The Trouble With Turkey

[Gavur]

By John Tirman

Boston Globe, MA
Nov. 30, 2005

IN THE ONGOING debate about "democratization," Turkey is a vivid
example of how difficult it can be. Its inability to end old habits of
repression and embrace democratic values presents an agonizing dilemma
for Europe and a reminder of failed policies of the United States.

Formally a republic since the early 1920s, when its great military
hero, Kemal Ataturk, carved out the modern Turkish state from
the remains of the Ottoman Empire, Turkey has mostly had elected
governments ever since. But it has been a "guided" democracy, and
the guide in this case is the iron fist of the military. It remains
so to this day, despite Turkey's professed desire to become a member
of the European Union.

The powerful military, itself guided by Ataturk's extreme nationalism,
is now demanding the prosecution of some 50 writers and publishers
for insulting the state, raising issues about Kurds in Turkey,
and exploring the Armenian genocide of the First World War. Among
those being prosecuted is Fatih Tas, the publisher of a book I wrote
in 1997 about US-Turkish relations, which he had translated and
released in Turkey earlier this year. Among the cited crimes are
my many interviews with Kurds who had been forcibly evacuated by
the military and descriptions of the scale of human rights abuse,
including 1 million displaced people, many of whom now live in
shantytowns on the outskirts of Istanbul. He could go to prison.

Suppression of speech is not the only problem. Turkish forces recently
bumbled a covert operation in the Kurdish areas of southwest Turkey,
where they planted and exploded bombs to make it appear that the old
Kurdish rebel group, the PKK, remained active and a threat to state
security. It's not the first time such nefarious activities have
been exposed.

These are the actions of the "deep state," that part of the permanent
governing structure -- security forces, intelligence operatives,
paramilitaries -- which abhors the possibility of EU standards being
applied to them. So they create phony crises and arbitrary prosecutions
to subvert those in Turkey who seek EU membership.

Politicians are typically afraid to confront the military over the
abuses and bullying. Prime ministers have been overthrown by the
military and even executed; the current constitution was written by
the generals after a 1980 coup. Political discourse has always been
curtailed, and most journalists, party leaders, and other public
figures censor themselves.

For Europe, the dilemma in all this bad news is obvious. Does Turkey
deserve EU membership? Many Europeans, some of them anti-Muslim,
harbor grave doubts about admitting a poor country of 70 million whose
dispossessed may swarm into the prosperous parts of the continent. They
prefer to highlight the alarming human rights violations. But Turkey
is serving up a ready-made excuse for rejection, with the state firmly
in the grip of hard-line militarists.

For the US government, the chief promoter of Turkey's EU ambitions,
the policy choices are less stark but fraught with embittering
irony. Turkey was for years the largest recipient of US military
assistance after Israel and Egypt, including massive arms transfers
-- ostensibly as a hedge against the Soviet Union, and then Iran and
Iraq. But Turkey refuses to do Washington's bidding in the region,
and anti-Americanism is at an all-time high. And the weapons Turkey
received were used in the civil war with the Kurds that resulted in
40,000 killed.

Meanwhile, the United States is protecting Kurdish ambitions in Iraq,
including its bid for the oil-rich city of Kirkuk. Turkey has vowed to
"take action" should Kirkuk fall into Kurdish hands, since that would
be the missing piece the Kurds need for secession and an independent
Kurdish state. Turkey could intervene militarily, close oil pipelines,
shut off water supplies, support militias and death squads -- generally
adding to the myriad forms of extreme violence that the war in Iraq
has bred.

So the United States finds itself frustrated by a military it helped
strengthen and train. And that explains why American political leaders
have been mute on Turkey's repression of free speech and the cascade
of other misdeeds by the military. We need them to behave in Iraq, and
the price for that is silence on the relentless abuses of democratic
values. It is reminiscent of America's lavish support for the Shah
of Iran in the 1970s and of Saddam Hussein in the 1980s.

Such stratagems never work in the end. Democracy can't flourish
without sunlight, and now it is Washington, again, that is in the way.

John Tirman is executive director of the Center for International
Studies at MIT.

[1.5 million]

excellent article and a sobering assessment for anyone (Turkish opr otherwise) whop really thinks that Turkey will just walze right into the EU without a hitch...and in this case the hitch is an internal one - not an external and is a major stumbling block...of course most Turks will just revert to the typical - blame European anti-Muslim sentiment or racsism or any outside factor except looking to themselves and why it is Turkey and the Turks themselves - meaning government or more specifically the Attaturk established MGK supragovernment - which has every reason to derail EU bid if it threatens their exisistence/degree of control etc - and of course this goes counter to all EU/Western/democratic principles...etc and it is this body that will be the reason for no Turkley ontop the EU and nothing else...

[Gavur]

Çiçek suffering from problems

Thursday, December 22, 2005









I met with the justice minister the other day. Our outlook on the Orhan Pamuk case is not too different, but we are at opposite ends concerning the way it was handled. However, as I listened to him, I agreed with some of the points he made.

Mehmet Ali Birand
On Tuesday, we went to Eskişehir to attend Doğan Holding's “Europe in Anatolia” series of meetings. We were hosted by Eskişehir Anatolia University and the Eskişehir Chamber of Industry. Top journalists from the Doğan Group and Justice Minister Cemil Çiçek were there.

Çiçek's presence eventually forced the discussions to turn to the Orhan Pamuk case. Almost all the debates centered on it.

As I was listening to the minister, I realized we both looked at it from very different perspectives. His world is completely different. He approaches the matter from the political side and is knowledgeable in all its technical aspects. Consequently, his outlook is very different but, from his perspective, sound.

We look at the issue from a broader context.

We object to people being sent to court just because he or she voices an opinion.

On the other hand, Çiçek said: “Please be patient. We are going through a transition period. You are right. There are some delays and mistakes. These are due to the system's failure to adapt to the new set of rules. If you give it enough time, you'll see that courts or the Supreme Court of Appeals will implement the necessary fine-tuning.” This is, of course, what he means.

We, meanwhile, are very impatient.

There are some things we are right about, but we can also say the same thing about Çiçek.

We want things to be fixed immediately.

The minister defends the judiciary.

Who is right?

It appears we need to find a “right” between what we and Çiçek say.

What relieved me the most among all the debates was the fact that everyone agreed on Pamuk's right to voice his opinion.

And that's what's important.



Anti-EU sentiment at universities:

One incident during the meeting at Anatolia University bothered me quite a bit.

