The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

[Armenian]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

Not exactly, BMD-4 was not in the Caucasus. The Russian airborne forces used only the older Soviet era BMD-1 and BMD-2 vehicles.

I stand corrected. I had read that the new BMD-4 (or the BMD-3 I don't recall which) were deployed in the Caucasus during the war. Since I wasn't very familiar with their look, I guess kept mistaking them with vehicles such as these:

As a matter of fact, the Russians used older equipment to defeat the Georgian army. Other examples: - No T-90 or T-80 tanks were used.

I read that T-90s and T-80s were also deployed but only after a few days into the war, however.

Btw, aren't these T-80s?

Only T-72 and even 40 year old T-62 tanks. - No modern BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicles. Just BMP-1 and BMP-2. - No MSTA-S self propelled 152mm guns. Just the older ACCACIA. - No SMERCH multiple rocket system. Only the older URAGAN and GRAD....and so on. The older equipment was more than enough to "break the back" of Suckashvili's Western equipped and trained army and force them into a "mother of all retreats" maneuver. This war, just like the Karabagh war, prooved that it is not only weapons and training that win wars, but the tactics and resolve of the high command plus the will and bravery of the soldier on the ground.

You are right. As a matter of fact, Georgians were noticeably better armed, on the ground at least. Russia had total air superiority from day one, they sustained their fighting spirit, their special forces were performing extremely well, they had a large supply of anti-tanks rockets, a large number of artillery, a large number of tanks; Russia did not need to use its modern equipment, it would have been pointless in a sense.

[ZORAVAR]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

I stand corrected. I had read that the new BMD-4 (or the BMD-3 I don't recall which) were deployed in the Caucasus during the war. Since I wasn't very familiar with their look, I guess kept mistaking them with vehicles such as these:

First photo is a BMD-2
Second photo is a BMD-3
Third and fourth are a NONA-S self-propelled 120mm mortar based on a BMD-1 chassis and also used by the airborne troops.

As for the tanks in your photos, I always have difficulty in telling apart the T-80 from a modernized T-72. As far as I know the 58th army does not have T-80s.

Georgians were noticeably better armed,

They also had superiority in numbers at least for the first 2 days. According to many analysts, they still had numerical superiority when they started retreating. Some of the figures (from day 2 when the Georgians started their retreat) quoted are: around 8-9000 Georgian troops entering S. Ossetia against around 6000 Russians from the 58th Army plus a couple of thousand S. Ossetian militiamen

Russia had total air superiority from day one

True, but they did not achieve total air supremacy until very late in the conflict. Georgians had an effective Soviet-made SAM defense system that shot down 4 Russian warplanes (3 x Su-25 and 1 x Tu-22) and damaged 3 more (Su-25s). The air force played a significant role in routing the Georgians but the Russians could not bring to bear the whole might of their arm as they did not plan this conflict. They also lacked helicopter support because their Mi-24 gunships were all around Vladikavkaz and did not have the combat radius to reach the front after crossing the Caucasus mountainchain. They also had no servicing/maintaining/rearming facilities in S.Ossetia. Very few helicopter missions were made by the Russian side.

Recently released photo of a Russian SU-25 that was hit by a Georgian manportable SAM. The pilot managed to bring it back to base.

they sustained their fighting spirit, their special forces were performing extremely well, they had a large supply of anti-tanks rockets, a large number of artillery, a large number of tanks; Russia did not need to use its modern equipment, it would have been pointless in a sense.

Absolutely. In addition, I think that Georgians are like Azerbaijanis. Not much of a fighting spirit in them. Photos of their panic retreat from Gori illustrated that.

[Armenian]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

Second photo is a BMD-3

So they did have BMD-3s? I still get confused between the different variants.

As for the tanks in your photos, I always have difficulty in telling apart the T-80 from a modernized T-72. As far as I know the 58th army does not have T-80s.

It's 'definitely' not a T-72. They have to be either T-80s or T-90s. Come to think of it, more I look at them more I think they are T-90s. I could be wrong but here is a picture of a T-90, compare the two:





I do recall reading that T-80s and T-90s were deployed in the conflict zone, but supposedly they arrived a little late. Who knew Georgians would run away so fast? So, I don't think they engaged in any battles. What's more, I recall reading that armored units from different divisions in the general region were called in. So, it wasn't just the paratroopers and the 58th engaging the Georgians in combat. Perhaps the reason why the T-80s and/or T-90s got to the conflict zone late was because of the distance they had to travel.

