The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

[Armenian]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

Armenian, I have to admit that I'm not well informed of the Armenian involvement in the Georgian-Abkhaz war. Why would Armenians not remain neutral?

I am no expert on the topic either, nevertheless, here is an article that might shed some light on the matter. It's important to note here that the Armenian militia's actions in Abkhazia was not a pan-Armenian affair. In other words, the entire Armenian nation, the Armenian government, or even the entire Armenian population of Abkhazia, did not sanctioned the action. It seems that the Armenian militias were more-or-less formed by several well connected individuals and like minded sympathizers as a result of Georgian aggression. I don't know if you were aware but Abkhazia's Armenian population has has problems during the past several years. Besides the socioeconomic neglect they suffer in the region, there have been instances were anti-Armenian leaflets were distributed and there has even been a bomb explosion within Armenian owned school. Many think that the provocative actions are the doings of the Georgian government seeking ways to create friction between Armenians and Abkhazians.

Armenian

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Abkhazia Armenians: Holding a home in an unstable territory

The Republic of Abkhazia is recognized as Georgia in international diplomacy, but has declared itself to be separate. The Black Sea is to the west, Russia (Krasnodar) is to the north, Georgia to the east and south. But along its seacoast are scattered a number of Armenian settlements and, throughout the region, you are as likely to hear Armenian spoken as Abkhazian or Russian.

In fact, Armenians represent the second largest population. Some 50-60,000 make their home here. (During Soviet times the population of Abkhazia was 525,000. Official numbers now claim 320,000, but an unpublished census conducted last year found 214,000.) Until the early 20th century, Abkhazia had been an independent nation. It even survived as a Soviet Republic for the first decade of communist rule. But, as Nagorno Karabakh was handed over to Azerbaijan by Stalin, so, too, was Abkhazia annexed into Georgia, being reduced from a Soviet socialist republic to an autonomous republic in 1932.

At the end of the Soviet Union, Abkhazia began enlarging its autonomy and intensified its desire to be independent of Georgia. In 1992 Georgian authorities tried to subdue the movement. A war broke out and lasted until 1994, resulting in the de facto independence of Abkhazia. In 1994, the Commonwealth of Independent States imposed a blockade on Abkhazia. Only children younger than 16 and adults older than 60 were allowed to leave the republic. The effect was a life of misery for Abkhazians, including its Armenian population.

Four years ago, Russia partially opened its border to Abkhazia, allowing some movement that has brought a breath of life. Now, the people of Abkhazia can ply their trade through the Russian border, though at a hefty price in both taxes and bribes. Tangerines are the region’s cash crop and the main source of income for families, including the Armenians. Either by wagon or by muscle they are hauled into Russia in hopes that the return of the season will sustain for the year.

While most Armenians are engaged in agriculture, in the southwestern part of Abkhazia they are in the resort business, hosting tourists, mainly from Russia, who are returning to the once-famous destination that was deserted after the war until about two years ago. Abkhazians are mostly Christian; some Muslim, and a few pagan. Nonetheless, pagan traditions are widespread, including the custom that a rite of manhood is to steal a horse. Many joke, however, that modern times have turned the ritual into car theft.

Armenians like making fun of Abkhazians as idle people. The subtropical nature allows one to live well by working little. The whole year round, villagers gather harvests in their gardens. There is even an anecdote: An Abkhazian marries an Armenian girl and, the next day, seeing her sitting around, asks why she isn’t working. “Had I wanted to work,” the girl replies, “I’d have married an Armenian.”

About 95 percent of Abkhazian Armenians come from settlements on Turkey’s eastern sea coast. They speak the dialect of the historical region of Hamshen, a tongue hardly recognizable for other Armenians.

“According to the information we have, the first Armenians came to the territory of Abkhazia in 1878,” says Zorik Keshishian, a 70-year-old resident of Tsandripshi. He is writing a book about the history of the Hamshen Armenians. “Abkhazians warmly welcomed Armenians and enabled them to found villages. The first seven families founded the village of Mtsara in the Pitsunda region.”

During the Armenian Genocide in 1915-1923, the major part of the Hamshen Armenians was massacred, while the rest found refuge in Abkhazia and other Russian shores of the Black Sea. In Soviet times, according to official data, 76,541 Armenians lived in Abkhazia along with 239,872 Georgians, 93,267 Abkhazians and 74,914 Russians.

At the beginning of the 1992 war with Georgia, Armenians were trying to remain neutral. However, the Georgian military detachments started looting the Armenian villages, and forcing residents to leave. Murder and rape were reported on the part of the Georgian army. The Armenians consequently came to favor the Abkhazian side.

“At first, we were trying not to mess around, but then the Georgians exerted so much cruelty against Armenians that we had to back the Abkhazians,” says Artavazd Saretsian, editor of the Sukhumi-based Hamshen newspaper issued in Armenian and Russian. “They would invade the houses and rob and torture the people. In Labra, they seated a married couple on chairs with holes on the seats and burned them. They were raping the women. It was impossible to stay neutral.”

In a few months after war broke out, Armenians raised a battalion named “Baghramian”, numbering 300 people, then a second one.

“Armenians are reserved people, ultimately absorbed in daily routine. I didn’t expect they would fight next to us,” says Anatoli Tarba, “but now I can say that the Armenians are damn good fighters. The first victim of my battalion was an Armenian.”

A total of 1,500 Armenians participated in the war, a quarter of the Abkhazian army. Twenty Armenians were awarded the title of Abkhazian Hero and 242 were killed in battle. We are different from the Armenians from Armenia because we have two homelands: one we attained by blood, the other we inherited,” says Galust Trapizonian, one of the three Abkhazian Armenian Members of Parliament (MP). Not all Armenians feel at home in Abkhazia, however. Second in population (following the departure of Georgians after the war), many also feel themselves second-class.

“Armenians are more subject to oppression than others,” says Petros Palasanian, regional MP of Ochamchira. “The state of the Armenians in the region of Gagra is a lot better. There’s no oppression because they are the majority, while all we have is two villages, plus many people fled after the war.”

There are Armenians in five of the seven regions of Abkhazia. In two, Armenians are the majority. In Soviet times, there were numerous Armenian officials; the deputy chairman of the ministers’ council was an Armenian. During the war, the top-ranking Armenian official was the vice-chairman of the parliament. Nowadays, deputy village governor is the highest post an Armenian occupies.

Source: http://www.agbu.org/publications/article.asp?A_ID=159

WHO STANDS BEHIND THE NEW ANTI-ARMENIAN PROVOCATIONS IN ABKHAZIA?

Official Sukhumi sees the "hand of Tbilisi".