At one point a group of 15 to 20 people started to hold a demonstration. They chanted slogans and carried placards describing the European Union membership process as part of an international imperialistic ploy. Their ages were between 17 and 20, but it was obvious there were others who were giving them orders. The statements they made came from a different age. Their shouting caused some delays in the discussions.

They exercised their democratic rights, but I was amazed by two aspects of the incident.

One was their hostility towards the EU. They described it as something that would make Turkey even poorer; however, the EU is already making Turkey richer. They blamed the EU for unemployment, but the only way to defeat unemployment is to create new jobs. It appears these young people want a return of the old system, under which they can only find state jobs.

How upsetting…

I believe these young people will regret what they are doing now in 20 years' time. They will say, “I made some stupid mistakes when I was young.” However, they will still be glad that what they did, or, for that matter, what everyone else like them did, didn't stop Turkey's progress towards EU membership. They'll remember these days as a memory of youthful innocence.

Another thing that amazed me was that while this group was shouting, no one, apart from a single brave individual, was able to say: “Please stop. You don't represent the entire university. There are many people who don't think like you.”

The rest were frightened into silence.

They couldn't say a word.

It's obvious we can't teach what the EU stands for at this university.

If they had based their anti-EU sentiment on agriculture policies or environmental issues, I wouldn't have been this upset. However, their opposition is based on classic leftist slogans from another age and pro-state arguments. They stand for Turkey becoming closed to the outside world, just like Albania was at one time.

The EU provides hope and a future for these kids, but what they want is to seek benefits from the state and to have a guided, not free, economy.

This state of affairs is not confined to Anatolia University. At many other universities small groups of people, especially Workers' Party (İP) members, constantly create trouble. They want to impose their outdated views on other students.

However, they will never succeed.

[Gavur]

Nationalism is a drug-"JUST SAY NO'!

Pope's assailant offered to nab bin Laden

By Agence France Presse (AFP)

Wednesday, January 18, 2006


ANKARA: Mehmet Ali Agca, the Turkish gunman who tried to assassinate Pope John Paul II, once volunteered to go to Afghanistan to kill or capture Al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden as a gesture to the United States, a newspaper report said Tuesday.

The mass-circulation Hurriyet published excerpts from letters Agca wrote from prison over the past few years before his release last week after a quarter of a century behind bars in Italy and Turkey.

In a letter dated September 1, 2000, addressed to the then head of Turkish intelligence, Agca wrote of U.S. help to Turkey in capturing Kurdish rebel leader Abdullah Ocalan in Kenya the previous year.

"America gave us Ocalan as a gift. Let's give them bin Laden in return," wrote Agca, then jailed in Istanbul, one year before the September 11 attacks in the U.S., Hurriyet reported.

"I'm ready to go on my own to Afghanistan, penetrate bin Laden's organization and hand him over to America, dead or alive," he wrote. "I really hate terrorism. If I become a national hero in America, this will be to the great benefit of the Turkish nation and the Turkish state," he wrote.

Many consider Agca, 48, to be deranged, while others believe he is a sly operator playing the madman.

He has pronounced himself as the reincarnation of Jesus Christ, and Hurriyet said some of his letters were signed "The Messiah." In another letter, he wrote that he refused a Vatican offer of $50 million and the title of cardinal to convert to Catholicism.

"I'd rather be a monkey in Africa than a king at the Vatican," he reportedly wrote.

Agca was a 23-year-old far-right militant on the run from the Turkish police after murdering journalist Abdi Ipekci in 1979 when he shot and wounded John Paul II in St. Peter's Square in Rome on May 13, 1981.

He spent the next 19 years in Italian jails before being pardoned and extradited to Turkey in 2000.

Agca has claimed that his attempt on the pope's life was part of a divine plan.

The Turkish court of appeals is expected to review Agca's early release from prison after jurists charged that reductions to his jail term provided by amnesties and penal code amendments have been miscalculated. - AFP

[Gavur]

Agca, Law And Nationalism

Agca, Law And Nationalism
Published: 1/17/2006







BY HASAN CELAL GUZEL
RADIKAL- Discussions on Mehmet Ali Agca’s release showed once more that Turkey needs a judicial reform urgently. Justice Minister Cemil Cicek has been making efforts concerning the issue of judicial reform for three years and got ahead in the fields of democratization and law thanks to the laws he has prepared. He should declare the year 2006 as the ‘Year of Judicial Reform’ and complete his operations to solve the problems concerning the judiciary. Agca’s release derives from the mistakes in the Execution Law. If amnesty laws are enacted often in a country, the deterrent force of punishment is removed. What’s more, the probation system in the Law on Execution of Punishment numbered 647 which came into force in 1965 shows that this institution isn’t understood in the Turkish Penal Law and that it’s used just like an amnesty law. According to lawyer Assoc. Prof. Sami Selçuk, the probation was completely misunderstood. Selçuk stated that this is the institution of personalizing the punishment during its execution, but this is considered an opportunity to be rescued from troublesome criminals and applied like an amnesty law. He said that the execution law prepared by famous execution lawyer Lopez Rey was spoiled and that the 6-month period of test was decreased to 2 days. This period ranges between 2 and 6 months in developed countries and the convict person is taken under observation and then released with a commission decision. This way of release can be applied on one of 9 convicts. However, if the guardian of the convict says that this is a good man in 2 days, he can be released. In other words, all the convicts can benefit from the release automatically. It’s hard to say if the calculation in Agca’s release is wrong without seeing his file. However, Cicek used the method of written order, which shows that there are legal hesitations concerning the issue of release. The right which was obtained is out of the question in this incident and now there’s nothing to do but wait for the decision of the Court of Appeals. Agca, who assassinated Pope John Paul II was tried in Italy in 1981 for three days and the court gave its decision on the fourth day. At that time, certain columnists who are also lawyers complained that a trial can’t be that short. However, this was the right way of trial and it’s wrong to carry out trials which last for many years just like in our country. Don’t you think that this shows that Turkey needs a judicial reform? The press’ intensive interest in Agca should be received normally, because Agca killed one of the leading journalists in Turkey. However, I also wish that the press shows the same level of sensitivity concerning similar issues. In addition, I can understand that Agca’s relatives and family welcomes him, but I can’t tolerate that he was considered a nationalist and welcomed with flowers and a Turkish flag. Agca killed one of the leading press members in Turkey and attempted at killing the highest-ranking representative of a religion. Both of these incidents which are inhuman damaged Turkey’s image. Agca’s actions have nothing to do with being a Turk and patriotism. Those who protect Agca should stop this fanaticism and remember these truths.

