The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

[Armenian]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

Serbia, Kosovo 'never going to be one again': Rice

Russia must accept the reality that "Serbia and Kosovo are never going to be one again" or risk instability there, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said in an interview published Wednesday. "I hope that the Russians are as committed as we are to a stable outcome in the Balkans and to being constructive in the Balkans," Rice said after talks on Kosovo in Brussels last week with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov. "But the fact of the matter is Kosovo and Serbia are never going to be one again, and that's the reality," Rice was quoted as saying in USA Today. "And if you don't deal with that reality, you're only going to sow the seeds of considerable discontent and considerable instability," Rice said.

The Albanian-majority Serb province of Kosovo is seeking independence while Russian-backed Serbia is willing to grant its southern province no more than autonomy. Rice endorsed a plan presented early this year by the UN special envoy for Kosovo, Martti Ahtisaari, that calls for independence under international supervision for the province. "Both Kosovo and Serbia need to get on with their futures, their separate but related futures. And the way to do that is for Serbia to have a strong European perspective," Rice said. "I have been encouraging our European allies to do as much as they can to encourage that European perspective," she added. The focus now is on ensuring that Kosovo fufills its obligations under the Ahtisaari plan -- such as the protection of minority rights and religious sites -- "because there isn't any more point to further negotiation," she said.

A negotiating deadline expired on Monday after a diplomatic troika of the United States, Russia and the European Union failed to broker a compromise between the ethnic Albanians and Serbs on Kosovo's future. European Union leaders are to meet over Kosovo at a summit Friday, ahead of a UN Security Council debate on the thorny issue on December 19. Russia said Tuesday it will demand that the UN Security Council annul any unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo. Following the expiry of the UN-set deadline for a negotiated settlement, Kosovo's Albanian leaders said they would immediately begin coordinating a move to independence with international partners. A declaration on breaking away from Serbia is widely expected next month.

Source: http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5...montwgOwr3z4Qg

Georgia fears impact of Kosovo crisis

Georgia, the former Soviet republic struggling to assert its independence from Russia, appealed on Thursday for US and European support in the event that a crisis in Kosovo should spread to the Caucasus and threaten Georgia's territorial integrity. "We hope our friends and allies in the west take a firm position on the inapplicability of the Kosovo case to Georgia. In other words, Kosovo is sui generis," Lado Gurgenidze, Georgia's prime minister, told the Financial Times in an interview. He was referring to the risk that if the US and most European Union member-states recognise Kosovo's independence, Russia might retaliate by recognising Abkhazia and South Ossetia, two Russian-backed separatist enclaves in Georgia.

Months of fruitless negotiations between Belgrade and Kosovo's ethnic Albanian leaders are due to end on Monday. Russia backs Serbia in its insistence that Kosovo can have autonomy under Serbia's sovereignty but not full independence. Mr Gurgenidze won support for his position on Kosovo on Thursday from Benita Ferrero-Waldner, the EU's external relations commissioner, with whom he held talks in Brussels. "We do hope also that Russia will understand that, certainly on South Ossetia and Abkhazia, things should remain as they are," she told reporters. Some EU officials doubt that Russia, beset with restive minorities of its own on its southern borders, would go so far as to recognise Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states. But few are under any illusions about Moscow's desire to retain influence over Georgia, especially since its pro-western leadership took power after the Rose Revolution of November 2003.

Referring to Russia, Mr Gurgenidze said: "So long as there is unequivocal respect for our territorial integrity and our sovereign Euro-Atlantic choice, which is not at all at the expense of anyone else, everything else can be discussed and addressed and negotiated." Mr Gurgenidze, 36, a US-educated former investment banker with ABN Amro, was appointed prime minister one month ago after the Georgian authorities drew criticism even from their western allies for suppressing opposition street protests and imposing a state of emergency. He travelled to Brussels to ease the concerns of EU and Nato about the turmoil in Georgia and to stress that the presidential election, scheduled for January 5, will be free, fair and open to foreign observers. Mr Gurgenidze said monitors from the Council of Europe, the European parliament, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe and anyone else that wanted to observe the election was welcome. "The more the merrier," he said.

● Nato is set to heighten the readiness of 1,600 additional troops in order to be able to respond to any increase in violence following the failure of status negotiations for Serbia's breakaway province of Kosovo, according to people familiar with the plans. The troops are part of Nato's operational reserve force, standing by in case Nato's 16,500-strong Kosovo Force, known as Kfor, needs reinforcements.

Source: http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/22139735/

[Armenian]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

Armenian, why Kosovo? There exists many reasons, pick one. Albania is in the geographic epicenter of Europe, maybe they would like to increase Albanian power in order to decrease the long term authority of Russia.

Albania is not the "epicenter" of Europe, that honor goes to the pro-western central European nations - Czechia, Romania, Austria, etc. One of the fundamental reasons why I believe the US favors Albania is simply because Albanians can potentially be a balancing power to Serbia and Greece, two pro-Russian Orthodox nations. What's more, due to the Kosovo issue, Albanians tend to be vehemently pro-USA, unlike many other nations in the region who are at best pro-European Union. Moreover, as you pointed out, Albania also has an intimate relation with Turkey and, to a lesser extent Israel. So, the unofficial alliance here seems to be an extra-NATO military pact designed to forestall the evolution of a Orthodox/Russian pact within Europe. But why aggressively push the issue regarding Kosovo now? This issue is only serving to turn Serbs and Russians, I would even dare say Greeks, strongly against the USA and the EU. On the face of it, I think Kosovo's current status would have benefited the West. That is why I can't figure out their true intentions. There must be something we are not aware of.

I don't think it would lead to war, not yet at least, but I am 100% sure it is connected to the isolation of Russia and oil pipelines.

I'm still unsure about this one. Yes, it is the 'indirect' isolation of Russia by isolating Serbia and Greece. However, this still does not answer the question - why now? The world is a power keg. Western policy makers know this well. So, why play with fire now? Why attract another crisis in Europe when all you had to do was keep the status quo regarding Kosovo? I believe there exists another reason to all this that we have yet not addressed. And you are naive to think that independence for Kosovo will not eventually lead to an armed clash between Serbs and Albanians, which can easily evolve into an armed clash between NATO and Russia.

[Armenian]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

Is Russia Democratic? Yes – but so what?

by Justin Raimondo

Russians cast their votes in parliamentary elections on Sunday, with an overwhelming victory widely expected for Vladimir Putin's United Russia Party – and yet we already knew what we were supposed to think of the whole process, with Western governments and media outlets (or do I repeat myself?) having already decided the whole thing was a farce well before a single vote was cast. How did they know this? Well, because Putin is supposedly the reincarnation of Joseph Stalin – in spite of the fact that he hasn't jailed a single person on account of their political opinions, and the Russian gulag has long since disappeared into history. Yet the accusations against Putin have grown louder, even as Russia grows more prosperous and ordinary Russians are more supportive of their president – and therein lies a tale.

Not since the run-up to war with Iraq has Western media coverage of a country been so completely and unreasonably one-sided: take, for example, this CBS News report. It features an interview with one Robert Amsterdam, described as "an expert on Russian politics," who gives his view that the election is just a pro forma exercise in which the outcome is predetermined. What they somehow neglect to tell you is that Amsterdam, far from being a disinterested "expert," is in reality a partisan of the jailed oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky – he's Khodorkovsky's lawyer. Amsterdam has spent much of the past few years making the case for his client, who is up on charges of embezzlement, fraud, and murder, and whose vast holdings were essentially a gift from the notoriously corrupt regime of Boris Yeltsin, the perpetually drunk Russian leader who died in 2006. The crux of Khodorkovsky's case against his prosecutors is that they represent an authoritarian state out to get him, and, in the process, re-Sovietize Russian political life as well as the economy. I won't waste any more words on the infamous oligarch, whose fortune is the result of crony capitalism at its worst rather than laissez-faire, and whose career is best characterized as a cross between Tony Soprano and Wesley Mouch. You can read all about it here.