On the 12th of January, the President of Abkhazia Sergey Bagabsh held a working session on preventing anti-Armenian provocations, which had taken place in Sukhumi, on the 1st of January. The head of the unrecognized republic assured Armenian community leaders, who were present at the session, that Abkhazian government makes every effort for finding and punishing the criminals.

Two bombs exploded in the Sukhumi Armenian school after Hovhannes Tumanyan. The explosives were put in one of the classrooms and at the pedestal of H. Tumanyan's monument in the schoolyard. The whole territory of the schoolyard was scattered with anti-Armenian leaflets in Russian language. The fact that no one was injured can rightly be called a miracle, since the explosions were quite powerful and smashed the windows of not only the school, but also of neighboring houses. Criminal investigation of the incident has not yet brought any results. The situation cannot but alarm the Armenian community members who are facing such provocations not for the first time.

The meeting at the President's residence was initiated by the Armenian community. Sergey Bagabsh invited almost the whole staff of the Security Council, the parliament speaker, the head of the government and leaders of force structures. The position of Armenian community concerning the incidents was stated by the cochairmen of the Armenian community council Marietta Topchyan and Khachik Minosyan. They demanded from republic leaders to prevent the repetition of anti-Armenian provocations. It is noteworthy that in his speech Sergey Bagabsh indirectly admitted that authorities had really been not attentive enough to the problems of Abkhazian Armenians.

"Among numerous problems, tackled by the authorities of the country, we did not focus enough on the problems of Armenian community. But the government and the parliament make every effort to overcome most of those problems", Bagabsh said. The meeting also became a good occasion for raising the issue of the social condition in Armenian villages. Bagabsh assured that the government would manage to implement the whole complex of planned actions for the rehabilitation of Armenian Labra, Arakich and Atara villages. The President informed about the intension to create a Public Chamber, which will deal with the solution of issues concerning national politics.

Who could benefit from the incident that took place in Hovhannes Tumanyan School? Whether it be internal or external forces, it is pretty obvious that the aim of the organizers is to provoke conflict between Armenians and Abkhazians. Abkhazian Armenians have been an object of political speculations for more than a year. Georgians accuse them of supporting Abkhazians and Abkhazians on their turn accuse Armenians of supporting Georgians. This is why in Sukhumi they are more inclined to see the role of Georgian special services in the incident. This version can look quite convincing if we take into account the fact that several attempts have already been made in Tbilisi to provoke Abkhazian-Armenian clashes. In May 2005 Georgian papers wrote that Armenians of Sukhumi had organized actions of protest against the politics of the unrecognized republic of Abkhazia. It was reported that the participants of the rally held the portraits of Michael Saakashvili with "Michael, reconcile us!" slogans. According to Georgian sources, 16 participants of the action were arrested.

Last year Georgian mass media informed that Armenians of Abkhazia were creating a "Liberation Committee" for defending against Abkhazian terror. All of that is of course a lie. In summer 2004 Georgian "Rustavi-2" TV channel reported that Georgian special services successfully accomplished the operation of "rescuing" Armenian worker Ashot Hambardzumyan who was said to be exploited in Abkhazia like a slave and worked free of charge on a construction. The TV channel even showed his interview. However, it is noteworthy that after the interview Hambardzumyan did not return to Armenia and his relatives were extremely astonished at his interview because he had never told them things like that.

Unfortunately, sometimes Abkhazian authorities also create grounds for the successful propaganda of international strife. The thing is that the large and once influential Armenian community of Abkhazia today has no mechanisms of participation in the social-political life of Abkhazia. Meanwhile, in Soviet times the Armenian population of the autonomy was practically equal to the Abkhazian population. If the leaders of the unrecognized republic really want to build civil society it is unclear why they are artificially pushing aside Armenians from the administration process. There is not a single representative of Armenian community in the government of the republic. It also quite difficult for Abkhazian Armenians to make their way to serious business. Many Armenian-populated villages do not have elementary facilities.

All of that promotes flow-out of Armenian population to Krasnodar Territory of Russia. Even so, Armenian emigrants living in Kuban all the same feel themselves citizens of Abkhazia and do not refuse the intension to return to their motherland. This was proved during the last presidential elections where Sergey Bagabsh was strongly supported not only by Abkhazian Armenians, but also by their compatriots in Sochi and other regions of Krasnodar Territory. Hopes, which Armenians pinned on the new government, have not come true yet. However the self-criticism of the Abkhazian President during the meeting with the leadership of Armenian community gives grounds to believe that the authorities of Abkhazian Republic will find ways to return the trust of the largest ethnic minority.

Source: http://www.news.ge/v1/index.php?lang...&info_id=43938

[skhara]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

You effort here has been much appreciated, enker. Would it be right to assume that this film is an Abkhazian/Russian documentary about the conflict there in the early 90s where they choose to highlight the actions of the Armenian Baghramyan battalion, and what the brilliant Youtube Georgian warrior did was he put in his anti-Armenian comments in the film? Anyway, was the film more-or-less claiming that the Armenian units at the time played a pivotal role in defeating the Georgian military outside of Sukhumi?

Thanks again.

Yep you are right. The narrator sounded Russian. The focus really was mainly on one Armenian company commander as he was the only Armenian interviewed in the video. The other guy was maybe a (brigadier general) who happened to be in charge of the brigade in which the Bagramyan battalion was in. I would gather from the film that they do portray the Armenians as having played a crucial role since that Galust Trepizonian fella describes being tasked with difficult assignment such going ahead and seizing the bridge crossing in their fist unsuccessful attempt, and later going up a mountain from which Georgians were controlling the approaches. Finally, they showed the Armenians advancing on the streets of Sukhumi tasked with taking some important government building.

The Georgians anti-Armenian commentary in the end was added after the documentary was pretty much over.

[skhara]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

That's exactly the kind of thing I was looking for. Here is a piece of commentary from the postings down bellow:

(Spam)
Ne znal, chto armiane tozhe sluzhat islamskomu delu
daxure (4 months ago) Show Hide Marked as spam
(Spam)
ты наверное плохо информирован планами армян по захвату чернаморского побережья, причём тут турки когда армяне делают всё чтобы проводить проармянскую(пророссийскую) политику на кавказе.



The part in the italics says: I didn't know Armenians also serve the Islamic agenda.

The part in bold is by the same guy who posted the video and he writes:
You are likely poorly informed about the plans of Armenians to capture the Black Sea coast. What do Turks have to do with anything when Armenians do everything possible to carry out pro-Armenian (pro-Russian) policy in the Caucasus.

I read that and just got curious. There is no way anyone could convince a group of fighting aged men out of a total population of Armenians of 70,000 to go and put their lives on the lines for complex geo-politics. They had to have a much simpler reason to go fight.

