnic
Azeri community of Marneuli, the stray bomb near the Baku-Supsa
pipeline and reports of Russian troops entering the Azeri-owned oil
terminal at Kulevi. Aliyev said that in response, the troops withdrew
from Kulevi and there were no further bombings in these sensitive
areas.
GAS SALES TO RUSSIA A "SUBTERFUGE"
7. (C) Inglis explained that limited future gas sales to Russia are
for the purposes of enhancing Azerbaijan's position in the gas transit
talks with Turkey. He emphasized that Aliyev told him that Azerbaijan
still wants to sell Shah Deniz Phase Two gas west and not north. "It
would be madness to do otherwise. The events have not changed the
(political) rationale for exporting gas westward," the President
added.
8. (C) Inglis believes that Aliyev is in a much stronger position with
Turkey than a month ago. Inglis added that Turkey must agree to
transit rights and that Aliyev is not going to negotiate from a point
of weakness. Aliyev said that he would be selling some gas to Russia
and that "these sales to Russia must be credible." Inglis noted that,
for Russia, some is not enough. There is not enough gas to go around
and Russia wants it all. There's no compromise solution. The 2 bcm to
Russia is not significant. It is "subterfuge" for the price
negotiations, Inglis added.
9. (C) The President also told Inglis that as a result of the pipeline
closures, Azerbaijan will be forced to sell crude to Iran.
ADDITIONAL DETAILS ABOUT THE PKK ATTACK ON BTC
10. (C) Inglis confirmed reftel report that BP has evidence showing
that the fire at the block valve along BTC in Turkey was the result of
sabotage. "We are absolutely confident it was terrorism," he said. The
evidence are photos showing a dent in the 8 inch bypass pressure line
showing force from the outside as well as shrapnel holes. He passed
copies of these photos to President Aliyev to show Turkish PM Erdogan
in the event Erdogan denied that this was caused by terrorists.
11. (C) Inglis added that the block valves are the most vulnerable
points, while the 42 inch main line is buried and was not damaged. To
attack the main line would require a two meter trench, and something
to penetrate its thick alloy. There are ten most vulnerable block
valves in Turkey. BP has asked that the Turkish security forces "camp
out" at these valve stations, in addition to requesting that the
Turkish State Oil Company Botas eventually harden the facilities
around the valves. BP has raised this with the Ministry of Energy in
Turkey, but believes it needs to be raised with the Turkish Army as
well.
12. (C) In Turkey, block valves are housed in "little green corrugated
shacks," whereas in Azerbaijan and Georgia the block valves and
actuators are in concrete buildings with intrusion detectors. In
Borjomi, Georgia, BP has installed carbon fiber matting to defend the
main line against an RPG attack and fiber optic lines above the main
line to detect digging.
AZERI CHARM OFFENSIVE WITH BP
13. (C) Last year, the Azerbaijani State Oil Company (SOCAR) was
threatening to have BP Azerbaijan's President arrested and tried for
theft of state resources. In contrast, Inglis described the mood about
BP in Azerbaijan as having come full circle. Aliyev made positive
comments to the press about BP and SOCAR being friends in difficult
times.
14. (C) The President told Inglis that Azerbaijan still needs BP. He
asked rhetorically, "If SOCAR owned BTC would it still be there?" The
President said he knows that he needs to keep BP motivated and
interested in Azerbaijan. There was good discussion about a Production
Sharing Agreement (PSA) extension and the extraction of
Azeri-Chirag-Guneshli (ACG) deep gas. Inglis believed the details will
still move at a certain pace, for tactical reasons, but that these
issues are headed in the right direction.
15. (C) The President summoned the SOCAR President after the evening
meeting with Inglis and made SOCAR available to Inglis the next day.
"(SOCAR President) Rovnag (Abdullayev) was the nicest Rovnaq we've
ever met." Inglis said that he had "real conversation" with Abdullayev
about the Shah Deniz Phase One gas price. Inglis advised SOCAR to
settle on a price now and not wait for a conclusion of transit talks
as the price of gas is rising every day.
COMMENT
16. (C) Inglis believes that Aliyev is looking for a statement from
the West (and particularly the U.S.) that parallels Aliyev's statement
to Moscow: If you mess with the pipelines, you're messing with us. He
noted that Aliyev was dismissive of high-level people turning up in
Baku for a photo-op with him and lacking a substantive message.
17. (C) On the sale of Azeri gas to Russia, Inglis clearly seemed to
be spinning this to try to head off expected U.S. objection to such a
sale. His analysis may yet be true about this sale being used to
pressure Turkey over transit talks, but it is also doubtless motivated
by BP's commercial interest in developing a market and routes to
justify Shah Deniz Phase Two and ACG deep gas production. Likewise,
Azerbaijan oil sales to Iran could be problematic, if continued over
the longer-term. LU
(Azerireport) -
Re: Wikileaks
Iran, Azerbaijan In Tense Caspian Standoff, Cables Show
October 4, 2011 - 4:32pm, by Joshua Kucera The Bug Pit Azerbaijan Iran U.S.
Iran's movement of an oil rig toward Azerbaijan's territorial waters in the Caspian Sea in 2009 caused Baku to fret about its lack of military capacity to handle such a threat, and to seek advice from U.S. officials on what to do, recently released Wikileaks cables show.