Amsterdam is an "expert," all right – at obfuscating the facts. He decries a change in the election rules requiring parties represented in parliament to get 7 percent of the vote, up from 5 percent. Yet the Russian system is far more democratic than, say, the American system, where a party that gets 7 percent – or even 10 or 20 percent – is by no means guaranteed a single seat in Congress. That is, if they even manage to get on the ballot. Parties other than the state-sanctioned and state-subsidized Democrats and Republicans face almost impossible hurdles to achieve ballot status – and, even if they do, these "third" parties operate at a tremendous disadvantage not only legally, but in terms of being taken seriously by the "mainstream" media. Is this any better than in Russia? One could make a convincing case that it is far worse.

The CBS report shows footage of an opposition demonstration supposedly being "broken up" by the Russian cops. What our intrepid reporters fail to mention, however, is that the demonstrators were given a permit to hold a rally, but instead insisted on marching through the streets – a course that, in, say, security-conscious Washington, D.C., would earn them a few nightstick blows on the head and at least one day in jail. A breakaway march was led by members of the neo-fascist National Bolshevik Party (NBP), whose crazed leader, Eduard Limonov, addressed the crowd alongside more "respectable" opposition figures such as chess champion Gary Kasparov. Both were arrested when they followed the violence-prone NBP on a mad run through the streets. Kasparov is lionized in the West, yet in Russia he is considered a marginal figure, partially on account of his association with the "Other Russia" grouping, which is essentially controlled by the lunatic NBP.

The reality is that Putin is wildly popular, which Amsterdam is forced to admit even as he spins this against the contention of an alleged "crackdown" on the opposition by claiming that the election is all about "legitimacy." Putin, it seems, is determined to cement his unchallenged authority by racking up a huge majority. According to Deutsche Welle, the plan is for Putin – constitutionally constrained against running for a third term as president – to reappear in some other office, where he will run the show from behind the scenes. The Western powers – who hate and revile the revival of Russia's fortunes – are determined to delegitimize not only Putin, but the Putin-era prosperity and stability that is the source of the Russian president's enormous popularity. Under the Yeltsin regime, the oligarchs were free to loot and otherwise abuse the Russian economy, with former Communists who used their political connections to amass obscene wealth draining the nation's lifeblood like a flock of vampires on the hunt. The jailbird Khodorkovsky is one, and another is the infamous Boris Berezovsky, who has declared his intention to overthrow the Russian government – by force if necessary – and who is financing much of the opposition, both in country and in exile.

Berezovsky – wanted in Russia on charges of theft, extortion, and murder – was the patron of Alexander Litvinenko, the former KGB agent turned anti-Putin activist supposedly poisoned by the Russian secret service using an exotic and scary radioactive substance. This case caused a sensation in Britain, where Litvinenko succumbed, yet questions remain about the real cause of his death. I've covered it in this space, in depth, here, here, here, and here. Suffice to say that the semi-official story – Litvinenko was killed by the neo-Stalinists in the Kremlin, much like Trotsky was found with an icepick in his head – is in considerable doubt, as evidence emerges that he may have been part of a smuggling ring that secreted radioactive polonium into Britain. Now more evidence that the mainstream media narrative of Litvinenko-the-martyr is very far from the truth is coming out, with Britain's Daily Mail revealing for the first time what everyone in Russia has been saying since the case broke: "The former Russian spy poisoned in a London hotel was an MI6 agent, the Daily Mail can reveal. Alexander Litvinenko was receiving a retainer of around £2,000 a month from the British security services at the time he was murdered."

Citing "diplomatic and intelligence sources," the paper goes on to aver that this was the real reason for Litvinenko's alleged assassination. By leaking what we all knew to be true in any event, the spooks behind the departed spy have managed to divert attention away from the more likely death-by-self-contamination scenario – in which the polonium poisoning is due to a botched smuggling operation – and back in the direction of a plot directed or implicitly sanctioned by Putin. Very slick – as the entire anti-Putin propaganda campaign has been from the beginning. The real purpose behind the anti-Putin campaign – which, at its most frenetic, is designed to convince us that the Russians are coming once again, posing the dire prospect of a reborn Soviet threat – is to topple a leader who challenges American hegemony in the world. The Russian president won't go along with the American plan to "transform" the Middle East into a "democratic" pile of rubble, nor will he countenance "regime change" on his periphery, helped along by generous dollops of U.S. tax dollars and the enmity of George Soros. If Kosovo is to be independent, he avers, well then, why not Abkhazia, or Ossetia, or any of the other Russia-friendly breakaway republics with close ties to the Motherland?

Putin is no saint, but neither is he the devil depicted in the Western media, which regularly presents such representatives of the exiled Russian oligarchs as Mr. Amsterdam and Boris Berezovsky as credible critics and misses no opportunity to portray Putin as a "dictator." The Russian media is neither state-owned nor is it more concentrated in terms of ownership than our own: it is about as friendly to the opposition as America's mainstream media is to, say, Ron Paul. Opposition parties, including the Communist Party of Russia, exist and are free to organize, stand for election, publish materials, and conduct campaigns, including the distribution of propaganda. What they are not allowed to do any longer is accept subsidies from foreign governments and other overseas entities, such as the National Endowment for Democracy, USAID (a U.S.-government-funded propaganda agency), and any one of a number of Berezovsky-supported-and-funded front groups, including Western-based "support groups" for Chechen terrorists.

This "restriction" on foreign funding – which is also the law in the U.S. – has the U.S.-government-supported opposition in a tizzy, because it has hit them where they really live – in their pocketbooks. No longer on the take, these "dissidents" on the make are furiously denouncing Putin's government as a "dictatorship." Yet Russia hasn't been this free since the overthrow of the Kerensky government and the Communist coup of 1917, and it hasn't been this prosperous ever. Luxuriating in oil and national gas reserves that may be among the biggest in the world, the Russians are coming out of their long post-Soviet funk – and reasserting their place on the world stage. That is Putin's real "crime." He is making Washington very nervous, as the would-be hegemonists of the West eye the emerging Russo-Iranian alliance and chafe as Putin arms the Syrians with missile defenses against the increasing likelihood of an Israeli (or American) attack. And it isn't just his actions but his words that sting. In a widely quoted speech at a recent Munich Security Conference, the Russian president took on the Americans quite openly:

"It [the U.S.-dominated unipolar world] is a world in which there is one master, one sovereign. And at the end of the day this is pernicious not only for all those within this system, but also for the sovereign itself because it destroys itself from within. "And this certainly has nothing in common with democracy. Because, as you know, democracy is the power of the majority in light of the interests and opinions of the minority. "Incidentally, Russia – we – are constantly being taught about democracy. But for some reason those who teach us do not want to learn themselves." I especially appreciate that bit about how the hubris of our rulers "destroys itself from within" – this is precisely what the domestic critics of the rising American Empire have been saying for years, and it's gratifying to see that America's true friends abroad see this, too. To anyone who admires the U.S. and is not the captive of a crude "anti-Americanism" – a woefully overworked catch phrase that has been shamelessly utilized by our government and its overseas amen corner to smear anyone who opposes American imperialism – it is no doubt sad, indeed, to witness the sight of the freest country on earth succumbing to its own worst instincts. Putin isn't insulting us: he's reminding us of who we are – or, rather, who we used to be.

