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'Iraq's Impending Fracture to Produce Political Earthquake in Turkey''
nusual political stability in Turkey faces upheaval from Iraq's impending fracture along sectarian lines. The birth of an independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq will end Turkey's E.U. accession hopes. The collapse of the accession process will strongly undermine the legitimacy of the ruling Justice and Development Party (A.K.P.), making it increasingly vulnerable to political attacks from Turkey's secular establishment. These attacks could prompt the disintegration of the Erdogan government as soon as the end of 2006.
Sectarianism Governs Iraq
Far from providing the long-awaited impetus for political and social stability, the results of Iraq's December 2005 parliamentary election were another step toward the division of the country along sectarian lines. Secular candidates supported by the Bush administration were trounced in the election, while the broad victory of the Iran-backed Shi'a political parties undermined Washington's influence in Iraq. [See: "Red Lines Crisscross Iraq's Political Landscape"]
Thus far, it has been impossible for either Ibrahim al-Jaafari or his successor as prime minister, Nouri Maliki, to form a government. At the heart of Iraq's political impasse is the country's new U.S.-drafted constitution, which incomprehensibly calls for the division of political powers along sectarian lines.
The constitutionally-mandated division of political power in Iraq was meant to ensure that Shi'a, Kurds and Sunnis would participate equally in a government of "national unity." In practice, however, it has proved impossible for these disparate ethnic groups to reach a consensus for sharing cabinet positions.
Bush administration officials blame the escalation of sectarian violence in Iraq on the inability of the country's political parties to form a government. More likely, it is the other way around. Iraq's descent into civil war, which began with the February 2006 bombing of the al-Askari mosque in Samarra, has made it impossible for Shi'a and Sunni political parties to work together. Meanwhile, sectarian violence has raged out of control. At least 3,000 Iraqis have died in sectarian-related violence since February 2006.
Although Prime Minister Nouri Maliki is expected to soon fill his cabinet positions, Iraq's escalating civil war will continue to obstruct governance making it impossible for the country's new government to function. This, combined with the planned withdrawal in 2006 by most of Washington's coalition partners from Iraq, will pressure the Bush administration to begin withdrawing U.S. troops. A U.S. troop drawdown may be accelerated by electoral politics as the U.S. mid-term elections approach. The withdrawal of U.S.-led forces will fuel Iraq's civil war, speeding the country's fracture along sectarian lines.
Like Iraq's government, Washington played a strong role in the creation of the country's military, police and paramilitary organizations. As a result, these security organizations are also steeped in sectarianism, hence their role in enflaming Iraq's civil war. As foreign forces are withdrawn, Iraq's security organizations will devolve back into the Shi'a and Kurdish militias from which they were derived. These militias will be used to protect Shi'a and Kurdish territories, respectively. Compared to the Shi'a, the Kurdish militia, or peshmerga, is much better organized and more well-armed thanks to many years of U.S. support.
More than 90 percent of the Iraqi National Army troops stationed in northern Iraq, or Iraqi Kurdistan, hail from the Kurdish peshmerga. Rather than allegiance to a central military authority, these troops are loyal to peshmerga leaders. The Kurds have also maintained their peshmerga militia in northern Iraq. Combining these troops gives the Kurds a formidable army with which to defend its territory. Inevitably, Iraqi Kurds, who just anointed their own prime minister and parliament creating the Kurdistan Regional Government, will likely declare their independence from Iraq.
No E.U., No Erdogan
In the past six months, the Turkish military has amassed nearly 250,000 troops in southeastern Turkey and along the border between Turkey and Iraq. This buildup has two aims: thwarting Turkey's own Kurdish separatists operating in the region and protecting the interests of the Turcoman population in Iraqi Kurdistan. The birth of an independent Kurdistan could agitate Turkey's Kurdish population, which has suffered decades of repression at the hands of the Turkish military. It could also undermine the rights of the Turcoman living in Kurdistan.
The militarization of southeastern Turkey in response to Iraq's fracturing and moves toward Kurdish independence has already prompted new repression designed to foil any separatist designs by Turkey's Kurds. This repression, combined with probable Turkish military action against the new Kurdistan, will probably end Turkey's hopes of eventual E.U. accession. Without E.U. accession as an anchor, the Erdogan government will quickly lose its legitimacy.
