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Re: The Army of Arsakh
Air War over Nagorniy-Kharabakh, 1988-1994
Map of Armenia and Azerbaijan with main Air Bases left from the times of the USSR. (Map by Tom Cooper, based on Encarta 2003)
First Battle
Serious fighting broke out in January 1992, and soon the AzAF began using Mi-8s and Mi-24s to transport reinforcements around the front. Due to the fluid situation on the battlefield, poor communications and training but lots of enthusiasm on the part of participants on both sides, an understandable chaos reigned within both military services, but especially so the Azerbaijani army and air force. Without surprise, they were much too often an easy prey for well-armed Armenians and Russian-supported Armenians. Already on 9 January, the Armenians claimed the first AzAF helicopter as shot down, and more claims followed on 24, 28 and 31 – all of them over Nagorniy Kharabakh, the last being a Mi-8 downed by MANPADs over the village of Huha. On the same day, 31 January, the Azeris also claimed their first victims, when they shot down two (Russian) Mi-8s that supported the first Armenian offensive.
After the initial chaos, the next two months were relatively quiet and there were only sporadic reports about the fighting. The only report known from this period is the one about the first combat sortie flown by AzAF Mi-24s, on 19 February, when two of them – flown by exSoviet Army mercenaries – attacked Armenian positions near Karagaliy. Obviously, both sides used this break to obtain more equipment, establish new units, build up stocks of supplies and improve their positions. The Russians used this period for evacuation of their nationals from the area. In most cases, helicopters had to be used, as numerous villages were cut off from the outside world. Exactly such an evacuation caused the first instance of air combat during this war.
On 3 March 1992, a RuAF Mi-26 – escorted by two Mi-24s – delivered 20 tons of food to the Kharabakh village of Gyulistan. On the return flight, the helicopter transported 50 Russian refugees (mainly women and children) from Stepankert to Yerevan. Before reaching the Armenian airspace, the formation was intercepted by a camouflaged AzAF Mi-8 that seems to have fired in the general direction of the Mi-26. Before any hits could be scored, however, the Azeri Mi-8 was driven away by escorting Mi-24s. Attempting to avoid a wider confrontation, the Russian pilots did not insist and gave up the pursuit.
Nevertheless, minutes later, the Armenians shot down the Mi-26s by a single 9K32/SA-7A over the village of Seydilyar, killing 12, and injuring 38. The RuAF immediately initiated a SAR operation, and two Mi-8s managed to extricate the injured survivors despite considerable difficulties caused by the deep snow in the area.
On the first view, the Azeri attack against this Mi-26 appears as an unprovoked slaughter of civilians, but it must be mentioned, that between the 23 February and 7 March, the Russian Army helicopters flew the whole 366th Mechanized Infantry Regiment to Stepankert, the capital of Nagorniy-Kharabakh. The Azeris - not without a good reason - considered this unit and helicopters that supported it as likely to support the local Armenians, and thus as a legitimate target. There were constant problems with identification of helicopters and aircraft deployed by all three involved parties, as most of these wore similar camouflage and markings. New markings of Armenia and Azerbaijan were largely unknown to helicopter crews and gunners on the ground. Finally, the Azeris were not that wrong with their assumption about what the Russian helicopters were actually doing in Nagorniy-Kharabakh: it is now known, that – between other supplies – the Mi-26s have transported a batch of 9K32 Strela/SA-7A MANPADS and several ZU-23-2 anti-aircraft guns (two of which were positioned in the hills over Mardakert with a special task of countering AzAF Mi-24s) to Armenian militia in Stepankert.
In late February 1992, the Armenians readied two of their newly formed mechanized brigades for a new offensive with the task of establishing a corridor from the Armenian border to Nagorniy Kharabakh. The attack was initially successful, and a road connection – usually called “Lachin Corridor” - was established, resulting in the Russians now having some time to stand down from flying continuous supply sorties to the isolated enclave. By early March, the Azeris organized a counteroffensive on several places along the Armenian corridor.
During this operation the AzAF again deployed its helicopters, but a number of these was rapidly shot down by newly-reinforced Armenian air defences, now equipped with a considerable number of ZU-23-2s and 9K32 Strelas. On 5 March, another Mi-8 was shot down, followed by a Mi-24 on 28 March, shot down by SA-7s near Kapzchvan.
