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The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

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  • Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

    Originally posted by Supreme View Post
    Insane and awesome story.
    The first exposure I got to the Al-Qaeda-CIA connection was via Michael Ruppert. I caught him on a left-wing radio station in New York City and on the internet soon after the September 11, 2001 attacks. Listening to what he had to say basically opened my eyes and it made me start thinking. Soon thereafter, I began looking more closely at regional geopolitics; I picked up the book by Brzezinski the Grand Chess Board; the book by Michael Ruppert himself Crossing the Rubicon; began researching David Ray Griffin's works; started to look deeper into the Neoconservative movement and their Project for the New American Century. So, meeting the young CIA & Al-Qaeda trained Bosnian "sniper" basically brought it all home - literally.

    I've only heard somethings about Iran's involvement in Bosnia and Tajikistan.
    They clearly were playing both sides of the fence in the Caucasus during the early-mid 1990s. They gave up on Baku when they realize that Baku was more interested with establishing ties with Turkey and the West. They gave up on Chechnya and Bosnia essentially for the same reasons, in addition to Tehran coming to the realization they will need Russian support.

    I've seen the book but haven't read it.
    Excellent book! A must read. But you must have a good background on the region's geopolitical nature before you read it. The book requires reading between the lines because the the author has an obvious anti-Iranian/anti-Islamic agenda. Excellent source of information in the English language, nevertheless.

    Here the link to my post regarding the book: http://forum.armenianclub.com/showpo...postcount=1673

    I don't understand why Iran would be helping the worthless "islamic" Chechen's against a somewhat vital ally like Russia, especially at a time when Russia was Iran's main arms supplier. I do agree with you about the Iran trying to setup shops in newly emerging republics but it knew it would eventually have to back off when superpowers were involved.
    Worthless Islamic Chechens? I don't think so. In the early-mid 1990s the Chechen movement was riding high. Most western intelligence agencies placed their bets on the Chechen movement. Russia was on its knees. The Chechens at the time were poised to expel Russians from the Caucasus and Caspian region.

    Like I told Lucin:

    The Soviet Union was not looked upon favorable by Iran to begin with. I don't know if Iran played a significant role in Afghanistan's fight against Soviet occupation, but I would not be surprised if it did. When the Soviet Union collapsed there was anarchy and chaos across the former Soviet republics of Eurasia. Since there are significant gas/oil reserves in the region, since the Caspian Sea region is considered vital to Iran's national security, since Iran had cultural ties with various Central Asian and Caucasian former Soviet peoples, Tehran attempted to plant its seeds in the Muslim populations of the region in question. This is my opinion.

    A drastically weakened Russia was not a big factor at the time. Remember that in the mid-90s many political analysts, the CIA as well, were forecasting the total demise of the Russian nation. In a sense, taking advantage of the situation, Tehran tried to put its hands on something new with the hopes that it can manipulate it in its favor in the future. Don't forget, they had done the same in Lebanon and succeeded, thanks to the Shiite population there. They are doing the same in southern Iraq and succeeding, thanks to the Shiite population there. And believe it or not, Iran tries to infiltrate Armenia's security apparatus and they try to recruit Armenian agents as well. I have a well informed colleagues in Yerevan that tells me Armenia's national security services are infiltrated by Russian agents (the majority) Iranian agents and American agents.

    So, why shouldn't Tehran have tried establishing a foothold in various Islamic centers around the world such as the Balkans, Caucasus and Central Asia? I am sure there were many other practical reasons that we are not exposed to. Anyway, by the late 90s Russia had started to make a gradual comeback and certain geopolitical factors had changed. I believe this forced Tehran to pull back and seek better relations with the Russian Federation. And since Putin's rise to power and Washington's recent agenda against Iran, Tehran is locked to Moscow for the foreseeable future.


    I'm sure there are good Iranian's and Iranian leaders that would be disgusted by the actions of the intelligence services, if they only knew. This also goes for American's and others.
    Well, that's the nature of politics. If Americans only knew what some of their "democratically elected" officials are engaged in...

    IMO someone needs to write a book exposing "secular" Turkeys involvement in Islamic terrorism from Azerbaijan to Bosnia and then on to Chechnya It would be a great way to get westerners against the scum turks. (or another reason to)
    Ironically, the book Chechen Jihad fully discloses the extensive Turkish and Pakistani involvement in Chechnya - and Nagorno Karabagh. I suggest you pick up a copy if you can. But if you think that this "information" will turn the West against Turkey, that's very naive to say the least.

    Did you have a chance to read these?







    The anti-Russian (and to a certain extent, anti-Armenian) agenda in the Caucasus was a Western, Turkish, Azeri, Georgian, Pakistani and Saudi Arabian project.

