Tweet
Germany
German Responsibility in the Armenian Genocide: A Review of the Historical Evidence of German Complicity, by Vahakn N. Dadrian, Cambridge, Mass.: Blue Crane Books, 1996. Pp. 304.
Vahakn N. Dadrian, an internationally well-known scholar on the Armenian genocide wrote an exceedingly important and scholarly book, not directly related to the issue of his long life interest of Armenian Genocide, but on the German Responsibility in the Armenian Genocide. This book is a review of the historical evidence of German complicity in the Armenian genocide. Indeed, Hitler once said "who remembers the Armenians?" in contemplating the Jewish holocaust. The focus of the present study is an examination of the role that German officials (both military and civilian) played in the Armenian genocide by Turkey, then an ally of Germany during World War I.
Using an avalanche of historical sources both primary and secondary (drawn from diplomatic history, international law, political science, and official German documents), the author has written a book indictment not only of Germany but of the Western world -- an affront against humanity. In his words, the author "attempts to dissect and expose the lethal role performance of these officials who, for reasons of their own, allowed themselves to be co-opted by the Turk Ittihadist leaders to aid the executioners of the Armenian people" (p. 94). The author believes, "the study is also an invitation to consider the entire matter as a challenge to historical truth and, therefore, ultimately treat it as a moral issue" (p. 94). Dadrian argues the Armenian genocide is not due to memory amnesia, nor is it a "forgotten genocide," but it was sacrificed by the altar of political expediency and economic rapaciousness by the victorious Entente powers. Seen in this light it is more about the distribution of power relations in national and international politics rather than historical truth. In a diabolical sense, the Turkish denial of Armenian genocide served as a shield to Nazi Germany. Despite the overwhelming historical evidence of the documents, the author states, the Turks continue to deny its ocurrence. In his words, "Turkey has engaged in all forms of public relations and co-optation, cajoling, and intimidation to influence the western media" (introduction). According to him, there is a systematic effort on the part of modern Turkey to conceal its crime by changing the archives and deleting sentences in a sort of cover-up. The book was written primarily for German audiences by relying a great deal on German State archives and documents. The author also makes clear that the German complicity of the Armenian genocide does not in any way exonerate the crime committed by Turkey, which is second only to the holocaust in the 20th century. In his introduction Dadrian states that "German minor officials and consuls stationed in Turkey had documented the Armenian genocide, sometimes in defiance of their superiors or in secrecy. Most of these reports were classified information and were marked as confidential secret or top secret (p. 11).
Using a variety of informal and secret methods such as stealth, conspiracy, and secrecy of transactions, Turkey bribed German and Austrian newspapers and agents to suppress any trace of Armenian massacres. Turkey also used spies overseas to spy on Armenian nationalists. The author examines the legal and international ramifications of the Armenian genocide. He documents the fact that a number of German (mostly) minor officials risked their lives by objecting to the Armenian carnage in the interior of Turkey. By failing to address this international crime against humanity, the author strongly believes this later led to the Jewish Halocaust. Dadrian thinks that the Armenian genocide is also an issue of international law which the West has failed to address. The author found an overwhelming evidence of a mass execution of an Armenian labor battalion ordered by the German General Bronsart von Schellendorf, who worked with the Ottoman general staff. The rationale of the mass execution of the Armenians was justified for security reasons. Both civilian and military personnel attest to this crime as eye witnesses and reported in many documents.
A commission on these atrocities, which issued its final report on March 29, 1919, accused Turkey and its allies (the Germans) of using barbarous and illegitimate methods against the Armenian citizens. Again, a committee of jurists in 1920, commissioned by the Council of the League of Nations, concluded that the official order to deport the Armenians en masse "was a violation in international law" (p.l9). Two German generals, Bronsart (on July 25, 1915) and Boemich (on October 3, 1915), who served as members of the military mission in Turkey, are said to be responsible for ordering the Armenian deportation.