Key points and areas of main airborne activity during the war in Nagorniy-Karabakh. (Map by Tom Cooper, based on Encarta 2003)
Hijacking a Su-25
The heavy losses of the AzAF in the first three months of the conventional fighting forced the Azeris to certain unconventional methods. On 8 April 1992, the AzAF obtained its first fixed-wing combat aircraft, as a 25-years-old Senior Lt. Vagif Kurbanov hijacked a Su-25 Frogfoot ground-attack of the 80th IBAP RuAF aircraft from the air base at Sital Tchaiy, and flew it to Azerbaijan. Assisted by two of his compatriots (Aircraft Technician Lieutenant Mamedov and Rigger Warrant Officer Kuliyev), Kurbanov prepared the Su-25 for flight, took off, and, after a flight of several minutes, landed at Yevlakh, a civilian airfield in Azerbaijan. The Russians were obviously surprised by the hijacker, but they did not expect the Azeris to be able to do anything meaningful with the aircraft. Therefore, their surprise was even larger, when Kurbanov started flying combat sorties against Stepankert.
Most of Kurbanov’s strikes flown against different sites in Armenia were of no military value: they usually resulted in destroyed civilian objects and dead civilians. But, it is possible, that he was responsible for downing one of two Russian Mi-8s lost on 17 April over Nagorniy Kharabakh (both crews managed to land their helicopters, but were immediately captured by the Azeris), and it is assumed that he also flew the Su-25 that attacked the Mi-8 flown by the Russian Major Alexander Gorchakov, few days later. On 9 May, he also intercepted a civilian Yak-40 that was flying refugees from Stepankert to Yerevan, and damaged it so heavily by gunfire, that the airliner crashed on landing. Kurbanov’s controversial career as the first fighter-jet pilot of the AzAF found its end on 13 June 1992, when his Su-25 was shot down by Armenian MANPADs over Mkhrdag.
Meanwhile, the AzAF lost two additional Mi-24s, one on 20 April, and another on 18 May, and was left with only six operational helicopters of this type. Nevertheless, these continued flying intensive combat sorties. For example, on 8 May, four Mi-24s raided Stepankert, and on the same day other Azeri helicopters also attacked the NKAOSDF positions – but also civilians – in the villages Avdoor, Krasniy Basar, Myurishen, and Norshen. Three days later, more attacks were flown against Dagraz and Agbooldag. Also, AzAF Mi-24s took part in the third Azeri counteroffensive – this time against Mardakert – which was initiated on 23 June, after the Armenians on 18 May secured the Lachin Corridor, widening it in several places.
Reinforcements for the AzAF
The Azeri offensives in June 1992 put the Armenians under a considerable pressure, but did not manage to cut off the Lachin Corridor. Nevertheless, the Azeris were not to stop, especially as now their military was to be considerably reinforced, as it was agreed that most of the former Soviet Army units still on their soil were to leave their equipment back. On 9 June, the Azeri Defense Minister Rakhim Gasev started an intense operation against the remaining Russian garrisons in Azerbaijan: by applying substantial pressure on local commanders, arresting or bribing several officers, taking hostages, or assaulting several bases, the Azeris managed to take over much heavy equipment, including the Gandzha AB, where no less but eleven (western sources say 16) Su-24MRs, 20 MiG-25RBs, and three Il-76 transports were taken over from the RuAF. The Russians put up no armed resistance on that base, but their pilots managed to fly eight MiG-25RBs out in the last moment, and their technicians also removed the complex “Peleng” nav-attack systems from remaining Foxbats. In this way, the AzAF was reinforced, but could not make much use of the MiG-25s for combat operations.
Actually, much more important for this young air force was the takeover of no less but 70 L-29 Delfin training jets of the 97th IAP, at Sanchagaly AB, in the same month. These planes - and a number of additional helicopters taken-over elsewhere - were not only very useful for training and re-qualification of new pilots for fast jets, but are known to have been used also in combat already in June 1992. At least one was shot down during renewed fighting along the Lachin Corridor, on 24 of the same month (the pilot was killed), together with two more Azeri Mi-24s (one of which went down already on 19 June). As it seems, most of the L-29s were flown by the former Azeri cadets from various flying schools of the Soviet Air Force. When the war began, many of Azeri cadets were dismissed “for health reasons”. This was especially the case with students based at Salyuan and Pirsagat airfields, although the main base for the L-29s remained the Armavir Air Force Pilots School, at Sanchagaly, which subsequently became training center of the AzAF.