    I would also like to extend my welcome to you as well. It's always a pleasure to converse with intelligent individuals.
    Մեր ժողովուրդն արանց հայրենասիրութեան այն է, ինչ որ մի մարմին' առանց հոգու:

    Նժդեհ


    Please visit me at my Heralding the Rise of Russia blog: http://theriseofrussia.blogspot.com/

    Comment


    • Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

      Originally posted by zeytuntsi View Post
      http://www.armradio.am/news/?part=pol&id=12970


      Official Baku expects Russia to expresses its will on the settlement of the Karabakh conflict

      Official Baku believes that the visit of the Russian President Dmitry Medvedev to Azerbaijan will provide conditions for further development of the relations between the two countries. One of the fundamental directions of Azerbaijans foreign policy is to establish close corporation with the neighboring countries. Azerbaijan attaches great importance to its relations with Russia, Novruz Mammadov, head of the international relations department of the Presidential Administration of Azerbaijan said to TrendNews.

      Newly elected Russian President Dmitry Medvedev will pay his first official visit to Azerbaijan on 3 to 4 July. The visit will take place at an invitation of the Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev.

      The visit of Dmirti Medvedev shows that Azerbaijan is one of the four or five priority countries for Russia, Mammadov said.

      According to Mammadov, Azerbaijan wants only one thing from Russia. We believe that if Russia expresses its will on the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, it would be fair and right. The position of Russia on the settlement of this conflict is of great significance. If Russia takes more fair and concrete position in this regard, Nagorno-Karabakh conflict will be solved soon, Mammadov said.
      That is why I think it would be a great move from Moscow or Yerevan, showing that Armenia comes before azerbaijan, if Medvedev made a quick and brief meeting with the Armenian president first, in Armenia before visiting Baku You see they already would like to use Russia only for the solution of the Karabakh issue.

      Comment


      • Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

        As for the Iranian question, see the thing is that when Ahmadinejad was elected president of Iran I was too young to understand geopolitical issues but i remember very well my father saying another CIA game electing him as a president. Do you guys have any articles back 6-7 years that somehow can support the idea of America's role in the presidential elections in Iran? I mean if you look at it from that perspective allot of question that were raised above about Iranian partisans fighting against its nowadays allies would start making sense, I know that Karabakh and the Kosovo wars were way before Ahmadinejad but still the atmosphere would still be the same today.
        Last edited by Eric; 06-18-2008, 12:53 PM.

        Comment


        • Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

          The title of this thread is The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations.
          Well, I am not sure that it's a good thing to build an Empire, but Russia (as a country) just got bigger....

          Here's a report from RT:

          June 17, 2008, 9:51

          A piece of land in the town of Jericho in the West Bank, which once belonged to Russian tsars, has been handed back to Russia








          A ceremony in Moscow saw Hassan Saleh, the mayor of Jericho, hand over an ownership deed for the area to Sergey Stepashin, the head of the Imperial Orthodox Palestine Society.
          Russia hopes to develop the 12,000 square metres of land and boost tourism in the area.
          Jericho is thought to be one of the oldest towns on earth and has significant biblical links.
          It contains the biblical tree which, according to St. Luke's Gospel, the tax collector Zacchaeus climbed up in order to get a better view of Jesus Christ.

          Two other plots have been transferred to the ownership of the Russian Orthodox Church. One of them is located in the district known as Moscovia to many citizens of Jericho.
          Two centuries ago, the Russian tsar bought this land and built a nunnery on it. For many it was a place where pilgrims came to visit.

          But after the 1917 revolution when the country turned to socialism and then communism, the place was abandoned and the buildings left to rot. Today four graves with the names of Russian women and some old ruins are all that remain.
          Saeb Erekat, chief Palestinian autonomy negotiator, hopes the land will be developed and rejuvenated for tourism.

          He said: “I hope that now the Russian government realises now that they have 12,000 square metres in the best located commercial area in Jericho, the oldest city on earth, with Zacchaeus street where Jesus spoke to the tax collector, and it’s up to them. They’re the owners, they can build whatever they want, either alone, or through partners with Palestinian business people. I believe any project will really help foster relations.”

          For Russia, it is a chance to regain a religiously symbolic foothold in Israel and the West Bank.
          For the Palestinians, it is a sign of friendship and a new breath of economic life.



          The ancient city of Jericho

          Source - http://russiatoday.ru/news/news/26278






          President Vladimir Putin at Easter services at Christ the Saviour Cathedral in Moscow 8 April 2007



          The Cathedral of Christ the Saviour (Russian: Хра́м Христа́ Спаси́теля) is the tallest Eastern Orthodox Church in the world.



          Comment


          • Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

            US enters missile talks with Lithuania


            Lets not ruin Russian-Polish relations lets get even closer to the borders huh

            Eric




            The US and Lithuania are discussing co-operating on Washington’s missile defence system in a move likely to deepen Russian opposition to the plans.

