Energy in Azerbaijan

[Vrej1915]

Re: Energy in Azerbaijan

I heard on an Armenian channel (news) that Greece had opted out.
To be supplied by Gasprom

Have not found confirming sources on the internet.

.

Not exactly.
SOCAR was willing to buy Greece's national gas network (just as Gasprom did ours).
Gazprom visibly offered a better price (1 billion against azeri 400M)..., yet no signature done.
But the trans-adriatic pipe project is supposedly independent.

[londontsi]

Re: Energy in Azerbaijan

Not exactly.
SOCAR was willing to buy Greece's national gas network (just as Gasprom did ours).
Gazprom visibly offered a better price (1 billion against azeri 400M)..., yet no signature done.
But the trans-adriatic pipe project is supposedly independent.

Thanks for the clarification.

.

[Mher]

Re: Energy in Azerbaijan

Not exactly.
SOCAR was willing to buy Greece's national gas network (just as Gasprom did ours).
Gazprom visibly offered a better price (1 billion against azeri 400M)..., yet no signature done.
But the trans-adriatic pipe project is supposedly independent.

Vrej jan, do you have better figures on the current Azerbaijan gas exports and the future predicted gas exports?
I got the 27 billion and 40 billion from Reuters, and though the 40 seems correct, I don't know if the 27 is correct
I must note though, as I stated before, the difference would still not mean much in terms of making up for oil loss

[Vrej1915]

Re: Energy in Azerbaijan

Vrej jan, do you have better figures on the current Azerbaijan gas exports and the future predicted gas exports?
I got the 27 billion and 40 billion from Reuters, and though the 40 seems correct, I don't know if the 27 is correct
I must note though, as I stated before, the difference would still not mean much in terms of making up for oil loss

I'm not a specialist, but I'll try to find some credible data for you.
Was reading on the question a couple of months ago, need to find back the articles.
What I can say:
1/ Most official azeri data, and all western analysis blindly or partially using azari official data are highly suspect. For evident reasons, azerbaijan hides the real data, and regularly overesteamates all numbers, since this is their main bargaining chip in blackmailing:trying to intimidate us (remember, it nearly worked with LTP in 1998).
For instance, until recently, the oil proven reserves remained unchanged in official data between 1995-2006 (if I do remember well), while they pumped nearly a million barrel a day... they agnowledged the reality, once it was evident, and impossible to hide.
2/ They won't receive any income from Gas, before 2018-19. (BP recovers its investment in infrastructure first..., detail of the contract).
3/ For them, oil is bar far more profitable, than gas can ever be, no question on that. Even with best estimates coming true (if no new discovery/ no major hike in prices), they will never recover their high incomes of oil 2008-2011 with Gas.
4/ Their 2012 Poduction was of 14.04 Billion , we can trust BP on that (http://www.bp.com/en/global/corporat...ting-tool.html). you may also compare to others producers on same chart..
5/ We are very lucky, they are married with BP. That company is the best plunderer of hydrocarbon we might have hoped for them...
6/ I will have to look the details back, but some of the difference might come from the covert fight between BP/Aliyev, about how much more investment must/should be made, implying how much extra oil must be extracted, using Gas from Shah Deniz II, by reinjection in ACG.. Aliyev is very interested to obtain as much oil as possible, while BP may prefer Gas...
According their latest data, they seem to have succeeded, in forcing BP to reinvest, thus nearly stopping the decline of oil output from ACG in the first 9 months of this year (even if it is good news for them on short term, it may fasten the clock even more for them).
7/ Paradoxically, they are the hostages of their own saber rateling retoric: no matter how many times they may reinsure BP in privet or how much BP says it is used to war risks, nevertheless, for a capitalist like BP, the risk factor pushes it to try to invest the less, and get the most, in the shortest time frame possible, even if it is not the maximum or the optimum on a more longer time period..
8/ Apart from the potential future surprise find hypothesis, there is also the possibility of a much smaller (yet not that well explored, that is might be much more than expected ??) field disputed by Iran. This may depend of the future evolution of West/Iran warming + what road finally Iran will use to reach European markets for its Gas: 1/Syria; 2/Turkey; 3/Armenia; 4/Azrbaijan.
Given sad realities, 1 & 3, seem less than possible today.
Between Turkey & Azerbaijan, no doubt Iran will favor Turkey, for evident reasons (subjective & objective), unless confrontation in the Levant between the 2 goes beyond any foreseeable limit, toward open enmity (not very likely).
In case Iran is forced to use Baku, then it may be forced to cede the contested gas fields ...?
This Caspian disputed fields, real or potential, may well be the last hope of the regime in Baku: thus the reason of "navy building", we, from a very egocentric point of view, tend to mock... (Iran & Turkmenistan being the potential contenders).