And that was not all: the Azeris captured a large depot with spare parts for MiG-25s near Baku, and also some old and unserviceable MiG-21s at Dallyar AB, while the Azerbaijan Army was also reinforced by much heavy equipment, including T-72 tanks.
Meanwhile, an increasing number of Russian officers stationed in Azerbaijan joined the Azeri military. One of them was RuAF Col. Vladimir Kravtsov, CO of the PVO regiment equipped with MiG-25PDs and stationed at Nasosny AB. Kravtsov dissolved his unit and joined the Azeris, becoming the commander of the AzAF. Another was the former deputy commander of the Dallyar AB, Lt.Col. Alexander Plesh, who became a commander of a fighter wing of the AzAF. Finally, there was Capt. Yuri Belichenko, who was later to fly several combat sorties with repaired MiG-25RBs, before being shot down (by an 9K32/SA-7A) and captured by the Armenians on 20 August 1992 (his plane was initially reported as Su-25 or L-29).
Aside from qualified pilots, the Azeris managed to press an ever increasing number of MiG-25RBs and MiG-25PDs into service with the AzAF, and during August and September they were to fly a numer of bombing sorties against Armenia.
Bloody Autumn
The military situation in the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan in late summer and autumn 1992 became very precarious for both sides. On 19 July, the NKAOSDF – reinforced by regular Armenian troops – stormed the hills around Mardakert, and successfully captured several important peaks. The Azeris responded by pounding the hills with BM-21 rocket launchers, and also air strikes, flown by MiG-25s, L-39s and Mi-24s. The Armenians were unable to keep the corridor into Nagorniy Kharabakh permanently open, as their transport convoys were frequently hit by AzAF fighters and helicopters. This caused the Armenian troops inside the enclave to be constantly short on fuel, ammunition, and other supplies. On the other side, intensive operations cost Azeris - which proved unable to break the stubborn Armenian resistance – dearly, both on the ground and in the air.
Beside the loss of the MiG-25PD flown by Capt. Belichenko, on 20 August, near Chebran, a MiG-21 was shot down on the same day near Shokhiy. The Russian pilot, called Alexander, later died as PoW in Armenia. Another AzAF MiG-21 was shot down also over Shokhiy on 31 August, by small-arms fire. On 5 September, also a Mi-24 flown by Russian Maj. Sergey Sinyushkin and Capt. Yeugeni Karlov was shot down, and the crew killed, and another Mi-24 went down near Askeran, on 18 September.
Armenian Air Force Mi-24P "42" as seen in the late 1990s. The camouflage pattern appears quite unusual for Mi-24s of any nation - especially one that was mainly using "Hinds" left behind by the Soviet armed forces. But, this combination of two Greens and Brown is what all the combat aircraft and helicopters of the ArAF now wear. (Artwork by Tom Cooper)
Spoiled Negotiations
Officially and inofficially, Moscow half-heartedly supported Armenia, foremost in order to keep the back of its units engaged in Georgia and Chechnya free. In September, the Russians attempted to organize negotiations: on 19 of the month, a meeting between the Defense Ministers of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Russia, was organized in Sochi, on which a cease-fire for the following two months was agreed. The commanders of involved armies and the troops on the front, however, barely noticed any kind of a break in fighting.
As the ArAF still lacked combat aircraft, the AzAF meet snore resistance in the air, and in October started a series of severe attacks against supply bases and the traffic along the corridor. The Armenians responded by reinforcing their – already fairly effective – air defenses, for example by deploying eight S-60 57mm anti-aircraft guns along the Lachin Corridor. Two of these were positioned in the hills overlooking Mardakert, and they soon started claiming additional successes, even if one was destroyed in the first AzAF Mi-24 attack against their position, when the crews were taken completely by surprise by a Hind closing at a very low level and high speed.
On 10 October, the Armenians claimed another Su-25 shot down over Nagorniy-Kharabakh. Indeed, an AzAF fighter was downed by MANPADs on that day near the village of Malibeili, and its Russian pilot was killed when his parachute failed to deploy. But, the aircraft in question was almost certainly not Su-25: it is questionable where from could the Azeris get additional Sukhois and why should they try to purchase any. Of course, there was a small possibility that the Georgians have supplied one or two examples, as Su-25s were assembled at the Tbilisi aircraft plant.
[...]