            The preliminary contacts with Vilnius come after months of US negotiations with Poland, which have failed to secure a breakthrough. Those talks have been complicated by tensions with Russia, which says US plans to locate 10 missile interceptors in Warsaw and a radar base in the Czech Republic would affect its strategic deterrent – despite US assurances that the missile bases are intended to deal with a threat from Iran, not Russia.

            US diplomats characterise the talks with Lithuania as a fallback plan in case a deal with Poland cannot be reached.

            “We are hopeful that we can soon reach a deal with the Poles, but we have always said that there are other options available to us. There are several other European nations that could host the interceptors and Lithuania is one of them,” said Geoff Morrell, the Pentagon press secretary. “That said, we have not entered into negotiations with any other country and hope that does not become necessary.”

            Audrius Bruzga, Lithuania’s ambassador to the US, told the Financial Times his country was not in formal negotiations with Washington. “We are in discussions with the US on a variety of issues related to security policy, and missile defence is included,” he said. When asked if Lithuania would host a US interceptor base, he added: “If there was such a proposal, we would look into it and of course consider it carefully.”

            In the negotiations between Warsaw and Washington the two sides still appear to be far apart. Poland, which is less concerned about Iran than it is about Russia, insists the US help modernise the Polish military and beef up its air defences with a system such as Patriot missiles if Poland is to host the missile base.

            “We are counting on the US treating us like it does other strategic partners in other parts of the world when it comes to talks over the missile shield,” Bogdan Klich, Poland’s defence minister, recently said in Brussels. He compared Poland with US partners such as Egypt and Pakistan, indicating Warsaw wanted tens of millions of dollars to help the Polish military.

            But a US official in Warsaw said aid on such a scale was “not on the cards”.

            US officials said the talks with Lithuania had been proceeding for about a month and acknowledged the US also recently considered the possibility of the Czech Republic hosting interceptors.

            By Daniel Dombey and Demetri Sevastopulo in Washington and Jan Cienski in Warsaw
            Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2008

            Comment


            • Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

              Originally posted by Armenian View Post
              They clearly were playing both sides of the fence in the Caucasus during the early-mid 1990s. They gave up on Baku when they realize that Baku was more interested with establishing ties with Turkey and the West. They gave up on Chechnya and Bosnia essentially for the same reasons, in addition to Tehran coming to the realization they will need Russian support.
              Yup, pretty much the same reason when the Chechen and Afghan Mujahideen left the Azeri's in Karabakh. They knew the fight was more about nationalism rather than Islam.


              Excellent book! A must read. But you must have a good background on the region's geopolitical nature before you read it. The book requires reading between the lines because the the author has an obvious anti-Iranian/anti-Islamic agenda. Excellent source of information in the English language, nevertheless.

              Here the link to my post regarding the book: http://forum.armenianclub.com/showpo...postcount=1673
              I'll definitely look into it since I was already contemplating about ordering some books relating to Armenian issues.


              Worthless Islamic Chechens? I don't think so. In the early-mid 1990s the Chechen movement was riding high. Most western intelligence agencies placed their bets on the Chechen movement. Russia was on its knees. The Chechens at the time were poised to expel Russians from the Caucasus and Caspian region.
              I mean worthless for Iran not western nations. Iran at the time was not in the position to piss of the western powers or Russia.

              I'm just glad the west is getting a taste of its own medicine in Iraq and Afghanistan



              Well, that's the nature of politics. If Americans only knew what some of their "democratically elected" officials are engaged in...
              Yeah, well I'm mostly talking about the intelligence agencies and their covert operations.

              Ironically, the book Chechen Jihad fully discloses the extensive Turkish and Pakistani involvement in Chechnya - and Nagorno Karabagh. I suggest you pick up a copy if you can. But if you think that this "information" will turn the West against Turkey, that's very naive to say the least.


              This is the book right?


              Thanks for the links. I think I have read a few of em.

              The anti-Russian (and to a certain extent, anti-Armenian) agenda in the Caucasus was a Western, Turkish, Azeri, Georgian, Pakistani and Saudi Arabian project.
              Yeah I agree. I did follow your threads and picked up a bunch of info and researched the topics myself.

              A good example is the Armenian Assembly of America fiasco.

              I would also like to extend my welcome to you as well. It's always a pleasure to converse with intelligent individuals.
              Thank you...I've been following your threads for quite a while

              Originally posted by skhara View Post
              PS:

              Supreme, welcome here . Glad you could join us.
              Thanks bro and thanks for sharing that story.

              Comment


              • Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

                Is the rising racial violence in Russia the tree that hides the forest? Does it hide a deep social crisis resulting from the widespread poverty?







                Ethnic violence in Russia rises
                Russians increase attacks on Muslims, xxxs, others
                By Corydon Ireland
                Harvard News Office


                Racial and ethnic hate crimes are a growing problem in Russia, and spell trouble for the multiethnic federation.