The author names specific German generals and civilian officials who knew of the destruction of the Armenians, such as Marshal Sanders, the Prussian officer Captain Rudolf Nadolny, German Regimental Commander Colonel Stange, Lieutenant Scheubner Richter, Hauptmann Schwarz, Louis Mosel, Oswald von Schmidt and others. He also mentions Turkish generals and leaders of the Special Organization East led by Dr. B. Sakiz, Alihsan Sabis, Omer Naci, Yakub Cemil, Deli Halit, Cerkez Ahmed, and Topal Osman (p. 55). In addition, the author documents the ideological complicity and zealousness of the Baron Oppenheim against the Armenians in order to please the German emperor. The author details Oppenheim's conspiratorial consort in plotting the destruction of the Armenians (p. 77). Finally, the author examines the issue of legal liability by reviewing the record made by the Allies and issued as a joint declaration on May 24, 1915. This record condemned the Ottoman massacres of the Armenians and those responsible for assisting in the genocide (pp. 89-94).
The book is divided into two major parts. Part one covers pages 7-105 including notes and part two covers pages 107-198. Each part contains extensive notes and annotations from various primary and secondary sources. In addition, there are four appendixes (A, B, C, & D, pp. 199-271), and a number of photographs and names of the major architects (both German and Turkish generals) of the Armenian genocide mentioned in the text (pp. 273-281). Pages 283-291 include a general bibliography of primary sources of state and national archives and official documents including materials from Austria, Germany, France, Great Britain, Turkey (both Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic), United Nations, United States, and Armenian sources. Also the author includes an extensive list of works on genocide and genocide-related topics (pp. 293296). Dadrian himself has published extensively on the issue of genocide including 5 books, 3 monographs, 34 articles, and a translation of a book.
Part one deals with the German's readiness to embrace Turkey's antiArmenian posture. Germany's relationship to Turkey extends back to Bismark (1878), the German nationalist who was instrumental in the unification of Germany. According to the author, Germany was interested in reorganizing the Ottoman Turkish military and Bismark played the broker at the Congress of Berlin. Within four years following that Congress, the first German military mission arrived in Turkey with the aim of reorganizing the Ottoman Turkish Army. A number of military missions and economic elites arrived, including emperor William II. Germany was the first country to be given the Bagdad Railway Construction Project in 1888 during the reign of Sultan Abdul Hamit.
The Bagdad Railway Construction Project was facilitated by two trips of the emperor to Turkey in 1889 and 1898. At the same time, Prussian military officers continued to instruct, train, and rebuild the Ottoman Turkish Army (p. 8). It must be noted that while these things were taking place, the Armenian genocide already had started in the closing decade of the 19th century. The German-Turkish military and economic alliance made the Germans indifferent to ongoing Armenian genocide. Not only did the official German government not protest, but emperor William II visited Turkey for the second time and was welcomed with red carpet treatment by the Sultan himself during the Armenian massacres of November 1896. It was obvious that in the name of German national interests Germany did not raise the issue of Armenian genocide, despite the fact that both Bismark and the emperor William II were dismayed by Turkish barbarities. Yet, despite his knowledge of the Armenian genocide, the German emperor praised Abdul Hamit as a model for other countries to emulate. Moreover, the German emperor was against the young Turk revolution of 1908 which deposed the Sultan. It was this revolution that ended the Ottoman empire in the Balkans.
General Bronsart, in particular, knew in advance about the real purpose of the mass Armenian deportation and did nothing to prevent the mass execution. Not only did he refuse the request to intervene on the Armenian behalf, but he scolded the German vice consul for wanting to help the Armenians. The name of the consul was Dr. Max Erwin Von Schenbner Richter (p. 23). In his report, the vice consul stressed the pitiful and painful condition of Armenian women and children slated for deportation. He also arranged for the distribution of bread to deportees. General Bronsart objected against even this humanitarian help and urged the bread to be sent to the Turkish Army (p. 23). Indeed, the vice-consul risked his life, not only from General Bronsart, but from General Mahmud Kamil, the commander-in-chief of the Ottoman 3rd Army.