Link: http://www.acig.org/artman/publish/article_280.shtml
Air War over Nagorniy-Kharabakh, 1988-1994
Map of Armenia and Azerbaijan with main Air Bases left from the times of the USSR. (Map by Tom Cooper, based on Encarta 2003)
First Battle
Serious fighting broke out in January 1992, and soon the AzAF began using Mi-8s and Mi-24s to transport reinforcements around the front. Due to the fluid situation on the battlefield, poor communications and training but lots of enthusiasm on the part of participants on both sides, an understandable chaos reigned within both military services, but especially so the Azerbaijani army and air force. Without surprise, they were much too often an easy prey for well-armed Armenians and Russian-supported Armenians. Already on 9 January, the Armenians claimed the first AzAF helicopter as shot down, and more claims followed on 24, 28 and 31 – all of them over Nagorniy Kharabakh, the last being a Mi-8 downed by MANPADs over the village of Huha. On the same day, 31 January, the Azeris also claimed their first victims, when they shot down two (Russian) Mi-8s that supported the first Armenian offensive.
After the initial chaos, the next two months were relatively quiet and there were only sporadic reports about the fighting. The only report known from this period is the one about the first combat sortie flown by AzAF Mi-24s, on 19 February, when two of them – flown by exSoviet Army mercenaries – attacked Armenian positions near Karagaliy. Obviously, both sides used this break to obtain more equipment, establish new units, build up stocks of supplies and improve their positions. The Russians used this period for evacuation of their nationals from the area. In most cases, helicopters had to be used, as numerous villages were cut off from the outside world. Exactly such an evacuation caused the first instance of air combat during this war.
On 3 March 1992, a RuAF Mi-26 – escorted by two Mi-24s – delivered 20 tons of food to the Kharabakh village of Gyulistan. On the return flight, the helicopter transported 50 Russian refugees (mainly women and children) from Stepankert to Yerevan. Before reaching the Armenian airspace, the formation was intercepted by a camouflaged AzAF Mi-8 that seems to have fired in the general direction of the Mi-26. Before any hits could be scored, however, the Azeri Mi-8 was driven away by escorting Mi-24s. Attempting to avoid a wider confrontation, the Russian pilots did not insist and gave up the pursuit.
Nevertheless, minutes later, the Armenians shot down the Mi-26s by a single 9K32/SA-7A over the village of Seydilyar, killing 12, and injuring 38. The RuAF immediately initiated a SAR operation, and two Mi-8s managed to extricate the injured survivors despite considerable difficulties caused by the deep snow in the area.
On the first view, the Azeri attack against this Mi-26 appears as an unprovoked slaughter of civilians, but it must be mentioned, that between the 23 February and 7 March, the Russian Army helicopters flew the whole 366th Mechanized Infantry Regiment to Stepankert, the capital of Nagorniy-Kharabakh. The Azeris - not without a good reason - considered this unit and helicopters that supported it as likely to support the local Armenians, and thus as a legitimate target. There were constant problems with identification of helicopters and aircraft deployed by all three involved parties, as most of these wore similar camouflage and markings. New markings of Armenia and Azerbaijan were largely unknown to helicopter crews and gunners on the ground. Finally, the Azeris were not that wrong with their assumption about what the Russian helicopters were actually doing in Nagorniy-Kharabakh: it is now known, that – between other supplies – the Mi-26s have transported a batch of 9K32 Strela/SA-7A MANPADS and several ZU-23-2 anti-aircraft guns (two of which were positioned in the hills over Mardakert with a special task of countering AzAF Mi-24s) to Armenian militia in Stepankert.
In late February 1992, the Armenians readied two of their newly formed mechanized brigades for a new offensive with the task of establishing a corridor from the Armenian border to Nagorniy Kharabakh. The attack was initially successful, and a road connection – usually called “Lachin Corridor” - was established, resulting in the Russians now having some time to stand down from flying continuous supply sorties to the isolated enclave. By early March, the Azeris organized a counteroffensive on several places along the Armenian corridor.
During this operation the AzAF again deployed its helicopters, but a number of these was rapidly shot down by newly-reinforced Armenian air defences, now equipped with a considerable number of ZU-23-2s and 9K32 Strelas. On 5 March, another Mi-8 was shot down, followed by a Mi-24 on 28 March, shot down by SA-7s near Kapzchvan.