[Armenian]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

I read that and just got curious. There is no way anyone could convince a group of fighting aged men out of a total population of Armenians of 70,000 to go and put their lives on the lines for complex geo-politics. They had to have a much simpler reason to go fight.

I agree. However, there are feelings and convictions that lurk within the subconscious of individuals that lead people towards one direction or another. Although Armenians may not consciously/actively think about the potential geopolitical threat Georgians pose to the Armenian nation, they do nevertheless sense it within their inner-psyche. And this subconscious sense comes out at times when Armenians are forced to engage in collective action.

[Armenian]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

Thousands Rally Against Georgia’s Once Popular President

Tens of thousands of demonstrators converged on the capital of Georgia on Friday, demanding Parliamentary elections for early next year and venting dissatisfaction with the country’s once enormously popular government. The rally, organized by a loose coalition of opposition parties, presented the strongest domestic political challenge thus far to President Mikheil Saakashvili, who rose to office after peaceful protests swept away the country’s post-Soviet old guard four years ago.

Opposition demonstrators filled Rustaveli Avenue, the city’s main boulevard, and packed the entrance to Parliament, where they chanted anti-Saakashvili slogans and issued their demands. Among them was a call for the government to set Parliamentary elections for next spring and enter into negotiations for other power-sharing changes. Last year, Mr. Saakashvili and Parliament amended the Constitution to extend the Parliament’s term to next fall — officially, to align Parliament with the presidential election cycle — an act that the opposition said will make the legislature illegitimate when the term it was elected to expires in the spring.

“If we allow a sitting Parliament to extend its term for these months, this may happen again and again,” said Giorgi Khaindrava, a former government minister who is now in the opposition. “Changing their term while in office violates a fundamental principle of democratic systems.”

The demonstration signaled a significant degree of popular discontent with Mr. Saakashvili and his government, which inherited a country in near ruin four years ago and embarked upon an ambitious set of reforms. Mr. Saakashvili, a lawyer educated at Columbia University, has steered his post-Soviet country sharply toward the West, seeking admission to NATO and the European Union, while moving against corruption at home, especially in the police.

He has often said he hoped to model his country’s development after the experience of the Eastern European countries that were once under the Kremlin’s yoke, and to bring democracy and free markets to the Caucasus, a region with a history of corrupt, brutal and autocratic governments. He has set new standards for education, increased tax collection and revenue-generation, improved the readiness of the country’s once feeble army and repaired Soviet-era infrastructure to the degree that the country, once plagued by blackouts, now has a reliable electricity supply. But some of the reforms have made him enemies, and he has alienated several prominent politicians, who find him domineering and abrasive. His opponents accuse him of hoarding and abusing power, and of running the nation through a clique that will neither tolerate dissent nor engage in dialogue with the opposition, which Mr. Saakashvili has repeatedly made clear he despises and considers weak.

“The biggest shortcoming for us,” he said in an interview on Wednesday, “is that that we failed to grow up a real, mature opposition. The problem with them is that they have no real national leaders.”

The arrest last month of a former defense minister who had criticized Mr. Saakashvili and accused him of crimes also galvanized the opposition. The former minister later recanted on national television and was freed on bail, and left Georgia this week under circumstances still in dispute. The government insists that the former minister was guilty. But the case has raised questions about whether the police and prosecutors had received political instructions, which the government strongly denies. The government also faces pressure from rising prices and lingering underemployment, and over complaints about a weak judiciary that many government officials concede lacks independence and which the opposition says remains corrupt. Economic conditions remain difficult enough that many Georgians travel abroad for work.

Western diplomats said their initial estimates put the crowd at 40,000 to 50,000 people; the opposition claimed to have assembled at least 100,000. Either number rivaled the size of the demonstrations that brought Mr. Saakashvili to power and vastly exceeded the government’s predictions. The demonstration, held on a day when the government was playing host to foreign diplomats in a conference exploring Georgia’s efforts to integrate with Europe, served as a potential international embarrassment to Mr. Saakashvili, who has been framed abroad as the region’s standard bearer of democracy.

Shota Utiashvili, a senior official in the Interior Ministry, said the government estimated that 35,000 people had shown up — enough to close vehicle access on the streets in front of the hotel where the foreign delegates were staying. Mr. Lenzi, the local director of the International Republican Institute, an organization affiliated with the Republican Party that promotes democracy, has worked closely with both the opposition and the government. He said the size, energy and timing of the rally showed that political issues and popular grievances had converged and posed the government with a challenge.

“This is definitely a wake-up call,” he said. “It is evident to everyone now that something has to give. There will have to be negotiations between the opposition and the government.”

Although the protests rivaled the size of those, known as the Rose Revolution, that toppled President Eduard Shevardnadze in 2003, most of the opposition leaders said they did not seek another revolution. Even some of the rally’s participants said the opposition had no leader of Mr. Saakashvili’s political stature or record. Instead, they said, they sought to demonstrate their strength to Mr. Saakashvili and to persuade him and his government that they must be more inclusive and open to compromise.

“We must struggle by evolution, not by revolutionary means,” Badri Patarkatsishvili, widely regarded as Georgia’s richest man, said by telephone before the rally. “I know my country does not need another revolution. It will not survive it.”

Mr. Patarkatsishvili said late last month he had decided to underwrite the opposition, and their many parties, with hopes of balancing the power in Georgia. Georgian officials have sharply criticized him, saying he is an oligarch with a criminal history, and that he resents the current government because it is honest and will not do his bidding.

“He wants a weak government, destabilized and corrupt, that he can exploit,” said Giga Bokeria, a prominent member of Parliament and one of Mr. Saakashvili’s closest allies. “That is his element, like Yeltsin’s Russia, where he can thrive. We are everything that is against his values.”

Speaking before the crowds took to the streets, Mr. Bokeria added that the fact that the demonstration would be allowed was a sign that Georgia differed from many of its post-Soviet neighbors, which have quieted open dissent with repression and large-scale police action. Georgia has an active opposition television station, owned by Mr. Patarkatsishvili, and has passed strong laws ensuring a free press — elements of civil society not evident in many other post-Soviet states. Mr. Bokeria also said that the discontent was a natural leveling of Mr. Saakashvili’s popularity after the revolution, when he won 97 percent of the vote. A decline was inevitable, he said.

“In a democracy you always have people against you, and rallies are an integral and normal part of having a democratic system,” he said. “Russia said, ‘You see, you have internal problems.’ That’s the difference. In Russia, it is an internal problem. To us, it is a democracy.”