They also had superiority in numbers at least for the first 2 days. According to many analysts, they still had numerical superiority when they started retreating. Some of the figures (from day 2 when the Georgians started their retreat) quoted are: around 8-9000 Georgian troops entering S. Ossetia against around 6000 Russians from the 58th Army plus a couple of thousand S. Ossetian militiamen

According to many sources I have been reading, Russian forces numbered around 10,000-12,000. Georgian forces that invaded South Ossetia numbered around 10,000. However, they had at least another 10,000 ready back in their country to check the Russian advance into Georgia once Russian forces broke out of the disputed territories. So, I think that even late into the war, even when Russia was deep into Georgia, the Georgian army (at least on paper) had more troops fielded than the Russians. The number and quality of Ossetian militiamen here are insignificant.

True, but they did not achieve total air supremacy until very late in the conflict. Georgians had an effective Soviet-made SAM defense system that shot down 4 Russian warplanes (3 x Su-25 and 1 x Tu-22) and damaged 3 more (Su-25s). The air force played a significant role in routing the Georgians but the Russians could not bring to bear the whole might of their arm as they did not plan this conflict. They also lacked helicopter support because their Mi-24 gunships were all around Vladikavkaz and did not have the combat radius to reach the front after crossing the Caucasus mountainchain. They also had no servicing/maintaining/rearming facilities in S.Ossetia. Very few helicopter missions were made by the Russian side.

Losing a few aircrafts in the opening stages of any major conflict is normal and in this particular case it does not mean Russia did not have total air superiority over the field of battle. Air forces normally adjust to the actual threat after suffering some loses, as did Russia. Also, they performed their close-air-support duties flawlessly. The point you made about the attack helicopters is interesting. However, I did see them in some video footage and pictures, perhaps not in numbers one would normally expect to see in Russian combat operations. But where are you getting your specific information from, not to mention some of your very interesting pictures, such as the amazing picture below?

Recently released photo of a Russian SU-25 that was hit by a Georgian manportable SAM. The pilot managed to bring it back to base.

Also, I don't think Russia did not know this war was coming. All sides knew and all sides were preparing for this war. Russia was fully aware of the - who what, when, where and how. If Russians weren't properly prepared for this it's more because of a national 'trait' thing, than a surprise... Push comes to shove, Russians get things done. They are invincible when they want to be, but they do things quite sloppily...

[Armenian]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

Medvedev Sargsyan Meeting

Medvedev: You will make friends with the Turk.

Sargsyan: Say what?!

Medvedev: I said you <<will>> make friends with the Turk <<and>> you will invite him over to your house.

...

Sargsyan: You also want me to sit next to that Turk?

Medvedev: I'm afraid so Tavarish, and you will do it with a smile.

Sargsyan: Ay qez ban...

...

Lukashenko: Hehehe, I hear you will be hosting someone very very special tomorrow...

Sargsyan: Ah, xxxx you.

...

Sargsyan: Efendi Gul, we are so pleased to have you here...

...

When pictures say more than a thousand words....

[Yedtarts]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

When pictures say more than a thousand words....

Well done Armenian, I think that’s what exactly happened.

[Armenian]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

Russia: The Challenges of Modernizing the Military

Russia will improve its army: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KuFfbk_HOFk

Summary

Russian President Dmitri Medvedev said Sept. 11 that Russia must focus on rearming and modernizing its military. Though echoing statements made frequently by senior civilian and military leaders in Russia, the assertion warrants careful consideration in the wake of the Russo-Georgian war. Russia may face substantial hurdles in its military resurgence, but the effort should not be underestimated.