It must be stressed that the Turkish war propaganda had accused the Armenians as being against the Turkish war effort. The Turkish high command used this lie as a pretext for the Armenian annihilation. In fact, according to the author, the Turks created an artificial rebellion of Armenians in order to justify the mass deportation (pp. 25-30). In addition, Dadrian documents the critical role that Lt. Colonel Felix Guse (who held the post of Chief of Staff at the headquarters of the Ottoman 3rd Army) played in the extermination of the Armenians concentrated in six Turkish provinces (p. 29). In fact, Lt. Guse's model was General Bronsart.
Pages 35-43 is a summary of the key support role that the German Chief of Staff (the 3rd Army high command) played in the initiation of the Armenian genocide. On pages 44-54, the author examines the decisive role the Special Organization East played in the liquidation of the Armenians of Eastern Turkish provinces. Dr. Sakiz was the legitimate chief of the Special Organization East who played a pivotal role in organizing and implementing the Armenian genocide (p. 43). The Armenians were viewed as enemies of Turkey, not only because they were heavily concentrated in Eastern provinces, but because they were geographically interposed between Turkey and the Turkic peoples in the Caucasus region (pp. 44-49). Even today this continues to be the case following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the creation of an Armenian independent nation. The German connection to the Special Organization via German secret service agents and surveillance are also discussed. The use of Islamic masses against the Christian populations, especially the Armenians, were used by Dr. Nazim who was one of the principal architects of the Armenian genocide. These special Muslim bands were used by the Special Organization to massacre Armenians. One of the major characteristics of the Armenian genocide was the forced conversion of Armenian women, children, and girls to Islam (pp. 49-54). Step by step, the author documents the collaboration of Turkish-German joint military campaigns against the Ottoman Armenians. The Germans knew too well of the Turkish intention to annihilate the Ottoman Armenians in the Caucasus Trabzon region. Indeed, the Germans accommodated their allies, the Turks, to carry out the Armenian genocide.
In part two (pp. 107-198), the author documents the political and ideological determinants for the involvement of the German military in the
Armenian genocide. More specifically the author discusses a number of issues including the following:
(1) The revival of the Armenian question and the new TurkoGerman partnership in the period interposed between the first Balkan War and World War I. Germany was the official ally of Turkey, and emperor William II of Germany had cultivated a new and invigorated partnership with the young Turk regime. This German partnership with Turkey culminated on August 2, 1914 with the secret Turko-German military alliance.
(2) The creation of the German military mission and the inroads into Turkey led by veteran Prussian officers. The purpose was to reform and reorganize the Turkish army. The GermanTurkish military relationship dated back to 1882 when then major van der Goltz was commissioned by Sultan Abdul Hamit to reorganize the Turkish army and train its officers corps.
(3) The bearings of the German ideological perspectives, and especially emperor William II, who came to identify with the Turkish/Islamic theocracy and regarded Turkey as the Prussia of the Orient. He compared the Islamic attributes of selfdenial to his notions of Prussian puritanism (p. 113).
(4) Dadrian documents the complicity of the military, the order for the deportations, and the roles that high ranking German officers played in the Armenian genocide, especially the roles of General Major Bronsart von Schellendorf, Von Der Goltz, Feldmann, Boettrich, Guido von Usedom, Wilhelm Souchon, Seeckt, and Count Eberhard Wolffskeel von Reichenberg (pp. 116-136).
(5)The political indicators of complicity are discussed in pages 137-186. The author examines various indicators of the German complicity in the Armenian genocide including: the role of the emperor William II, the high ranking German officers, ambassador Hans Freiherr von Wangenheim whom American ambassador Morgenthau described as "the perfect embodiment of the Prussian system" (p. 141), and Lt. Commander of the Navy and Marine Attache Hans Humann.
(6) While Turkey denied any German involvement in the liquidation of the Armenians before the war, in the aftermath a number of Turks came forward to implicate Germany, especially the Turkish Interior Minister Grand Vizier Tolat, Turkish publicists, a former Turkish foreign minister, two Turkish deputies, and a Turkish historian.