Unfortunately, the interventionists in the media, and the War Party that has hijacked American foreign policy, are not inclined to listen, either to Putin or those here at home who agree that America is getting too big for its britches. What are we doing getting in Putin's face, insulting him and his people by insisting that the OSCE send "observers" to make sure Russia's election is sufficiently "democratic"? What would we have thought if Putin had sent observers to, say, Florida, where the drama of the "hanging chads" and the intricacies of the Electoral College denied the White House to the candidate who got the most votes? It's outrageous – especially when we're giving full military, political, and diplomatic support to real dictators like Egypt's Hosni Mubarak, who is now in the process of setting up a hereditary "presidency" and has taken to locking up bloggers for violating political and cultural "norms." And what about Gen. Pervez Musharraf, who is beating the crap out of his opponents in the streets of Islamabad, arresting the Supreme Court, and installing himself as "president" of Pakistan in a procedure that is a cruel mockery of democracy?

The difference is that these dictators meet the "pro-American" test, which consists of kowtowing to Washington when it comes to the conduct of foreign affairs, and particularly when it comes to providing full access to American economic and military interests. In the case of Russia, the Americans and especially the British are still smarting over the expulsion of Western companies from the lucrative Russian oil and natural gas fields, which is going to benefit the people of Russia rather than overseas investors and the usual gang of ruthless Russian oligarchs, who are little more than gangsters in business suits. Russia for the Russians – the slogan has energized the pro-Putin parties and given the Russian president more power and prestige than any Moscow-based ruler since Peter the Great. It's also a sentiment Western elites can't and won't abide, since they consider Russia to have been properly defeated in the Cold War and therefore fair game for economic colonization. Their reaction to Putin's pushback has been an aggressive campaign to encircle Russia, starting with the ill-fated "Rose Revolution" in Georgia, followed by the various Western-engineered attempts at "regime change" represented by the so-called "color revolutions," from Ukraine to Kyrgyzstan, nearly all of which have since been rolled back.

The neoconservatives were early agitators for a more aggressive stance toward Russia: it was Richard Perle, you'll recall, who led a neocon hue and cry over Putin's alleged misdeeds, calling for Russia to be thrown out of the G-8. This was soon followed up by a full-scale denunciation of Putin by none other than xxxx Cheney, who railed that the Russian president was ushering in a new Cold War by engaging in economic "blackmail" and "intimidation" against its neighbors. This attack was occasioned by the freeing up of Russian energy prices, which had long been kept artificially low by government decree: apparently, this move toward a free market in energy was considered a hostile act by Cheney and his fellow "big government conservatives."

[...]

Source: http://www.antiwar.com/justin/?articleid=11996

[Armenian]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

wow, that really puts a twist to things doesn't it.

China and Russia have had political problems in the past. During the past several years, however, the two nations have been moving closer in a strategic alliance. Reading some of the western analysis regarding Russian and Chinese relations one would not be able to see this. I think this is a result of wishful thinking on the part of western analysts. They fear a Russian-Chinese alliance so much that I am suspecting they are subconsciously choosing not to see its unmistakable emergence. China receiving oil directly from Kazakhstan should not be translated as an anti-Russian move on their part. Let's not forget that Russia and Kazakhstan have very close relations. Any major decision undertaken by Kazakhstan must have been approved by Moscow. The news in question is actually bad for western interests, who have wanted to have full control over supplying China's energy needs.

[Armenian]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

Putin goes to Belarus for talks on union

Vladimir Putin could become the leader of a land even larger than Russia — a development that may hinge on talks beginning Thursday in neighboring Belarus. Putin has unexpectedly revived efforts to create a single state from the two former Soviet republics — a merger that would expand his options for exercising power after he steps down from the Russian presidency next year.

Putin heads to the Belarusian capital, Minsk, on Thursday for discussions on a framework for the long-debated union, fleshing out an existing agreement that has meant little in practice. A merger of Russia and Belarus could allow Putin to leave the Russian presidency as promised in May yet still remain a chief of state. "I wouldn't be surprised if Putin tries to speed up a union with Belarus ... to become the president of the unified state," said Gennady Zyuganov, Russia's Communist Party chief. Putin, who has indicated he will seek to retain significant influence after term limits force him from the Kremlin, does have at least one other option.

On Monday, he said he supported his protege, first deputy prime minister Dmitry Medvedev, to become Russia's next president. Medvedev instantly became the overwhelming favorite in the March 2 vote. Medvedev, in turn, asked Putin on Tuesday to be his prime minister. Putin has not commented publicly on the offer. But First Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov, a senior government official and close Putin ally, said Wednesday that Putin was unlikely to respond swiftly to the proposal. The creation of a single state could give Putin an alternative to the Russian prime minister's post. If the two countries can agree, it would mark the first merger of a former Soviet state with Russia since the Soviet Union split apart in 1991 — a step that would make many Russians proud.

But the move could damage Russia's relations with the West, especially if Moscow is seen as using pipelines that supply Belarus with natural gas to force the smaller country into an agreement. Ahead of Putin's visit, Belarus' beleaguered Western-oriented political opposition was already fighting the idea of a merger. Police on Wednesday forced some 200 protesters from a Minsk square where they waved flags and chanted "No union with imperial Russia!" One of the leaders of the opposition Young Front was knocked off his feet and stomped on by riot police. He was bundled into an ambulance, unconscious. Some analysts doubt a deal can be reached, because Belarus President Alexander Lukashenko — a Soviet-style leader dubbed Europe's last dictator by the West — is unlikely to cede power.

Lukashenko's office said last week the talks between Putin, Lukashenko and other ranking officials would focus on a draft constitution of a union. Russia's Ekho Moskvy radio quoted unidentified members of the Lukashenko administration as saying Moscow and Minsk had struck a deal: Putin, the sources said, would become president of a Russia-Belarus union while Lukashenko would become the speaker of its parliament. Officials in Moscow and Minsk have denied the report, but politicians and commentators in both countries agree that Putin's trip signals a renewed interest in the merger. When Medvedev proposed that Putin become prime minister, many analysts saw it as the Kremlin's preferred plan to maintain his influence. But some said Putin would never accept what would amount to a demotion.

Pavel Borodin, secretary of the existing Russian-Belarusian executive body, said Wednesday that drafts of the constitution being considered would give the president of a new unified country the power to rule over the current national governments. He said the new constitution would be subject to approval by each nation's parliament and would be put to voters in national referendums. Putin could find it difficult to persuade the Belarusian leader to relinquish his country's independence. And Lukashenko seems to lack the leverage needed to win an agreement that favors Belarus, which has a population of just 9.7 million compared to Russia's 141.4 million. "Putin and Lukashenko have sought to outmaneuver and cheat one another over the past few years," said Fyodor Lukyanov, the editor of Russia in Global Affairs magazine.

Russia and Belarus signed a union agreement in 1996 that envisaged close political, economic and military ties, but efforts to achieve a full merger have foundered. In the 1990s, Lukashenko pushed for the creation of a single state, apparently hoping to take reins from Russia's ailing President Boris Yeltsin. Putin's election in 2000 demolished Lukashenko's hopes to rule both countries. Two years later the Belarusian leader angrily rejected a Kremlin proposal for incorporating his nation into the Russian Federation — leaving him without a job. Bilateral relations soured. Lukashenko described Russia as a "huge monster," saying Moscow's actions were worse than those of Nazi Germany, which reduced much of Soviet Belarus to ruins in World War II.

If Lukashenko refuses to cede control, the Kremlin could try to force his hand by using its most powerful weapon: energy. At the year's start, Russia more than doubled the price of natural gas and imposed a customs duty making oil more expensive. To pay its bills, Belarus was forced to sell half of its national gas pipeline company to Gazprom, Russia's state gas monopoly. In August, Gazprom threatened to halt future natural gas shipments if Belarus failed to pay what it already owed. The two sides negotiated a settlement, but the threat of a further increase in energy prices still looms over Belarus' heavily subsidized, Soviet-style economy.