The cables make for some fascinating reading, and seem to provide some real insight into the strategic thinking of both the Azerbaijani and U.S. governments about the threat of conflict in the Caspian. They make it clear that Azerbaijan is afraid of both Iran and Russian threats against its gas and oil infrastructure in the Caspian, and that U.S. embassy officials are eager to prevent any such conflict because of the economic disruption that it would cause.
The crisis, which seems not to have been previously reported, began in November 2009, when Iran moved its new Alborz-Iran rig into waters that were disputed between Azerbaijan and Iran. The U.S. shared some (unspecified) intelligence information to Ali Asadov, senior energy advisor to President Heydar Aliyev to which Asadov responded:
"This situation is challenging, your information shows this. This tension will escalate." Asadov did not outline specific responses the Azerbaijani government planned to undertake. Rather, like many of our GOAJ interlocutors, Asadov appears to be gathering information and weighing Azerbaijani options, in light of superior Iranian naval strength."
Asadov's assessment of the situation is worth quoting at length:
Asadov stated that the Iranian incursion "was not only about Iran, but about our northern neighbor (Russia)." He told us that Russia was increasing military pressure in the Caspian Sea, placing obstacles in the path of a possible Trans-Caspian Pipeline, and preventing Azerbaijan's energy cooperation with Turkmenistan. He described Russia's goal as preventing the transport of Azerbaijani and Central Asian gas to world markets. He noted that of all of the countries in the region, only Azerbaijan's energy resources were now exported to world Markets without transiting Russia. Russia, he declared, blocked Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. He also described Russia as eager to thwart thawing relations between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan...
Asadov outlined his core concern: Iran and Russia are taking advantage of the current poor state of Azerbaijani-Turkish relations and stalled gas transit discussions to kill the prospects for transit of Azerbaijani and Turkmen gas to international markets. Asadov underscored, "I believe this moment was chosen with a purpose," and indicated that Iran was taking advantage of the current "coldness in relations between us and Turkey..."
Asadov explained that the GOAJ would respond within its capabilities, but lacked the ability to mount a significant military response. "You know our military capacity on our borders. We do not have enough capacity. We need military assistance." He further highlighted that, "With even the smallest conflict in the region, all energy activity in the Caspian Sea will be stopped." Asadov indicated that it was not in Azerbaijan's interests to escalate the confrontation unnecessarily, stating "you carry a gun so that others will think twice..."
The strategic picture that Asadov painted was grim: the strategic encirclement of Azerbaijani and Central Asian energy resources by Russia and Iran, assisted, wittingly or unwittingly, by Turkey. According to Asadov's assessment, Turkey's gas transit dispute with Azerbaijan, hitherto a commercial issue, has morphed into a broader strategic and security issue, for Azerbaijan, the EU and U.S. With Azerbaijan now effectively hemmed in by Turkey on westward transit of its gas, Asadov also believes that Iran and Russia are now poised to squelch prospects of Turkmen gas coming west for the foreseeable future. The Embassy agrees that escalation of military tensions in the southern Caspian could serve as a disincentive for further western energy firm interest in a Trans-Caspian pipeline.
Another cable describes a meeting with a vice president of the state oil company SOCAR, in which the official "underscored Azerbaijan's inability to take on Iran militarily, stating that "we are not the U.S., Iran or Russia, sometimes we prefer to close our eyes," because possible courses of action appear difficult or unpalatable."
Then, the official asked for advice on what to do:
VP Nassirov asked for the best advice of the USG, U.S. Navy and Coast Guard on how the GOAJ and SOCAR should address this situation. Naval Attache stressed that there were many mechanisms within the maritime field to allow peaceful resolution. We agreed to seek additional guidance for SOCAR and the GOAJ on handling this situation. Naval Attache Verich further laid out some immediate suggestions to minimize the possibility of an incident at sea, while preserving Azerbaijan's territorial claims:
--The Azerbaijan Coast Guard should exercise peaceful presence. Mere presence in the area preserved Azerbaijan's territorial claim.
--The Coast Guard should communicate with any vessels it believed were violating Azerbaijan's sovereignty, and log these communications. Naval Attache explained that there were established methods via international organizations, such as the International Maritime Organization, (IMO), to thereafter raise a complaint.
--To prevent an incident at sea, the Coast Guard ship captain in the vicinity of the Alborz should receive clear and controlled instructions from Azerbaijan's political leadership regarding his mission and permissible courses of action.
Another cable said that the episode presented an opportunity to increase security cooperation with Azerbaijan.
The recent move of the Iranian Alborz rig into potentially disputed waters in the Caspian offers a timely opportunity to gain traction on Caspian maritime cooperation with the GOAJ. The Azerbaijani Navy, Coast Guard, and Azerbaijans state oil company, SOCAR, all appear eager to accelerate potential maritime cooperation. They recognize their current maritime domain awareness (MDA) capabilities are weak, covering only about 30 percent of the maritime sector claimed by Azerbaijan. From the USG perspective, most immediately concerning is that the GOAJ lacks shore-based visibility on half of the ACG oil fields, the country's largest, which feed 1 million-plus barrels per day of crude oil into the Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline flowing to western markets. Embassy Baku recommends that we move swiftly now to capitalize on current Azerbaijani concerns about the Alborz rig to jointly develop additional Azerbaijani MDA capabilities....