(7) Incidents of concealment and disclosure, such as, deletions of foreign office documents for financial reasons, injunctions of German military and civilian missions in Turkey not to intervene in the process of extermination of the Armenians (p. 157), the removal by the Germans of Ottoman General Staff files, a German document of May 4, 1916 indicating.....the annihilation of the Armenians was ordered by the Germans (p. 160-163) and the disclosure of two veteran Austrian consuls are also examined.
(8) The anti-Russian ideology in the Turko-German partnership and its anti-Armenian repercussions are also discussed. A chief exponent of pangermanism and panturkism was Tekin Alp, who argued that the Slavs were the historical common enemy of both the Turks and the Germans, and therefore an alliance between the two nations was "a geographical and historical necessity" (p. 167).
(9) The German political economists were rather tacitly supportive of the Armenian genocide.
(10) The view of German experts in criminal and international law that German complicity was a by-product of militarism is also discussed.
(11) The testimony from a German newspaper editor, who investigated the massacres of the Armenians by going to Turkey (pp. 175-182), is also discussed.
The analysis will not be complete unless a few words are said about the appendixes. The book consists of four appendixes A, B, C, D (pp. 199-271). Each appendix deals with a specific issue and includes its own notes. Appendix A, examines the transition of prominent German officials from service in Turkey to service in Nazi Germany later. The author mentions by name three such prominent officials who served both the Turkish Army and Nazi Germany. One official was Franz von Papen, who was the Chief of General Staff of the IV Turkish Army in World War I, and served as Hitler's Vice Chancellor and President of Prussia (1933-1934). Later he became Special Ambassador to Austria and helped with the annexation of Austria to the Nazi Reich. Other prominent German officials were: Kanstantin Freiherr von Neurath who served as foreign minister in Papen's cabinet. During World War I he served as Councillor at the German Embassy in Constantinople (1915-1916) and was instructed by Chancellor Hollweg to monitor the operations against the Armenians (p. 199). Others who served both in Turkey during the Armenian genocide and in Nazi Germany were: Count F. W. Von der Schulenburg, Privy State Councillor Frederic Hans von Rosenberg, Wilhelm Solf, Albert Ballin, and Lt. General Hans von Seeckt (one of the top Prussian generals who served as Chief of Staff at Ottoman General Headquarters, and who returning to Germany after WWI, laid the foundation for the emergence of the Wehrmacht). In addition, two other prominent German generals who also served in both the Turkish army and Nazi German military were Major General Otto von Lossow and Major General Kress von Kressenstein (p. 201).
Appendix B deals with the indignity of decorating the arch-perpetrators of the Armenian genocide. Both in Berlin and Instanbul, a host of Turkish military and civilian officials in wartime Turkey were decorated with a variety of Prussian and German medals, awards, and honors (p. 205). Some of these honorees who were instrumental in the liquidation of the Armenians were: Hlseyin Azmi, Atif, Haci Adil (Arda), Mustafa Abdulhalik (Renda), Ahmed Muammer, Mehmed Memduh, Tahir Cevdet, and also eight more high ranking Turkish military officers received German decorations. The German decorations reached its apogee of indignity by extending its honors to Dr. Behaeddin Sakiz and Ittihad party boss, interior minister and Grand Vizier, Talat Pasa, who by all accounts, were the two architects of Armenian genocide (p. 216).
In Appendix C the author deals with the issue of differential treatment of the Greeks and the Jews vis-a-vis the background of the Armenian genocide. In the case of the Greeks, the author argues that despite the fact the Turks hated the Greeks even more than the Armenians, the Turks did not use large scale extermination massacres in the deportation of the Greeks. One of the main reasons was that unlike the Armenians, the Greeks had a government. Moreover, Greek premier Venizelos warned the Turks that in the case of widespread massacres against any Asia Minor Greeks, the Greek government will retaliate against the Turkish subjects of Greece. The Greeks also urged the German and Austrian Ambassadors to warn Turkey. Another reason mentioned was the fact that King Constantine I of Greece was married to Sophia of Prussia, the sister of German emperor William II. In the end, over 1.5 million Greeks were also eliminated or expelled from Anatolia in the Greco-Turkish war of 1922.