Source: http://www.guardian.co.uk/worldlates...148370,00.html

This related news from a year ago:

Loveless brothers

Jan 11th 2007, From The Economist print edition

Another Russian gas conflict was averted, but a short oil war broke out instead. Europe should take heed

RUSSIA and Belarus, its ex-Soviet neighbour, are supposedly brotherly Slavic nations that are in the process of forming a union state. There are indeed some striking family resemblances. Both have irascible authoritarian presidents—Russia's Vladimir Putin and Belarus's brutal Alyaksandr Lukashenka—and both are inclined to risky diplomatic brinkmanship. This week that similarity propelled them over the brink and into an unfraternal trade dispute. Brief though it may have been, it had important implications for Russia's energy dealings with Europe, and perhaps also for the future of benighted Belarus.

A year ago, wrangling over the price of gas sold by Russia to Ukraine briefly diminished the flow of gas through Ukraine to Europe. At the end of 2006, Belarusian resistance to Russia's demand that it too pay more for gas threatened to unleash another so-called “gas war”. The modest economic growth that Mr Lukashenka terms the “Belarus economic miracle”—which along with his total control of the media and harassment of opponents has shored up his regime—has in fact been largely based on massively discounted Russian gas imports.

In the event, the two countries cantankerously reached a deal on an increased gas price just before their New Year's Eve deadline. But a few days later, an oil war broke out instead: Russia imposed new duties on the crude oil it exports to Belarus (refining and re-exporting it have been a crucial money-spinner for Mr Lukashenka, in effect another big Russian subsidy to the Belarusian economy). In revenge, Belarus demanded a transit fee on the oil that crosses Belarus to other European customers. The Russians refused—and Belarus began siphoning off oil in lieu of payment. On the night of January 7th Russia stopped pumping oil into a pipeline network that crosses Belarus and delivers 12.5% of the European Union's oil needs. Supplies to Poland, Germany and others stopped flowing.

The two countries' tactics may be similar, but their muscle is not. Mr Putin talked of cutting oil production and rerouting supplies. The Russians also threatened duties on all Belarusian goods, many of which would struggle to find markets elsewhere. On January 10th, after the presidents talked on the telephone, Mr Lukashenka blinked; the transit fee was lifted; and oil began to flow again before Europe was seriously affected. Nevertheless, the short but nasty spat has telling lessons.

One is that, with the Russians in this mood, Mr Lukashenka's grip on Belarus may be in jeopardy. While others reviled him, Mr Putin stood by Mr Lukashenka during his rigged re-election last year. But Mr Putin's motive was more aversion to European meddling in Russia's “near abroad”, and to the so-called “colour revolutions” of the kind that overtook Ukraine in 2004, than affection for Mr Lukashenka. Personal relations between the two men are said to be rancid; a proper union between their two countries, a plan Mr Putin inherited from his predecessor, Boris Yeltsin, now looks fanciful. (Mr Lukashenka is said to have cooled on the idea after it became clear that he was unlikely to remain president after the merger.) In the absence of a reliable alternative, defenestrating Mr Lukashenka may not be part of Mr Putin's plan. But the new gas price alone could seriously damage Belarus's mostly state-owned factories and collective farms, and alienate ordinary Belarusians.

The affair also confirms the increasingly poisonous nature of Russia's dealings with many of its former vassals. Energy feuds are both a cause and a symptom of this trend. Georgia, Mr Putin's least favourite ex-Soviet neighbour, has been forced to accept a price for Russian gas that is more than twice the new one for Belarus. But supplies from neighbouring Azerbaijan are helping Georgia through the winter, and they may soon, says Nika Gilauri, Georgia's energy minister, replace Russian imports altogether. With its own oil and gas deposits in the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan itself recently rejected what Hafiz Pashayev, the deputy foreign minister, describes as the “unreasonable” gas terms offered by Russia, and stopped importing Russian gas. It has also ceased sending its oil through Russian pipelines.

The most important lesson for Europe, however, is once again that over-reliance on Russian energy is dangerous. In principle, the Kremlin's drive to charge its neighbours more for gas is reasonable. Overall demand for Russian gas is outstripping supply; suppressing demand in the ex-Soviet states should make more gas available for export to the more lucrative European market. In the particular case of Belarus, the Russians deserve some sympathy. Until last year they were criticised for coddling Mr Lukashenka with preferential gas terms—and Belarus's re-export of duty-free Russian oil was, as one foreign observer in Minsk puts it, an obvious “scam”.

But however reasonable its aims, Russia's bullying and capricious methods, plus its volatile relationship with energy transit countries and carelessness over the impact on European consumers, have rightly alarmed European leaders. Though Mr Putin pledged to “do everything to secure the interests of Western consumers,” Germany's Angela Merkel spoke of damaged confidence. The Europeans should also note that Russia has emerged from its tussle with Belarus with a 50% stake in Belarus's gas pipeline (payment for which will partly offset the gas-price hike), strengthening the Kremlin's grip on Europe's energy infrastructure. An EU energy strategy released this week talked about the need for diversifying suppliers and dealing with them collectively: the quicker, the better.

Source: http://www.economist.com/world/europ...ory_id=8521935

[Armenian]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

A bear at the throat

Apr 12th 2007, From The Economist

The European Union is belatedly grasping the riskiness of its dependence on Russian gas, but it is disunited and short of ideas for how to reduce it

RUSSIA'S president, Vladimir Putin, must be feeling smug. His strategy of using the country's vast natural resources to restore the greatness lost after the break-up of the Soviet Union seems to be paying off. If power is measured by the fear instilled in others—as many Russians believe—he is certainly winning. The Soviet Union relied on its military machine for geopolitical power: its oil and gas were just a way to pay for it. In today's Russia, energy is itself the tool of influence. To use it the Kremlin needs three things: control over Russian energy reserves and production, control over the pipelines snaking across its territory and that of its neighbours, and long-term contracts with European customers that are hard to break. All three are in place. For all the talk of a common strategy towards Russia, the EU is divided and stuck for an answer.

Gazprom, Russia's energy giant, cherished by Mr Putin as a “powerful lever of economic and political influence in the world”, has long-term supply contracts with most European countries, including France, Germany, Italy and Austria. It also has direct access to these countries' domestic markets. The EU reckons that half its gas imports now come from Russia. Newer EU members, such as Hungary and the Czech Republic, are almost entirely dependent on Russian gas. Moreover, a pipeline network that it inherited from the Soviet Union gives Russia control over gas imported from Central Asia. The EU has few ideas for how to deal with its chief energy supplier. “We know we should do something about Russia, but we don't know what,” one Brussels official says. “In the EU we negotiate on the rules, whereas Russia wants to do deals.” The deals are coming thick and fast. Last month, Russia secured one to build an oil pipeline from Bulgaria to Greece that will bypass the Bosporus. Symbolically, it will be the first Russian-controlled pipeline on EU territory. The pipeline will carry Russian and Central Asian oil straight to the EU, avoiding Turkey.

Oil can at least be bought from elsewhere. The bigger worry is about the EU's dependence on Russian gas. The flow of natural gas depends on the routes and control of pipelines, as European consumers were reminded when Russia switched off the gas supply to Ukraine just over a year ago and Ukraine started to steal Russian gas that was destined for the EU. Russia's pipeline routes encircle the EU from the north and south. Russia and Germany have teamed up to build a gas pipeline under the Baltic Sea, bypassing Ukraine and Poland (see map). Gerhard Schröder, a former German chancellor signed up by Mr Putin to preside over this Nord Stream pipeline, claims that it will make Europe safer. But a study by Sweden's Defence Research Agency concludes that it will divide the EU and increase dependence on Russia. It will let the Kremlin turn off gas supplies to Ukraine, Poland and Belarus without affecting “more important” customers. Understandably, Poland is anxious. The pipeline will increase the flow of gas to Germany and hook in countries that do not yet consume much Russian gas, including the Netherlands and Britain.