Azerbaijan's poor MDA risks unwitting confrontation with Iran, Russia, or other regional actors, as Azerbaijan must physically deploy vessels to potentially disputed waters to ascertain even basic information regarding developments in the maritime sector. Lack of MDA also leaves both the ACG fields and Shah Deniz vulnerable to attack by nations in the region, terrorists, or other non-state actors. Azerbaijan understands that both Russia and Iran regularly violate their claimed sector, but can do very little about it...
The GOAJ remains deeply concerned with potential underwater sabotage of its energy facilities. Naval Attache notes that the USSR developed and fostered significant underwater sabotage capabilities at a special operations center in Baku. Soviet capabilities were actively matched by Iranian efforts, in a type of low-intensity conflict which persisted for many years. There is evidence to suggest that both Russia and Iran maintain these capabilities. Therefore, DAO's best assessment is that the GOAJ's deep concern about underwater sabotage of its energy facilities is not misplaced...
Appropriate MDA would provide better maritime visibility to Azerbaijan, and assist the GOAJ to:
-- better understand and assess Caspian security developments, including those in potentially disputed waters,
-- help to avoid potential unwitting confrontations with neighbors such as Iran, Russia, and Turkmenistan;
-- provide better warning of threats from non-state actors, and
-- learn about and potentially forestall threats to existing Azerbaijani energy infrastructure.
Post also would note that security flare-ups significantly contribute to delays in the commercial development of energy infrastructure. For example, after the 2001 military confrontation between Azerbaijan and Iran at the disputed Alov field, BP and Statoil withdrew from exploration efforts. Eight years later, the Alov field is no closer to development.
The last cable referring to the incident, from February 2010, suggests that it had ended in a sort of stalemate:
Iran's recent provocative positioning of the Alborz mobile oil rig into disputed Caspian waters (despite promises not to) is of concern to the GOAJ, but they have not publicized their concern. The GOAJ appears willing to tolerate the situation, so long as the Iranian rig is not moved further north.Comment
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Re: Wikileaks
UNCLAS ANKARA 000936
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL PGOV TU IZ AM
SUBJECT: TURKS CONCERNED ABOUT UNBALANCED ARMENIAN GENOCIDE
PROGRAM TO BE AIMED ON AL HURRA
¶1. (SBU) Turkish MFA Deputy Director General for Security
Affairs Sakir Torunlar called us in April 18, under
instructions, to express concern about a program they had
heard would be aired on Iraqi TV station Al Hurra soon
regarding allegations of Armenian genocide. Torunlar said
that, were this a commercial station with advertisers, it
might be understandable, but al Hurra appears to be
congressionally funded. This was neither the appropriate
time nor the appropriate audience, he emphasized, for such a
film. If it made it into the Turkish press, the reactions
would be very unpleasant. Deputy U/S Haydar Berk, in a
separate meeting, made similar points to the Ambassador.
¶2. (SBU) We shared information that the Turkish desk in
Washington had been in touch with the programmers, who had
reviewed the film for balance. We stressed that it would be
the station's call, not the Embassy's or the State
Department's. We noted that there is an issue of freedom of
the press. We pointed out that these sorts of issues will
continue to arise until Turkey and Armenia take concrete
steps toward normalizing relations.
¶3. (SBU) Comment: The MFA's attention to detail shows
continuing Turkish sensitivities on this issue. It is one of
the prisms through which they view the world and will
continue until the sore is lanced. We hope that can occur
after parliamentary elections later this year and formation
of a new government with a fresh mandate. End comment.
Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
WILSONComment
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Re: Wikileaks
R 261254z jul 93
fm amembassy yerevan
to secstate washdc 4112
info amconsul istanbul
amconsul adana
amembassy ankara
c o n f i d e n t i a l yerevan 002697
e.o. 12356: Decl
adr
tags: Pins prel pter am tu
subj: Pkk "support" from armenian sources
refs: A) state 220237 b) yerevan 1701 c) yerevan 0165
¶1. Confidential - entire text.
¶2. Reftel (a) asked for a report on "possible pkk-
armenian" links and instructed embassy yerevan to
"continue to monitor the situation closely and to keep
us informed." we raised the subject with foreign
minister papazyan july 26 and he said that he had been
asked the same thing by journalists during his recent
trip to the u.s. His answer is (and was) that "there
are no links of any kind between the pkk and the
government of armenia, although there might be such
links between certain opposition groups such as the
dashnaks." when we asked him whether he was talking
about the dashnaks here or those at party headquarters
in athens, he replied "there's no difference."
¶3. This reply is consistent with responses we have
gotten from senior goa officials for more than a year
now, not only regarding the pkk but also regarding all
sorts of terrorist organizations, and particularly the
asala. Reftel (b) was this embassy's attempt to track
down the basis of rumors in turkey about a pkk magazine
being published in armenia. It turns out that the
magazine only published two issues, that the vast
majority of the kurds in armenia are non-muslim (and
apolitical) yezidis, and that the editor-in-chief of
this magazine - although prone to exaggerate the level
of political consciousness among armenia's small
kurdish community - admitted that there was no pkk
activity inside armenia. (comment: This makes sense;
at a time when the goa is trying to do all within its
power to achieve normal relations with turkey, why
would it want to provoke turkey by allowing pkk
activity within its borders? Furthermore, the goa is
making a maximum effort to confiscate weaponry of all
types from civilians and put it into the hands of the
"proper" authorities; why would it countenance the
training of terrorists who could one day be turned
against any target of opportunity?)