In Turkey's November 2002 elections, the A.K.P. won a stunning 363 out of 550 parliamentary seats, allowing Prime Minister Erdogan to form the country's first single party government in over ten years. Turkey has a unique electoral system, which allows political parties to gain parliamentary representation only after surpassing a ten percent threshold in popular votes.
Heavy political fragmentation combined with growing disdain for traditional political parties allowed the A.K.P. to control 66 percent of the seats in Turkey's parliament despite gaining only 34 percent of the popular vote. That a government with Islamist roots came to power with such a weak popular mandate initially raised serious legitimacy questions within Turkey's secular establishment, which includes the business community, the judiciary and the military.
The Erdogan government strengthened its legitimacy by immediately and aggressively pursuing E.U. accession, an issue dear to Turkey's secularists. These Herculean efforts seemingly paid off in December 2004, when Brussels formally accepted Turkey's E.U. accession application. Accession negotiations subsequently commenced in October 2005. Nearly simultaneously, Kurdish nationalists, based in Iraq, began to launch increasingly bold attacks in Turkey, including military ambushes and civilian bombings.
Turkey's military leaders have been almost powerless to pursue Kurdish nationalists of Turkish origin in Iraq due to Washington's restraining hand. The Bush administration does not want to undermine its Kurdish partners in Iraq by allowing Turkish military operations in Iraqi Kurdistan. This is most likely because many in the Pentagon believe that Iraq's fracture along sectarian lines is unavoidable.
With no leverage over Iraq's Shi'a or Sunnis, Washington's only hope for maintaining military basing rights in Iraq is by cementing its relations with the Kurds. In addition, Turkey's military leadership, headed by General Hilmi Ozkok, has taken a pragmatic approach toward developments in Iraq and the broader implications of these developments for Turkey's E.U. membership. Nonetheless, a red line undoubtedly still exists for the Turkish military in Iraq. This red line is Kurdish independence.
In August 2006, General Ozkok will retire in favor of Turkish Ground Forces Commander General Yasar Buyukanit. General Buyukanit appears to have much more hawkish views toward the birth of an independent Kurdistan and Turkey's Kurds than General Ozkok. Buyukanit raised many eyebrows at home and abroad after stating that he would personally lead the Turkish military into northern Iraq should Iraqi Kurds establish an independent state.
In order to launch a military action against Iraq's Kurds and to contain the threat of secessionist activity by Turkish Kurds, the Turkish military has already begun to militarize southeastern Turkey. With Europeans focusing heavily on Turkey's ability to improve its human rights record, military action against Kurds in Iraq, military action against an independent Kurdistan and renewed oppression of Turkey's own Kurds will bring Istanbul's E.U. accession process to a screeching halt.
Conclusion
The collapse of Turkey's E.U. accession bid can be expected to raise significantly the political heat on the Erdogan government from Turkey's secular establishment. This heat will be amplified as the May 2007 presidential succession approaches. Turkey current president Ahmet Necdet Sezer has acted as a secular bulwark against the Erdogan government, using his power to veto A.K.P.-sponsored legislation and to reject many government appointments made by Erdogan.
Since Turkey's president is appointed by the country's parliament, the political party controlling parliament will decide who replaces Sezer. Barring early elections, this party will be the A.K.P. Turkey's secular establishment is unlikely to accept an A.K.P.-appointed Islamist as the country's next president. The Turkish military may find it quite convenient to intervene politically to prevent this. Intervention could provoke the collapse of the Erdogan government by late 2006 or early 2007.
Report Drafted By:
Jephraim P. Gundzik
nusual political stability in Turkey faces upheaval from Iraq's impending fracture along sectarian lines. The birth of an independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq will end Turkey's E.U. accession hopes. The collapse of the accession process will strongly undermine the legitimacy of the ruling Justice and Development Party (A.K.P.), making it increasingly vulnerable to political attacks from Turkey's secular establishment. These attacks could prompt the disintegration of the Erdogan government as soon as the end of 2006.
Sectarianism Governs Iraq
Far from providing the long-awaited impetus for political and social stability, the results of Iraq's December 2005 parliamentary election were another step toward the division of the country along sectarian lines. Secular candidates supported by the Bush administration were trounced in the election, while the broad victory of the Iran-backed Shi'a political parties undermined Washington's influence in Iraq. [See: "Red Lines Crisscross Iraq's Political Landscape"]
Thus far, it has been impossible for either Ibrahim al-Jaafari or his successor as prime minister, Nouri Maliki, to form a government. At the heart of Iraq's political impasse is the country's new U.S.-drafted constitution, which incomprehensibly calls for the division of political powers along sectarian lines.