Analysis

Russia must make re-equipping its military a top priority, President Dmitri Medvedev announced Sept. 11, the day after a pair of Russian bombers landed at an airbase in Venezuela. In one sense, Medvedev’s statement — made during a conference on modernizing the Russian military — is simply the latest in a long line of martial declarations made by Russia’s senior civilian and military leadership. But in another sense — one that warrants careful consideration in the wake of recent developments in Georgia — the statement suggests military reforms begun when Prime Minister Vladimir Putin was president may be gaining steam. Though very real challenges remain, a well-armed as well as reassertive Russia could be on the horizon. One cannot talk about Russian military modernization without understanding the devastating effects of the 1990s. The decline in Russia’s military capability during this period — everything from morale and tactical proficiency to the maintenance and care of equipment — was holistic. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Russian defense industry continued to eke out an existence for a few more years by consuming immense Soviet-mandated stockpiles of raw material. But it, too, suffered immensely — and in the end, perhaps more than the military itself.

This is not to say that the Russian military went back to square one. It was actually worse than that. Instead of being discarded, outmoded equipment in a state of disrepair remained in the inventory — as did outmoded capabilities and marginal personnel — as generals failed to recognize the new world order and tried in vain to sustain the powerful Red Army. The military also became increasingly top heavy as the officer corps — especially its upper echelons — fought any reductions. Opportunity costs mounted as the system failed to properly maintain the most crucial units and capabilities. Competent lower and mid-level officers left in droves. The Russian military became an underfunded, bloated and rusting shadow of its former self, a downward spiral symbolized by the tragic loss of the nuclear-powered guided-missile submarine Kursk (K-141) in 2000. Many observers today, including much of the U.S. defense and intelligence establishments, still disregard the Russian military based on events nearly a decade passed. But the loss of the Kursk was a wake-up call for the Kremlin, and Putin came to office in 2000 with a plan. As we have argued, events in August 2008 demonstrated unequivocally that the Russian military has regained, at the very least, the infrastructure and capability for warfighting on its periphery.

Of course, the Georgian operation was just one carefully planned and orchestrated gambit in a much larger and more complex strategic maneuver. Since the fighting in Georgia has waned, the Kremlin has been happy to have its performance denigrated and its military accomplishments marginalized by Western analysts. This buys it more time to rearm its forces — a process that will continue for a decade or more. Russia faces a number of challenges in this endeavor. First is its scope. Re-equipping armed forces is only one component of defense reform. Parallel efforts to resolve underlying issues with manpower, training and doctrine are equally important. The Kremlin is attempting to reduce the term of conscription from 24 months to 12 months. While concurrent efforts are underway to reduce the size of the armed forces, shorter tours for draftees will require an overall increase in the proportion of the population turning 18 each year that submits to the draft. This at a time when there are fewer 18-year-olds available at all due to the post-Soviet decline in the Russian birth rate. Of course, the Soviets also employed conscription and always relied more heavily on quantitative numbers than on the qualitative skill of individual soldiers. Yet conditions for draftees are notoriously bad and a major point of national discontent. Drunkenness, drug abuse, brutality, desertion and even suicide are all too common. To improve the quality of military personnel, the Kremlin has its work cut out for it. In Russia today, all the most competent candidates for military service use their competence to dodge the draft, and the quality of conscripts has tumbled.

Meanwhile, a competent noncommissioned officer corps — something Western military models have always valued more highly than the Russian model — would go a long way toward reining in the abuse and improving tactical proficiency. However, the Russian military has little in the way of such traditions and even less in the way of experience. The professionalization of select units with more highly paid volunteers continues, though with spotty results so far. Ultimately, the establishment of a professional corps of soldiers and a cadre of junior and mid-level officers to lead them will be an important aspect of any true Russian military resurgence. In terms of hardware acquisition, any defense establishment always tries to stagger its major acquisition programs over the course of many years so as to allocate funding to each in turn. One cannot fund everything all at once. Though Russia is not exactly starved for cash these days, it faces an immensely complex acquisition balancing act for which it may not have the appropriate knowledgebase and experience to execute. The Russian military-industrial complex also is a problem. Though reforms have been underway for some time, inefficiency, graft, corruption and incompetence still characterize much of the sector. Issues with not only the notoriously behind-schedule Admiral Gorshkov conversion but also Kilo-class submarine upgrades and even the delivery of MiGs to Algeria evince an industry still struggling to achieve a passable, baseline degree of quality control.