The police presence during the rally was light, and officers were not wearing helmets or armor, or visibly armed. Many chatted amiably with demonstrators. But there were brief shoving matches between demonstrators and the police at the entrance to one government building, and allegations of police misconduct on the roads leading to the capital from the south and west, with several demonstrators saying that officers tried blocking cars and seizing keys and driving licenses. Mr. Utiashvili, the police official, said that he had received no complaints of police misconduct. “So far that information has not come to us, but if there are any complaints we will investigate them,” he said.

Source: http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/03/wo...nt&oref=slogin

[Armenian]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

Russian-Chinese relations have reached "unheard-of" level - Chinese Premier

Russian-Chinese relations have reached "an unheard-of level" and entered a qualitatively new phase in their development, Chinese State Council Premier Wen Jiabao said. "Judging by the level of mutual trust, intensity of contacts, and results of cooperation, it is safe to say that our strategic interaction has reached an unheard-of level in terms of its range and depth, and relations between our countries have entered a qualitatively new phase in their development," Wen said in an interview with Interfax.

The Chinese premier recalled that the leaders of the two countries had set goals for the development of relations of strategic interaction and partnership between Russia and China in March. "Both countries should seek to build partnership marked by sincerity and mutual confidence in politics, mutual trust and common preferences in the economy, joint contributions to innovation in the scientific and technological areas, harmony and friendship in the field of humanities and culture, and solidarity and mutual assistance in the security field," he said.

To attain such goals, the two countries should make efforts in several areas, including politics, trade and economic relations, scientific-technological and humanitarian cooperation, he said. Wen said he was confident that Beijing and Moscow need "to step up cooperation in the area of strategic security, efficiently oppose new threats and challenges, and defend common interests of the two countries by making a worthy contribution to the cause of peace, stability, and development worldwide."

Wen highly praised the results of the China Year in Russia and the Russia Year in China and called for "analyzing the record of their organization and putting on the events that proved to be the most popular with our peoples on a regular basis."

The organization of the China Year in Russia and the Russia Year in China "was aimed at strengthening long-term friendship between our peoples and comprehensively improving the level of strategic interaction and partnership between China and Russia," Wen said. "This was an unprecedented event in the entire history of Chinese-Russian relations," he said.

Source: http://www.interfax.cn/displayarticl...HINA-RELATIONS

[Armenian]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

Debating Big Brother’s Presence: Concerns linger of Armenia as “outpost”

Russia continues to expand its presence in Armenia’s economy, buying up infrastructures of national importance. The increased “Russification” of Armenia gives way to concerns that Speaker of Russia’s State Duma Boris Grizlov in 2004, calling Armenia an “outpost” is coming true. Strategic partner Russia owns 80 percents of energy sources and systems of independent Armenia, which has forced Armenia into the state of an “energy colonization”, economists say.

One of Armenia’s few remaining infrastructures is now on sale too.
With the latest deal Russia took possession of the communication sphere. On September 14th the Russian MTS got 80 percent of International Cell Holding Company, the owner of K-Telecom for 310 million euros. 90 percent of Armenia’s leading communications operator ArmenTel were bought by Russian Vimpelcom Company in November 2006 for 382 million euros. Armenia still owns some infrastructure including the railroad, but the Russian Railroads Company will be the most likely winner in the tender announced on October 15th as it competes with an unknown company from India.

Last year, Andranik Manukyan, Minister of Transport and Communications of the Republic of Armenia stated that the only way to save the Armenian railroad is to hand it over for concession management to Russia, something the RA government is likely to do. The beginning of the Russian policy of getting economic leverages is symbolically chosen to be the year of 2002, when the ‘Property for Debt’ deal was set into circulation; according to the deal Armenia gave Russia 4 enterprises and the most powerful Hrazdan Thermo-Electric Station as a pay for its debt to Russia of $97 million.

“Russia intruded into its strategic partner’s home like a bailiff and demanded our strategic entities for just $97 million. This took place in case when Russia had forgiven much larger debts to others: say, $40 billion to Turkey, Syria and had even reconstructed Georgia’s debt in $150 million with the right of privilege to repay in 6 years,” economist Eduard Aghajanov says. In 2001 Putin called the criticism of the deal ‘hysteria over selling the Fatherland’ saying those times have passed and the economy has to go in a different direction. The ‘hysteria’ of opposition and economists became even fiercer, when none of the enterprises was re-launched within the 5 years since then, gave no production and did not bring any use to the economy of the country.

Andranik Mihranyan, Russia-based political scientist of Armenian descent believes the deals have been made by mutual agreement and Russia has never imposed conditions unacceptable for Armenia. “Russia simply has very little interest in those plants. It has even appeared that Russia does not need them, because there are numerous similar factories in Russia itself that do not operate.” A similar opinion was expressed in Yerevan recently by the co-chairman of the Armenian-Russian inter-parliamentary commission Nikolai Rizhkov, saying the plants received particularly by the “Property for Debt” deal were not profitable for them. “Some of our expectations connected with those enterprises did not prove right.”

Economic analyst Aghajanov asks who forced the Russians to purchase the enterprises. And answers that the decision on the purchase has not been economic, but rather political aiming to get as much leverage in the Armenian economy as possible. The most powerful leverage is the energy system. Russia bought more than 80 percent of the country’s energy sources and system, including the 5th energy bloc of the Hrazdan Thermal-Electric Station, the Sevan Cascade, distribution network, and took the Metsamor Nuclear Power Plant for licensed management because of a set state monopoly in this sphere. With the exception of thermal-electric and several minor hydro-electric stations, the rest are owned by Russian companies.

Besides, no cash money has been given for the majority of these structures. The first energy infrastructure that became Gazprom’s was the 45 percent of ArmRosGazProm. Russians paid in gas instead of the $148 million over several years. According to official data the Russian RAO UES paid $25 million for the Sevan-Hrazdan cascade; however, some sources mention the RAO UES took the cascade in exchange for the Armenian debt for nuclear fuel.

The Hrazadan Thermal-Electric Station went into Russian possession as a result of the ‘Property for Debt’ deal. An exception is the Electric Network of Armenia as RAO UES has to pay $70 million in exchange – though not to Armenia but to the owner of the network – the British Midland Resources. The most controversial deal further empowering the economic leverages of Russia and deepening the disproportion of the Yerevan-Moscow relations was signed in 2006, when the 5th bloc of the Hrazdan Thermo-Electric Station, the last significant energy system, was ceded to Russia (the other four blocs already belonged to the Russian company).