German Responsibility in the Armenian Genocide: A Review of the Historical Evidence of German Complicity, by Vahakn N. Dadrian, Cambridge, Mass.: Blue Crane Books, 1996. Pp. 304.
Vahakn N. Dadrian, an internationally well-known scholar on the Armenian genocide wrote an exceedingly important and scholarly book, not directly related to the issue of his long life interest of Armenian Genocide, but on the German Responsibility in the Armenian Genocide. This book is a review of the historical evidence of German complicity in the Armenian genocide. Indeed, Hitler once said "who remembers the Armenians?" in contemplating the Jewish holocaust. The focus of the present study is an examination of the role that German officials (both military and civilian) played in the Armenian genocide by Turkey, then an ally of Germany during World War I.
Using an avalanche of historical sources both primary and secondary (drawn from diplomatic history, international law, political science, and official German documents), the author has written a book indictment not only of Germany but of the Western world -- an affront against humanity. In his words, the author "attempts to dissect and expose the lethal role performance of these officials who, for reasons of their own, allowed themselves to be co-opted by the Turk Ittihadist leaders to aid the executioners of the Armenian people" (p. 94). The author believes, "the study is also an invitation to consider the entire matter as a challenge to historical truth and, therefore, ultimately treat it as a moral issue" (p. 94). Dadrian argues the Armenian genocide is not due to memory amnesia, nor is it a "forgotten genocide," but it was sacrificed by the altar of political expediency and economic rapaciousness by the victorious Entente powers. Seen in this light it is more about the distribution of power relations in national and international politics rather than historical truth. In a diabolical sense, the Turkish denial of Armenian genocide served as a shield to Nazi Germany. Despite the overwhelming historical evidence of the documents, the author states, the Turks continue to deny its ocurrence. In his words, "Turkey has engaged in all forms of public relations and co-optation, cajoling, and intimidation to influence the western media" (introduction). According to him, there is a systematic effort on the part of modern Turkey to conceal its crime by changing the archives and deleting sentences in a sort of cover-up. The book was written primarily for German audiences by relying a great deal on German State archives and documents. The author also makes clear that the German complicity of the Armenian genocide does not in any way exonerate the crime committed by Turkey, which is second only to the holocaust in the 20th century. In his introduction Dadrian states that "German minor officials and consuls stationed in Turkey had documented the Armenian genocide, sometimes in defiance of their superiors or in secrecy. Most of these reports were classified information and were marked as confidential secret or top secret (p. 11).
Using a variety of informal and secret methods such as stealth, conspiracy, and secrecy of transactions, Turkey bribed German and Austrian newspapers and agents to suppress any trace of Armenian massacres. Turkey also used spies overseas to spy on Armenian nationalists. The author examines the legal and international ramifications of the Armenian genocide. He documents the fact that a number of German (mostly) minor officials risked their lives by objecting to the Armenian carnage in the interior of Turkey. By failing to address this international crime against humanity, the author strongly believes this later led to the Jewish Halocaust. Dadrian thinks that the Armenian genocide is also an issue of international law which the West has failed to address. The author found an overwhelming evidence of a mass execution of an Armenian labor battalion ordered by the German General Bronsart von Schellendorf, who worked with the Ottoman general staff. The rationale of the mass execution of the Armenians was justified for security reasons. Both civilian and military personnel attest to this crime as eye witnesses and reported in many documents.
A commission on these atrocities, which issued its final report on March 29, 1919, accused Turkey and its allies (the Germans) of using barbarous and illegitimate methods against the Armenian citizens. Again, a committee of jurists in 1920, commissioned by the Council of the League of Nations, concluded that the official order to deport the Armenians en masse "was a violation in international law" (p.l9). Two German generals, Bronsart (on July 25, 1915) and Boemich (on October 3, 1915), who served as members of the military mission in Turkey, are said to be responsible for ordering the Armenian deportation.