¶4. Reftel (c) was an offer to demarche the goa about
the aleged pkk presence in a specific region as
reported by embassy baku in baku 0070. According to
our records, the department never replied to this
message. But we have brought up the subject of
terrorism on a regular basis with a range of senior
officials, all of whom condemn the asala and all of its
cousins in the terrorist world. Their one regret in
this area is that -- as they see it -- there is
precious little they can do if, for example, the
dashnaks living in iran want to finance, train, or
equip terrorist units operating - illegitimately and in
direct opposition to goa policy - in the name of the
armenian people.
GilmoreComment
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Re: Wikileaks
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 YEREVAN 000347
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR EUR/CACEN
SENSITIVE
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL PHUM TU AJ AM
SUBJECT: TOUGH DASHNAK TALK ON N-K, TURKEY AT PARTY
CONFERENCE SPARKS CONTROVERSY
¶1. (U) Sensitive But Unclassified. Please treat
accordingly.
-------
SUMMARY
-------
¶2. (SBU) Dashnak Party Chairman Hrand Margarayan's
February 6 comments on relations with Turkey, N-K,
and Georgia's Armenian population sparked renewed
controversy among Armenia's political elite.
Margaryan declared during his address to the
Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF or
"Dashnaksutyun") 29th World Congress that the GOAM
should not entertain closer relations with Turkey,
endorsed permanent independent status for all
geographic regions involved in the N-K conflict and
called for autonomy for the Armenian enclaves in
Georgia's Javakheti region. FM Vartan Oskanian, who
himself addressed the meeting before Margaryan's
speech, was quick to distance himself and the GOAM
from these statements during press opportunities
this week. Margaryan's comments appeared carefully
calibrated for the Diasporan audience that is still
a significant support base for the ARF. The extent
to which local ARF politicians are willing to adopt
Margaryan's speech as a party mantra will affect the
ARF's privileged place in the governing coalition.
While it is still too early to separate last week's
hype from long-term effects on party policies, the
ARF congress hurled the party back into the domestic
spotlight. End Summary.
------------------------------
SPEECH MAKES HEADLINES FOR ARF
------------------------------
¶3. (SBU) ARF Chairman Hrand Margaryan opened the
party's 29th World Congress February 6 with a
controversial speech that has sparked debate among
Armenia's political elite. Margaryan declared
during the speech that the GOAM should halt
discussions of rapprochement with Turkey until the
GOT met all ARF pre-conditions. He called any
proposal for border opening "irrelevant" until the
GOT classified the events of 1912-15 as genocide.
Margaryan accused the Turkish-Armenian
Reconciliation Commission of "treachery" against
Armenia and criticized its "secret funding by world
powers."
¶4. (SBU) Margaryan reiterated the ARF's
traditionally harsh stand regarding Nagorno-
Karabagh. He told the audience categorically that
no land involved in the N-K conflict should ever be
returned to Azerbaijan. He suggested expanding the
current areas controlled by Armenian forces to
include other regions historically inhabited by
Armenians (referring to Shahumian and Getashen).
These comments incited waves of enthusiastic
applause from the audience and wincing from GOAM
representatives seated behind him on the stand.
¶5. (SBU) The most unexpected part of Margaryan's
speech was a call for autonomy for Armenians living
in Georgia's Javakheti region. He declared that
Javakh was "now a part of the Armenian agenda" and
accused successive Georgian regimes of
discrimination and exploitation of the country's
Armenian population. He fell short of calling for
an independent state and clarified that an
autonomous Armenian region should exist within the
Georgian state. Margaryan claimed that the Armenian
Diaspora was increasingly supportive of the ARF's
approach to Javakheti.
-------------------------------------
SPEECH CREATES HEADACHES FOR THE GOAM
-------------------------------------
¶6. (SBU) FM Vartan Oskanian, who himself addressed
the meeting before Margaryan's speech, was quick to
distance himself and the GOAM from these statements
during press opportunities this week. Oskanian did
not criticize Margaryan's comments, but went to
great lengths to categorize them as ARF opinions
that "do not reflect Government of Armenia policy."
MFA spokesman Hamlet Gasparian responded
aggressively to the speech by reciting
constitutional passages giving the president
authority to create foreign policy. Local news
outlets carried his closing statement that,
"[Foreign Policy] issues are a constitutional
prerogative of the President," not of the Dashnaks.
--------------------------------------------- -
MEETING ATTRACTS DIASPORA, LOCAL POWER PLAYERS
--------------------------------------------- -
¶7. (U) The ARF Congress was a standing-room only
event that included an impressive selection of high-
level GOAM representatives. The Prime Minister, a
majority of cabinet-level ministers and
parliamentarians from the whole range of Armenia's
political spectrum attended the meeting. Most
speeches from GOAM representatives made
congratulatory remarks about the ARF's place among
the GOAM governing coalition and the party's current
role as a cooperative political player. The event
attracted a large number of Diasporans who support
ARF and was the largest public event for the party
since its reemergence in 1998. An ARF
parliamentarian told us that the most enthusiastic
support for the event came from Diasporan ARF
chapters in France and Russia.
