Armenia's situation is even more complex. Rapprochement between Moscow and Ankara destroyed Yerevan's traditional system of foreign policy guidelines. The Armenians were especially disappointed by that fact, that in their dialogue with the Turks, the Russians have absolutely ignored the interests of their strategic ally in the Caucasus. The subsequent activization of Russian-Azerbaijani contacts has caused even bigger concern in Yerevan. Though Iran is still the major support of Armenia, it is hardly possible to rely on it as before in confrontation with Azerbaijan and Turkey, taking into account the warming of relations between Tehran and Ankara.
The de-facto recognition of Turkish Cyprus by Azerbaijan in the summer of 2005 led to the reviving of the Armenian-Greek connection, but that was merely an echo of the large-scale participation by Yerevan in the geopolitical axis of Russia, Iran, Syria, and Greece.
Fearing of full isolation, Armenia gradually began to reconsider its foreign policy. Despite the protests of its powerful pro-Russian lobby, in 2005 Yerevan tried to speed up contact with the European Community and the USA. The soft-pedal activization of connections with Israel became a part of this policy.
The Armenian initiative
During the 1990s the Armenian-Israeli relations remained “in embryo.” Of all the CIS countries only Armenia and Tajikistan have no official representatives in Israel, and Israel has no representation in these states.
The first serious attempt to initiate contact with Tel Aviv was undertaken by Yerevan in May, 1999. The first round of negotiations between representatives of the foreign policy departments of the two countries took place in the Armenian capital. The Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs represented Israel. This event caused extreme irritation in Ankara and Teheran. Despite the reaction of the Iranian partners, in January, 2000, the Armenian President visited the Jewish State for the first time. However, further development of mutual relations was interrupted as the Al-Aqsa Intifada began in the autumn of the same year. The coverage of the events in the conflict zone by the Armenian mass media usually had a frankly anti-Israeli character. It was caused by the efforts of the pro-Iranian lobby in the business circles of the republic, and owing to the activity of the Israeli armies in the areas close to Armenian Church facilities in the Palestinian territories.
And even stronger blow to the fragile mutual relations was made by the official representative of the Jewish State. Rivka Cohen, who was heading the Israeli embassy in Tbilisi and responsible for connections with Yerevan, made a highly improper declaration in February, 2002. She publicly refused to recognize the events of 1915 in the Ottoman Empire to be the genocide of Armenians. Her statement caused the most serious reaction in Armenia. However, in reply to the indignation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the republic, the Israeli Foreign Service refused to correct the statement of its representative. The wave of the anti-Israeli publications in the Armenian press and statements of local politicians was enormous. Many demanded that the nation’s leaders break off any connection with the Jewish State. Yerevan, on the contrary, tried to smooth away the consequences of this unpleasant incident. In November, 2002, Israel was visited by Ruben Shugaryan, the Armenian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs. The following year, talking to Russian journalists he declared: "There are problems which puzzle us from time to time, in particular concerning the relations between Israel and Turkey. But we carry on political dialogue with Israel and we have an opportunity to discuss all urgent problems." Shortly before that, in January, 2003, David Peleg, the Deputy Director of Israel’s Foreign Department, came to Yerevan. According to the diplomats on both sides, these two visits served as a breakthrough toward development of the Armenian-Israeli relations.
According to our sources, in October, 2004, Yerevan was visited by two Israeli diplomats. Their arrival remained unnoticed by the journalists. At a meeting with the visitors from Tel Aviv, the Minister of Agriculture of the republic discussed questions of cooperation in this area. Summing up the results of the year, the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Armenia announced activization of contact with Israel within the framework of the United Nations, and also "in consular and intergovernmental spheres." One month after that, Shugaryan told Armenian journalists about the relations with Israel: "We have some distinctions in our visions of the Middle Eastern settlement, and there are certain constraining circumstances. But at the same time there is much what we will learn in the sphere of economy, information technologies, agriculture, medicine." Yerevan publicly showed interest in the development of cooperation with the Jewish State
The year 2005 appeared to be the most outstanding from the point of view of Armenian-Israeli relations, primarily due to the efforts of Yerevan. In May, Jerusalem was visited by the largest Armenian delegation, numbering almost 80 persons, in the history of bilateral contacts, Among them were Garegin II, the Catholicos of all Armenians, Ara Abramyan, Chairman of the World Congress of Armenians, Serge Sarkisyan, Minister of Defence of Armenia, Tigran Sarkisyan, the Head of Central Bank, and a number of the high-ranking diplomats and businessmen. Summing up the results of the visit, the Catholicos proclaimed "the beginning of a new era in relations between the Jews and the Armenians." The Head of the World Congress of Armenians added: "The relations between our countries are obviously at unsatisfactory level, and there is a necessity to develop them."