                So says Nickolai Butkevich, research and advocacy director for the Washington, D.C.-based Union of Councils for xxxs in the former Soviet Union (http://www.ucsj.org). On Monday (Oct. 16), Butkevich delivered the first Sakharov Seminar of the 2006-07 academic year at the Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies at Harvard.

                "It's gone from almost nothing to quite a bit of violence," said Butkevich, in remarks before his hour-long presentation in a small seminar room in front of 20 scholars and graduate students. Government authorities are doing little to stop it, he said later, and increasing violence threatens the economic and political stability of Russia.

                Tatiana Yankelevich, director of the center's Sakharov Program on Human Rights, called the apparent rise of xenophobic violence in Russia "a sadly hot and relevant topic" - marked by at least seven murders and dozens of assaults this year by neo-Nazi groups.

                She called Russian President Vladimir Putin's public condemnations of the violence "perfunctory."

                The program and lecture series, both in their third year, are named after Andrei Sakharov. The eminent nuclear physicist-turned-activist, who died in 1989, helped develop the Soviet hydrogen bomb before embracing dissent during the Cold War.

                Butkevich has testified before three congressional committees about "the very gloomy and ugly topic" of extremist nationalism in Russia and the violence it engenders. He admitted that official data on violence is sketchy, but ticked off a litany of recent crimes associated with bigotry: desecration of Muslim and xxxish graves, attacks on African students, and militarylike assaults on rail passengers in suburban Moscow.

                The violence is aggravated by signs that ordinary Russians - inflamed, in part, by Russian police actions in Muslim Chechnya - are losing patience with non-Russian groups immigrating to Russian cities.

                Traditional racial and religious prejudices, forced underground during the Soviet era, are beginning to resurface. A recent poll showed 54 percent of Russians in support of restrictions on non-Russians. Another 41 percent agreed there was a need to limit xxxish influence in education, business, show business, and virtually every other facet of Russian life.

                At the extreme end of feeling, said Butkevich, neo-Nazi groups and sympathizers are still active both in crowded major cities and in more traditionally tolerant areas of Siberia and the Far East.

                Why? In part because Russia is losing ethnic Russians (at the rate of 1 million a year during the 1990s - though only 600,000 last year) - and gaining immigrants. Russia "is becoming darker, and more Muslim," said Butkevich. "This scares a lot of people."

                Add to that Russian police actions in Chechnya, which have fanned ethnic suspicion and hatreds. Meanwhile, government officials "are playing footsie with nationalist politics," said Butkevich, including still-influential splinter groups of the once-powerful Russian National Unity, an ultranationalist group.

                But in Russia's rural areas or in cash-strapped one-company towns, formal neo-Nazi organizations have given way to loose-knit neighborhood gangs. Members are young men humiliated by poverty; trapped by the difficulty of moving within Russia (de facto internal passport controls are still in place); and angered by what Butkevich called a "weird mix of sex and jealousy." In Russia, perceptions persist that immigrants from the ethnically diverse and oil-rich Caucasus region are sexually aggressive - and rich.

                "In these small towns, people do take the law into their own hands," and retribution often has ethnic or racial undertones, said Butkevich. "A lot of people in Russia feel humiliated, and find an outlet by rioting."

                Laws exist to punish hate crimes, especially Article 282 of Russia's criminal code, "a de facto hate crimes provision," he said. But the law is little used and poorly understood by judges and prosecutors.

                To make matters worse in the legal realm, local police and politicians in remote localities often side with ethnic Russian gangsters, and treat ultranationalist figures as statesmen.

                In questions from the audience, Butkevich faced sharp questioning about the strength of his statistics on the upward trend in violence. The data "is not as clean [or] as scientific as it should be," he admitted.

                And there were reminders from the audience that some non-Russian ethnic groups embrace their own extremist groups. "But the Russians are in charge," countered Butkevich, whose organization maintains a weekly "bigotry monitor" on its Web site, and updates violence figures three times a day. "What they do is more important."

                Comment


                • tranquill

                  Here an Israeli commentator warns of pogroms coming in America in response to xxxish participation in liberal movements. A curious read.

                  Comment


                  • Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

                    REGNUM: Prospects of war in Transcaucasia and Central Asia



                    An analytical report of REGNUM News Agency based on its own information and materials of its correspondents.


                    1. The global scene

                    Trasncaucasia and Central Asia are still key conflict areas in the post-Soviet territory (apart from Crimea). Security prospects are determined here by following factors:

                    (1) the nature of the strategic dialog between Russia, the United States and the accompanying European Union, interests of China, Turkey and Iran;

                    (2) domestic political situation in the countries of the mentioned regions;

                    (3) regional conflicts (Georgian-Abkhaz, Georgian-Ossetian and Nagorno Karabakh, Azerbaijani-Iranian ones), other regional conflicts (Kazakh-Uzbek, Uzbek-Tajik, Afghan-Tajik (Uzbek, Kyrgyz) ones) and other discreet conflicts taking shape of the “security expansion” (for instance, Iran's in Transcaucasia and Central Asia, Iran and China's in Central Asia);

                    (4) capability of local regimes to generate domestic and external conflicts on their own.