Under Russian pressure the initial length of Iran-Armenia pipeline was also drastically minimized, thus preventing its competitiveness to the Russian energy companies. This new deal was called ‘Property for Gas’, which, Aram Sargsyan, chairman of the oppositional Republic Party says should in fact be called ‘Everything for the Post.’ The necessity in ‘Property for Gas’ deal appeared after Russia decided to increase the price for the gas for 2.5 times ahead of parlamentary elections in Armenia; and coincided with time when Armenia was making attempts to diversify its energy sphere.

After protracted negotiations, the government of RA gave preference to Iranian Mar and Sanir companies in both tenders for the construction of the Iran-Armenia gas pipeline and the modernization of the Hrazdan Thermal-Electric Station the same year. “Russia realized quite well that this cooperation with Iran is a serious alternative and blackmailed Armenia by increasing the price for gas,” former Prime Minister, and presidential candidate Vazgen Manukyan says insisting the latest deal is a new leverage in the hands of Russia to be used for political purposes.

“In the presidential election in 2008 Russia may say: ‘If my proxy does not come to power I will make the price for the gas $250, if he does – it will remain at $110’,” Manukyan told Armenianow. The 5th bloc of Hrazdan station was given to Russia for $60 million in cash, while the remaining nearly $189 million will be paid to the ArmRosGazProm as subsidy. For three years the citizens of Armenia will be getting relatively cheap gas; however, another highly important energy entity of the republic will go into Russia’s possession. According to the agreement the prices may go up beginning 2009.

Radical opposition political analyst Suren Surenyants is confident the authorities agreed to the economically unprofitable gas deal to prolong their stay in power and to fulfill all the ‘directives’ of the Kremlin. Vahan Hovhannisyan, deputy speaker of the National Assembly, member of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation insists Armenia-Russia relations are a strategic partnership in nature and include mutual obligations of the sides: “We may frequently dislike those obligations, but they are unavoidable.” “After the Soviet years it’s natural that the relations with Russia are viewed as colonial. However, the situation has changed and I don’t see a threat that Russia may use its economic leverages for political purposes,” a co-chairman of the Armenia-Russia Inter-Parliamentary Commission Vahan Hovhannisyan said.

Source: http://armenianow.com/?action=viewAr...0&IID=&lng=eng

[Armenian]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

A geopolitical essay resurrected from the pre-9/11 world. The article below, concerning Russian-Iranian relations, was featured within a Neocon website, the Think Tank called - The Heritage Foundation: Leadership For America. This essay come to us from a time period when the terms "Neocon" and "War on Terror" were still unknown to the public. As the essay clearly highlights, however, even before it all began in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States, the grand agenda of the special interest groups working within Washington DC was there for all to see.

Armenian

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Countering Russian-Iranian Military Cooperation



Iranian President Mohammed Khatami's recent visit to Russia resulted in expanded strategic cooperation between the two states, particularly in the areas of weapons and nuclear and ballistic missile technology. Iran already is the third largest importer of Russian arms after China and India.1 A new de facto alliance between Russia and Iran that increases Tehran's military capabilities will make this sponsor of terrorism more of a threat to vital U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf as well as to the security of America's allies in the Middle East. Moreover, by gaining nuclear-tipped intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and other advanced weapons systems, Iran could one day threaten the United States directly.

Nevertheless, Moscow has ignored Washington's repeated protests over the proliferation of its advanced weaponry and technology to Iran, particularly technology that could be used in producing weapons of mass destruction (WMD). For these reasons, Khatami's visit to Moscow on March 12-15 and the agreement by Iranian officials to buy state-of-the-art Russian surface-to-air missile defense systems have greatly increased concerns in Washington over this close relationship. On March 19, Secretary of State Colin Powell issued a warning to both Russia and Iran that the United States would closely watch their military cooperation and would take unspecified action if their activities threatened to destabilize the Middle East.2

Rhetoric alone will not be enough to deter cooperation between Iran and Russia. The Bush Administration will need to employ an array of military, diplomatic, and economic measures to slow Iran's strategic buildup of weapons, deal with its radical Islamic regime, and prevent further deterioration of U.S. relations with Russia. The Administration should proceed cautiously but deliberately to:

* Maintain a strong U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf to deter and defend against Iranian aggression or terrorism;

* Ensure that no U.S. enterprises or government credits contribute to Iran's buildup of missiles or development of weapons of mass destruction;

* Prevent American investors from subsidizing Russian projects that generate revenue for the Iranian government that could be used to purchase advanced military technology;

* Task the interagency WMD working group at the National Security Council with designing a strategy for sanctioning Russia and Iran because of their proliferation activities;

* Support the rescheduling of Russia's $150 billion debt to the Paris Club only in exchange for Moscow's active cooperation in cutting the flow of advanced military technology to Iran and other states;

* Accelerate the development of sea-based missile defense systems to be deployed in the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf;

* Strengthen U.S. military ties to the Gulf Cooperation Council, which includes Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, and encourage the council's members to form a more effective military alliance; and

* Assist the Iranian people in their quest to achieve genuine democracy.

HOW RUSSIA HAS CONTRIBUTED TO IRAN'S MILITARY BUILDUP

Concerns over Russia's increasing military ties with Iran, especially in the area of weapons proliferation, have grown since 1994 when senior Iranian officials first took steps to establish relations with Russian bureaucrats in charge of nuclear and missile programs in the post-Soviet military-industrial complex. Up to $25 million changed hands to facilitate Tehran's access to Russian advanced technology.3

After intensive consultations, Vice President Al Gore and Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin on June 30, 1995, signed a confidential agreement that was supposed to limit Moscow's sales of arms to Iran. Russia agreed to supply only weapons specified under the 1989 Soviet-Iranian military agreements and promised not to deliver advanced conventional or "destabilizing" weapons to Iran. Finally, Russia agreed not to sell any weapons to Iran beyond December 31, 1999.4

With sales exceeding $4 billion between 1992 and 2000, however, Iran is now the third largest customer for Russian weapons. Among the systems Russia supplied to Iran in the 1990s are three Kilo-class attack submarines, which could be used to disrupt shipping in the Gulf; eight MiG-29 fighter bombers; 10 Su-24 fighter bombers; and hundreds of tanks and armored personnel carriers.5

In addition, the Russian Ministry of Nuclear Industry and affiliated firms may have transferred uranium enrichment technology to Iran while building a civilian nuclear reactor slated for completion in 2003 in the Gulf port of Bushehr.6 This technology is necessary in the development of nuclear bombs. Moscow has facilitated the sale of technology to Iran that is used in the manufacture of the Soviet-era SS-4 intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) and has helped Iran to develop its Shahab-3 IRBM, which has a range of 1,200 kilometers and is capable of hitting targets throughout the Middle East, including Saudi Arabia and Israel.7

Cooperation between Moscow and Tehran increased after the election of President Vladimir Putin last spring and Moscow's November 2000 renunciation of the 1995 Gore-Chernomyrdin Agreement.8 Anticipating lucrative arms sales, a large number of Russian hard-line politicians and generals have endorsed Russia's rapprochement with the Islamic Republic.9 For its part, Tehran sees Russia as a valuable source of military technology that Western states have declined to provide since Iran's 1979 revolution.10

A Boost from Official State Visits

Khatami's state visit to Moscow reciprocated the visit of Russian Defense Minister Marshal Igor Sergeev to Tehran in December 2000. Sergeev's visit, in addition to being a major breakthrough in the military relationship between the two governments, was the first visit by a Russian defense minister to the Islamic Republic since Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini seized power in 1979.