[Gavur]

Turkey's so-called 'nationalists'

Tuesday, January 17, 2006







Flowers, chants and cheers for the release of Mehmet Ali Ağca by a small group of so-called 'nationalists' angered millions of Turks during the Feast of the Sacrifice holiday. Millions watching the footage of the release on their TV screens felt that something was seriously wrong with this. I do not think I was alone in being disgusted by the small parade of a handful of fascists welcoming Mr. Ağca. Not only was it annoying that Ağca would be welcomed and cheered by some of our countrymen but the exploitation of our flag for such a disgraceful occasion was extremely distasteful.

Suat Kınıklıoğlu
Flowers, chants and cheers for the release of Mehmet Ali Ağca by a small group of so-called “nationalists” angered millions of Turks during the Feast of the Sacrifice holiday. Millions watching the footage of the release on their TV screens felt that something was seriously wrong with this. I don't think I was alone in being disgusted by the small parade of a handful of fascists welcoming Mr. Ağca. Not only was it annoying that Ağca would be welcomed and cheered by some of our countrymen, but the exploitation of our flag for such a disgraceful occasion was extremely distasteful.

Ağca, either himself murdered or was an accomplice to the murder of one of Turkey's most enlightened minds in the 1970s, the editor in chief of daily Milliyet, Abdi Ipekçi. After his mysterious escape from a high-security prison he resurfaced with the assassination attempt on Pope John Paul II in 1980. I remember those days when the whole world woke up to the fact that one of the most prominent figures of Christianity survived an assassination attempt by a Turkish national. It was very embarrassing.

Once my initial disgust subsided, I was reminded of Article 301 of our penal code, which deals with insulting “Turkishness.” Is it not these people -- people like Ağca and the handful of fascists welcoming them -- who really insult Turkishness, Turks and Turkey altogether? They are the ones who cast a dark shadow on this proud nation that does not deserve to be mentioned in the same paragraph with the likes of Ağca. They are the ones who seem to have fully missed the changes occurring in this country and the world in the last 25 years. The words uttered by these people to the cameras would make you think that we were put back in a time machine and are in the 16th century. As a Turkish citizen I continue to be truly angered by the travesty that was on display.

A rather unnoticed and less accentuated event on the day of Ağca's release was the small demonstration by the Turkish Communist Party. They were the only group who demonstrated the courage to express their opposition to Ağca's release there. Unfortunately, millions of Turks who could not make sense of what was going on could not find the same amount of courage to express their dissatisfaction.

The Ağca case is only one example. By now it has become almost conventional that the balanced and sensible majority of Turkish public opinion rarely finds expression at public rallies or meetings. More often than not our intellectuals and concerned citizens leave the podium to marginal elements of our society. The consciousness of our society clearly objected to the release of Ağca but, despite the fact that his release was evident days ago, we could not organize a democratic rally that would have expressed our displeasure with it. When that could not take place, it was a group of fascists who carried the day and made sure the whole world found out about a handful of Turks cheering for the release of a murderer.

This country has enough problems when it comes to the question of image. The last thing we need is to be tainted with the accusation that we release murderers and assassins and penalize writers. Let us hope that the public outcry that could not organize in front of the prison Ağca was released from will translate into something more tangible in coming days.

Not all was negative. One element of our public discourse was extremely constructive. That element was the vocal opposition expressed by our electronic and printed media. Similar to the role our media played during the uncovering of numerous malpractice cases in the past, the Turkish media fulfilled a significant role in expressing its opposition to the release of Mr. Ağca. Let us hope that these incidences will serve as triggers to reform some of the outdated and/or misinterpreted articles in the penal code.

Finally, a word on Turkey's so-called “nationalists.” Although it is difficult to measure these things, Turkey's nationalists seem to have been unable to make the transition from 19th century nationalism to 21st century patriotism. This is because true patriots follow international trends and developments closely and make sure that their country is in tune with them so that it does not lose out. True patriots are alert to potential embarrassments of their country and thus take necessary precautions to avoid them. True patriots do not act in contradiction to a large majority of their own public opinion. True patriots are those who learn and understand what shape and form a modern nation must take so that it can survive with dignity in an extremely complex and difficult environment. And lastly, true patriots do not applaud murderers and assassins.

http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=33305

[Gavur]

Agca Deserves Congressional Medal

Published: 1/18/2006







BY TUFAN TURENC
HURRIYET- The decision for the release of Mehmet Ali Agca surprised everybody, including Justice Minister Cemil Cicek. When he was released from prison, he got on a luxurious car and people welcomed him with flowers. Then he was examined medically and diagnosed the antisocial personality disorder in 3.5 hours. Thus, he was exempted from military service. The only thing that we failed to do is to present a congressional medal to him in a glorious ceremony, because he shot the Turkish journalist Abdi Ipekci and destroyed Turkey’s image by assassinating Pope John Paul II. Thus, we could have proven that Turkey was proud of him.

I never have seen that a person could receive a report of antisocial personality disorder in such a short period at a hospital in Turkey. I saw how skilled our psychiatrists were, because they could diagnose Ipekci’s murderer as soon as they saw him. They should be congratulated, because I think it’s a world record to determine and diagnose such a complicated disease in such a short period of time. Obviously, if the Court of Appeals overrules the decision of release and the way to prison is opened, Agca would be kidnapped abroad. Meanwhile, Justice and Development Party (AKP) Group Deputy Chairman Salih Kapusuz should be congratulated, because he said, ‘Agca was released from the prison with a court decision. He served his time, long or short. This issue concerns the jurisdiction.’ However, Republican People’s Party (CHP) leader Deniz Baykal said, ‘This is certainly corruption. This incident is a scandal. The jurisdiction in Turkey started to be in a miserable state.’ Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan said a few words upon the insistence of journalists. He just said, ‘This would be evaluated when the time comes’.

[Gavur]

Bird flu shows the other Turkey

Friday, January 20, 2006

There are some events in life that remind you of realities you would prefer not to recall. You can't escape these realities, though, even if you are amazed when reminded of them, as if you were facing them for the first time. Bird flu is one of these events. It reminded us of how far behind the Southeast has lagged. Ankara has shown the full extent of the loutishness of its perspective on this region.