-------
COMMENT
-------
¶8. (SBU) Margaryan's comments appeared carefully
calibrated for the Diasporan audience that is still
a significant support base for the ARF. The extent
to which local ARF politicians are willing to adopt
Margaryan's speech as a party mantra will no doubt
affect the ARF's privileged place in the governing
coalition. Some are quick to forecast the
controversy surrounding the speech as one of the
first fissures before the coalition's possible
breakdown. While it is still too soon to determine
how much of last week's hype has real resonance
within ARF party leaders and policy, Margaryan's
comments and the ARF's splashy World Congress has
definitely hurled the party back into the domestic
spotlight -- for now.
ORDWAYComment
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Re: Wikileaks
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 YEREVAN 000587
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR EUR/CACEN, S/CT
E.O. 12958: DNG: CO 03/10/2014
TAGS: PTER PREL PGOV PINR AM TU
SUBJECT: KURDISH ACTIVITIES IN ARMENIA
Classified By: Ambassador John Ordway for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d).
-------
SUMMARY
-------
¶1. (S) There is an Armenian-Kurdish friendship society in
downtown Yerevan with a sign posted on the door identifying
it as such. The "Friendship Society's" main goals in Armenia
appear to be to promote Kurdish culture, organize holidays,
demonstrations, and campaigns for better treatment of and/or
freedom for Ocalan, as opposed to promoting a specific
anti-Turkish propoganda campaign. The office, however,
openly admitted to us that it represents the Kurdish People's
Congress (also now known as Kongra Gel). There is no
evidence that Kongra-Gel has either the interest or the
ability to fundraise in Armenia. Active recruitment drives,
or the establishment of any type of Kurdish military camps in
Armenia would be extremly difficult to conduct and hide in a
country that is 97 percent ethnically Armenian. Kurds
currently constitute a small minority of approximately
40,000, most of whom work as nomadic cattle and goat farmers
and live near the poverty level. Approximately 500 Armenian
Kurds held a peaceful demonstration in downtown Yerevan on
February 15 to mark the fifth anniversary of Ocalan's arrest.
End Summary.
-----------------------------
KURDISH POPULATION IN ARMENIA
-----------------------------
¶2. (S) According to Knyaz Hasanov, the Kurdish representative
to the executive office of the President of Armenia,
approximately 40,000 Kurds live in Armenia (down from an
estimated 60,000 in 1989). Many Kurds emigrated either to
Azerbaijan (because of the Nagorno Karabakh war, Hasanov told
us) or to Russia for economic reasons. The majority of
Armenian Kurds live in or near Talin, Ashtarak, Aragats,
Aparan and Odketenbuan. Most work in cattle or goat
husbandry and have been hard hit by the economic crisis that
affects Armenia's rural sector. Hasanov noted that in
Armenia there were no successful Kurdish businessmen, Kurdish
restaurants, Kurdish supermarkets or even a Kurdish library.
¶3. (S) Hasanov commented that the majority of Kurds in
Armenia are Yezidis, or Christians. While some members of
the Yezidi community liked to differentiate themselves from
the Muslim Kurds, Hasanov said, he felt that ethnicity,
history, and language bonded all Kurds in Armenia together
with no visible religious friction. Hasanov felt that the
Kurdish population as a whole had a good relationship with
the Armenian government. Hasanov did not feel that Kurds
suffered discrimination on a personal or official level and,
while the Armenian government did not always respond to their
requests for funding for cultural events, it would usually at
least listen to them. (COMMENT: In our experience, the local
Yezidis vigorously differentiate themselves from Kurds,
regardless of the obvious connections. Moreover, the
indigeneous Yezidis and Kurds are quite split. A proposed
USDA project to engage them in livestock-related projects
faces substantial challenges due to their inability, at least
initially, to agree among themselves on how to organize. END
COMMENT)
¶4. (S) Hasanov introduced us to prominent Armenian/Kurds
including the chairman of the Kurdish writers association,
the head of a Kurdish radio program (which broadcasts for 30
minutes a day), the deputy head of the Armenian-Kurdish
Friendship society, a professor of Kurdish language, an
engineer, a government bureaucrat and the Armenian head of
the local "Friendship Society." All of the prominent
Armenian/Kurds told us that they were desperately
underfunded, and were able to only sporadically publish three
Kurdish language newspapers, unable to fund Kurdish cultural
events, and wanted more than the government-allotted 30
minutes of daily Kurdish radio time. All claimed that they
had very few contacts with prominent Kurds abroad and that
they were unable to successfully solicit funds for their
cultural projects. While most agreed that the Armenian
government could do more for them as a minority group, none
felt that they faced rampant discrimination on a personal or
government level and realized that their economic situation
does not differ substantially from Armenians as a whole.