The author names specific German generals and civilian officials who knew of the destruction of the Armenians, such as Marshal Sanders, the Prussian officer Captain Rudolf Nadolny, German Regimental Commander Colonel Stange, Lieutenant Scheubner Richter, Hauptmann Schwarz, Louis Mosel, Oswald von Schmidt and others. He also mentions Turkish generals and leaders of the Special Organization East led by Dr. B. Sakiz, Alihsan Sabis, Omer Naci, Yakub Cemil, Deli Halit, Cerkez Ahmed, and Topal Osman (p. 55). In addition, the author documents the ideological complicity and zealousness of the Baron Oppenheim against the Armenians in order to please the German emperor. The author details Oppenheim's conspiratorial consort in plotting the destruction of the Armenians (p. 77). Finally, the author examines the issue of legal liability by reviewing the record made by the Allies and issued as a joint declaration on May 24, 1915. This record condemned the Ottoman massacres of the Armenians and those responsible for assisting in the genocide (pp. 89-94).
The book is divided into two major parts. Part one covers pages 7-105 including notes and part two covers pages 107-198. Each part contains extensive notes and annotations from various primary and secondary sources. In addition, there are four appendixes (A, B, C, & D, pp. 199-271), and a number of photographs and names of the major architects (both German and Turkish generals) of the Armenian genocide mentioned in the text (pp. 273-281). Pages 283-291 include a general bibliography of primary sources of state and national archives and official documents including materials from Austria, Germany, France, Great Britain, Turkey (both Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic), United Nations, United States, and Armenian sources. Also the author includes an extensive list of works on genocide and genocide-related topics (pp. 293296). Dadrian himself has published extensively on the issue of genocide including 5 books, 3 monographs, 34 articles, and a translation of a book.
Part one deals with the German's readiness to embrace Turkey's antiArmenian posture. Germany's relationship to Turkey extends back to Bismark (1878), the German nationalist who was instrumental in the unification of Germany. According to the author, Germany was interested in reorganizing the Ottoman Turkish military and Bismark played the broker at the Congress of Berlin. Within four years following that Congress, the first German military mission arrived in Turkey with the aim of reorganizing the Ottoman Turkish Army. A number of military missions and economic elites arrived, including emperor William II. Germany was the first country to be given the Bagdad Railway Construction Project in 1888 during the reign of Sultan Abdul Hamit.
The Bagdad Railway Construction Project was facilitated by two trips of the emperor to Turkey in 1889 and 1898. At the same time, Prussian military officers continued to instruct, train, and rebuild the Ottoman Turkish Army (p. 8). It must be noted that while these things were taking place, the Armenian genocide already had started in the closing decade of the 19th century. The German-Turkish military and economic alliance made the Germans indifferent to ongoing Armenian genocide. Not only did the official German government not protest, but emperor William II visited Turkey for the second time and was welcomed with red carpet treatment by the Sultan himself during the Armenian massacres of November 1896. It was obvious that in the name of German national interests Germany did not raise the issue of Armenian genocide, despite the fact that both Bismark and the emperor William II were dismayed by Turkish barbarities. Yet, despite his knowledge of the Armenian genocide, the German emperor praised Abdul Hamit as a model for other countries to emulate. Moreover, the German emperor was against the young Turk revolution of 1908 which deposed the Sultan. It was this revolution that ended the Ottoman empire in the Balkans.
General Bronsart, in particular, knew in advance about the real purpose of the mass Armenian deportation and did nothing to prevent the mass execution. Not only did he refuse the request to intervene on the Armenian behalf, but he scolded the German vice consul for wanting to help the Armenians. The name of the consul was Dr. Max Erwin Von Schenbner Richter (p. 23). In his report, the vice consul stressed the pitiful and painful condition of Armenian women and children slated for deportation. He also arranged for the distribution of bread to deportees. General Bronsart objected against even this humanitarian help and urged the bread to be sent to the Turkish Army (p. 23). Indeed, the vice-consul risked his life, not only from General Bronsart, but from General Mahmud Kamil, the commander-in-chief of the Ottoman 3rd Army.