                    The key problem around which the regional competition is taking place is in control over the energy potential of the Caspian and the transit potential of the Black Sea region, which is a part of the bigger Balkan-Black Sea region and the prospect of “the global Balkans from Suez (Kosovo) to Xinjiang” directly including Central Asia and Kazakhstan. In this case, the traditional role of “restraining” Russia from its southern borders is being accomplished by the western line of “containment” through the Baltic-Black Sea-Caspian axis. And, which is the most important, “restraining” Russia is a part of the Euro-Atlantic “containment” of the Arabic world and China, and Eurasia in general.

                    The West has been suffering economic losses and is short of time in the practical implementation of its new Euro-Atlantic projects around the “Transcaucasian Corridor”: after investing finances into laying alternative pipelines, including the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline, by promoting Nabucco, by involving Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan into the “corridor,” the West has failed to provide guaranteed sources for filling the pipes, and even estimated amounts of the resources to be exported have no principal influence upon the energy market. That is why Kazakhstan rich in natural resources becomes a focus of special political, military and humanitarian attention of the West, whose key task is to pull Kazakhstan away from Russia and China. Evidently, the most realistic scenario of such pulling away will be communicational, economic and defense isolation of Kazakhstan in the region. The harder for Kazakhstan will be the results of rearming its anti-aircraft defense by NATO specialists that would put under its control the whole Western China, Russia's territory up to the Arctic Ocean and the Persian Gulf countries and pose a direct threat to all Kazakhstan's neighbors. Opposite to Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan has not acknowledged the prospect of turning into a small change in the strategy of “containment.”

                    Meanwhile, the key generator of political conflicts in the “global Balkans” area are the United States rather than regional forces; namely, the inability of the USA as an irresponsible external force results of whose policy were disintegration of Iraq, activity of Iran, indetermination of Turkey and the drug and terror epidemic from Afghanistan.

                    2. Transcaucasia

                    Up to date, the priority practical and tactical goal of the West in region is to implement the Trans-Caspian pipeline that could fuel the pipeline junctions along the Azerbaijan-Georgia-Turkey line as well as load transshipping capacities of Georgian ports. At the same time, the West has been strategically pushing Iran and Turkey from the region which makes them situational partners of Russia. Nevertheless, Turkey is still exerting gross political impact upon the situation in Azerbaijan using extended social networks as well. In its turn, Iran, parallel to weakening Russia's positions, is increasing its presence in Armenia, turning eventually into a factor guaranteeing security of the republic.

                    After Mikhail Saakashvili and his team came to power, Georgia handed over its sovereignty to the United States, assuming a role of a full-extent buffer zone from Russia that hampered its capability to increase its regional interests. Withdrawal of the Russian military bases from Batumi and Akhalkalaki as well as a many-year massive anti-Russian campaign instigated by Saakashvili bereaved Moscow of any influence in Georgia. As a result, Russia practically had to fence off the region blocking transport links via a check-point on the Georgian Military Highway and the ports of Poti and Batumi. Within whole that period, the only legal land way from Russia to the region was via Dagestan to Azerbaijan and was used only locally. The Georgian-Russian confrontation granted a great limit of time to the West and an extensive space for maneuvering in increasing their influence upon the political systems of the countries. At the same time, the energy dialog of the West with Azerbaijan was grounded basically upon prospects of neutralizing Iran, and with Armenia upon a possibility to take the country out of the Russian orbit and unblock the border with Turkey. Neither of the goals can be considered to be fully accomplished, as both Tehran and Ankara did their best not to let Washington's positions strengthen excessively.

                    Meanwhile, the West gained substantial success particular in engaging the three countries in the region into NATO Individual Partnership Action Plans and for Georgia, in stating clearly the prospect of the country joining the alliance. The USA announced directly it was considering the region as a territory for deploying its air defense. The Azerbaijani territory is already granted for putting into practice interests of the American radiolocation systems and Air Forces. An agreement signed by the US and Azerbaijan on military and technical cooperation foresees US plans to connect the radiolocation station in Lerik and radiotelephone observer station in Agstafa to the Kavkaznet radiolocation system that they intend to establish in South Caucasus. The USA has placed its radars in the territory of Astara and Xizi districts, modernized an air-defense base in Kurdamir, is taking part in talks between Moscow and Baku about future exploitation of the Gabala Radiolocation Station.