Compounding this is the fact that the bulk of the sector’s work force is nearing retirement and fresh manpower (because of the declining birth rate) is becoming an issue, just as it is for the military. The trouble here, in addition to a weakening institutional knowledge base, is that fewer and fewer workers and managers have the faintest of memories of Soviet-era manufacturing capacities, just as Moscow is moving toward ramping up production. Proficiency with software development and programming — an increasingly essential skill set in producing modern weapons systems — is an additional Russian weakness; those with such competency find more lucrative work in other industries (and often other countries). And just as the workforce has aged and been neglected, so have the sector’s manufacturing facilities. This goes to the heart of the capacity for quality and efficient production. Even though Russian design work has always emphasized production efficiency and equipment durability (to endure crude maintenance conditions), in certain sectors — such as aviation and naval propulsion — there is no substitute for high-quality engineering and manufacturing. In addition, efficient serial production — once a Soviet hallmark — is made more difficult by aged equipment and facilities. Meanwhile, foreign sales continue to constitute the bulk of Russia’s post-Soviet military production efforts. This may, in part, be a conscious choice. As Moscow continues to roll out prototypes, conduct testing and tweak designs for production, foreign funds that are sustaining the industry may also help shake off the cobwebs of neglect and ramp up production. Major programs currently include:

* Navy: While the expensive and complex production of new nuclear submarines continues to be slow, there are also some indications that the Russian navy (despite continued rhetoric about carrier aviation) may be pursuing more obtainable goals for revitalizing its surface fleet. Two classes of multipurpose guided-missile frigates are now being built, though the quality and efficiency of serial production will not be seen until around 2011.

* Army: Much of the equipment used to invade Georgia was Soviet-era. Nevertheless, one of the notable deliveries of late has been the BMD-4, a heavily armed infantry fighting vehicle used by airborne units and for which Western airborne formations have no equivalent. Delivery of the new BTR-90 wheeled armored personnel carrier is also slated to begin soon, as is that of the Iskander short-range ballistic missile.

* Air Force: The most modern version of the venerable Su-27 “Flanker” multirole fighter series is the Su-35, which could begin serial delivery to the Russian air force alongside the Su-34 “Fullback” fighter-bomber in the next decade. Work on a fifth-generation air superiority fighter with stealth characteristics is under way. Though such claims have been circulating for a decade at least, some early sketches suggest that it may be an evolutionary outgrowth of the same Flanker architecture, thus suggesting realistic and obtainable designs. India may be lending assistance with this project.

* Air Defense Forces: The newest S-400 strategic air-defense system is now being fielded around Moscow. The rate of production is not yet clear, but the system is regarded as among the most capable in the world.

* Strategic Nuclear Forces: The slow fielding of the Topol-M intercontinental ballistic missile is slated to continue, alongside upgrades to the Tu-160 “Blackjack” strategic bomber and work on the Yuri Dolgoruky, the lead boat in a new class of nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarines. The strategic nuclear forces will reportedly remain a funding priority in the near future.

These latest systems generally rely heavily on design work done in the last days of the Soviet Union. It is not clear the degree to which they represent true modernizations, incorporating research and development work that the Russians have continued to fund as well as technology gleaned from ongoing espionage. It is important to note, however, that even re-equipping the Russian military on a broad scale with new production batches of late-Soviet technology and equipment — essentially the same designs with new paint jobs — would go a long way toward rejuvenating Moscow’s military power. Russia already possesses the basic tools. And in the wake of the Georgian conflict, which Stratfor considers a Russian success, military reform is likely to gain steam under Putin’s continued supervision. The ultimate trajectory is one of improving capability beyond the fundamentals recently demonstrated in Georgia.

Source: http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/rus...izing_military

[ZORAVAR]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

So they did have BMD-3s? I still get confused between the different variants.

Well, you changed the second photo now. So, there is no longer any BMD-3 in your photos.


It's 'definitely' not a T-72. They have to be either T-80s or T-90s. Come to think of it, more I look at them more I think they are T-90s. I could be wrong but here is a picture of a T-90, compare the two:

I do recall reading that T-80s and T-90s were deployed in the conflict zone, but supposedly they arrived a little late. Who knew Georgians would run away so fast? So, I don't think they engaged in any battles. What's more, I recall reading that armored units from different divisions in the general region were called in. So, it wasn't just the paratroopers and the 58th engaging the Georgians in combat. Perhaps the reason why the T-80s and/or T-90s got to the conflict zone late was because of the distance they had to travel.