Mehmet Ali Birand
If the same thing had happened in western Turkey, the government would have acted differently

Let's think for a moment.

If bird flu had broken out in the western part of Turkey, what would have happened?

How would Ankara and the government bureaucracy have behaved?

Let's say that bird flu had first shown itself in the Aegean, Mediterranean or Marmara regions. Would the government have taken the same course of action?

No.

It would have acted with lightning speed to identify the disease and begin treating it. There would not have been endless false explanations that people were ill with pneumonia, and so much time would not have been wasted. Patients would have had the disease diagnosed immediately in well-equipped hospitals by expert doctors. And many children would have been saved from death.

The government's reaction to the latest events shows us all how they perceive this poor section of our country. If you are lucky enough to live in a richer part of our country, you are treated more like a human being. There are better hospitals, more doctors and better equipment. You receive more information about what is going on. You know more about what you should and should not be doing. Bureaucracy treats you with more care. State ministers run to be by your side. They don't move slowly, after days of prodding, but with alacrity. In fact, even the prime minister might show up by your side to ask how you are.

Is what I'm noting here wrong?

We have all, not just the state bureaucracy, but all of us, seen the reality of the "other Turkey," the thing we did not want to see, the thing we wanted to push away.

We have undergone an embarrassing test.

We acted as though these things were occurring somewhere outside of Turkey, that they had nothing to do with us, that we had woken up and discovered bird flu suddenly at our doorstep.

We have failed.

It has been revealed how certain sections of our country have been left ignorant and poor. Bird flu has caused this shame to hit us in the face.



The other Turkey surprises most of us:

Most of us did not want to look at it, or chose not to speak about it. We knew that there were people different from us living in the eastern part of the country. But what we didn't want to know was how great the gap was between us.

If we hadn't encountered this "bird flu incident," our lives would have generally continued on in the same way. But that didn't happen, and the birds spoiled our comfort. They forced us to look at reality. The "other Turkey" horrified us, entered into our dreams. Following this, we became sad. The people we saw on the screen spoke differently. Some were not even comprehensible to us. They were, at one and the same time, both from us and not from us. They look like us in some ways and in other ways are nothing like us. They seem like distant cousins.

We realized watching them on TV that we had seen them before. But we had never felt their presence so closely. We couldn't decide whether to take them in or push them out.



They were burning the chickens alive…

Thanks to television, there were many realities made available to us.

The scene that horrified us the most was that of chickens being put into bags alive, which then had kerosene poured over them, to be burned.

We could not believe our eyes.

Especially when chickens escaped the burning sacks, only to be grabbed and put back in. The squawks of the chickens as they were being burned.

The majority of us said, "These people are not like us." But very few of us said: "Why? Why are these people any different than us?" When, actually, it is we who have put these people into the situation they are in. Rather than questioning why we have never given them anything, we chose to exclude them.



Both poor and very, very ignorant:

Much time has passed since the emergence of bird flu in our country. One of the aspects that has amazed us the most is the fact that some of our citizens are as poor and ignorant as they seem to be.

We have seen the poverty with our own eyes. They live in places even an animal might not be expected to live in. They live in filth. They slaughter and eat chickens that are clearly sick, at the most dangerous time there could be to do so, chickens they have not been able to sell. They don't know what bird flu is. They are not even aware of what should and should not be done.

Why?

When, actually, it is we who have put them into this situation.

We did not educate our own people; we enslaved them in poverty and ignorance.

But be aware, I am not trying to draw your attention to only the people in the East and Southeast of Turkey with this column.... And I'm not talking only about our Kurdish citizens. We can see the same situation in areas of the Black Sea, in the Aegean, even in certain sections of Istanbul and Ankara. But the situation in the Southeast is much more dramatic.

I want to call on everyone:

We are responsible for the poverty, for the ignorance.

Let us at least not degrade these people for these things.

Let us at least not exclude these people for these things.

These people are our people.



We want to enter the EU for the sake of these citizens:

We keep seeing the same scenes on our television sets, week after week. Filth, poverty, ignorance and lack of care. After watching these scenes, there are those of us who ask ourselves, "Are we going to be EU citizens along with these people?"

Yes, the EU will accept us even in this state, inasmuch as they won't say "no" for different reasons. And we want to join the EU in order to be able to turn the other Turkey into our Turkey. We have to do this in order to change the other Turkey. Rather than be embarrassed by the other Turkey, we have to embrace it.

[Gavur]

Perspectives on the accession negotiations between the EU and Turkey

2/12/2006 European Turkey civic commission
European Turkey civic commission, EUTCC

1. Introduction

The EU Turkey Civic Commission (EUTCC) would like to present its views on the perspectives of the accession negotiations between the European Union and Turkey.

The EUTCC is genuinely supportive of Turkey’s aspirations to become a member of the EU. We believe this is the best opportunity Turkey will have to become a truly democratic country, with full respect for the rule of law and human rights. However, it is obvious that Turkish membership must be conditional on the full implementation of all accession criteria, including respect for and protection of minorities. There must be no bargaining or reductions in the standards of compliance for geopolitical or other extraneous reasons.

After some observations on the 2005 Progress Report, the present paper limits itself to discussing five main problem areas, which in many ways represent an acid test for Turkey’s aspirations to membership of the European Union:

• Torture
• Freedom of expression
• Freedom of association - political parties
• The judiciary
• The role of the military

2. General observations on the Progress Report

The 2005 Progress Report describes in some detail both the achievements and shortcomings with regard to Turkey’s progress towards implementation of the accession criteria. The EUTCC does realise that the EU and the Government of Turkey are operating within the framework of normal diplomatic relations. This understandably colours the language of the Progress Report, which tends to give the reader the impression that the overall progress has been substantial, and that the remaining problems are limited, primarily relating to improved implementation. This is also how the Report has been interpreted in the media and the political circles in Turkey.

However, when reading all the cases where no or only limited progress has been achieved, the rather rosy language in many parts of the Report is not substantiated by the hard facts on the ground. Even less rosy is the picture when one realises that the cases referred to in the Report are just examples, the tip of an iceberg.

Generally speaking, it is primarily at the level of adoption of legislation that some real progress has been achieved. And even at that level, much remains to be done. In fact, in some cases, there has been regression rather than progress. This includes what was proclaimed to be the big step forward: the new Penal Code. However, the reality is that there has been a rush among members of the judiciary to clamp down on freedom of expression, based on authoritarian legislation such as the new Article 301.