                    From time to time, Azerbaijan is trying to calm down Tehran saying it would not take actions against the southern neighbor, however, it is evident that it is impossible to calm down Iran by statements and pledges. Iran continues developing its military cooperation with Russia in improving its air defense, including supply of S-300 air defense systems. Russia has been leveling off the actions in arming Armenia and Azerbaijan. Tehran is pursuing not only the evident “security expansion” to Turkmenistan and Tajikistan, but is carrying out the most active intelligence activity in Transcaucasia, while it does not give up attempts to establish pressure groups within frameworks of religious schools. The regional policy of Iran is in backing the outlines of the Moscow-Yerevan-Tehran axis, maneuvering in the relations with Yerevan and Baku by using the Karabakh factor. In this situation, Armenia acts as a weak sister, which is, in spite of its peculiar ties with Iran and Russia, subjected to the will of the USA.

                    If US active policy in Transcaucasia brings about tension in the relations of Iran and Azerbaijan, Tehran and Yerevan, on the opposite, are having a pointedly constructive dialog with each other. For the Iranian side, the relations with Armenia are important in terms of securing pressure levers upon Baku and preserving its presence in the border region at all; for Armenia, Iran is becoming an alternative pole in providing its national security. Russia is actively involved in Armenian-Iranian energy projects. Iran, Russia and Armenia have a number of joint projects — a railway link from Armenia to Iran with participation of the RZhD Russian Railways company, an oil refinery at the Armenia-Iran border with participation of Gazprom, supply of gas from Iran to electricity producing facilities in Armenia owned by Russia, increasing carrying capacity of electricity networks to export electricity from Armenia to Iran. Meanwhile, Tehran is trying to sustain relations with the authorities in Nagorno Karabakh, particularly by conducting several construction projects there.

                    The Turkish-Armenian and Turkish-Azerbaijani relations are built on the reverse logic. Washington's effort aimed at reconciliation of Yerevan and Ankara and unblocking a section of the state border between the two countries bore no results. The government in Yerevan knows it perfectly well that Ankara is in no way interested in establishing dialog with the Armenians. The prospect will not suit Azerbaijan either, which is the major regional Turkish prop and supplier of hydrocarbons via Turkish transit routes. One can state that the United States has abandoned promoting its reconciliation strategy, moreover, discrepancies between the USA and Turkey around Iran and sovereignization of Kurdistan appeared. Thus, the policy of the USA and its allies in Transcaucasia met practically consolidated aversion from Russia, Iran and Turkey. Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia will have to choose in the long run their own way depending on outcomes of this struggle of positions: either to form their own strategy at their own risk or become small change of the American strategy of “containment,” responsibility for which would be assumed by neither the United States nor Russia or Iran. To cut it short, the options are not satisfactory.

                    Source: http://www.regnum.ru/english/1014455.html
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                    • Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

                      REGNUM: Prospects of war in Transcaucasia and Central Asia



                      An analytical report of REGNUM News Agency based on its own information and materials of its correspondents.


                      3. Kosovo forever

                      The precedent of Kosovo independence recognition, as expected, resulted in radical change of the situation in Transcaucasia, where three territorial conflicts involving ethnic and religious elements have been smoldering. Despite the fact that before the declaration and recognition of Kosovo independence, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia announced that conflict settlement in the region was developing irrelevantly to the outcomes of the developments in Kosovo, their behavior after the Kosovo precedent showed the opposite. In particular, the Kosovo independence was not recognized by Azerbaijan despite the contrary decision made by Turkey. Even the pro-American Georgian government refused to follow the example of Washington and recognize Kosovo. Meanwhile, the Armenian authorities did not rule out recognition of Kosovo, despite the unambiguously negative attitude of Russia and Iran. There is direct evidence of a situational behavior of Baku, Tbilisi, and Yerevan. Denying the precedent nature of Kosovo by word of mouth, the Transcaucasian nations treated it as precedent, each deciding to fill it with the contents the needed. Tbilisi is against Kosovo, as it does not want it to repeat globally in Abkhazia and South Ossetia; Baku opposes Kosovo as it does not want the same recognition of Karabakh; Yerevan backs it, as it is fighting for at least preserving the legal personality of Karabakh.

                      Kosovo rid the West of time, space for maneuver and pure political influence in Transcaucasia. Everyone here has no place to retreat; everyone has to hurry and substitute the voluntary “allied relations” with the West by primitive bargaining: it is evident to everyone that after Kosovo there won't be enough security for all. After withdrawing the regime of economic sanctions against Abkhazia and deciding to render economic support to Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Russia, although it did not declare its readiness to recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia, is bringing about integration of the two protectorates: when Georgia enters NATO, Abkhazia and South Ossetia are supposed to be fully secured from a possible aggression from Georgia. Nevertheless, with direct military assistance of the western allies, Georgia has been intensely preparing itself for military settlement of the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. As the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi are getting closer, Georgia will be increasing its military pressure in the conflict zones, blackmailing Russia with possible derailment of the Olympics (and renewal of the ethnic conflict in North Caucasus by expelling Ossetian population from South Ossetia).