In the south, Russia has a pipeline across the Black Sea which supplies gas to Turkey. Now Russia wants to extend this Blue Stream pipeline to Hungary. That would compete directly with Europe's own plan to build a pipeline called Nabucco from Turkey to Austria. Nabucco has been one of the EU's few concerted responses to Russian domination of its gas supplies: it would be filled up with gas from Central Asia and thus bypass Russia altogether. But it is now creating more friction than unity.

Hungarian rhapsody

Last month Hungary's prime minister, Ferenc Gyurcsany, called Nabucco a “long dream”. Instead, he suggested that Hungary would support the extension of Blue Stream. Gazprom already supplies 80% of Hungary's gas and has promised to build a large gas-storage facility that could be a hub for central Europe. “Blue Stream”, enthused Mr Gyurcsany, “is backed by a very strong will and a very strong organisational power.” (When Hungary was accused of undermining the EU's common energy policy, the tart response was that it was impossible to undermine something that did not exist.) As well as controlling pipelines, Gazprom has also been busy buying up pieces of Europe's gas infrastructure. It owns 35% of Wingas, a German distribution company, and also has stakes in the Baltic countries' distributors. It has 10% of the interconnector pipeline between Belgium and Britain and wants a similar share of a British-Dutch link. It is also muscling its way into electricity, oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG) projects. “It is not enough for us to meet 25% of global gas consumption. We want to be the biggest energy company in the world,” Alexander Medvedev, Gazprom's deputy head, has said of his company's modest ambition.

Most European governments have been careful not to alienate Russia. As long as Gazprom plays by the rules, they say, it should be allowed to invest in their markets. Belgium recently said it had no problems with Gazprom owning parts of its infrastructure. Russia, in contrast, has a big problem with foreign companies owning, let alone controlling, any of its natural resources. It has bullied Royal Dutch Shell into ceding control of the Sakhalin-2 project in the far east of the country; it has blocked BP's plan to develop a gas field in eastern Siberia; and it has kept foreign companies out of the development of the giant Shtokman field in the Barents Sea, saying that it will go it alone. In the same spirit, the Kremlin has flatly ruled out ratifying the EU's energy-charter treaty, which would require it to open up its gas pipelines to other countries and other suppliers. The Russians have made a mockery of a joint declaration on energy issued at the G8 summit they chaired in St Petersburg last July. The declaration called for more honesty, competition and transparency. Yet just two days later, Mr Putin enshrined into law Gazprom's monopoly position as the sole exporter of gas.

Then there is the talk of creating a gas equivalent to the OPEC oil-exporters' cartel. On April 9th Russia joined other gas producers in Qatar to discuss the possibility, and offered to lead a study into gas pricing. The next meeting of the group will be in Moscow. With almost 60% of the world's gas concentrated in just three countries —Russia, Iran and Qatar—the notion of a cartel sounds appealing. But fixing prices for a commodity that is not traded on world markets will prove much harder than it has been for oil. Even so, as Mr Putin said earlier this year, “it would be a good idea to co-ordinate our activities.” Gazprom has already signed a memorandum of understanding with Algeria's Sonatrach to co-operate in gas production. This has unnerved European consumers, as Algeria is their third-largest supplier of gas, after Russia and Norway. America, too, is nervous. “Russia's commercial and political shadow over the governments in central Europe makes it harder for us to deal with our allies,” says a senior State Department official.

The EU's dependence on Russian energy is hardly new. Nor is tension between Russia and America. “The Americans were constantly telling us we were too dependent on Russian gas in the 1970s and 1980s,” says Sir Rodric Braithwaite, a former British ambassador to Moscow. Yet, throughout the cold war, Russia remained a reliable gas supplier. Why should things be different now? First, says, Cliff Kupchan, director of the Russian programme at Eurasia Group, a consultancy in Washington, DC, the Soviet Union was politically more predictable than its successor. “It was run by geriatrics, but we knew that one geriatric would succeed another.” Russia's political stability is ephemeral. It relies on Mr Putin's will, not on an institutional transfer of power. With nationalism on the rise, it is anybody's guess who will be in charge of Russia in ten years' time.

A second difference is that the energy relationship between the Soviet Union and the West stopped at the border—albeit the border of the Soviet block. The oil and gas ministry, Gazprom's predecessor, did not try to take over any of western Europe's infrastructure. Gazprom has no scruples about using its muscle to buy such assets. Gazprom's desire to control their pipelines has been central to Russia's recent clashes with Ukraine and Belarus. Third, the Soviet energy business was run by technocrats who implemented centrally planned decisions. Today, it is controlled by former KGB men obsessed with money and power. Gazprom has several ex-KGB members on its board of directors. Rosneft, the state-controlled oil champion, is chaired by a former agent who is now deputy chief of the Kremlin staff. “People in Europe have a natural apprehension about their homes being heated by these people,” says one commentator on Russia.

Yet dependence cuts both ways. Europe may depend on Russia for half its gas imports, but Russia is dependent on Europe for the bulk of its export revenues. Repeated threats by the Kremlin to divert the flow of gas to China mean little without pipelines that it would take many years to build. Switching off gas to Europe will never make commercial sense for Gazprom. The fear in some EU countries is that commercial interests may one day become secondary to political ones. Of 55 cut-offs, explicit threats or coercive price actions by Russia since 1991, only 11 had no political underpinnings, according to the Swedish defence study.

Running on empty

If all this is not worrying enough, there is another, more immediate source of concern for the EU: that Russia may be physically unable to produce enough gas to satisfy demand. Even worse than being dependent on a company like Gazprom may be to be dependent on a Gazprom that is short of gas. The output of Gazprom's three super-giant fields, which account for three-quarters of its production, is declining at a rate of some 6-7% a year. Output from a new gas field brought on stream in 2001 has already peaked. Last year, Gazprom decided to develop a massive field in the Yamal peninsula—frozen and barren Arctic land—but that will take years. Meanwhile, Russia's domestic demand for gas is growing by more than 2% a year. For all its swagger, Russia is short of gas, a problem that is already affecting its electricity-generation capacity. This does not reflect any lack of reserves—Russia has the world's biggest—but rather a longstanding failure to invest enough in their development.

Gazprom has argued that it will invest in new fields only if it can pre-sell the output to Europe. Instead it has been spending lavishly on pipelines and downstream assets. This has a certain monopolistic logic. Raking in the middleman's profits from exports is easier and more lucrative than investing billions in developing new fields for a domestic market which, although it consumes two-thirds of Gazprom's production, generates hardly any profits, as regulated Russian gas prices are much lower than most European ones. Meanwhile, Gazprom relies on Central Asia, especially Turkmenistan, to plug the gap in gas supplies, which makes many investors and consumers nervous. A study by UBS, a bank, concludes that Turkmenistan may have signed contracts to supply twice as much gas after 2009 as it can actually produce. The nervousness over potential shortages of gas, though, plays in Gazprom's favour: as with talk of a gas OPEC, it prods the Europeans into striking special deals with Gazprom.

Gazprom's position is reliant on support from Europe's national energy champions such as Gaz de France, ENI of Italy and Ruhrgas of Germany. Companies such as Ruhrgas and Gazprom have each other's interests at heart. Indeed, Ruhrgas owns about 7% of Gazprom, worth some $17 billion, and has a seat on Gazprom's board. ENI and Enel of Italy this month acted directly for Gazprom when they bought the expropriated gas assets of the bankrupt Yukos company in a controversial auction. Under a pre-arranged deal, the two Italian companies agreed to cede control of these assets to Gazprom, which was too cautious to bid in its own name. In return ENI and Enel were given a foothold in Russia's gas fields and possibly a seat on the board of Gazprom's oil company. Gazprom also has long-term gas contracts with ENI, which gives it direct access to Italian consumers. Gazprom has similar arrangements in Germany and France. Vladimir Milov, the head of the Institute of Energy Policy in Moscow, says that the links between Gazprom and its European counterparts amount to a cartel between wholesale buyers and sellers. The losers in this game are European consumers who are forced to pay gas prices that are several times higher than the wholesale price which their national companies pay to Gazprom.