Only the very trained eye can tell the difference between the multitude of versions of T-72, T-80 and T-90. The best way to identify a T-90 is by counting the number of spokes on the wheels. I can not give a positive identification from your photos. I know T-90s were not engaged in combat. Were they brought there and arrived late? could be. The few hundred T-90s that the Russians have are based in the Moscow area and in the far east. Long distance to travel.

According to many sources I have been reading, Russian forces numbered around 10,000-12,000. Georgian forces that invaded South Ossetia numbered around 10,000. However, they had at least another 10,000 ready back in their country to check the Russian advance into Georgia once Russian forces broke out of the disputed territories. So, I think that even late into the war, even when Russia was deep into Georgia, the Georgian army (at least on paper) had more troops fielded than the Russians. The number and quality of Ossetian militiamen here are insignificant.

True. The Russian troop numbers reached up to 12000. That was at the end of the conflict when Georgia was already firmly beaten. Do not underestimate the S. Ossetians, they stalled the Georgian advance long enough till the Russians reached Tsinkvali.

Losing a few aircrafts in the opening stages of any major conflict is normal and in this particular case it does not mean Russia did not have total air superiority over the field of battle. Air forces normally adjust to the actual threat after suffering some loses, as did Russia. Also, they performed their close-air-support duties flawlessly. The point you made about the attack helicopters is interesting. However, I did see them in some video footage and pictures, perhaps not in numbers one would normally expect to see in Russian combat operations. But where are you getting your specific information from, not to mention some of your very interesting pictures, such as the amazing picture below?

I meant the Russians did not use their overwhelming power of their airforce the same way the Americans used in the 1991 Iraq conflict. The Amerians (and allies) had ample time to prepare and place their air assets in position. The Russians used what they had on the spot. I can confirm that the Russians made little use of their helicopter gunships (only a handfull were used) and accordingly suffered no losses.

Some of my information and photos are from Russian sources. I never lived in Armenia (or Soviet Union), but I understand Russian to a limited extant (I learned it by myself over the years).


Also, I don't think Russia did not know this war was coming. All sides knew and all sides were preparing for this war. Russia was fully aware of the - who what, when, where and how. If Russians weren't properly prepared for this it's more because of a national 'trait' thing, than a surprise... Push comes to shove, Russians get things done. They are invincible when they want to be, but they do things quite sloppily...

I don't fully agree on this one. Of course the Russians were prepared for the eventuality of war, but could not have known when, how and where. The Georgians timing was well planned, not because of the olympics as most people mention, but because large parts of the Russian 58th army had just finished training exercises with tired soldiers and some equipment needing maintenance. Clever timing from Suckashvili, but he underestimated the Russians

I hope I am not militarizing this thread too much

[Armenian]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

Well, you changed the second photo now. So, there is no longer any BMD-3 in your photos.

Sorry, it was late, I was half asleep. I don't know what happened to the picture. However, if it was a BMD-3 in your opinion, does that confirm its existence in the conflict zone?

Only the very trained eye can tell the difference between the multitude of versions of T-72, T-80 and T-90. The best way to identify a T-90 is by counting the number of spokes on the wheels. I can not give a positive identification from your photos. I know T-90s were not engaged in combat. Were they brought there and arrived late? could be. The few hundred T-90s that the Russians have are based in the Moscow area and in the far east. Long distance to travel.

Look me in the eyes, Zoravar - The picture in question is 'not' of a T-72. Examine it again. At the very least they could be T-80s, I think they T-90s. Unless you have some connections to the defense ministry in Russia there is no way you could know for sure whether or not there were any T-80s or T-90s within the general vicinity of the Caucasus. Perhaps anticipating the war, they moves some units south.

This might be another picture of the vehicle in question:



And here is a T-90 in a parade.



And a frontal view of a T-90:



And the tank in the tunnel, again.