                      Simultaneously, the USA and the European Union have stirred their activity in “peaceful” entrance to the settlement processes in Transdnestr, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, by offering to regional elites humanitarian, political and economic gains from the cooperation with the West, while counterweighing Russia's role at the same time. Top officials in Transdnestr and Abkhazia, the opposition in South Ossetia have already picked up the Western rhetoric of multipolar foreign policy as their official doctrines. Thus, there are trying to reduce their dependence from the changing Russian-American and Russian-European relations. At that, however, the West has not envisaged practical mechanisms of guaranteeing the capitulated nations and elites from Yugoslavia-style purges. All this is pushing Georgia and Moldova to give up peaceful settlement.

                      At the same time, the whole Georgian military and NATO military assistance are guided by not only offensive (Abkhazia, South Ossetia), but rear role of Georgia in future US activity against Iran as well as in activity of radical Muslims in Russia's North Caucasus. Azerbaijan has been torpedoing the many-year effort of the OSCE Minsk Group (Russia, the USA and France) in the Nagorno Karabakh conflict settlement. During a severe domestic crisis in Armenia, it persuaded the UN to adopt a resolution that weakened dramatically Armenia's positions in Karabakh, announced a possibility to dissolve the Minsk Group and warned that recognition of Nagorno Karabakh by Armenia would result in a war.

                      Meanwhile, the level of threats (from Georgia) and the weight of security guarantees for Abkhazia, South Ossetia (from Russia) cannot be compared with the realities of Nagorno Karabakh. While the former Georgian territories are under supervision of the CIS peacekeeping forces, are populated by Russian citizens and have common borders with Russia, Nagorno Karabakh is falling out of Russia's sphere of control. The only security guarantor of Nagorno Karabakh is a member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), Armenia. In recent years, Moscow has taken action to engage Nagorno Karabakh into the common political context with Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transdnestr, but this was met with aversion by Armenia (in particular, representatives of Stepanakert were invited to hearings at the Russian State Duma on prospects of conflict settlement, but decided not to come under recommendation from Yerevan). Russia has already made it public that a war of Azerbaijan against Nagorno Karabakh would not serve as a reason for Armenia's CSTO partners to get into the operation.

                      The USA has made significantly active its effort in the Nagorno Karabakh conflict settlement. Within frameworks of the Minsk Group, basic settlement principles were elaborated: the Armenians agree to return to Azerbaijan five of the seven occupied territories around the territory of the former Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Republic, into which Azerbaijani refugees return, peacekeepers from countries that are not members of the Minsk Group are deployed there, communications restored. Only after that a stage-by-stage settlement of the question of the status of Nagorno Karabakh will be started: Nagorno Karabakh is proposed to be granted postponed status that would be finally formalized after a referendum in 10-15 years (the format of such a referendum was not specified). It is evident that the settlement scenario proposed by the USA in the current situation can suit only Armenia. Together with the format of settlement with participation of the OSCE Minsk Group the plan was torpedoed by Azerbaijan as well, which pushed Armenia towards NATO even more.

                      After the Russian military base was withdrawn from Akhalkalaki (a southern Georgian territory populated mostly by Armenians), Armenia started having serious concerns about a prospect of establishing a base for soonest deployment of the “northern front.” Implementation of the Kars-Akhalkalaki-Tbilisi-Baku railway construction project will contribute to it as well. A possible blockade from the north (from Georgia) would assign the position of a communications dead-end to Armenia even taking into account the still existing route via Megri, Armenia, to Iran. All this helps popularizing among the Armenians the idea that only Armenia can become an effective partner for NATO in the region, as Georgia's joining NATO would deteriorate the situation around Abkhazia and South Ossetia, increase the confrontation between NATO and Russia, and Azerbaijan's membership to NATO will only help strengthening Turkey's stance in the region.

                      The USA will be increasing its pressure upon Armenia (where social protest is still active and the level of confidence in the government is low) in order to withdraw it from the orbit of Moscow's influence. In the near future, the USA and the EU will take part in construction of a new nuclear power plant in Armenia, which will allow influencing the energy security of not only Armenia but the rest countries in the region as well, they will also actively promoting ex-foreign minister Raffi Hovhannisyan for the presidential post. Further deterioration of the domestic political situation in Armenia (and upcoming election of Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev for the second term) will have as a result destabilization in Karabakh. So, Armenia is interested in the settlement under the patronage of the United States, as it has no economic capabilities to maintain the status quo around Karabakh, while Azerbaijan and Turkey, Iran and Russia are not interested in the settlement under the American scenario.