Key points and areas of main airborne activity during the war in Nagorniy-Karabakh. (Map by Tom Cooper, based on Encarta 2003)
Hijacking a Su-25
The heavy losses of the AzAF in the first three months of the conventional fighting forced the Azeris to certain unconventional methods. On 8 April 1992, the AzAF obtained its first fixed-wing combat aircraft, as a 25-years-old Senior Lt. Vagif Kurbanov hijacked a Su-25 Frogfoot ground-attack of the 80th IBAP RuAF aircraft from the air base at Sital Tchaiy, and flew it to Azerbaijan. Assisted by two of his compatriots (Aircraft Technician Lieutenant Mamedov and Rigger Warrant Officer Kuliyev), Kurbanov prepared the Su-25 for flight, took off, and, after a flight of several minutes, landed at Yevlakh, a civilian airfield in Azerbaijan. The Russians were obviously surprised by the hijacker, but they did not expect the Azeris to be able to do anything meaningful with the aircraft. Therefore, their surprise was even larger, when Kurbanov started flying combat sorties against Stepankert.
Most of Kurbanov’s strikes flown against different sites in Armenia were of no military value: they usually resulted in destroyed civilian objects and dead civilians. But, it is possible, that he was responsible for downing one of two Russian Mi-8s lost on 17 April over Nagorniy Kharabakh (both crews managed to land their helicopters, but were immediately captured by the Azeris), and it is assumed that he also flew the Su-25 that attacked the Mi-8 flown by the Russian Major Alexander Gorchakov, few days later. On 9 May, he also intercepted a civilian Yak-40 that was flying refugees from Stepankert to Yerevan, and damaged it so heavily by gunfire, that the airliner crashed on landing. Kurbanov’s controversial career as the first fighter-jet pilot of the AzAF found its end on 13 June 1992, when his Su-25 was shot down by Armenian MANPADs over Mkhrdag.
Meanwhile, the AzAF lost two additional Mi-24s, one on 20 April, and another on 18 May, and was left with only six operational helicopters of this type. Nevertheless, these continued flying intensive combat sorties. For example, on 8 May, four Mi-24s raided Stepankert, and on the same day other Azeri helicopters also attacked the NKAOSDF positions – but also civilians – in the villages Avdoor, Krasniy Basar, Myurishen, and Norshen. Three days later, more attacks were flown against Dagraz and Agbooldag. Also, AzAF Mi-24s took part in the third Azeri counteroffensive – this time against Mardakert – which was initiated on 23 June, after the Armenians on 18 May secured the Lachin Corridor, widening it in several places.
Reinforcements for the AzAF
The Azeri offensives in June 1992 put the Armenians under a considerable pressure, but did not manage to cut off the Lachin Corridor. Nevertheless, the Azeris were not to stop, especially as now their military was to be considerably reinforced, as it was agreed that most of the former Soviet Army units still on their soil were to leave their equipment back. On 9 June, the Azeri Defense Minister Rakhim Gasev started an intense operation against the remaining Russian garrisons in Azerbaijan: by applying substantial pressure on local commanders, arresting or bribing several officers, taking hostages, or assaulting several bases, the Azeris managed to take over much heavy equipment, including the Gandzha AB, where no less but eleven (western sources say 16) Su-24MRs, 20 MiG-25RBs, and three Il-76 transports were taken over from the RuAF. The Russians put up no armed resistance on that base, but their pilots managed to fly eight MiG-25RBs out in the last moment, and their technicians also removed the complex “Peleng” nav-attack systems from remaining Foxbats. In this way, the AzAF was reinforced, but could not make much use of the MiG-25s for combat operations.
Actually, much more important for this young air force was the takeover of no less but 70 L-29 Delfin training jets of the 97th IAP, at Sanchagaly AB, in the same month. These planes - and a number of additional helicopters taken-over elsewhere - were not only very useful for training and re-qualification of new pilots for fast jets, but are known to have been used also in combat already in June 1992. At least one was shot down during renewed fighting along the Lachin Corridor, on 24 of the same month (the pilot was killed), together with two more Azeri Mi-24s (one of which went down already on 19 June). As it seems, most of the L-29s were flown by the former Azeri cadets from various flying schools of the Soviet Air Force. When the war began, many of Azeri cadets were dismissed “for health reasons”. This was especially the case with students based at Salyuan and Pirsagat airfields, although the main base for the L-29s remained the Armavir Air Force Pilots School, at Sanchagaly, which subsequently became training center of the AzAF.