In November, following the invitation of the Catholicos, Israel’s Chief Rabbi, Yonah Metzger and the Member of Parliament of Russian origin, Yuri Stern, arrived in Yerevan. It is curious that according to the Azerbaijani journalists, the Embassy of Israel in Baku tried to deny these statements. "The Israeli position concerning the genocide of the Armenians remains unchanged. The statements of the Rabbi and of the Member of Parliament have an informal character and consequently of low significance," the comment of the press secretary of the Israeli diplomatic mission in Baku emphasized.
Despite the deterioration of relations with Turkey during recent years, in its contacts with Armenia the Jewish State still looks back at Ankara. However, after the beginning of Armenian Air Lines flights to Israel, one must first of all expect the reaction from Teheran...
The Russian Blockade of Armenia
The Russian president says that Armenia is one of the most reliable partners of his country. However, the relations between Moscow and Yerevan are far from a real partnership and are more remindful of the connection between an overlord and his vassal from the Middle Ages.
After Robert Kocharian's attempts to make a slight pro-Western turn in foreign policy, the Kremlin started purposefully to act on the preservation and strengthening of the economic and political isolation of Armenia.
Struggle for Transit of Iranian Gas
In May 2004 Armenia and Iran signed an agreement on construction of a gas pipeline connecting both countries. Since then Yerevan has striven to turn this project into a trans – regional arrangement. According to this plan, the gas from Iran should go through this pipeline to Armenia and further through Russian and Ukrainian territory to Europe. Realization of this plan would allow Yerevan to overcome economic isolation, and also to increase Armenian influence in Caucasian and Euroasian politics. The most important thing is that the construction of such a gas pipeline would transform Armenia into an important element of European power security policy. Azerbaijan and Georgia have already achieved a similar position as a result of the BTC oil pipeline.
Taking into account the geopolitical situation in the region, it was expected that Yerevan's idea would cause furious resistance in Washington. In fact, the gas pipe project would strengthen the economic and political position not only of Yerevan, but to a much greater degree that of Tehran (the supplier of gas). The United States is extremely uninterested in the increasing dependence of the European Community on the energy carriers of the Muslim countries, and especially those from Iran.
On the other hand, Russia as the largest regional ally of Armenia and Iran, should have promoted realization of this project in every possible way, especially as it contradicts the interests of the USA - the geopolitical competitor of Russia in Eurasia.
However, in reality, Moscow has taken an absolutely reverse position and is applying maximum effort not to allow realization of the gas pipeline project. One of the main reasons is the fear of growing independence in the power sphere, and accordingly political independence of Ukraine (because of such a gas pipe Kiev receives a very important alternative source of power supply). Additionally, Moscow aspires to prevent a rapprochement between Yerevan and Brussels. The strengthening of the connections between Armenia and the European Community threatens to put an end to the political and economic dependence of Yerevan on Moscow. Armenia is a major advanced post of the Russian presence in the Southern Caucasus. The loss of control over Yerevan would inevitably cause a weakening of the regional position of Moscow.
Brussels' interest in maintaining the greater independence of Kiev could lead to the construction of a gas pipe circumventing Russia in a roundabout way – at the bottom of Black sea. However, even in that case, Moscow would be inclined to support Ankara, insisting that the pipe has to pass through the territory of Turkey and Georgia – and not that of Armenia. It means that Yerevan, in any case, is out of the "East - West" corridor.
Simultaneously with attempts to block construction of a gas line on Armenian territory, Moscow supports construction of the Turkish-Caucasian railway Kars-Akhalkalaki-Tbilisi-Baku, designed to circumvent Armenia. Moscow pretends not to notice the numerous appeals of Yerevan to open the branch line, Gyumri (northwest of Armenia) - Kars. But at the same time the Russians are seriously considering another variant of the construction of the railway – the Iranian-Caucasian Kazvin-Resht-Astara railroad, which also would be built around Armenia. Thus, this Republic, due to Russia's concerns, would remain in transportation isolation.
As if this were not enough, the Kremlin is tightening a slipknot on the neck of its "most reliable partner" even more. In July, Moscow inspired mass disorders on grounds of separatism in the Georgian area of Samtskhe-Javakheti, populated mainly by Armenians and adjoining Armenia. Undoubtedly, Russia hoped to split and weaken Georgia. But it is obvious that events in Samtskhe-Javakheti provoked a growth of tension in Armenian-Georgian relations. Yerevan, in every possible way, is trying to normalize the situation as soon as possible, as a conflict with Tbilisi would mean a full blockade of Armenia. "Neither Armenian, nor Georgian sides are interested in creating new areas of tension", - the Prime Minister of Armenia Andranik Margarian emphasized during his visit to Tbilisi in July. He specified that Armenia would not question the autonomy of Samtskhe-Javakheti. However anti-Armenian moods in Georgia have already complicated the position of Armenia.