[Vrej1915]

Re: Energy in Azerbaijan

http://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2013/12/24/bp-led-group-set-to-develop-a-new-source-of-natural-gas-for-europe/

[Mher]

Re: Energy in Azerbaijan

I'm not a specialist, but I'll try to find some credible data for you.
Was reading on the question a couple of months ago, need to find back the articles.
What I can say:
...

Thanks a lot Vrej
that's an incredible amount of information, thank you for sharing your knowledge

[Vrej1915]

Re: Energy in Azerbaijan

Thanks a lot Vrej
that's an incredible amount of information, thank you for sharing your knowledge

Regarding this question, even if intox is the rule of the game in financial markets, yet they are by far more reliable, than official azari state statistics:


Azerbaijan Oil & Gas Report
Published 31 July 2013
120 pages

http://store.businessmonitor.com/azerbaijan-oil-gas-report.html

Azerbaijan Oil & Gas Report

Summary

BMI View: While stabilisation of the ACG field and new volumes from the Chirag Oil Project should support production that has proven disappointing over recent years, the long term outlook for the liquids is bearish. Although there is upside from liquids volumes extracted alongside gas, with a number of sizable potentially condensate rich deposits identified in the Caspian, we have not yet priced such developments into our current forecast. This stems from a slow and uncertain development schedule, with a shortage of rigs for example and a lack of firm operator timeline among the factors preventing us from including first gas from discoveries in our current forecast.
The key developments in Azerbaijan's oil & gas sector are:
While BP has reportedly stabilised output at the key Azeri-Chirag-Guneshli (ACG) field, we maintain a largely bearish outlook for oil production given challenges encountered at the field to date.
From 2014 onwards, first oil from the Chirag Oil Project (COP), part of the ACG complex, will help to offset some but not all of the lower-targeted volumes from other production sites. We retain our long-term view that on the back of production challenges at ACG and a failure to bring online major new liquids discovery, oil production is set to decline gradually from 2017. While we see upside from liquids volumes captured alongside major offshore gas discoveries, we are not currently pricing these in, given that development efforts remain in their infancy.
A recent study from the EIA highlighted the country's untapped potential with 2P gas reserves placed at 1.43trn cubic meters and 2P liquids reserves estimated at 8.5bn bbl. However, the overwhelming majority of remaining resources is thought to be offshore, where territorial disagreements with Turkmenistan have prevented exploration in certain areas.
Data from the EIA indicates production continues to disappoint and we expect production to average around 898,000b/d for 2013, before...
- See more at: http://store.businessmonitor.com/aze....plI6zCTJ.dpuf

[Vrej1915]

Re: Energy in Azerbaijan

http://www.amec.com/documents/investors/events/oil-and-gas-investor-event/mena-and-azerbaijan.pdf

[Vrej1915]

Re: Energy in Azerbaijan

Optimistic forecast of representative of Azerbaijan Ministry of Energy

Wednesday, 04 December 2013 16:05
Written by Ilham Şaban

http://caspianbarrel.org/index.php/en/extensions/s5-accordion-menu/5024-optimistic-forecast-of-representative-of-azerbaijan-ministry-of-energy

In 2015 Azerbaijan plans to increase the volume of tank gas up to 20 billion cub.m., reads the article by Ramiz Rzayev, chief of the Investment Department of Azerbaijan Energy Ministry, published in official press.
Rzayev claims that there are possibilities to double this index up to 40 billion cub.m. in 2025.
During 2012 Azerbaijan extracted 17.24 billion cub.m. of tank gas. This year the volume of gas is expected to be 17.5 billion cub.m.
The draft budget, which has been recently submitted to parliament for approval, envisages that in 2014 Azerbaijan plans to extract 27.36 billion cub.m. of tank gas and in 2015 – 27.23 billion cub.m. The government put this volume of gas together with associated gas, part of which is injected back into the oil wells. In 2012 total volume of gas production in Azerbaijan was 26.79 billion cub.m. Considering that, according to the government’s forecasts, in 2015 the country must extract about 18 billion cub.m. of tank gas.
First of all, there are no resources to increase production up to 20 billion cub.m. and secondly, there is no market. Therefore, it is hard to believe the data of representative of the Energy Ministry published in official press.

