Announcement

**Andranik** · 08-08-2005, 09:03 PM

AN END TO A CAREER

While the tragedy of October 27 and the subsequent chaos in Armenian
politics intervened, by December 1999 Babayan was forced to relinquish
his position as the Self-Defense Forces Commander. Kocharian's
precarious position in post-October 27 political environment did not
allow him to tackle the Babayan issue directly, leaving it to the
government in Karabakh under President Arkady Ghukasyan and the new
Karabakh Army leadership. Apparently, Babayan decided to strike
first, launching an assassination attempt against Ghukasyan on March
22, 2000, which left Ghukasyan seriously wounded but alive. The
shoddily prepared and executed assassination attempt displayed the
toll the government's efforts had already taken on his organization.
At any rate, it was nothing more than an act of desperation on his
part; it is difficult to imagine any benefit Ghukasyan's assassination
might have given him.

Having played his final trump card, Babayan gave the pretext for the
Karabakh authorities to carry out an efficient and ruthless campaign
to dismantle his organization, by detaining, removing from office, or
pettily harassing hundreds of his loyalists and family members,
closing down or nationalizing his enterprises, and confiscating his
real estate. The government press printed a disturbingly long list of
cars, houses, and companies amassed by Samvel Babayan and his brother
Karen, whom he had elected as Mayor of Stepanakert. The official
investigation, accompanied by torture and beatings, and the subsequent
trial were conducted in the best of post-Soviet traditions, i.e.
without regard to credibility of charges, testimonies, or indictment,
or for the public opinion, which at any rate was mostly glad to see an
obviously corrupt individual removed from power, even if for the wrong
pretext. While Babayan's charges were disputed by his cronies in
Armenia (including the parliamentarians elected on his ticket) as well
as by his former comrades-in-arms, the trial concluded in March 2001
with a verdict finding Babayan guilty of directing the assassination
attempt, and sentencing him and a dozen other loyalists to different
terms in prison. The verdict also stripped him of his many government
decorations and ranks, and disenfranchised him. In a separate trial,
his brother Karen was convicted of abusing powers of office in the
Stepanakert Municipality, and sent to jail as well (he was released in
2002). While the verdict was not agreeable to many in Karabakh and
Armenia, the sadness over the fall from grace of a former Army
Commander and war hero was more universal.

LESSONS OF FALL

Whatever the merits of the case against Babayan, there can be no doubt
about the positive effect his removal from power has had on the
political and economic development in Karabakh, and the international
credibility of its government. Babayan's rule was not the sole cause
for Karabakh's social-economic ills, nor did his internment put a
definite end to corruption and government abuse in Artsakh.
Nevertheless, freed from the hegemony of one person, Karabakh's
business and investment environment improved dramatically, allowing
Armenia's economic progress to spill over into Karabakh. Babayan's
fate provides an important precedent and stark reminder of what
unchecked usurpation of power can lead to; this lesson is undoubtedly
on the minds of leaders in Armenia and Karabakh. Another lesson was
that, unlike its neighbors Georgia and Azerbaijan, the Armenian
political environment, and by extension, that of Artsakh does not
tolerate a one-person rule.

Imprisoning a former leader and war hero for his transgressions may
not be a revolutionary idea, but it remains a novel one for
post-Soviet countries and statelets. Babayan's removal from office and
subsequent imprisonment provided an important test of durability and
maturity of government in Karabakh, as well as the strength of its
statehood. Contrast this with the continuing excesses and abuse by
President Smirnov in Transnistria, or Abkhazia's Ardzinba clan, or
Ajaria's Abashidze before he was removed by the central government in
Georgia (and even then allowed to escape rather than put on trial).
This is a lesson not entirely lost even on foreign observers, as a
recent article in The Economist shows. Another important contrast was
provided by Azerbaijan in the summer of 2004. After a group of
activists of the so-called Karabakh Liberation Organization, a group
of activists funded and encouraged by hardliners in the government,
disrupted a NATO PfP conference in a Baku hotel and attempted to
assault its participants for inviting Armenian officers to Baku, the
initial response of the government of Azerbaijan was proper. The
activists were arrested, put on trial, and given lengthy sentences for
sabotaging an event sponsored by NATO, an organization to which
Azerbaijan is said to want to adhere. After a public outcry, President
Ilham Aliyev quickly backtracked, publicly admonished the court for
the 'tough verdict,' and forced the appellate court to release the KLO
activists. The entire episode betrayed serious dilettantism of
Aliyev's government, and certainly did not inspire confidence in
Azerbaijan among its international partners.