It is noteworthy that most of the recent cases where the Turkish judiciary has failed blatantly in recognising and following European human rights standards, are related to the situation of ‘non-Turkish citizens’. This applies particularly to the situation of the greatest non-Turkish population, the Kurds. The cases have revealed and emphasized, again and again, how deep-rooted and sensitive the Kurdish issue is in a strongly nationalistic state.

The EUTCC believes that this will prove to be the major hurdle on the way to a genuine acceptance and implementation of European values and standards. Freedom of expression can be accepted generally in Turkey, as long as it does not touch the raw nerve: the nationalistic ideology and its sequel, the Kurdish problem.

The Ottoman empire, with its multi-ethnic/cultural and political structure gave the Kurdish people a great degree of autonomy. In the new Turkish republic, the Kurdish people were not able to find a place either as a minority or as a cultural-political identity group. The discrimination against the Kurds and the assimilation policies led to uprisings and unrest, which have continued until our time. In turn, this reinforced anti-democratic and authoritarian political structures, hampering the development of a genuine democratic society.

The EUTCC believes there can be no progress in this field, unless the Turkish political establishment, as well as major parts of the public, accept the rights of the Kurdish population. This issue is not focused on adequately and clearly in the Progress Report. As a result, Turkish authorities, media and large sectors of the population, were triumphant when reading the Progress Report and discovering that the Kurds were not described as a minority. Nationalistic elements are using this as a shield to protect their views, denying the identity and the rights of 15 million Kurds.

The Turkish authorities have had little difficulty so far in accepting the Copenhagen criteria, which specifically obliges Turkey to ensure ‘respect for and protection of minorities’. However, Turkey has officially made it abundantly clear that this acceptance is limited to those people who are defined as minorities in the 1923 Lausanne Treaty. In other words, Turkey claims the exclusive right for itself to determine the extent of its commitments to the EU and its standards and values. So far, this has not been challenged explicitly by the EU.

Instead of describing the Kurdish problem as a main problem that Turkey must face and resolve, the Report refers to ‘the situation in the Southeast’, the expression favoured by Turkey. Only the Greeks are directly referred to as a ‘minority’, again in line with the Turkish official position, although the Report does state that under relevant international and European standards, ‘other communities ‘. could [emphasis added] qualify as minorities’.

This ambiguous terminology lends itself to misleading the people of Turkey, including many within the political establishment. Reading the Report, they believe that the EU does not consider or does not insist that the Kurdish population have rights under international and European law and standards, whether the Kurds are conceived as a ‘people’, a ‘nation’ or as a ‘minority’. A genuine implementation of the Copenhagen criteria can only come about after the Kurdish problem has been both recognised and resolved.

Prime Minister Erdogan said in September 2005 that he recognised the ‘Kurdish issue’, and that it must be resolved through ‘more democratization’. His statements could have given some degree of hope, and to many Kurds it did. On the other hand it gave rise to a wave of loud protest among nationalistic circles, including critical comments from the military. This shows the admittedly difficult balancing act that the Government must perform between the reforms required by the EU and the demands of the established nationalistic ideology and its proponents, including the military. This is probably the reason why, half a year later, no steps have been taken, not even at the verbal level, towards a resolution of the Kurdish problem.

This lack of progress in the most difficult problem Turkey is facing is not acceptable. The EU must insist on a ‘roadmap’ to solve the Kurdish problem.

3. The Realities of the Present Situation

a) Torture, Police Brutality and Extra-judicial Executions

Although there are conflicting reports and views, it appears that torture has become less wide-spread than it used to be until recent times. This is particularly the case at detention centres. On the other hand there are increasing reports of torture or degrading treatment outside of the detention centres, e.g. during apprehension or transportation to detention centres.

A complete picture of the situation on the ground is for obvious reasons not easy to gather and document. The Turkish authorities are not particularly forthcoming in this regard. It is illustrating to read in the report of 08.12.2005 from the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT):

‘Not for the first time during a CPT visit, the Committee’s delegation found that certain law enforcement establishments which (according to the custody registers) regularly hold a considerable number of detainees were practically if not totally empty [emphasis added] during the time of the delegation’s visit.’ (Paragraph 6 of the Report).

In other words, these detention centres had been emptied before the visit of the CPT to prevent embarrassing situations for the Turkish authorities!

Nonetheless, the CPT report refers to ‘numerous persons’ alleging ill-treatment, e.g.:

• ‘blows to the body, including on occasion falaka)’,
• ‘suspension by the arms’,
• ‘stripping naked and hosing with cold water’,
• ‘squeezing the genitals’,
• ‘immersing the head in water’,
• ‘asphyxiation using a plastic bag’.

The CPT also expressed its regret that ‘the Turkish authorities have not provided replies to a number of issues’ raised by the CPT during its visit in 2004, some of which ‘were clearly of an urgent nature’. The CPT also complained about ‘inadequate or incomplete’ response to its report on the September 2003 visit.

The CPT was in particular concerned about the failure to implement existing regulations concerning the medical inspection of detainees. The CPT stated that in many cases, the law enforcement officers were present during the medical examination, which in many cases was very perfunctory.

The picture emerging from the CPT report is of a systematic and deliberate procedure to evade the responsibilities of the Turkish authorities, and to protect those who are guilty of torture.

The reports of Turkish and international NGOs are also not indicating much progress. According to the records of the Human Rights Foundation of Turkey (HRFT), in its annual report dated 29.12.2005:

• 5 persons died in detention in 2005,

• 164 women, 10 children and 483 reported to the HRFT torture rehabilitation centres having been tortured or ill-treated (180 of them in 2005) and in more than half of the cases the torture or ill-treatment occurred outside detention centres,

• 52 persons were shot to death and hundreds were wounded by security forces in connection with armed clashes with PKK forces.

The training of police and security forces does not appear to have had the desired effects. There are too many reports of police brutality, particularly connected with public demonstrations. The beating and spraying with pepper gas of men and women on the International Women’s Day in March are just one of many examples. It was not helpful that Prime Minister Erdogan criticized the press for having made critical comments on the case.

It is sad to observe that the system of extra-judicial executions performed by the state’s security forces or with their collusion has not disappeared. There have been various incidents, notably the Semdinli affair, where it appears clear that security forces have been guilty of executions and killings.