[Vrej1915]

Re: Energy in Azerbaijan

Azerbaijan Oil & Gas Report Q1 2014
Published by Business Monitor International on Oct 31, 2013 , 133 pages
PDF - Download Now with 3 Quarterly Updates format - Download Now

http://www.fastmr.com/prod/723420_azerbaijan_oil_gas_report_q1_2014.aspx

While stabilisation of the ACG field and new volumes from the Chirag Oil Project should support production that has proven disappointing over recent years, the long term outlook for the liquids is bearish. Although there is upside from liquids volumes extracted alongside gas, with a number of sizable potentially condensate rich deposits identified in the Caspian, we have not yet priced such developments into our current forecast. This stems from a slow and uncertain development schedule, with a shortage of rigs for example and a lack of firm operator timeline among the factors preventing us from including first gas from discoveries in our current forecast.

The key developments in Azerbaijan's oil & gas sector are:
While BP has reportedly stabilised output at the key Azeri-Chirag-Guneshli (ACG) field, we maintain a largely bearish outlook for oil production given challenges encountered at the field to date.
From 2014 onwards, first oil from the Chirag Oil Project (COP), part of the ACG complex, will help to offset some but not all of the lower-targeted volumes from other production sites. We retain our long-term view that on the back of production challenges at ACG and a failure to bring online major new liquids discovery, oil production is set to decline gradually from 2017. While we see upside from liquids volumes captured alongside major offshore gas discoveries, we are not currently pricing these in, given that development efforts remain in their infancy.
A recent study from the EIA highlighted the country's untapped potential with 2P gas reserves placed at 1.43trn cubic meters and 2P liquids reserves estimated at 8.5bn bbl. However, the overwhelming majority of remaining resources is thought to be offshore, where territorial disagreements with Turkmenistan have prevented exploration in certain areas.
Data from the EIA indicates production continues to disappoint and we expect production to average around 898,000b/d for 2013, before recovering in 2014 to 922,000b/d as stabilisation efforts at ACG and the start of the Chirag Oil Project support a recovery in output. SOCAR chief Rovnag Abduallayev reported in September that the period of production decline was over and from late 2013 a gain in production were possible. Abduallayev reported that the COP was on-track to come online from year end.
We retain our long-term view that on the back of production challenges at ACG and a failure to bring online major new liquids discovery, oil production is set to decline gradually from 2017. While we see upside from liquids volumes captured alongside major offshore gas discoveries, we are not currently pricing these in, given that development efforts remain in their infancy.
The outlook for gas projects remains promising, with the steady advance of Shah Deniz II (SDII), the country's leading gas project, which should see 10bn cubic metres (bcm) exported to Europe from 2019 and 6bcm to Turkey. In June, commenting on the selection of TAP, Abdullayev expressed confidence that Azeri 'gas exports will increase dramatically as fields like ACG Deep, Absheron, Umid and Shaxxx-Asiamn are developed and we see the pipeline route towards Austria as a natural market for this gas'.
The Shah Denis Consortium (SDC) has selected the Trans Adriatic Pipeline, leaving the final investment decision (FID) on the SDII field itself as the last major commercial hurdle. FID was due at the end of 2013 however Interest in the Southern Corridor may also be waning: BP officials warned there was a 25% reduction in long-term European demand from Azerbaijan. This could slow plans to develop recent offshore discoveries such as Absheron and the potentially 300bcm Zafar-Mashal structure for which Statoil recently signed a MoU. Further, it may reduce interest in an expansion of the Southern Corridor beyond Azerbaijan to Turkmenistan or Iraq.
An additional obstacle to further development of the Caspian's gas potential is a shortage of available rigs. This has slowed appraisal of Total's Absheron field, for example, and has potential to lead to delays in developing additional prospects that could support gains in Azerbaijan's gas output.
Yet over the medium term, we expect gas output to experience only incremental growth or possibly be subject to small annual declines. This stems from a lack of major projects in the pipeline due to come online before SDII toward the tail end of the decade, and we also see risks to gas output as greater volumes of associated gas output from the ACG fields may be reinjected to support liquids recovery, thus reducing marketable gas supplies.
Azerbaijan's dependence on energy prices leads to high volatility in the country's export revenues. However, continued demand from emerging markets and persistent efforts from Europe to secure access to gas from the Caspian Sea suggests a robust outlook for Azeri resources. With supply now comfortably meeting demand, we believe OPEC basket oil prices will hold steady, at US$105 per barrel in 2013 - a decrease from US$109.45 in 2012.