I don't fully agree on this one. Of course the Russians were prepared for the eventuality of war, but could not have known when, how and where. The Georgians timing was well planned, not because of the olympics as most people mention, but because large parts of the Russian 58th army had just finished training exercises with tired soldiers and some equipment needing maintenance. Clever timing from Suckashvili, but he underestimated the Russians

Between the FSB and the GRU, there is no way anyone can convince me that Moscow did not know. Signs they new: Evacuating the children several days before the war started; The BTC pipeline explosion in Turkey on August 07, a day before the war started; The fact that Russia has informants agents working in Tbilisi; Diplomatic signals, such as Moscow mediating between Yerevan and Ankara in anticipation of the war. However, as far as the 'exact' date or hour the war was to commence, I guess only a handful of Georgians would have known that information. So, the 'exact' time and date, Moscow may not have known. But I would no be surprised if they did.

I hope I am not militarizing this thread too much

Not at all, this is generally related to the topic of discussion and I enjoy it. However, let's not over do it.

[ZORAVAR]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

Sorry, it was late, I was half asleep. I don't know what happened to the picture. However, if it was a BMD-3 in your opinion, does that confirm its existence in the conflict zone?

The original picture you posted was indeed a BMD-3. So, yes, BMD-1, BMD-2 and BMD-3 were there. BMD-4 was not.

Look me in the eyes, Zoravar - The picture in question is 'not' of a T-72. Examine it again. At the very least they could be T-80s, I think they T-90s. Unless you have some connections to the defense ministry in Russia there is no way you could know for sure whether or not there were any T-80s or T-90s within the general vicinity of the Caucasus. Perhaps anticipating the war, they moves some units south.

From the information that I have: no T-90 in the Caucasus.

They could be T-80. However, I would not be surprised if they are modernized T-72s. Don't try to identify a tank by the shape of the reactive armour (the small boxes) fitted on it. There are so many kinds of this removable add-ons. Unfortunately, I cannot confirm the type of the tank posted in your photo at this moment, I will investigate more by asking people who are tank experts. I will let you know if I come up with something.

[ZORAVAR]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

Russia plans record $46.5 bln arms spending in 2009

MOSCOW (Reuters) - Russian spending on arms will rise to a record $46.5 billion next year, a senior government official said on Friday, as the Kremlin moves to beef up the armed forces after a conflict in Georgia.

Russian national defence orders will rise to 1.2 trillion roubles ($46.55 billion) in 2009, 70 billion roubles higher than previously planned, Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov was shown saying on Russian television.

"We have managed to convince the Finance Ministry that the volume of state defence orders in 2009 will be 70 billion higher than previously planned," Ivanov told Prime Minister Vladimir Putin.

"The overall volume of state defence orders next year are planned at a record level of 1.2 trillion roubles," Ivanov said.

State defence orders includes spending on arms by all of Russia's military organizations -- such as the Defence Ministry, Interior Ministry and special services -- as well as repairs and spending on research and development.

Ivanov did not give reasons for the rise but said prices for military goods was rising faster than government inflation forecasts.

President Dmitry Medvedev said on Thursday the five-day conflict in Georgia last month had shown the armed forces needed modernizing and that problems with equipment needed to be resolved.

Russia provoked an outcry from the West when it sent troops deep into Georgia after repelling a Georgian attack on the Moscow-backed rebel enclave of South Ossetia, which is internationally recognized as part of Georgia.

Putin hiked defence spending during his eight year presidency in an attempt to stop the decline of Russia's once mighty fighting forces.

But domestic critics and former officers say the Russian armed forces are hampered by rampant corruption, poor discipline, faulty equipment and outdated battle plans which still focus on a major land war in Europe.

In Russia's draft budget, spending on "national defence" is set to rise more than a quarter to 1.28 trillion roubles in 2009 from 1.02 trillion roubles this year. A more detailed breakdown of the spending is classified.

Putin also told Ivanov he had approved increases in spending on space programs and that he had signed a decree ordering an addition 67 billion roubles for the Russian GLONASS satellite navigation system.

Putin said an additional 45 billion roubles would be spent on the Federal Space Program over the next three years.

He said the money would be used to build a new cosmodrome in the Far East, finance the International Space Station and help space research.

(Reporting by Guy Faulconbridge, editing by Matthew Jones)

Source: http://www.reuters.com/article/world...C9615420080912