Trying to persuade Russia to break up Gazprom's monopoly is a futile task. The best way to increase the EU's energy security would be for it to liberalise its own market and unbundle its national utilities. This would cut profit margins in gas distribution, and thereby reduce Gazprom's appetite for European domestic assets. It would encourage European network operators to invest in interconnectors between electricity grids and pipeline networks, weakening Russia's ability to play off one customer against another. No wonder Gazprom does not warm to the idea of European energy liberalisation, which it has called “the most absurd idea in the history of the world economy”.

Dependence of different groups of European countries on gas imports from Russia (percentage of imports from the RF in total consumption)

[..]

Source: http://www.economist.com/displayStor...ory_id=9009041

[Armenian]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

Security of Russian Gas Supplies to the EU - the Qestion of Infrastructural Connections

Main export gas pipelines Russia-Europe

The energy security of countries importing energy resources depends largely on the shape and quality of operational transport connections. This is particularly important in the case of natural gas supplies. Natural gas is transported mostly by gas pipelines which permanently connect gas producers and consumers. Thus Europe as a consumer is "tied" to certain gas suppliers for anywhere between a dozen and several tens of years. As their own resources are becoming depleted, the EU Member States get increasingly dependent on import of natural gas.

The present paper discusses the existing and projected gas transport routes from Russia to the EU. The first part deals with the importance of gas exports to the economy of the Russian Federation, and the second delves into the EU Member States' dependence on gas imports. Then this paper examines the differences in perceiving the energy security issue between the old and the new Member States, those differences stemming from the different degrees of their dependence on Russian supplies. In the third part, two new transport route projects for Russian gas supplies to the EU are compared and it is argued that from the point of view of the Community's interests, the Yamal gas pipeline is a better solution than the North European (Trans-Baltic) gas pipeline.

I. The importance of gas exports to Russia

Russia has the world's largest natural gas reserves and it is the largest gas producer and exporter. At the same time it remains significantly dependent on revenues from the sale of energy resources. The gas sector is one of the pillars of Russia's economy, and an important instrument of the Russian Federation's internal and foreign policy. Its importance is founded mostly on the following factors:

* the role of the gas sector in Russia's budget (Gazprom, which monopolises the domestic market and exports, provides approx. 8 percent of Russia's consolidated budget (federal budget and regional budgets), while revenues from gas exports account for approx. 12 percent of the foreign exchange revenue of the RF)[1]
* the role of gas in the Russian Federation's energy balance (more than 50 percent)[2];
* the gas monopoly, like the electricity monopoly, subsidises the Russian economy in a disguised manner (through lower prices);
* Gazprom plays a social role (low domestic prices on gas are an important instrument of the state's welfare policy);
* exporting gas affords Russia certain opportunities in terms of international cooperation and strengthens the country's position.

Europe is the only major consumer of Russian gas presently[3]. The European Union is Russia's most important and most profitable market, in which Russian gas occupies a strong position. The chief objectives of Russia's gas policy in this market are to maintain the presence and to increase the market share of Russian gas. In order to achieve these objectives Gazprom has to ensure stability and reliability of gas supplies. Russian gas reaches Europe via three major land routes. The most important system of export trunk pipelines runs from the Russian Federation across Ukraine and Slovakia to countries in Western Europe (it handles approx. 90 percent of Russian gas exports to Europe). The second major route is the Yamal - Western Europe pipe (the Yamal pipeline) which runs via Belarus and Poland to Germany. The third route runs to the Balkans and Turkey[4]. Thus, the transport of Russian gas to the EU markets is dependent on transit via third countries (mostly Ukraine and Belarus) and diversified only to a very small degree. One of the basic objectives of Russia's gas policy is to diversify export routes.

Among all current new gas pipeline project two seem to be the most important: the Yamal gas pipeline and the North European gas pipeline (also referred to as the Trans-Baltic pipeline). The Yamal gas pipeline project was popular in the 1990s. The route was designed as two branches with a total capacity exceeding 60 billion m3 per year, supplying gas mostly to Poland and Germany. In the mid 1990s Moscow, Berlin and Warsaw were all interested in that project. The first branch was completed with a target capacity of 30 billion m3 and it delivers gas to Poland and Germany. The construction of the second branch has not started yet. Among other reasons, this is because Russia's priorities have changed, and in the late 1990s works were commenced on a project for a different gas pipeline route.

Since 2001, the plan to build the North European gas pipeline on the Baltic Sea bottom, connecting Russia directly with Germany, Great Britain and Scandinavian countries, has been attracting growing interest. That route would reduce Russia's dependence on transit via third countries, especially Ukraine. Implementation of the North European project would certainly postpone the construction of the second branch of the Yamal pipeline via Belarus and Poland. That project has also some obvious downsides such as very high cost and technical complexity of the route construction.
In recent years a concept has been proposed to modify the route of the Yamal pipeline's second branch in what is called the Amber project. It envisages a pipeline from Russia via Latvia, Lithuania and the Kaliningrad Oblast to Poland and Germany (see Map).

II. European Union's dependence on gas imports from Russia

Presently, approx. 1/4 of all primary energy in the EU comes from natural gas[5]. Gas consumption in the Community is increasing steadily. In 2003 it amounted to approx. 480 billion m3, 51 percent of which was imported from outside the EU[6]. The major suppliers of gas to the EU include Norway, Algeria and Russia[7]. A growing proportion of gas is delivered to the EU as LNG (liquefied gas). According to projections of the European Commission's Transport and Energy Directorate, the dependence on external sources of gas will grow (to approx. 75 percent in 2020) as internal consumption is expected to rise and European gas deposits become depleted. In the light of these projections, the largest global and regional gas producer and exporter, i.e. Russia, has an important role to play in the EU's gas supply security concept. Security of supplies depends directly on the security of transport, i.e. the routes of export gas pipelines[8]. Because of the rigid transport infrastructure connections it is difficult to diversify the sources of gas supplies within a short time span. On the average, Russia provides approx. 23 percent of gas consumed in the EU at present. This dependence rose to this level after the recent enlargement in May 2004, at which time regional differences in the geographic structure of gas imports also widened. Before May 2004, the European Union imported 17 percent of its gas from Russia. The major EU consumers of Russian gas before May 2004 included Germany, which depended on Russia for more than 32 percent of its consumption, and Italy and France, which depended on Russia for approx. 25 percent of their gas[9].

The dependence of the New Member States on Russian gas supplies is several times higher. On the average, they import 73 percent of their annual gas consumption from Russia, but a large group of the new Members (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Slovakia) are completely dependent on gas from Russia. This is why the old Member States and the countries that joined the EU recently have different perceptions of the energy security issue and, in some cases, they have conflicting interests. There is also a fundamental difference between the views of the two groups of countries on the problem of supplies diversification. For the EU Fifteen, increasing gas imports from Russia is one of the basic methods to ensure stable and diversified supplies, and for many of the old Member States Russia may be a new supplier. In their energy policy, these countries put the greatest emphasis on creating optimum conditions for the transport of Russian gas. The New Member States, on the other hand, have no possibility to diversify their supplies presently or in the next several years. For them Russia is and in the medium term will remain the largest and most important gas supplier. Hence, the emphasis of their energy security policy is on counterbalancing the dependence on supplies by expanding their transit role and developing their own transmission networks. This is they only way they can reduce their unilateral dependence on gas imports from the Russian Federation and thus improve their energy security. These countries can hope to diversify their gas supplies only in the long term, with projects such as the Norwegian gas pipeline, Nabucco or gas supplies from Libya.