------------------------------------
KURDISH PEOPLE'S CONGRESS IN YEREVAN
------------------------------------
¶5. (S) Cherkeze Erash, the administrative head of the office,
explained to us that the KPC established its office in
Yerevan in 1994 and while the KPC sent representatives from
time to time to Armenia, Erash was the long-term
representative. (NOTE: He openly admitted to us the
connection with KPC. END NOTE.) Presently, he told us, the
KPC had two activists who arrived from Turkey, Heydar Ali and
Gazim Seyit, who arrived in January 2004 and were planning to
stay until May. The office is a Soviet-style three-bedroom
apartment located in the center of town, with modest
furnishings and multiple posters and banners depicting Ocalan
and other prominent Kurdish heroes and "martyrs." Erash
explained to us that they had three full-time employees and
approximately 22 Armenian Kurds who live in villages outside
of Yerevan and work for the office part-time. We noticed one
part-time driver with an older Russian vehicle. Erash worked
as a professor at a local university to supplement his
income.
¶6. (S) Erash told us that they usually receive 2-3 KPC
visitors at a time from Iran, Syria, Europe, Iraq and Russia,
who usually stay for one to four months. He said that in
2003 the Armenia office had approximately 15 such visitors.
Erash stated that the visitors come to Armenia for the
purpose of monitoring the local Kurdish population, give
seminars on the Kurdish situation in northern Iraq, and help
with Kurdish language and cultural instruction in the
villages. Erash described his own job as a coordinator and
organizer of Kurdish holidays, demonstrations and overseas
visitors. He stated his next assignment was to organize the
upcoming Novruz holiday in March, and coordinate the travel
of famous Kurdish speakers and/or musicians from Europe to
Yerevan for the holiday. When asked about KPC's relationship
with the Armenian government, Erash told us that he had good
contacts in most government ministries and the Armenian
government did not restrict KPC's movement or interfere with
their office in any significant way.
¶7. (S) When we asked about KPC's finances, Erash commented
that the local Kurdish population was very poor, and KPC was
not able to raise funds in the poor village areas. Erash
stated that money for the KPC's office rent came from
Russian-Kurdish businessmen, whom he did not name, and/or
occasional gifts from European Kurds. Erash lamented that
they did not pay salaries at the KPC office, but money from
various Diaspora Kurds did defray some living expenses of the
key KPC office employees (including Erash himself). Erash
stated that KPC visitors and Kurdish entertainers from
overseas generally paid their own way and often lived with
local Kurds as a way of reducing expenses. Erash told us
that the KPC avoids using the local banking system and money
was often hand-carried by couriers or by businessmen
themselves when they came to visit Yerevan.
¶8. (S) Rzgan Lezgiyan, a local Kurdish language professor,
agreed that the KPC was probably unable to raise much money
in Armenia, but criticized the fact that the KPC spent what
little money it had to transport village Kurds to Yerevan for
pro-Ocalan rallies instead of creating social welfare
programs. Lezgiyan stated that most educated Yerevan Kurds
did not interact with the KPC office in Yerevan because of
its strict pro-Ocalan propaganda. Lezgiyan remembered that
in 2002 the KPC office had sponsored five Kurdish students to
take Kurdish language courses but suspended the funding when
the students failed to show at a KPC organized pro-Ocalan
rally. Lezgiyan believed that the KPC office was most
influential five years ago when Ocalan was first captured and
they were able to attract several thousand people to downtown
Yerevan for a pro-Ocalan rally. Since then there had been a
noticeable decline in numbers of attendees at pro-Ocalan
rallies, which were now only numbering in the low hundreds.
The most recent such rally was held February 15, and
attracted about 500 participants.
--------------------------------------------- --
NEW DIRECTION FOR THE KURDISH PEOPLE'S CONGRESS
--------------------------------------------- --
¶9. (S) Ali explained to us that his job in Armenia was to
travel to the villages and educate Kurds on the new direction
of the KPC which was focused on human rights, democracy and
freedom. Ali stated that guarantees of freedom were more
important than statehood and as long as Ocalan was in good
health they would pursue a strategy of peaceful negotiations
with Turkey. He then amended his comments by stating that if
Ocalan's health worsened or died in captivity then the KPC
might have to revise its strategy. He explained that the
Caucasus, Central Asia and eastern Europe were in his sphere
of responsibility and he traveled throughout this region
often. In Armenia his job was to give seminars to Kurds
about news from Northern Iraq and to spread the message of
the new KPC policy. He also stated he acted as a facilitator
for Kurdish businessmen and looked for investment
opportunities, but lamented he did not see many in Armenia.
Lezgiyan told us that when he met Ali he noted that the KPC
had dropped their demands for an independent Kurdistan and
also downplayed the fact that Ocalan was their supreme leader
in their propaganda. Lezgiyan speculated that this was done
because of pressure from the American government.
--------------------------------------------- -------------
KURDISH PEOPLE'S CONGRESS DENIALS OF WRONGDOING IN ARMENIA
--------------------------------------------- -------------
¶10. (S) Erash, Ali, Hasanov and Lezgiyan all strongly denied
that there were any camps of Kurdish fighters in Armenia.