                      This makes Russia engaged into regional conflicts in Transcaucasia, however, without providing acceptable starting opportunities for it in the region. Meanwhile, technically military preparedness of Georgia and Azerbaijan for conflicts is very high, however, it is low motivated among the troops. When Chechen units joined Russian peacekeepers changed dramatically the psychological portrait of the seat of war to Russia's benefit, but it does not change its passive defensive conception. Understanding disastrous outcomes of a future war in Karabakh also affects readiness of Armenia for a war with Azerbaijan. Such “war of nerves” puts the prospect of war in the extremely militarized Transcaucasia into dependence not on strategic, controllable factors, but rather upon a poorly controllable spontaneous “ignition” in front of which interests of regional powers and transregional communication projects are equally vulnerable.

                      Prospects of the key destabilizing factor in the region remain uncertain — US intentions regarding the Muslim Turkish government, establishment of an independent Kurdistan, Iran's nuclear program. A factor of restrain for US activity is huge political investments of the West introduced to the “Transcaucasian Corridor” that can cease its existence in case of war. Thus, the conflict initiative is mainly in the hands of those who is weighing effectiveness of two rival technologies of strategic containment of Russia:

                      (1) to halt growth of its impact by diversifying routes of energy supply to Europe (through Transcaucasia)

                      or

                      (2) to aspire to the same goal by undermining its underpinning in the conflict zones in Transcaucasia with a prospect of extending them towards North Caucasus.

                      Impact of the first scenario upon the real energy market of Europe is overestimated, while the practice of instigating a new Caucasian War against Russia is clearly underrated. However, the temptation of the global player to build “the global Balkans towards Xinjiang” is too high to let us hope that its pro-European sympathies would overweigh its anti-Russian, anti-Iranian and anti-Chinese complexes.

                      4. Central Asia

                      Contrary to Transcaucasia, potential military conflicts in Central Asia are results of new agenda not implemented in the past rather than of old, already shaped premises. There has been an assumption for along time that the key economic spring of the conflicts lies in the problem of the water and energy balance, where major sources of water and energy resources (Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan) are at the same time the poorest countries in the region, while major consumers of water and resources (Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan) are the leaders. In this situation, all the parties in the water and energy balance saw Russia as a natural mediator in terms of finances, technology and policy in settlement of the issue. Today, under conditions of a demographic crisis (overpopulation) in Uzbekistan, a financial crisis in Kazakhstan, economic, political and energy crises in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan the most acute are contradictions of not general economic nature but rather of traditional — migration, terrorist, social and regional character. The role of new external players in Central Asia (Iran, China, Afghanistan) has harshly increased.

                      Two extraterritorial conflict zones have finally formed — the Afghan-Tajik border and Fergana Valley, to which the Islamist, terror and drug trafficking have direct corridor from Afghanistan. China has become a not less active player in developments in the region; it is directly interested in “security expansion” into Central Asia to provide safety of its Xinjiang-Uighur Autonomous District that is a traditional goal for Islamists and a new target of the US activity in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Mongolia. It is significant to mention that China's economic and other activities in the neighboring territories of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan is based on practical absence of regular border between China and the countries, and, for instance, actual trade turnover between China and Kyrgyzstan is multiply higher than the trade turnover of Kyrgyzstan with Kazakhstan and Russia altogether. Facing external and domestic weakness of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan has to act more and more “impudently” in forming its own border system. Kazakhstan could become a rival for Uzbekistan in it, but now it has to resort to strategic defense in depth.

                      [...]

                      5. Potential armed conflicts in Transcaucasia and Central Asia

                      High probability and intensity:

                      Kodori Gorge — Gali District — Ochamchira: Georgia — Abkhazia (with participation of Russia)

                      Tskhinval — Java: Georgia — South Ossetia (with participation of Russia)

                      Nagorno Karabakh — Nakhichevan: Azerbaijan (with participation of Turkey) — Armenia

                      Osh: Kyrgyzstan — Afghanistan

                      Fergana Valley: Afghanistan — Uzbekistan — Kyrgyzstan — Tajikistan

                      Khodjent: Uzbekistan — Tajikistan

                      Medium probability and intensity:

                      Vakhsh — Pamir: Afghanistan — Tajikistan

                      Jalalabad — Osh: Uzbekistan — Kyrgyzstan

                      Derbent: Azerbaijan — Russia

                      Lenkoran: Azerbaijan — Iran

                      Shymkent: Uzbekistan — Kazakhstan

                      Low probability and intensity:

                      Akhalkalaki: Georgia — Armenia

                      Astrakhan: Russia — Kazakhstan

                      Altai: Russia — Kazakhstan

                      Chui Valley — Issyk Kul: Kazakhstan — Kyrgyzstan


                      Source: http://www.regnum.ru/english/1014455.html
                      Մեր ժողովուրդն արանց հայրենասիրութեան այն է, ինչ որ մի մարմին' առանց հոգու:

                      Նժդեհ


                      Please visit me at my Heralding the Rise of Russia blog: http://theriseofrussia.blogspot.com/

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