The Progress Report notes that the security situation has worsened, and blame this entirely on ‘the resumption of violence by the PKK’. It does note with concern that ‘the security forces sometimes respond inappropriately’. However, incidents like Semdinli indicate that this is not a question of an ‘inappropriate’ response to attacks by PKK. The reality is that certain organized groups within the state have carried out planned attacks on civilians and then tried to hold PKK responsible for these attacks.

Members of the Parliamentary Commission investigating the Semdinli incident have vociferously expressed their disquiet at what they perceive as efforts to manipulate the presentation of relevant evidence.

These incidents have resulted in protests and clashes between civilians and security forces, during which several people were killed and many more injured. The situation is volatile. Some Turkish media have speculated that ‘elements in the ?deep state’ are trying to provoke instability in order to win a freer hand in the South East’ (Turkish Daily News [TDN], 17/01/2006).

The military and other parts of the ‘deep state’ continue to accuse the PKK of organising and carrying out all these killings.

b) Freedom of Expression

The Progress Report optimistically predicts a ‘continued reduction in the number of prosecutions and particularly convictions’ in freedom of expression cases, although it notes that there remain various provisions in the laws which are a ‘potential’ threat to freedom of expression. Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul proclaimed proudly to the Turkish parliament on 21 December that there was no person in Turkish prisons convicted for the expression of non-violent thoughts (HRFT annual report, 29/12/2005).

At the end of 2005, the situation on the ground looks much bleaker. It has become clear that several articles of the new Penal Code are not only ‘potential’ threats, but are part of the daily reality in Turkey. The present report would become far too voluminous if all the individual cases were to be discussed here. Some of them are widely known, others do not reach the headlines in the media.

The most illustrious example is perhaps the infamous new Article 301 of the Penal Code. Rather than widening the freedom of expression, it has been used as a powerful tool of repression. According to a recent report from ‘Reporters without Borders’, this article has been used to charge or convict at least 22 journalists and writers since June 2005. The latest conviction was on 27 December, when Zulkuf Kisanik got a six months prison sentence for writing a book investigating the destruction of Kurdish villages.

A realistic and sad picture of the Government’s priorities is given by the Justice Minister’s attitude relating to the Pamuk case. Firstly, he refused to consider prompt action to remedy the obvious anomaly, saying he needed to see how the new article would be applied in practice. 22 cases in six months were obviously not sufficient for him to discover the anomaly. Secondly, he criticized Pamuk for not making ‘conciliatory remarks’ and hinted that such a move ‘would have prevented his prosecution’. He advised Pamuk to state publicly: ‘I apologize to the nation’! (TDN, 07/01/2006). As if that was not enough, the Justice Minister, while admitting the flaws in the justice system, added that ‘Pamuk was also guilty’(Zaman, 27.01.2006).

According to the Turkish Publishers Union 2005 report, 37 writers were tried in 2004-2005, and cases initiated against 43 books and 4 compilations from 25 publishing houses. According to the HRFT, (29/12/2005) only in the month of December there were trials in cases against:

• 2 executives of political parties,
• 26 journalists, editors, correspondents, TV producers, translators, photographers,
• 3 human rights defenders,
• 1 news agency,
• 6 publishing houses.

Not a single private broadcaster has so far been permitted to broadcast in Kurdish (HRW, Annual Report 2005).

There are some new and disturbing developments in freedom of expression cases. One is the trend of nationalistic groups and individuals (often with connections to the ‘deep state’) to file complaints and urge the prosecutors to ‘do their duty’! This has resulted in several cases being opened, which are manifestly unfounded under European standards (one of the cases referred to the newly coined expression: ‘the deep judiciary’!). In addition, these nationalistic groups interfere with an orderly conduct of the trials,which the judges seem unable to control. The training provided by the EU to the judiciary (15 mill ? allocated for 2005) seems to have had only limited effect so far.

Another trend is based on a bizarre interpretation of the article that prohibits attempts to influence the decisions of the judiciary, as an alternative crime to ‘insults’ against the court. These provisions are now being construed so as to stifle any negative comments on decisions within the judiciary, in cases that are uncomfortable for the nationalistic ideology. For Turkey the goal seems to be to ensure that radio and TV programs in Kurdish are fully controlled by the state.

Not surprisingly, no prosecution has been initiated or proposed against Prime Minister Erdogan for having condemned in strong words several court decisions. Nor was General Büyükanit investigated for having declared immediately after one of his men had been arrested in connection with the Semdinli affair, that the man could not possibly have committed any crime. Not surprisingly, he said he believed the PKK was behind the Semdinli bombing.

[Gavur]

Cont...

Some examples of recent freedom of expression cases are:

• the charges made against Hrant Dink and four other persons for ‘attempting to influence the judiciary’ (FIDH-HRA-HRFT, 28/12/2005. Their offence was to criticize the sentence against Dink in October for ‘denigrating the Turkish identity’. The charge followed a complaint by the nationalistic Union of Jurists.

• A similar case was announced in December 2005 against five journalists (ibid). Their offence was to criticize the court decision to ban the conference on the Armenian issue. This case is also based on a complaint from the Union of Jurists.

• Fatih Tas was sentenced to six months imprisonment for publishing ‘They say you are missing’, about a journalist who went missing in the 1990s (Amnesty International-AI-, 23/01/2006).

• Fatih Tas is also prosecuted for publishing a translation of ‘Spoils of War: Human Costs of America’s Arms Trade’ (Human Rights Watch, 01/12/2005). The book evaluates the effects of the US arms industry, and is seen to be ‘insulting to the memory of Kemal Atatürk’.
• Halil Altindere goes on trial on 13 April for a photograph exhibition that allegedly ‘insults’ the army (AI, 23/01/2006)

• On 6 April the case of Abdullah Yildiz will be heard, relating to his translation of the book ‘The Witches of Smyrna’, which allegedly portrays Turks in a bad light (ibid.).

• Worst of all, Ibrahim Kaboglu and Baskin Oran, former members of the Human Rights Committee (under the Prime Ministry’s Office, will be tried on 15 February for the report produced on Minority and Cultural Rights, at the request of the Prime Minister himself(!) (ibid.).

• The decision of the prosecutor of Diyarbakir to open investigations against 56 mayors from the Kurdish areas, following a letter urging Denmark not to close down Roj TV.

• Even the Ministry of Interior has decided to make its own investigation of the Roj TV case.