All stated that it would be impossible to hide a military
training camp in Armenian villages where the population was
97 percent Armenian and any large group of strange Kurds
would be immediately noticed by the local authorities. Ali
stated that it would also be logistically much easier to
transport fighters from Turkey to northern Iraq, where they
would be safe, receive good medical treatment and have the
infrastructure to support them, rather than trying to hide
them in Armenia. Ali and Erash also commented that the
Kurdish population has a good relationship with the Armenian
government, which they would be loathe to jeopardize. (NOTE:
In 1999 there was a meeting between the Armenian National
Security Service (NSS) and Turkish Intelligence which
resulted in meetings and exchange of information. We were
told recently by the NSS that this meeting focused primarily
on the issue of training camps, and included field visits to
sites suspected by the Turkish side of such activity. END
NOTE.)
¶11. (S) Erash and Ali both also strongly denied that there
was any drug trafficking by Armenian Kurds and stated
repeatedly that this type of behavior is not tolerated in
Kurdish culture. Erash claimed that everyone knew everyone
in the Armenian Kurdish community, and if Kurdish elders
found out about any such activity the offending parties would
be immediately expelled from Armenian Kurdish society.
¶12. (S) Erash, Ali, Hasnaov, and the educated Yerevan Kurds
were all in agreement in telling us that due to the poor
economic situation in Armenian there was little or no
possibility of KPC doing any type of fundraising in Armenia
and that the Armenian KPC office relied heavily on donations
from Diaspora Kurds to keep their office running, publish
their newspapers and help defray living expenses for key
employees.
-------
COMMENT
-------
¶13. (S) Through post's observations as well as through other
contacts it appears that the local KPC's office's main goal
is to spread pro-Ocalan propaganda. Due to the very poor
economic conditions of most Armenians, and especially that of
the Kurdish population, it would be difficult for KPC to
raise any significant funds in Armenia. Armenia's
overwhelmingly ethnically Armenian population makes it
equally difficult for the KPC to set up any type of armed
camps, or recruiting drives in the Armenian countryside
without attracting local authorities' notice. To the best of
post's knowledge, the local KPC office does not appear to be
actively engaged in supporting terrorist activities from
Armenia. The office's official registration as a "Friendship
Society" also serves to obscure any actionable connection to
the terrorist KPC. The NSS claims to be closely monitoring
the activities of the office and has stated that they would
immediately arrest and/or deport any member of the KPC office
found to be conducting illegal activities.
¶14. (S) There are, however, two vulnerable points that
might be exploited to disrupt, if not actually shut down,
this operation:
-- To the extent that we can reliably identify to the GOAM
the KPC visitors as members of Kongra Gel, which is on the
U.S. terrorist list, we can encourage the GOAM to expel them
or prevent their entry into the country.
-- The "cash-by-courier" funding mechanism is another
vulnerable point, if we can proivde the GOAM information that
shows the funding source is Kongra Gel.
ORDWAYComment
-
Re: Wikileaks
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T YEREVAN 000891
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR EUR/CACEN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/15/2014
TAGS: PARM PREL KCFE AM
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR RAISES CFE COMPLIANCE CONCERNS
REF: STATE 79196
Classified By: Ambassador Ordway for reasons 1.5 (b) and (D)
¶1. (S) Ambassador presented points per reftel to Minister of
Defense Serge Sargsyan April 12. Sargsyan first responded by
agreeing that "it was strange" that Armenia had not declared
the MT-LBs, and it was an incident that would not be
repeated. (Note: The Armenian side freely acknowledge that
there are MT-LBs in their inventory, and the Minister seemed
taken aback by the fact they had not been declared. End
Note.) Sargsyan briefly became combative when he deduced
that the source of the information about pre-inspection
inventory was not the CFE inspection team, and denied that
any equipment had been moved. He volunteered that the
weapons system in question was not MT-LBs but Chinese-made
weapons in the Armenian arsenal; and that any pre-inspection
movements had legitimate reasons--a point the Ambassador
rebutted. Sargsyan finally conceded that perhaps some
weapons had been moved by a "strange or sick person," and
that he would look in to the matter to ensure that it did not
happen again.
¶2. (S) Ambassador also raised reftel points with Foreign
Minister Oskanian April 14. He could provide no further
elucidation of the issue at this time, but clearly understood
the serious situation that the country would face if the
Secretary were unable to make the CTR certification for
SIPDIS
Armenia.
ORDWAYComment
-
Re: Wikileaks
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 YEREVAN 001345
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/16/14
TAGS: PREL PBTS MOPS AM AJ
SUBJECT: Armenian-Azeri border clash
Ref: State 130470
Classified by Ambassador John Ordway. Reasons: 1.5 (B,
D).
¶1. (C) Following receipt of reftel, DAO assistant spoke
with the CHOD, Gen-Lt. Haratunyan, and Ambassador spoke to
Ambassador Kasprzyk and Acting Foreign Minister Shugarian.
The CHOD claimed that the Azeri side had initiated the
outbreak of hostile action a week ago, and then on the
night of June 14/15 began shelling an Armenian village.
The Armenian side "shot back." At 02:00 Ambassador
Kasprzyk called the CHOD while monitoring on the Azeri
side. The CHOD said he had told Kasprzyk that if the
Azeris continued the shelling, Armenia would take the hill
that apparently was the original Azeri position before they
moved forward a week ago. Haratunyan said that the
Armenian MOD had been unable to establish any contact with
the Azeri side, and was using Ambassador Kasprzyk to pass
messages to Baku. He did not provide any timeline (or
deadline) for the threatened Armenian forward movement.