During his visit to Iran, the former commander of the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces toured Iranian aerospace, electronics, and missile facilities and consulted with top Iranian leaders on strategic cooperation in the Middle East and Central Asia.11 Sergeev and his Iranian counterpart discussed a 10-year arms and military technology program worth over $3 billion that would include training for Iranian military officers and engineers at Russian military academies. The representatives agreed that their governments would consult each other on "military doctrines, common challenges and threats," effectively bringing the status of their bilateral ties to that of an informal alliance.12 Sergeev bluntly rejected U.S. concerns about the relationship, telling the Iranian media upon his arrival in that state that "Russia...intends to pursue its own ends."13

During President Khatami's visit to Russia last month, Putin reiterated that stance, stating that Russia has the right to defend itself.14 Iranian officials toured a Russian missile factory and agreed to buy Osa and TOR-M1 surface-to-air missiles, which have missile defense capabilities. Khatami also toured a nuclear reactor plant in St. Petersburg and signaled that his country would buy another reactor from Russia. Since Iran already controls some of the world's largest natural gas reserves, the need for two nuclear reactors--at a cost of $1.8 billion--is questionable at best. The reactors could provide cover for a clandestine nuclear weapons program, which could make use of Iranian scientists who currently are studying nuclear physics and ballistic rocketry in Russia and the more than 500 Russian experts currently working in Iran on supposedly peaceful applications of nuclear science.

WHY RUSSIA IS DEALING WITH IRAN

Moscow has two strategic goals in pursuing a military relationship with Iran: keeping its own military-industrial complex solvent and building a coalition in Eurasia to counterbalance U.S. military superiority. Russia has found in Iran a large, oil-rich customer for its military-industrial complex, which supports over 2 million jobs. Russian leaders hoped the export revenues would allow them to save the research and development capabilities and technology base they inherited from the Soviet Union that could be used to develop new major weapons systems for the Russian armed forces and foreign customers. To achieve economies of scale, however, Russia needs access to large arms markets, such as China, India, and Iran.

The state-owned arms exporter, Rosoboronexport, is pursuing such former Soviet clients in the Middle East as Algeria, Libya, and Syria and is developing markets for arms in Latin America and East Asia, from Malaysia to Vietnam. Senior Russian officials reportedly have taken bribes from foreign customers anxious to gain access to Russia's sensitive technologies.15 Moreover, direct payments from foreign customers are often put in offshore bank accounts, from which some funds find their way into private pockets.

More worrisome for U.S. policy planners is the geopolitical dimension of Russian-Iranian rapprochement. In early 1997, then-Foreign Minister Evgeny Primakov and his Iranian counterpart, Ali Akbar Velayati, issued a joint statement calling the U.S. presence in the Persian Gulf "totally unacceptable." Primakov sought to build a Eurasian counterbalance to the Euro-Atlantic alliance, which would be based on a coalition that included Russia, China, India, and Iran.16 Such efforts make it likely that the United States and its allies will be the target of Russian-Iranian military cooperation in the future.

The Russian Federation and the Islamic Republic cooperate over a broad range of policy issues, with military ties being an important aspect of relations between the two countries. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Iran has refrained from actively promoting its brand of Islamic radicalism in the former Soviet republics. Despite fashioning itself as defender of all Muslims, Tehran did little when the Russian military slaughtered tens of thousands of Muslim civilians in the first Chechen war (1994-1996), and it put forth only weak protestations against Moscow's excessive use of force in the second Chechen war (1999-2001). Moscow and Tehran also have cooperated against Afghanistan's radical Taliban regime by supporting the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance opposition coalition; support Armenia rather than the pro-Turkish, pro-Western Azerbaijan; and oppose a "western" route for exporting oil from the Caspian Sea basin through Georgia to Turkey.

Some Russian officials, however, recognize that cooperation with Iran has its limits. As arms control expert Alexei Arbatov, Deputy Chairman of the Duma Defense Committee, has warned, technology transfers to Iran may backfire. Within 10 to 15 years, he predicts, Russian technology could be used by radical Islamic terrorists or in Iranian, Algerian, Saudi, Egyptian, and Libyan missiles and other weapons aimed at Russia.17

THE THREAT TO U.S. INTERESTS

Iran's military buildup poses direct threats to U.S. interests in the Middle East.18 Iran has long aspired to play a dominant role in the Middle East and the Islamic world. Under the late Shah as well as the current radical Islamic leadership, Iran has sought to build its military capabilities and its ability to defend itself against Iraq. However, its aspirations go beyond legitimate self-defense. Islamic militants in Iran make little effort to hide the fact that they want to destroy the United States and its ally, Israel.

For example, senior Iranian officials, including the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamanei, repeatedly have denied Israel's right to exist. In a 1998 parade in Tehran, a Shahab-3 missile carrier prominently displayed an inscription that read, "Israel should be wiped off the map."19 By opposing Arab-Israeli peace negotiations and maintaining a militant anti-Israeli posture, Tehran hopes to build support for its leadership role in the Arab and Muslim world. Iran also backs the Hezballah (Party of God) terrorist organization that is based in Lebanon.

A more aggressive, nuclear Iran would cause further political instability that could lead to high oil prices, which would benefit both Russia and Iran as oil exporters. Moreover, a nuclear- and missile-armed Iran could well present a serious challenge to America's allies and major oil exporters in the Gulf. Iran could use its missile capabilities to blackmail the West, deter the United States and its allies from deploying forces to defend oil shipping routes, or deny the U.S. Navy access to the Gulf itself.

According to Admiral Thomas R. Wilson, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Tehran is "not unlikely" to re-export the sensitive Russian technology for weapons of mass destruction it obtains to militant Muslim regimes or terrorist groups in other countries, from Algeria to Sudan.20 If America's efforts to limit the proliferation of weapons and weapons technologies from China, Russia, and other countries to Iran fail, the United States will have little recourse but to impose sanctions on the violators and take other measures to punish countries that proliferate weapons of mass destruction.