On the background of a quick strengthening of the regional alliance with Azerbaijan - Turkey - Georgia, Armenia appears to be in almost full isolation, thus becoming more and more dependent on Russia.
The de-facto recognition of Turkish Cyprus by Azerbaijan in the summer of 2005 led to the reviving of the Armenian-Greek connection, but that was merely an echo of the large-scale participation by Yerevan in the geopolitical axis of Russia, Iran, Syria, and Greece.
Fearing of full isolation, Armenia gradually began to reconsider its foreign policy. Despite the protests of its powerful pro-Russian lobby, in 2005 Yerevan tried to speed up contact with the European Community and the USA. The soft-pedal activization of connections with Israel became a part of this policy.
The Armenian initiative
During the 1990s the Armenian-Israeli relations remained “in embryo.” Of all the CIS countries only Armenia and Tajikistan have no official representatives in Israel, and Israel has no representation in these states.
The first serious attempt to initiate contact with Tel Aviv was undertaken by Yerevan in May, 1999. The first round of negotiations between representatives of the foreign policy departments of the two countries took place in the Armenian capital. The Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs represented Israel. This event caused extreme irritation in Ankara and Teheran. Despite the reaction of the Iranian partners, in January, 2000, the Armenian President visited the Jewish State for the first time. However, further development of mutual relations was interrupted as the Al-Aqsa Intifada began in the autumn of the same year. The coverage of the events in the conflict zone by the Armenian mass media usually had a frankly anti-Israeli character. It was caused by the efforts of the pro-Iranian lobby in the business circles of the republic, and owing to the activity of the Israeli armies in the areas close to Armenian Church facilities in the Palestinian territories.
And even stronger blow to the fragile mutual relations was made by the official representative of the Jewish State. Rivka Cohen, who was heading the Israeli embassy in Tbilisi and responsible for connections with Yerevan, made a highly improper declaration in February, 2002. She publicly refused to recognize the events of 1915 in the Ottoman Empire to be the genocide of Armenians. Her statement caused the most serious reaction in Armenia. However, in reply to the indignation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the republic, the Israeli Foreign Service refused to correct the statement of its representative. The wave of the anti-Israeli publications in the Armenian press and statements of local politicians was enormous. Many demanded that the nation’s leaders break off any connection with the Jewish State. Yerevan, on the contrary, tried to smooth away the consequences of this unpleasant incident. In November, 2002, Israel was visited by Ruben Shugaryan, the Armenian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs. The following year, talking to Russian journalists he declared: "There are problems which puzzle us from time to time, in particular concerning the relations between Israel and Turkey. But we carry on political dialogue with Israel and we have an opportunity to discuss all urgent problems." Shortly before that, in January, 2003, David Peleg, the Deputy Director of Israel’s Foreign Department, came to Yerevan. According to the diplomats on both sides, these two visits served as a breakthrough toward development of the Armenian-Israeli relations.
According to our sources, in October, 2004, Yerevan was visited by two Israeli diplomats. Their arrival remained unnoticed by the journalists. At a meeting with the visitors from Tel Aviv, the Minister of Agriculture of the republic discussed questions of cooperation in this area. Summing up the results of the year, the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Armenia announced activization of contact with Israel within the framework of the United Nations, and also "in consular and intergovernmental spheres." One month after that, Shugaryan told Armenian journalists about the relations with Israel: "We have some distinctions in our visions of the Middle Eastern settlement, and there are certain constraining circumstances. But at the same time there is much what we will learn in the sphere of economy, information technologies, agriculture, medicine." Yerevan publicly showed interest in the development of cooperation with the Jewish State
The year 2005 appeared to be the most outstanding from the point of view of Armenian-Israeli relations, primarily due to the efforts of Yerevan. In May, Jerusalem was visited by the largest Armenian delegation, numbering almost 80 persons, in the history of bilateral contacts, Among them were Garegin II, the Catholicos of all Armenians, Ara Abramyan, Chairman of the World Congress of Armenians, Serge Sarkisyan, Minister of Defence of Armenia, Tigran Sarkisyan, the Head of Central Bank, and a number of the high-ranking diplomats and businessmen. Summing up the results of the visit, the Catholicos proclaimed "the beginning of a new era in relations between the Jews and the Armenians." The Head of the World Congress of Armenians added: "The relations between our countries are obviously at unsatisfactory level, and there is a necessity to develop them."
In November, following the invitation of the Catholicos, Israel’s Chief Rabbi, Yonah Metzger and the Member of Parliament of Russian origin, Yuri Stern, arrived in Yerevan. It is curious that according to the Azerbaijani journalists, the Embassy of Israel in Baku tried to deny these statements. "The Israeli position concerning the genocide of the Armenians remains unchanged. The statements of the Rabbi and of the Member of Parliament have an informal character and consequently of low significance," the comment of the press secretary of the Israeli diplomatic mission in Baku emphasized.