¶2. (C) Ambassador spoke to Kasprzyk by phone shortly
after he had completed his June 14/15 monitoring mission.
Kasprzyk, en route to Tbilisi, said that it had not been
quiet the previous night. The monitoring that had just
been completed had established that one Armenian officer
had been killed, while on the Azeri side a woman and a
child had been injured. In addition, livestock on the
Azeri side had been killed. Kasprzyk said that he could
not determine which side had started the firing the night
before. He theorized that the Armenians had subjected the
Azeri village of Mazamly to a barrage as a means of
psychological pressure, and that the casualties were the
result of rounds that had actually landed in the village.
The attack clearly had frightened and enraged the
villagers. 8-10 of them came to the monitoring site (2 km
from the village). Aggravated by "untactful" remarks by
the Azeri military escorts, the villagers were
extraordinarily hostile. The Azeri military decided to
leave the scene before the villagers engaged in violent
action against them.
¶3. (C) The Armenian side requested, through the field
monitors, a face-to-face meeting with the Azeri local
commander. The Azeris refused, and requested a discussion
with the Armenian local commander via the OSCE radio
connection. The Armenian side refused. The Azeri side
then indicated that they would be willing to have a face-
to-face meeting. This, however, requires the approval of
the Minister of Defense. Although Kasprzyk told the
Ambassador he was very doubtful the Minister would agree,
he planned to pursue this option with the Minister on June
¶16. (The Minister is out of the country, and is returning
the morning of June 16.)
¶4. (C) Kasprzyk said that the situation was tense and
very dangerous. There is considerable and constant
military movement, and both sides appear to be reinforcing
their positions -- which are very close to each other.
Each side, he believes, feels it is in a corner and neither
side wants to retreat.
¶5. (C) The Armenians recently realigned the main road
between Noyembrian and Idjevan. The new route takes inter-
city traffic out of range of Azeri positions. (The road
had come under Azeri fire periodically over the past year.)
Kasprzyk theorized that the Azeri side believed its
leverage had been reduced by the road realignment, and
decided to regain its leverage by moving closer to the
Armenian pumping station. (Note: Kasprzyk did not know
whether the station was in Armenia or Azerbaijan, but said
that it is located between the lines that had been
maintained by the two armies.) The workers manning the
pumping station had fled when the Azeris moved closer, and
the Armenians were unwilling to lose the water supply for
five villages.
¶6. (C) Ambassador spoke to Deputy Foreign Minister
Shugarian, and passed on the points provided reftel. He
emphasized that the situation was tense and fraught with
danger of escalation. The U.S. expected that both sides
would refrain from taking any actions that would exacerbate
the situation, and especially refrain from any further
firing. Shugarian said he would get in touch with the MOD
and President's Office to pass on the message.
¶7. (C) French Ambassador Cuny telephoned the Ambassador
to say that Paris was also very worried about the
situation, and offered to join in a co-chairs demarche to
the Armenian side.
ORDWAYComment
-
Re: Wikileaks
S E C R E T YEREVAN 002447
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR EUR/CACEN
E.O. 12958: DNG: CO 11/08/2014
TAGS: PREL PGOV AM
SUBJECT: KOCHARIAN SACKS INTEL SERVICE CHIEF
Classified By: DCM A.F. Godfrey for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
-------------------------
KOCHARIAN SACKS NSS CHIEF
-------------------------
¶1. (C) President Robert Kocharian fired his Minister of the
National Security Service (NSS) Karlos Petrossian November 5.
Although there have been frequent rumors about Petrossian's
departure, the immediate cause for his fall from grace
appears to be the most recent report of Petrossian's
corruption that reached the President's desk.
-----------------------------
TOO MANY COMPLAINTS TO IGNORE
-----------------------------
¶2. (S) GOAM lawyer Vahe Yacoubian (a U.S. citizen) who said
he and the Minister of Justice David Harutunyan were with the
President when he made the call to fire Petrossian, told us
that "Karlos just went over the line once too often." The
most recent incident involved a high-end car stolen in Greece
that Interpol located in Yerevan, the police confiscated and
that then disappeared from police custody only to turn up in
a shipment of cars bound for Russia at the Georgian border.
According to Yacoubian, complaints about Petrossian's alleged
involvement reached President Kocharian separately from the
local Interpol office, the Greek insurance company that had
filed the initial reports, and Armenian Revolutionary Faction
(ARF) Dashnaks (part of the governing coalition) who had been
contacted by the car's owner in Greece. The complaint from
the Dashnaks was "the straw that broke the camel's back,"
according to Yacoubian: Kocharian simply could not afford to
let Petrossian continue to alienate the politically crucial
Dashnaks.
-----------------------
NO PRE-CHOSEN SUCCESSOR
-----------------------
¶3. (C) Because Petrossian's departure had not been scheduled,
no successor was immediately apparent. Press reports and
ministerial contacts speculate that NSS Deputy Minister
Feliks Tsolakyan, Presidential National Security Advisor
Garnik Isagulyan and former Kashatagh Marzpet Aleksan
Hakobyan are the leading candidates to replace Petrossian.
EVANSComment
Comment