III. Projects for new export gas pipelines from Russia to the EU: The Yamal pipeline and the North European pipeline

The two gas transport routes from Russia to the EU that are being considered presently both have their advantages and limitations. The North European (Trans-Baltic) pipeline project endorsed by the gas supplier Gazprom bypasses the unstable Belarus[10]. Moreover, European energy companies (especially EON of Germany) have initially expressed interest in its implementation, which improves the chances of the project being successfully financed, and Finland is also interested in the project. However, it is a very costly investment. It is also detrimental from the point of view of the New Member States, i.e. the Baltic States and Poland, because it bypasses their territory, thus diminishing their role as transit countries and their importance to Russia. It deprives these countries of the ability to counterbalance their dependence on the gas supplier with control over gas transit, which is enormously important from the point of view of their energy security.

On the other hand, the Yamal pipeline, and especially the new concept of the second branch of that pipeline, i.e. the Amber project, would increase the energy security of the New Member States while at the same time creating new routes for the transport of Russian gas to Western Europe. It would also be a much less costly investment than the Trans-Baltic pipeline[11]. Its main limitations are that Gazprom is presently not interested in the project, and the project's implementation would require co-ordinated action of many countries via whose territory the projected pipeline is going to run. The Yamal pipeline project is therefore a major challenge for the EU. In order to implement it one will have to persuade the Russian side to approve it, and overcome particular interests of certain European energy companies. Nevertheless, this project appears to be more in keeping with the Union's interests, both economically (it is much cheaper), and security-wise. It would be a practical fulfilment of the principle of solidarity among EU Member States, which is very important but seldom raised in energy discussions. A materialisation of this principle in such concrete shape would certainly be of great significance for the Union's cohesion in the long term and would send an important message to the EU's partners, especially Russia.

Source: http://osw.waw.pl/en/epub/epunkt/2005/02/gas.htm

[Armenian]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

Gorbachev Worries About Missile Plan

Former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev said Wednesday that he viewed a U.S. plan to deploy a missile defense shield in Central Europe as targeting Russia, not Iran. The United States wants to place a radar station in the Czech Republic and intercepter missiles in Poland, saying the components would defend European allies against a possible Iranian strike. Gorbachev, 76, whose policies of glasnost and perestroika - openness and restructuring - helped end communism in the Soviet Union and its satellites, criticized the high level of military spending by the United States.

"Does America intend to fight the rest of the world, does America need to build a new empire? They will not succeed," Gorbachev said at the close of a meeting of the World Political Forum, a group he founded in 2003 that includes many former high-ranking politicians. Gorbachev, who won the 1990 Nobel Peace Prize, said negotiations with Iran needed to continue with the involvement of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the U.N. nuclear watchdog agency, to ensure Iran did not produce nuclear weapons. Gorbachev said he hoped the United States would not attack Iran during the remainder of the term of U.S. President George W. Bush.

"There still one year that President Bush has on his hands. Let's hope that he will not take the risk... of military action against Iran," Gorbachev said, adding that such an attack "at the very least" could provoke increased terrorist attacks, an energy crisis and "even result in a big war." Asked about Russian President Vladimir Putin, Gorbachev said that, while he initially had doubts about Putin being able to lead Russia, he now supported him.

"Putin is a very capable person, a wise person, a man of strong character, of few words but with good management skills," Gorbachev said. "Now he is more than just a manager, he has become a credible political leader." Gorbachev added that he supported the Russian president because Putin's policies were consistent with his own social-democratic positions, "Putin is pursuing policies that benefit the majority of the Russian people," Gorbachev said.

Source: http://www.mnweekly.ru/world/20071129/55293408.html

[Armenian]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

Russian ultranationalist Zhirinovsky nominated for president

Vladimir Zhirinovsky, a flamboyant and controversial Russian ultranationalist politician, was nominated on Thursday as a candidate for the country's March 2, 2008 presidential election. He was nominated by his party, the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR). Speaking at an LDPR congress in Moscow, Zhirinovsky said he was seeking to turn Russia into a parliamentary republic. He also urged efforts to curb corruption, saying it was "the most appalling social woe," and highlighted Russia's territorial integrity as a key point in his election program. Zhirinovsky once confessed to dreaming of a day when Russian soldiers could "wash their boots in the warm waters of the Indian Ocean," and to have threatened to seize Alaska from the United States as well as invade ex-Soviet Baltic states in order to get access to their ports. Zhirinovsky came third in the presidential election in 1991. His party, which was the first to emerge in Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union, has since enjoyed modest popularity, although its ratings have tended to decline of late. In the latest, December 2, parliamentary polls, the LDPR came third, gaining 8.2% of the vote. Although he is often portrayed as a fierce critic of the government, Zhirinovsky and his party generally support Kremlin initiatives in parliament.

Source: http://en.rian.ru/russia/20071213/92278399.html

More on this excentric nationalist figure in Russia:

Zhirinovsky vs. the Turks

Russia's move south is above all a defensive measure, a response; for today the threat to Russia comes from the south. From Afghanistan, which is already attacking Tajikistan; from Tehran, which is planning the Pan-Islamic seizure of massive stretches of land; from Ankara, where plans for a Great Turkish State have long been ready. Pan-Turkism threatens Russia because of its large population of Turkic speakers, Muslims, and Persian speakers--a fertile soil, an attractive bait that entices Afghanistan, Iran, and Turkey northwards to create a Great Afghanistan, a Great Iran, a Great Turkey. At the very least, Turkey is dreaming of Azerbaijan and the Caucasus, Georgia, in order to create a country with four seas--the Black Sea, the Mediterranean, the Caspian and Marmara, and even the Aegian. While Russia will lose everything--"the great and talented" Turkish people deserve to live in the center of the world, in a fragrant region, in the shores of six [sic] seas, while the weak powerless Russian nation must die. Is that what the history of mankind has ordained? No, this is impossible.

Nothing would happen to the world should the whole Turkish nation perish, although this is not something I wish upon them. But let the Turks remember how they came to Asia Minor, barbarously seizing Constantinople, looting it, massacring and subjugating all the peoples of Asia Minor. Let them remember how they massacred 1.5 million Armenians in April 1915. Let them remember this, and let mankind's conscience tremble at the way a whole people can be massacred in the space of three nights.1 And millions of Kurds are groaning under the Turkish yoke and are unable to live in their own Kurdish state. A bitter fate has divided them. A large part of them live in Eastern Anatolia, on Turkish territory; some are in Syria, northern Iraq, western Iran, and the Transcaucasus. This is a people of thirty million. It has the right to its national freedom. Who can give them this? Only Russia. It is impossible today to place victim and aggressor on one set of scales. We finally have to understand who brought civilization to this world. Who conquered the cosmos--and who seized others' lands, looted other peoples, drove them off into slavery, burned and turned Christian churches into mosques.

What culture did the Turks bring to Asia Minor? Even today, Western tourists in Turkey are shown the remains of Byzantine culture. There is no Turkish culture--you don't have culture with an unsheathed sword. Who provided the basis of the Turkish army? The Janissaries. Who were they? Slav boys, captured along with their parents. The parents were killed and the boys were brought up in the Turkish spirit and turned into the core of Turkey's fighters.2 It's somehow strange that Slav boys destroyed Slav peoples while fighting under the Turkish flag. Who will answer for this? Who will pay for the desecration of Byzantine culture, of Slavic peoples? There was no Nuremburg trial to judge Turkey's genocide against Armenians. But where is the difference between the Turks and the Germans? The fascist regime was guilty for the deaths of fifty million people. The Germans had a population of seventy to eighty million. This is the same as when the seventeen million-strong Turkish nation wipes out 1.5 million Armenians. It is the same proportion. The Turks brought as much evil to mankind as the Germans. But the Germans, their party, and their ideology were put on trial. An international trusteeship was set up. Even now there are foreign troops in Germany. But no one punished the Turks. It turns out that you can wipe out the Armenians because they are a little people. But you can't do this to the French, Russians, or British, because then you'll be put on trial. But such political "hazing" won't work. All nations are equal. No one is permitted to engage in genocide. Today Georgia is wiping out the Abkhaz and Ossetians, but Europe is silent. Flatten Sukhumi with tanks. Dismember Abkhaz corpses. After all, your leader [Georgian president Eduard] Shevardnadze helped shake the USSR's position in Europe and destroy its military might throughout the world.3 And in gratitude to Mr. Shevardnadze for this he is allowed to engage in political banditry. There are not many Abkhaz, but they want to live on their own land, in freedom. But they are deprived of this right. This is genocide, racism, fascism, and it is happening today. Who will stop it?