• Two former DEP Members of Parliament, Selim Sadak and Hatip Dicle are being charged for praising PKK leader Öcalan, by terming his conditions in jail as ‘isolation’, and saying that ‘this will never be accepted by the Kurdish people’. If found guilty, they face a prison sentence of up to two years (TDN, 28/01/2006).

c) Freedom of Association and of Assembly - Political Parties

Although some reforms have been made in the legislation, the harassment of associations that are critical of government policies continues in multiple forms. There is also a need for further reforms in the legislation, e.g. to remove the ban on political parties ‘using languages other than Turkish’ (read: Kurdish).

The new law on associations and its implementing regulations have not prevented the authorities from intervening in the internal affairs, and placing obstacles for their registration, etc.

From November 2004 to December 2005, 55 cases and six investigations were initiated against the executives of 14 branches of the Human Rights Association (HRA). The chairman and board members of the Bingöl branch of the HRA were subjected to some 92 investigations and 51 court cases since the branch was opened in 2001. (HRFT, 29/12/2005). With a record like this, one may wonder how the HRA has time and resources to carry out its important task in the Turkish society.

The case against the teachers’ trade union, Egitim-Sen, is also illustrative of the methods employed to control associations. Faced with a threat of being closed down after a long battle in the courts, Egitim-Sen had no choice other than deleting from its statutes the reference to its objectives including the teaching of mother tongues. Its application to the European Court of Human Rights will take a long time to be decided, and in the meanwhile the Turkish state ideology will prevail, in spite of critical remarks from the EU and other European institutions.

The case against the pro-Kurdish party DEHAP is continuing, although its functions have been assumed by a new political party, in the traditional response by party members to attempts by the authorities to close down parties critical to the prevailing ideology.

Other examples of restrictive, harrassing and repressive practices are:

• In June 2005 the Ankara Governor refused to authorize the Kurdish Democracy Culture and Solidarity Association (Kürt-Der), claiming that its program ‘to secure the social and cultural rights of Kurds’ was unconstitutional.

• In July the Bingöl governor fined the chairman of the local branch of HRA for printing the association’s letterhead in Kurdish as well as in Turkish, in breach of the requirement of the Associations Law that correspondence must be exclusively in Turkish (HRW Annual Report 2005).

• The infamous case from 1994 against Kurdish MPs, Leyla Zana, Hatip Dicle, Orhan Dogan and Selim Sadak, is now in its 12th year, with a retrial in its 3rd year. The last hearing was on 3 February, where among other things the court refused the defendants’ request to have a witness heard (TDN, 04/02/2006).

• Hatip Dicle and Selim Sadak are in addition charged under article 215 of the Penal Code, for having characterized the prison conditions of PKK leader Öcalan as ‘isolation’ (DIHA, 04/02/2006).

d) The Judiciary

By now, many efforts have been made by the EU to aid the Turkish authorities in securing compliance, or at least better compliance, with European standards, at great expense to European taxpayers.

Thousands of the members of the judiciary and the security forces have been given training, manuals and directives about the requirements of European standards. Even those who have not still participated in formal training programs must by now have become aware that, for example, the European Convention on Human Rights is a binding part of Turkish domestic law, and even takes precedence over domestic law that may be in contradiction with domestic law and jurisprudence.

Against this background, it is disturbing, to say the least, that prosecutors and judges (with a few honourable exceptions) act as if they had no notion of the stipulations of the Convention. For example, the courts fail to distinguish between critical, but peaceful opinions, and opinions inciting to violence.

Another ‘technique’ is to assume that a defendant who has expressed an opinion, e.g. on mother tongue teaching, which coincides with statements by the PKK, is himself a terrorist or at least a supporter of terrorism.

With this kind of ‘jurisprudence’ and precedents, no peaceful discussion is possible about important problems in society. It is also troublesome to observe cases where the judiciary, instead of applying clear precedents from the Strasbourg courts, follow signals from the military and other nationalistic elements of the ‘deep state’.

Given all the training and information available to the judiciary, it cannot be for lack of knowledge that they so often, for various reasons, deliberately choose to follow the ‘deep state’ logic. Paradoxically, it may be said that the judiciary is too independent of the Government, which after all has given many signals that it wishes the judiciary to comply with European standards.

The few selected cases referred to above give witness to this contradiction. They also demonstrate that the task of change is enormous and that a resolution most of all requires the uprooting of the nationalistic ideology.

As mentioned above, the numerous cases which shock the European public are just the tip of an iceberg. Orhan Pamuk will never have to go jail. What is really worrying is the huge amount of cases that do not catch the attention of the media, the politicians and the EU.

These are the thousands who daily suffer torture and degrading treatment at the hands of the security forces, harassment by the police and prosecutors, unjust sentencing and cruel and inhuman treatment in prisons and detention centre.

Take the example of the man, apparently somewhat mentally disturbed, who had spray-painted a few statues of Atatürk in some school yards. The sentence for this crime against ‘the memory of Atatürk’ was 22 years in prison! More than many other cases, this one illustrates a judiciary gone blind by an authoritarian and outdated ideology. It also illustrates the need to eliminate this paranoia, which it must be hoped is not indicative of the sentiments of the vast majority of the people of Turkey.

It is an unworthy and unacceptable situation that Turkish and international NGOs, as well as the EU itself, have to play the role of some kind of a ‘guardian of the court’ in the numerous cases where freedom of expression has been denied or punished. The Turkish authorities themselves have demonstrated that they are unable, or unwilling, to prevent, or even to rectify, human rights violations.

This failure is partly due to an unwillingness to change the nationalistic ideology, and partly to strong pressures from the ‘deep state’ and other nationalistic elements. Whatever the reasons, the situation may be summarized, as it was done recently by Hurriyet columnist Bekir Coskun: ‘We all know justice doesn’t exist’ (quoted in TDN 25/01/2006), or by TÜSIAD Chairman, Ömer Sabanci, complaining about ‘courts making decisions as if there have been no changes made in the laws concerning freedom of expression and cultural rights’ (TDN 27/01/2006).

This appalling situation should not be allowed to persist. Europe must now demand that Turkey must take much more vigorous steps than it has so far been able or willing to take, in order to put its house in order. The Turkish system of justice must be brought up to European standards, as a matter of urgency. To take those steps is not the task of Europe, but of Turkey itself. Failure to take such steps should have consequences for the accession negotiations.


e) The Role of the Military

Although on paper the privileged, political role of the military has been reduced to some extent, the realities remain much the same. The military obviously still feel free to intervene in the political agenda, with public statements and other, more subtle forms of pressure. Various cases against persons expressing opinions contrary to the military ideology have been opened by prosecutors, eager to follow clear signals from the military.