[...]

Source: http://www.heritage.org/Research/Rus...sia/BG1425.cfm

[Armenian]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

continued from above:

ESTABLISHING A NEW U.S. POLICY ON RUSSIA-IRAN COOPERATION

The Bush Administration faces many challenges in dealing with the issue of strategic military cooperation between Russia and Iran. It inherited an ineffective policy from the Clinton Administration, which attempted to reason with Russia to limit arms proliferation to Iran. Although the United States spent $5 billion to secure Russia's nuclear arsenal, Moscow still sold its sensitive nuclear and ballistic technology to China, Iran, and other states of concern. In addition, American companies paid Russia $2 billion for commercial satellite launches authorized by the Clinton White House as compensation for Moscow's agreement to give up its arms trade with Tehran.21 Finally, President Clinton waived congressionally mandated sanctions against the suppliers of weapons and military technology to countries that support terrorism.

Congress attempted to limit the damage from these ill-advised Clinton Administration policies by imposing sanctions on companies that do business in Iran. In 1998, Congress overwhelmingly passed the Iran Missile Proliferation Sanctions Act (H.R. 2709) sponsored by Representative Benjamin Gilman (R-NY), chairman of the House International Relations Committee.22 The act mandated that the President report to Congress when there is credible information that a foreign entity has transferred any technology that is governed by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). All licensed exports, sales of defense items, and U.S. government financial assistance to that entity would then be terminated. However, President Clinton vetoed that legislation in June 1998. Instead, he issued Executive Order 12938 to assign penalties to companies that provide assistance to nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons programs.23

Nevertheless, Congress insisted on stronger steps and passed the Iran Nonproliferation Act (P.L. 106-178), which was signed into law on March 14, 2000. This law authorizes, rather than mandates, the President to impose sanctions on Russian entities that assist Iran's missile or weapons of mass destruction programs. These sanctions include a ban on U.S. government procurement from or contracts with the entity, a ban on U.S. assistance to the entity, a ban on U.S. sales to the entity of any defense articles or services, and a denial of U.S. licenses for exports to the entity of items that can have military applications.

The Clinton Administration's counter-proliferation policy was too little, too late. It has neither limited the willingness of states or companies to sell advanced technology to Iran nor stopped the flow of forbidden items and technicians. Until the regime in Tehran abandons its anti-American stance or the Iranian people replace it with a democratic government, tensions between Iran and the United States and its allies are likely to remain high.

To staunch the transfer of Russian weapons and missile technology to Iran, the United States should develop a counter-proliferation policy that is deliberate, vigilant, and aggressive. Specifically, it should:

* Maintain a strong U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf to deter and defend against military threats from Iran. Since the 1979 Islamic revolution, Iran has targeted Arab monarchies in the Persian Gulf with terrorism and subversion. It has sought to intimidate smaller neighbors with periodic naval exercises and has seized three islands claimed by the United Arab Emirates. To deter Iran from aggression and protect the free flow of oil exports, the United States must maintain a robust naval presence in the Gulf. As long as the United States stands by its allies, the chances of attack from Iran are low. A vigilant and robust naval presence in the Gulf would deter Iranian aggression, reassure nervous Arab states that the United States is committed to peace in the region, and help contain Iraq. The United States currently has deployed forces in Kuwait, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia, and it has pre-positioned military equipment in Qatar. The United States should deploy as few ground troops as necessary in the region to avoid a political backlash that Iran, Iraq, or local anti-Western movements could exploit. U.S. naval forces should limit their time in port and restrict refueling and resupply operations to only the most secure facilities to reduce their vulnerability to terrorist attack.

* Ensure that U.S. enterprises and government credits do not contribute in any way to Iran's buildup of missiles or weapons of mass destruction programs. The United States should expand sanctions against Russian companies and institutions that help Iran build missiles or that transfer weapons technology. They should be forced to choose between trading with America or aiding Iran. Under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-132), the President can withhold U.S. aid to any country that provides assistance to a government that the State Department deems a terrorist state. Iran has been on the U.S. terrorism list since 1984, and the State Department lists it as the most active state sponsor of international terrorism in its April 2000 Patterns of Global Terrorism report.24 Finally, the Administration should suspend all Export-Import Bank and Overseas Private Investment Corporation insurance and credits to U.S. companies that do business with Russian entities that are linked to Iran's military build-up activities.

* Prevent U.S. investors from subsidizing Russian projects that could generate revenue for Iran, which Tehran could use to obtain advanced military technology. Russian companies investing in Iran should not be allowed to raise capital in U.S. financial markets. The Securities and Exchange Commission should deny U.S. investors access to Russian companies that do business in Iran. Such investment, particularly in Iran's energy sector, would generate revenue for Tehran that could be used to buy military technology and weapons systems from foreign suppliers. U.S. sanctions under the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act (P.L. 104-172) penalize companies that invest over $20 million in Iran's oil industry. However, these measures should be amended and expanded when the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act comes up for renewal later this year. For example, the waiver provisions should be toughened by excluding a presidential waiver for any company from a country that sells arms or nuclear equipment to Iran. Russian government-controlled companies, such as the natural gas monopoly Gazprom, should not be allowed to raise funds from U.S. investors for energy schemes in Iran, since they could fund its military buildup and ultimately could be used to threaten U.S. interests in the region.

* Task the interagency WMD working group at the National Security Council with designing a strategy for sanctioning Russia and Iran because of their proliferation activities. In the past, Congress has taken the lead in mandating sanctions against proliferators of WMD and related technologies. These sanctions, however, were narrowly focused on U.S. assistance or trade in goods and services, and have proven ineffective in stopping proliferation. A new approach by the Administration is necessary. The intelligence community should be tasked with a comprehensive assessment of the ongoing technology transfer and weapons programs, and with providing recommendations identifying "choking points" that are vulnerable to sanctions.

The current WMD working group at the NSC should be tasked with developing a sanctions strategy that targets Russian and Iranian officials, businesses, and individuals involved in the proliferation of WMD technologies, materiel, or know-how, as well as their sources of financing. This strategy could include restrictions on access to U.S. capital markets, scrutiny of international investment and banking activities by violators, and stricter visa controls for the individuals involved. The working group should include representatives from the Department of State; the Department of Defense; the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FINCEN) and U.S. Customs Service within the Department of the Treasury; and (to control the visa regime for officials and business executives) the Immigration and Naturalization Service within the Department of Justice.