And what about the confrontation between Azeris and Armenians? How much longer will this last? Until the annihilation of the Armenian people. But this time it's the Azeris, not the Turks. Another Turkic nation. But that's the key to the issue: Azeris and Turks are the same. In 1915, the Turks massacred 1.5 million. The Azeris have been doing this since February 1986, five years already [sic]. The Turks took three nights, while the Azeris will take fifteen years. And they will try to wipe out the Armenians completely in order ultimately to wipe out the Armenian state. Why? Because it is a Christian state. It hinders the linking up of two Turkic peoples, the Azeris and the Turks. What is Nakhichevan?4 An artificial creation. Azeris on Armenian territory. Armenia has always been there, was there from ancient times. The country of three seas--the Caspian, Black, and Mediterranean. And what is left of Armenia today? A little strip of land is all that is left of a great state, a state with a great culture, the first slave-owning state on the territory of present-day Russia.

So the Russians cannot be blamed for anything. We are not preparing to punish the Turkish, Iranian, or Afghan peoples. But we want freedom for the peoples who live in the south. And today the south is covered in blood. Islamic guards wipe out dissidents in Iran. For ten years they fought with Iraq. For what? For ten years the Kurds' attempt at freedom have been suppressed. The Turks have bombed civilians, Turkish tanks have flattened populated areas. In other words, let the Kurdish nation, which is far from small, perish. Thirty million people. This a major state by European standards. But Europe is silent. It has profitable relations with Ankara. If we close our eyes to the Kurdish problems, the Turks will have good relations with the Europeans. And what did the Turks do to the communists? They tricked them onto boats, took them out into the Black Sea, massacred them and threw the corpses overboard. That's how you settle scores with the political opposition. Is this democracy? It's barbarism, savagery.

Lenin thought that Kemal [Atatürk] was a Turkish Bolshevik.7 He gave him guns and money. And what was the upshot of this? In the Second World War, the Turks were to attack the Caucasus. Our troops were there waiting for the assault. In the Turkish High Command all the plans were drawn up. Stalin's mistake was that he did not punish the Turks at the end of the war. Turkey should have been punished because many Russians died on the Klukhor pass and in other parts of the Caucasus. This is because [the Soviet secret police chief Lavrenti] Beria would not allow fresh troops to be moved from the Transcaucasus to help in the defense of the North Caucasus against the German forces that were pushing toward Grozny, Baku, Makhachkale--because of the threat of a Turkish attack. So in reality Turkey did take part in the Second World War, just as Japan did. We punished Japan. But only because the Americans wanted it. Japan attacked Pearl Harbor. The Turks did not attack Vienna or Paris, so no one demanded that it be punished.

There can be different opinions and viewpoints on this. And who will be judge of this? Will we Russians really be wrong to protect the Armenians, not only as Christians but as a nation that for centuries has been subject to annihilation from the south, east, and west? Will we be wrong to give freedom to the Kurds and Baluchis? Will it not be right to give Uzbeks, Tajiks, Pushtus, and Daris the right to live anywhere they like on the whole expanse of land from Tashkent to Kabul on the condition that they not form bands? Will they not be grateful to us for this? And will not southern Azerbaijan be grateful for the chance to unite with northern Azerbaijan? They are a single people. But there are about sixteen million of them living in northern Iran who are not allowed to speak their native language or consider themselves Azeris. And the Baluchis? And the Arabs in southern Iran? All of them will be grateful. Including the Persians. And even the Turks. Because today they live on Cyprus as if they are in a besieged fortress. This is a Greek island; it was never Turkish. And it must once again become Greek--either a free Cypriot republic or a part of Greece. Cyprus must not be occupied by Turkish troops. How many Greeks were wiped out? How many Greek women raped? They can tell you about that in Athens. And do the Dardanelles really belong to Turkey? They always belonged to Greece. And Thrace? This is Bulgarian and Greek territory. So why do the aggressors from the days of the great wars continue to be there? Now, when everyone is talking about regional coopeation, we can clear all this up. There should be no labels--aggressor, invader. The Turks can live throughout the area--they can go back to the area around Tashkent and Ashkhabad, to Karakalpakia and the Aral Sea, the areas which they originally left in search of better lands.

But you should improve the land where you were born and live, not seize other towns and countries, wiping out as you go the people who live there and their culture. Up to now they [the Turks] have not created anything in Asia Minor to replace what was once there. Asia Minor, Greece, Rome,8 Mesopotamia, Egypt--all this was under Turkish domination, was taken by force and for centuries groaned in slavery. And only Russia liberated North Africa and southern Europe from Turkish domination, from Ottoman rule.9 Even now, millions of people are grateful to Russia for this. So isn't Russia capable, should she not make one final gesture? One spurt, one small spurt south, so that Russian railway lines would be laid there, and Russian trains--Moscow-Delhi, Moscow-Kabul, Moscow to the coast of the Indian Ocean, Moscow-Tehran, Moscow-Baghdad, Moscow-Ankara--would be moving day and night along them, carrying freight and people, safely. All for the economy, for the development of culture.

Source: http://www.meforum.org/article/229

Vladimir Zhirinovsky: Territories should be returned to Armenia and Kurdistan

Regnum, May 2006

Russian deputy speaker: “Russia has every reason to recognize Artsakh, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transdnestr”

“The international situation has given us a positive example – if Albanians receive the right to establish their own independent state in the foreign territory, so ancient Armenian people must perhaps receive the right to restore the territory;” leader of the Russian Liberal Democratic Party, Deputy Speaker of Russian State Duma Vladimir Zhirinovsky is quoted by a Regnum correspondent as stating in Moscow, speaking at the third Russia’s Armenian Union (RAU) Congress.

“Yes, we pity Serbs, but it is a positive signal for the international community – it is a positive signal for Artsakh (Nagorno Karabakh), for Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transdnestr,” Zhirinovsky continued. According to him, if the international community recognizes Kosovo and Montenegro, Russia will have every reason to recognize analogous territories, especially as it has more rights for that, because these republics were parts of the Russian Empire, and now they pretend to restore their legal personalities. “It may not be denied – it is the international law,” he stated. As Vladimir Zhirinovsky stressed, addressing to the Russian Armenians Union (RAU) Congress deputies and guests, “the Armenian people have already been suffering for 100 years, and it is necessary to achieve adoption of at least one international organization’s resolution on returning territories to Armenian state by 2015, the 100th anniversary of those awful events.” “It is not enough to recognize the Genocide; the territories should be returned.

Those ones, who are living there now, should be returned to Ashgabat and Tashkent -- what does one people need two states for? And territories should be returned to Armenia and Kurdistan. Kurds are betrayed people too – they have been expecting for 100 years,” the LDPR leader said. Also, he called the RAU to be more active in the Russian provinces and to cooperate with Russian political and non-governmental organizations in order to explain to young generation of Russians that “Armenians are our brothers; they are Christians, and they have been living side by side with Russians for hundreds of years.” Zhirinovsky called on the RAU to cooperate for realization of other socially vital initiatives.

Source: http://www.ekurd.net/mismas/articles...ntstate766.htm

[crusader1492]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

This guy is righteous!