A recent article in Foreign Affairs (January/February 2006) spells it all out quite clearly. The article is written by a Turkish professor and two majors of the Turkish Armed Forces. The article points out the cohesive nature of the Armed Forces (TGS) and that the military ‘speaks with one voice’. The authors have not even inserted the traditional caveat that the views expressed are their own personal views. One can therefore safely assume that the article represents the official view of the military. The article raises (and attempts to answer) the question: How much further will the TGS go?

Among the many interesting statements of the TGS position are the following:

• ‘None of the reforms the EU still requires of the Turkish government can be achieved without the military’s backing’. In other words, the TGS retains ultimate control and veto over Turkey’s foreign policy.

• ‘It remains to be seen how much further the Turkish military leadership will be willing to retreat’, i.e. that is the exclusive privilege of the TGS to determine.

• ‘The military fears that various lobbies can unduly influence voters’ political choices ‘ [and] is willing to tolerate these social divisions only if [TGS] is tasked with monitoring them ‘ but in no case can they [the social divisions] be allowed to undermine the [TGS]. In plain language, the TGS does not believe in democratic processes.

• The article describes the various mechanisms used to prevent ‘the officer class from being influenced by external ideologies that could upset the military’s homogeneous worldview’. ‘The result is a singular, self-replicating class of generals, towering over an institution with a single mindset’. This philosophy is a far shot from the European perspective of the role of armed forces, and is more reminiscent of authoritarian regimes that Europe has experienced in the past.

• After assuring that the TGS is in favour of EU membership, the article states that ‘Whatever resistance it (TGS) may have occasionally displayed ‘ has stemmed .. from .. a significant degree of mistrust toward some EU policies’. In other words, while assuring that the TGS is in favour of membership of the EU, it mistrusts the EU policies.

• The article quotes as a ‘major [emphasis added] concession by the TGS’, a statement in its policy document from 2001, that the country’s citizens ‘should have their cultural and local linguistic characteristics be considered as individual rights and freedoms’. This ‘major’ concession is of course in line with the official ideology, which does not recognise an obligation to respect and protect minorities (except those three minorities recognised in the Lausanne Treaty of 1924), which is an essential element of the accession criteria.

• The article predicts that the military may go along with further ‘moderate progress ‘ so long, that is, as those reforms do not challenge its [TGS’] internal integrity or that of Turkey at large. As the country’s ultimate guardian, the military will carefully balance the EU’s demands for reforms, especially (emphasis added) those regarding cultural diversity [read ‘the Kurdish problem’], with national security’. This statement confirms that the TGS will not give up its self-determined role as the ‘ultimate guardian’ and that the Kurdish problem is seen as the most precarious ‘red line’.

• Finally, the article concludes that the EU ‘should not hasten to ask for the removal of the military’s remaining footholds in Turkish civilian society ‘ The TGS is likely to hold on to the tools and methods [sic!] it has long used to keep soldiers in line ‘ [and] will not relinquish their proven methods until they are confident that the ‘ institutions, policies, and, ultimately, the promises of the EU are viable’. So, we must conclude that the TGS will retain their traditional hold on society as long as they wish.

One may safely assume that this article is representative of TGS policy, and that the TGS will never negate its message. It reveals, in a coherent manner, a military that has not wanted to understand what a democratic society is. For the EU, it must be difficult to continue negotiations with the Turkish Government, when it has been explained so explicitly by the ‘ultimate guardian’ of Turkey that the Government may say what it wishes in the negotiations, but the decisions are at the end of the day taken, not by the Government but by the military.

4. Concluding Remarks

The EUTCC believes that:

• Considerable progress has been achieved by Turkey towards meeting the Copenhagen criteria.

• Much remains to be achieved, both in terms of legislative reform, and particularly in implementation

• It must be recognised by all actors involved that the problems of achieving full compliance with the accession criteria are enormous.


• This is not merely a question of changing ‘hearts and minds’ within the bureaucracy, or fine-tuning of the legislation, as some believe.

• The root of the problem is in the Turkish nationalistic ideology, sanctified in the existing Constitution, and providing the basis for the suppression of minorities and oppositional groups, in particular of the Kurdish people...

• In order to achieve European standards and meet the accession criteria, Turkey must shed the state ideology that has prevailed for almost 90 years, and replace it by a philosophy where cultural plurality is seen as positive, not as threatening.

• Uprooting the nationalistic ideology is no easy task, even if the will existed among the politicians, the judiciary and the military. Unfortunately, so far there are few signs that this is understood in Turkey.

• At the political level, there is generally a will to comply with the Copenhagen criteria, but the main hurdle is the sensitive Kurdish problem, itself a result of the nationalistic ideology.

• Unfortunately, the Government does not yet have a realistic picture of the causes and magnitude of the problem, nor of the solutions that may be found.
• Furthermore, even in introducing moderate reforms, the Government is torn between the demands of the EU and the demands of the nationalistic ideology, pronounced by the military and other segments of the ‘deep state’, including some of its own members and voters.

• The Progress Report indicates the EU itself does not consider the Kurdish problem as a main political problem hindering compliance with the accession criteria. It blurs the primordial nature of this problem, by referring to it as ‘the situation in the East and Southeast’. The problem is not one of geography, nor even primarily of a ‘socio-economic nature’, but goes much deeper.

• The Kurdish problem is primarily of a complex, political nature. The problem will not go away of its own. Nor can it be resolved through continued repression.A solution requires fundamental changes in an antiquated state ideology that has prevailed for more than 80 years.

• The European experience and history have shown that ethnic or nationalistic conflicts of a nature and gravity similar to the Kurdish problem have never been resolved with guns, but through dialogue and conciliation.

• Whilst the reforms required for Turkey to comply with the accession criteria must continue at an accelerated pace, the EU must in addition encourage and insist that the underlying Kurdish problem must find its solution through a dialogue between the parties involved.

• The EU should, within the framework of the accession negotiations, act as an honest broker in fostering the dialogue.

• Elements of such a process, should include:

o A roadmap prepared by the EU, and agreed between the parties involved
o Benchmarking of the steps required,
o A ‘Truth and Reconciliation’ commission,
o In the final stages of the process, a general amnesty for the Kurdish guerrilla.

Altea, Spain, 11 February, 2005

Jon Rud
Secretary General
EU Turkey Civic Commissio