It must be stressed that the Turkish war propaganda had accused the Armenians as being against the Turkish war effort. The Turkish high command used this lie as a pretext for the Armenian annihilation. In fact, according to the author, the Turks created an artificial rebellion of Armenians in order to justify the mass deportation (pp. 25-30). In addition, Dadrian documents the critical role that Lt. Colonel Felix Guse (who held the post of Chief of Staff at the headquarters of the Ottoman 3rd Army) played in the extermination of the Armenians concentrated in six Turkish provinces (p. 29). In fact, Lt. Guse's model was General Bronsart.
Pages 35-43 is a summary of the key support role that the German Chief of Staff (the 3rd Army high command) played in the initiation of the Armenian genocide. On pages 44-54, the author examines the decisive role the Special Organization East played in the liquidation of the Armenians of Eastern Turkish provinces. Dr. Sakiz was the legitimate chief of the Special Organization East who played a pivotal role in organizing and implementing the Armenian genocide (p. 43). The Armenians were viewed as enemies of Turkey, not only because they were heavily concentrated in Eastern provinces, but because they were geographically interposed between Turkey and the Turkic peoples in the Caucasus region (pp. 44-49). Even today this continues to be the case following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the creation of an Armenian independent nation. The German connection to the Special Organization via German secret service agents and surveillance are also discussed. The use of Islamic masses against the Christian populations, especially the Armenians, were used by Dr. Nazim who was one of the principal architects of the Armenian genocide. These special Muslim bands were used by the Special Organization to massacre Armenians. One of the major characteristics of the Armenian genocide was the forced conversion of Armenian women, children, and girls to Islam (pp. 49-54). Step by step, the author documents the collaboration of Turkish-German joint military campaigns against the Ottoman Armenians. The Germans knew too well of the Turkish intention to annihilate the Ottoman Armenians in the Caucasus Trabzon region. Indeed, the Germans accommodated their allies, the Turks, to carry out the Armenian genocide.
In part two (pp. 107-198), the author documents the political and ideological determinants for the involvement of the German military in the
Armenian genocide. More specifically the author discusses a number of issues including the following:
(1) The revival of the Armenian question and the new TurkoGerman partnership in the period interposed between the first Balkan War and World War I. Germany was the official ally of Turkey, and emperor William II of Germany had cultivated a new and invigorated partnership with the young Turk regime. This German partnership with Turkey culminated on August 2, 1914 with the secret Turko-German military alliance.
(2) The creation of the German military mission and the inroads into Turkey led by veteran Prussian officers. The purpose was to reform and reorganize the Turkish army. The GermanTurkish military relationship dated back to 1882 when then major van der Goltz was commissioned by Sultan Abdul Hamit to reorganize the Turkish army and train its officers corps.
(3) The bearings of the German ideological perspectives, and especially emperor William II, who came to identify with the Turkish/Islamic theocracy and regarded Turkey as the Prussia of the Orient. He compared the Islamic attributes of selfdenial to his notions of Prussian puritanism (p. 113).
(4) Dadrian documents the complicity of the military, the order for the deportations, and the roles that high ranking German officers played in the Armenian genocide, especially the roles of General Major Bronsart von Schellendorf, Von Der Goltz, Feldmann, Boettrich, Guido von Usedom, Wilhelm Souchon, Seeckt, and Count Eberhard Wolffskeel von Reichenberg (pp. 116-136).
(5)The political indicators of complicity are discussed in pages 137-186. The author examines various indicators of the German complicity in the Armenian genocide including: the role of the emperor William II, the high ranking German officers, ambassador Hans Freiherr von Wangenheim whom American ambassador Morgenthau described as "the perfect embodiment of the Prussian system" (p. 141), and Lt. Commander of the Navy and Marine Attache Hans Humann.
(6) While Turkey denied any German involvement in the liquidation of the Armenians before the war, in the aftermath a number of Turks came forward to implicate Germany, especially the Turkish Interior Minister Grand Vizier Tolat, Turkish publicists, a former Turkish foreign minister, two Turkish deputies, and a Turkish historian.