Despite the deterioration of relations with Turkey during recent years, in its contacts with Armenia the Jewish State still looks back at Ankara. However, after the beginning of Armenian Air Lines flights to Israel, one must first of all expect the reaction from Teheran...
The Russian Blockade of Armenia
The Russian president says that Armenia is one of the most reliable partners of his country. However, the relations between Moscow and Yerevan are far from a real partnership and are more remindful of the connection between an overlord and his vassal from the Middle Ages.
After Robert Kocharian's attempts to make a slight pro-Western turn in foreign policy, the Kremlin started purposefully to act on the preservation and strengthening of the economic and political isolation of Armenia.
Struggle for Transit of Iranian Gas
In May 2004 Armenia and Iran signed an agreement on construction of a gas pipeline connecting both countries. Since then Yerevan has striven to turn this project into a trans – regional arrangement. According to this plan, the gas from Iran should go through this pipeline to Armenia and further through Russian and Ukrainian territory to Europe. Realization of this plan would allow Yerevan to overcome economic isolation, and also to increase Armenian influence in Caucasian and Euroasian politics. The most important thing is that the construction of such a gas pipeline would transform Armenia into an important element of European power security policy. Azerbaijan and Georgia have already achieved a similar position as a result of the BTC oil pipeline.
Taking into account the geopolitical situation in the region, it was expected that Yerevan's idea would cause furious resistance in Washington. In fact, the gas pipe project would strengthen the economic and political position not only of Yerevan, but to a much greater degree that of Tehran (the supplier of gas). The United States is extremely uninterested in the increasing dependence of the European Community on the energy carriers of the Muslim countries, and especially those from Iran.
On the other hand, Russia as the largest regional ally of Armenia and Iran, should have promoted realization of this project in every possible way, especially as it contradicts the interests of the USA - the geopolitical competitor of Russia in Eurasia.
However, in reality, Moscow has taken an absolutely reverse position and is applying maximum effort not to allow realization of the gas pipeline project. One of the main reasons is the fear of growing independence in the power sphere, and accordingly political independence of Ukraine (because of such a gas pipe Kiev receives a very important alternative source of power supply). Additionally, Moscow aspires to prevent a rapprochement between Yerevan and Brussels. The strengthening of the connections between Armenia and the European Community threatens to put an end to the political and economic dependence of Yerevan on Moscow. Armenia is a major advanced post of the Russian presence in the Southern Caucasus. The loss of control over Yerevan would inevitably cause a weakening of the regional position of Moscow.
Brussels' interest in maintaining the greater independence of Kiev could lead to the construction of a gas pipe circumventing Russia in a roundabout way – at the bottom of Black sea. However, even in that case, Moscow would be inclined to support Ankara, insisting that the pipe has to pass through the territory of Turkey and Georgia – and not that of Armenia. It means that Yerevan, in any case, is out of the "East - West" corridor.
Simultaneously with attempts to block construction of a gas line on Armenian territory, Moscow supports construction of the Turkish-Caucasian railway Kars-Akhalkalaki-Tbilisi-Baku, designed to circumvent Armenia. Moscow pretends not to notice the numerous appeals of Yerevan to open the branch line, Gyumri (northwest of Armenia) - Kars. But at the same time the Russians are seriously considering another variant of the construction of the railway – the Iranian-Caucasian Kazvin-Resht-Astara railroad, which also would be built around Armenia. Thus, this Republic, due to Russia's concerns, would remain in transportation isolation.
As if this were not enough, the Kremlin is tightening a slipknot on the neck of its "most reliable partner" even more. In July, Moscow inspired mass disorders on grounds of separatism in the Georgian area of Samtskhe-Javakheti, populated mainly by Armenians and adjoining Armenia. Undoubtedly, Russia hoped to split and weaken Georgia. But it is obvious that events in Samtskhe-Javakheti provoked a growth of tension in Armenian-Georgian relations. Yerevan, in every possible way, is trying to normalize the situation as soon as possible, as a conflict with Tbilisi would mean a full blockade of Armenia. "Neither Armenian, nor Georgian sides are interested in creating new areas of tension", - the Prime Minister of Armenia Andranik Margarian emphasized during his visit to Tbilisi in July. He specified that Armenia would not question the autonomy of Samtskhe-Javakheti. However anti-Armenian moods in Georgia have already complicated the position of Armenia.
On the background of a quick strengthening of the regional alliance with Azerbaijan - Turkey - Georgia, Armenia appears to be in almost full isolation, thus becoming more and more dependent on Russia.
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