And that was not all: the Azeris captured a large depot with spare parts for MiG-25s near Baku, and also some old and unserviceable MiG-21s at Dallyar AB, while the Azerbaijan Army was also reinforced by much heavy equipment, including T-72 tanks.
Meanwhile, an increasing number of Russian officers stationed in Azerbaijan joined the Azeri military. One of them was RuAF Col. Vladimir Kravtsov, CO of the PVO regiment equipped with MiG-25PDs and stationed at Nasosny AB. Kravtsov dissolved his unit and joined the Azeris, becoming the commander of the AzAF. Another was the former deputy commander of the Dallyar AB, Lt.Col. Alexander Plesh, who became a commander of a fighter wing of the AzAF. Finally, there was Capt. Yuri Belichenko, who was later to fly several combat sorties with repaired MiG-25RBs, before being shot down (by an 9K32/SA-7A) and captured by the Armenians on 20 August 1992 (his plane was initially reported as Su-25 or L-29).
Aside from qualified pilots, the Azeris managed to press an ever increasing number of MiG-25RBs and MiG-25PDs into service with the AzAF, and during August and September they were to fly a numer of bombing sorties against Armenia.
Bloody Autumn
The military situation in the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan in late summer and autumn 1992 became very precarious for both sides. On 19 July, the NKAOSDF – reinforced by regular Armenian troops – stormed the hills around Mardakert, and successfully captured several important peaks. The Azeris responded by pounding the hills with BM-21 rocket launchers, and also air strikes, flown by MiG-25s, L-39s and Mi-24s. The Armenians were unable to keep the corridor into Nagorniy Kharabakh permanently open, as their transport convoys were frequently hit by AzAF fighters and helicopters. This caused the Armenian troops inside the enclave to be constantly short on fuel, ammunition, and other supplies. On the other side, intensive operations cost Azeris - which proved unable to break the stubborn Armenian resistance – dearly, both on the ground and in the air.
Beside the loss of the MiG-25PD flown by Capt. Belichenko, on 20 August, near Chebran, a MiG-21 was shot down on the same day near Shokhiy. The Russian pilot, called Alexander, later died as PoW in Armenia. Another AzAF MiG-21 was shot down also over Shokhiy on 31 August, by small-arms fire. On 5 September, also a Mi-24 flown by Russian Maj. Sergey Sinyushkin and Capt. Yeugeni Karlov was shot down, and the crew killed, and another Mi-24 went down near Askeran, on 18 September.
Armenian Air Force Mi-24P "42" as seen in the late 1990s. The camouflage pattern appears quite unusual for Mi-24s of any nation - especially one that was mainly using "Hinds" left behind by the Soviet armed forces. But, this combination of two Greens and Brown is what all the combat aircraft and helicopters of the ArAF now wear. (Artwork by Tom Cooper)
Spoiled Negotiations
Officially and inofficially, Moscow half-heartedly supported Armenia, foremost in order to keep the back of its units engaged in Georgia and Chechnya free. In September, the Russians attempted to organize negotiations: on 19 of the month, a meeting between the Defense Ministers of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Russia, was organized in Sochi, on which a cease-fire for the following two months was agreed. The commanders of involved armies and the troops on the front, however, barely noticed any kind of a break in fighting.
As the ArAF still lacked combat aircraft, the AzAF meet snore resistance in the air, and in October started a series of severe attacks against supply bases and the traffic along the corridor. The Armenians responded by reinforcing their – already fairly effective – air defenses, for example by deploying eight S-60 57mm anti-aircraft guns along the Lachin Corridor. Two of these were positioned in the hills overlooking Mardakert, and they soon started claiming additional successes, even if one was destroyed in the first AzAF Mi-24 attack against their position, when the crews were taken completely by surprise by a Hind closing at a very low level and high speed.
On 10 October, the Armenians claimed another Su-25 shot down over Nagorniy-Kharabakh. Indeed, an AzAF fighter was downed by MANPADs on that day near the village of Malibeili, and its Russian pilot was killed when his parachute failed to deploy. But, the aircraft in question was almost certainly not Su-25: it is questionable where from could the Azeris get additional Sukhois and why should they try to purchase any. Of course, there was a small possibility that the Georgians have supplied one or two examples, as Su-25s were assembled at the Tbilisi aircraft plant.
[...]
Link: http://www.acig.org/artman/publish/article_280.shtml
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