* Support the rescheduling of Russia's $150 billion debt to the Paris Club only in exchange for its active cooperation in cutting the flow of advanced military technology to Iran. The Administration should make clear that it opposes further rescheduling of Russian debt to the Paris Club as long as Moscow continues to export dangerous military technology to Iran. If Russia were to cooperate in stopping the flow of weapons technology to Iran, Washington should support debt rescheduling with full disclosure of past transactions. Disclosure of other proliferation activities, such as Russia's sales of advanced nuclear and ballistic missile technology to China and rogue states like Iraq, should also be included in any deal on debt rescheduling.

* Accelerate the deployment of sea-based missile defense systems on U.S. ships in the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf. Washington should cooperate with Israel and Turkey in the Mediterranean region and the states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to deploy a sea-based anti-ballistic missile system, the upgraded Navy Theater Wide (NTW) program, on U.S. ships. Once deployed, such a system would blunt the emerging threat of Iranian missile attack and bolster the ability of America's allies in the region to withstand Tehran's attempts at intimidation.

* Strengthen U.S. military ties with the Gulf Cooperation Council to help it become a more effective military alliance. Washington should assist the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council--Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates--in transforming their loose collective security arrangement into an effective military alliance. It can do so by expanding joint military exercises and defense planning; assuring the continuous stockpiling of military supplies in the region; helping the GCC members to integrate their command, control, and communications networks; and assisting them in coordinating their military training programs. The Gulf states should speed up execution of the Cooperative Defense Initiative to enhance interoperability. They also should improve control of airspace over the Gulf by accelerating work on an integrated civilian-military air traffic control system. Bolstering the GCC would lessen Iran's ability to intimidate its weaker neighbors and would enhance efforts to contain both Iran and Iraq.

* Assist the Iranian people in their quest to achieve genuine democracy. Despite the reform efforts of President Khatami, the current regime under Ayatollah Ali Khamanei remains a harsh dictatorship of radical Islamic ideologues. The Bush Administration should work with U.S. allies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to expose the regime's human rights violations. It should support the creation of an international network of NGOs concerned with the plight of Iranian students, businessmen, national and ethnic minorities, and women, the main supporters of reform who voted for President Khatami in 1997 and for reformers during the 2000 parliamentary elections. Washington should help Iranians gain access to uncensored information by expanding the broadcasting range and frequencies of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and the Voice of America. This strategy, implemented under President Ronald Reagan in Soviet-dominated Eastern Europe, proved highly successful. Applied to Iran, it could lead to the ascendancy of democratic forms of government and leadership.

CONCLUSION

Russian assistance to Iran in developing ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction increasingly threatens U.S. interests, U.S. forces, and U.S. allies in the Middle East. Should Iran develop a nuclear arsenal, it could use it to deny the United States access to strategically important Persian Gulf shipping lanes and to interfere with the export of oil, wreaking havoc in global energy markets. In the longer term, it could use its missiles to threaten U.S. territory directly. The Administration must develop a comprehensive strategy that relies on pro-active diplomacy, creative economic countermeasures, and innovative military responses to address this growing threat from Iran.

Source: http://www.heritage.org/Research/Rus...sia/BG1425.cfm

[Armenian]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

The military-industrial complex rules in Russia

IN HIS autobiography, Georgi Arbatov, the eminence grise of the Soviet foreign policy establishment, asked this question, referring to the Soviet intervention in Angola and Afghanistan, “Why did we in the eyes of the world become an aggressive expansionist power in the second half of the 1970s?” But he didn’t really answer it.

So given the opportunity to talk to him for a good three hours I had the time to push him for an answer, an answer that presidents Carter and Reagan wished they knew when they had to deal with the Soviet Union. Both overreacted, the former by arming the Mujahideen that later transfused into Al Qaeda and the latter by licensing the South Africans to fight an Angolan liberation army (the MPLA, now the government) which then turned to Cuba to help them defeat South Africa and make a negotiated peace possible. Of course, it is true if they known the answer their policies might not have changed one wit.

“My guess”, replied Arbatov, “is that our military-industrial complex had grown to such proportions that it escaped political control. The leaders depended on the military-industrial complex to stay in power. So they didn’t want to estrange relations with it. Not everything was controlled by one man. The whole system was infiltrated by the military industrial complex.”

I then asked Arbatov if the military-industrial complex was today under control. “The economic difficulties of post Soviet Russia”, he replied, “make military expenditures much more modest than they were, but we have a new thing, our new leader, Putin. He is in the hands of this military-industrial complex, and a lot of his appointments go to these people. I don’t know how much control he has over them. In general they have to worry about their survival in the military-industrial complex, not about enhancing peace… Maybe Putin is afraid of being blamed for neglecting the needs of the military. The communists would blame him, Zhironovsky would blame him. You have a lot of adventurers now.”

Clearly, this pressure on Putin would have led to a degree of hardening of Russian foreign policy even without the provocation of the expansion of Nato, the growing influence of the US in the soft underbelly of Russia, the former Asian republics, and the decision to build on Polish and Czech soil an anti-missile system. But for those with a bent towards traditional Russian paranoia, an urge to recapture a past imperial status, this is all the evidence they need to justify an attempt to rebuild the Soviet military machine.

“But the main thing is that real negotiations have stopped”, adds Arbatov in an important caveat. “Both sides are at fault. We need to start with two or three summits to discuss the new international situation, possible lines on the behaviour and responsibilities of big countries… You need to meet your adversary regularly and you get to know him and then it is easier to negotiate. This meeting in Kennebunkport. This wasn’t a negotiation. I know how the old summit meetings were. All organisations, including mine, were busy up to the ears -- the whole political and military establishment. We had to work, work, work. Now they have lost interest. Now it is theatre, just to show. I have no idea where they get their information from. Putin’s is the least transparent governmental system in my memory. Even in Stalin’s time we knew Malenkov meant this and this, and after it became much more visible.”

Once launched on a critique of Putin, Arbatov does not spare the knife. “Putin has done a lot of good work -- he has re-established the governmental system. But at the same time he gives not a single speech that gives the prospect. What are we striving for? What do we want to have in internal policy, in foreign policy?”

In Arbatov’s view it is time overdue that the two countries cut back their nuclear armaments. “Both sides have lost their enemy. They see no imminent danger from the other side. Neither seems to understand that it can quickly reappear. Just the existence of so many weapons makes deteriorating relations more likely and stability less dependable…Being honest, we in Russia are not right in our approach. We have so many weapons we could decrease the numbers unilaterally and show an example.”

Arbatov’s final point: “If you have so many nuclear weapons you have to say there is a plan to get rid of them even if you can’t give an exact date. Otherwise other countries say, if you have them why can’t we?”

Later that evening I walked by the Kremlin. Who is listening? Neither the military-industrial complex in Russia nor, come to that, its almost equally powerful counterpart in the US.

Source: http://www.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayA...n=opinion&col=