RELEASE FROM PRISON

Over the years, many rumors circulated about the pending release of
Samvel Babayan from his confinement in the maximum-security prison in
Shushi. Unofficially, it became known that his health greatly
suffered after duress caused during the investigation, and he never
recovered. He is said to suffer from hepatitis and other ailments
which could not be treated in prison. A total deterioration of health
or death in prison would have unnecessarily made Babayan a martyr, and
his release for health reasons was an acceptable solution. The
government is obviously satisfied that he would not become a public
nuisance, and the terms of release include a probationary period and
continued disenfranchisement.

It was only natural that the early release of Samvel Babayan from
prison led to several conspiracy theories, suggesting a political deal
cut with the government, or linking it to the current phase of the
Nagorno Karabakh conflict settlement. The Armenian newspaper Iravunk,
close to Babayan's former political clients in Armenia, reported that
the former General had not appealed for a pardon (his mother did on
his behalf) and that no deal had been offered, or accepted. This
appears to be the case. It is unlikely that a formal deal between
Babayan and the Karabakh government has been made, or was even
necessary. Babayan's political and economic resources were entirely
uprooted four years ago, and he is no longer a serious threat to the
government or society. Even if he does attempt political activities in
Armenia after his recuperation, he cannot run for office and as ARF
leader Vahan Hovhanisian aptly pointed out, "there is no political
niche in Armenia" left vacant for Babayan. His political options are
limited too, as any attempt to rock the boat could lead to his repeat
internment. Nor will he make a difference on the Karabakh settlement
either way. A peaceful settlement is currently the domain of the
Presidents and Foreign Ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan, and while
contours of what is being discussed are gradually becoming clear,
there is nothing negative or positive that Babayan can contribute.

Nonetheless, Babayan's release comes at a particularly sensitive time
for domestic politics in Artsakh. Discontent and dissatisfaction with
the pace of democratic and social-economic progress in Karabakh
finally bubbled to the surface during the municipal elections in
August 2004. Significantly, independent candidate Eduard Aghabekian
was elected Mayor of Stepanakert, defeating the incumbent in the first
round and the well-funded ruling party candidate in the run-off.
Election of an opposition candidate to the Mayor's office in a major
city is no small achievement, unsurpassed even in Armenia. As the new
Mayor assumed office, his victory appears to have emboldened both the
population and the legislature of Artsakh. When Major General Movses
Hakobian, acting Chief of Army Staff, was quoted by a group of
visiting journalists from Armenia as saying that Karabakh was not
ready for full democracy as long as war was not over, a special
session of the legislature was called to which he was summoned and
assured the parliamentarians that he was misquoted.

As the experience of the Saakashvili movement in Georgia shows, the
popular mandate over municipal government and the ability to win
elections allows building a political base for greater ambitions in
nationwide office. As Arkady Ghukasyan (like his political mentor
Robert Kocharian) is serving his second, and in principle, last term
in office, he has to increasingly take the public opinion into greater
account. Pardoning Babayan on his own accord, rather than being forced
to do it by political opponents, is a sound political move, even if
conditioned by Babayan's health problems.

In sum, Samvel Babayan's release appears to have been an act of
clemency by Karabakh's President Ghukasyan. Clemency in this case,
however, is a poisoned chalice for Samvel Babayan. As long as he was
in the Shushi jail, both his supporters and ill wishers viewed him
from a distance, if not with respect, then with certain appreciation.
They will now behold what is probably a sick and forlorn figure, an
untenable realization for the macho political culture in Armenia. That
will prove to be more difficult to recover from than the stigma of a
prison term or abuse of office.

Announcement

Forum Rules (Everyone Must Read!!!)

The Rise And Fall Of Samvel Babayan

The Rise And Fall Of Samvel Babayan

Comment