(7) Incidents of concealment and disclosure, such as, deletions of foreign office documents for financial reasons, injunctions of German military and civilian missions in Turkey not to intervene in the process of extermination of the Armenians (p. 157), the removal by the Germans of Ottoman General Staff files, a German document of May 4, 1916 indicating.....the annihilation of the Armenians was ordered by the Germans (p. 160-163) and the disclosure of two veteran Austrian consuls are also examined.
(8) The anti-Russian ideology in the Turko-German partnership and its anti-Armenian repercussions are also discussed. A chief exponent of pangermanism and panturkism was Tekin Alp, who argued that the Slavs were the historical common enemy of both the Turks and the Germans, and therefore an alliance between the two nations was "a geographical and historical necessity" (p. 167).
(9) The German political economists were rather tacitly supportive of the Armenian genocide.
(10) The view of German experts in criminal and international law that German complicity was a by-product of militarism is also discussed.
(11) The testimony from a German newspaper editor, who investigated the massacres of the Armenians by going to Turkey (pp. 175-182), is also discussed.
The analysis will not be complete unless a few words are said about the appendixes. The book consists of four appendixes A, B, C, D (pp. 199-271). Each appendix deals with a specific issue and includes its own notes. Appendix A, examines the transition of prominent German officials from service in Turkey to service in Nazi Germany later. The author mentions by name three such prominent officials who served both the Turkish Army and Nazi Germany. One official was Franz von Papen, who was the Chief of General Staff of the IV Turkish Army in World War I, and served as Hitler's Vice Chancellor and President of Prussia (1933-1934). Later he became Special Ambassador to Austria and helped with the annexation of Austria to the Nazi Reich. Other prominent German officials were: Kanstantin Freiherr von Neurath who served as foreign minister in Papen's cabinet. During World War I he served as Councillor at the German Embassy in Constantinople (1915-1916) and was instructed by Chancellor Hollweg to monitor the operations against the Armenians (p. 199). Others who served both in Turkey during the Armenian genocide and in Nazi Germany were: Count F. W. Von der Schulenburg, Privy State Councillor Frederic Hans von Rosenberg, Wilhelm Solf, Albert Ballin, and Lt. General Hans von Seeckt (one of the top Prussian generals who served as Chief of Staff at Ottoman General Headquarters, and who returning to Germany after WWI, laid the foundation for the emergence of the Wehrmacht). In addition, two other prominent German generals who also served in both the Turkish army and Nazi German military were Major General Otto von Lossow and Major General Kress von Kressenstein (p. 201).
Appendix B deals with the indignity of decorating the arch-perpetrators of the Armenian genocide. Both in Berlin and Instanbul, a host of Turkish military and civilian officials in wartime Turkey were decorated with a variety of Prussian and German medals, awards, and honors (p. 205). Some of these honorees who were instrumental in the liquidation of the Armenians were: Hlseyin Azmi, Atif, Haci Adil (Arda), Mustafa Abdulhalik (Renda), Ahmed Muammer, Mehmed Memduh, Tahir Cevdet, and also eight more high ranking Turkish military officers received German decorations. The German decorations reached its apogee of indignity by extending its honors to Dr. Behaeddin Sakiz and Ittihad party boss, interior minister and Grand Vizier, Talat Pasa, who by all accounts, were the two architects of Armenian genocide (p. 216).
In Appendix C the author deals with the issue of differential treatment of the Greeks and the Jews vis-a-vis the background of the Armenian genocide. In the case of the Greeks, the author argues that despite the fact the Turks hated the Greeks even more than the Armenians, the Turks did not use large scale extermination massacres in the deportation of the Greeks. One of the main reasons was that unlike the Armenians, the Greeks had a government. Moreover, Greek premier Venizelos warned the Turks that in the case of widespread massacres against any Asia Minor Greeks, the Greek government will retaliate against the Turkish subjects of Greece. The Greeks also urged the German and Austrian Ambassadors to warn Turkey. Another reason mentioned was the fact that King Constantine I of Greece was married to Sophia of Prussia, the sister of German emperor William II. In the end, over 1.5 million Greeks were also eliminated or expelled from Anatolia in the Greco-Turkish war of 1922.
Comment