The constitutionally-mandated division of political power in Iraq was meant to ensure that Shi'a, Kurds and Sunnis would participate equally in a government of "national unity." In practice, however, it has proved impossible for these disparate ethnic groups to reach a consensus for sharing cabinet positions.
Bush administration officials blame the escalation of sectarian violence in Iraq on the inability of the country's political parties to form a government. More likely, it is the other way around. Iraq's descent into civil war, which began with the February 2006 bombing of the al-Askari mosque in Samarra, has made it impossible for Shi'a and Sunni political parties to work together. Meanwhile, sectarian violence has raged out of control. At least 3,000 Iraqis have died in sectarian-related violence since February 2006.
Although Prime Minister Nouri Maliki is expected to soon fill his cabinet positions, Iraq's escalating civil war will continue to obstruct governance making it impossible for the country's new government to function. This, combined with the planned withdrawal in 2006 by most of Washington's coalition partners from Iraq, will pressure the Bush administration to begin withdrawing U.S. troops. A U.S. troop drawdown may be accelerated by electoral politics as the U.S. mid-term elections approach. The withdrawal of U.S.-led forces will fuel Iraq's civil war, speeding the country's fracture along sectarian lines.
Like Iraq's government, Washington played a strong role in the creation of the country's military, police and paramilitary organizations. As a result, these security organizations are also steeped in sectarianism, hence their role in enflaming Iraq's civil war. As foreign forces are withdrawn, Iraq's security organizations will devolve back into the Shi'a and Kurdish militias from which they were derived. These militias will be used to protect Shi'a and Kurdish territories, respectively. Compared to the Shi'a, the Kurdish militia, or peshmerga, is much better organized and more well-armed thanks to many years of U.S. support.
More than 90 percent of the Iraqi National Army troops stationed in northern Iraq, or Iraqi Kurdistan, hail from the Kurdish peshmerga. Rather than allegiance to a central military authority, these troops are loyal to peshmerga leaders. The Kurds have also maintained their peshmerga militia in northern Iraq. Combining these troops gives the Kurds a formidable army with which to defend its territory. Inevitably, Iraqi Kurds, who just anointed their own prime minister and parliament creating the Kurdistan Regional Government, will likely declare their independence from Iraq.
No E.U., No Erdogan
In the past six months, the Turkish military has amassed nearly 250,000 troops in southeastern Turkey and along the border between Turkey and Iraq. This buildup has two aims: thwarting Turkey's own Kurdish separatists operating in the region and protecting the interests of the Turcoman population in Iraqi Kurdistan. The birth of an independent Kurdistan could agitate Turkey's Kurdish population, which has suffered decades of repression at the hands of the Turkish military. It could also undermine the rights of the Turcoman living in Kurdistan.
The militarization of southeastern Turkey in response to Iraq's fracturing and moves toward Kurdish independence has already prompted new repression designed to foil any separatist designs by Turkey's Kurds. This repression, combined with probable Turkish military action against the new Kurdistan, will probably end Turkey's hopes of eventual E.U. accession. Without E.U. accession as an anchor, the Erdogan government will quickly lose its legitimacy.
In Turkey's November 2002 elections, the A.K.P. won a stunning 363 out of 550 parliamentary seats, allowing Prime Minister Erdogan to form the country's first single party government in over ten years. Turkey has a unique electoral system, which allows political parties to gain parliamentary representation only after surpassing a ten percent threshold in popular votes.
Heavy political fragmentation combined with growing disdain for traditional political parties allowed the A.K.P. to control 66 percent of the seats in Turkey's parliament despite gaining only 34 percent of the popular vote. That a government with Islamist roots came to power with such a weak popular mandate initially raised serious legitimacy questions within Turkey's secular establishment, which includes the business community, the judiciary and the military.
The Erdogan government strengthened its legitimacy by immediately and aggressively pursuing E.U. accession, an issue dear to Turkey's secularists. These Herculean efforts seemingly paid off in December 2004, when Brussels formally accepted Turkey's E.U. accession application. Accession negotiations subsequently commenced in October 2005. Nearly simultaneously, Kurdish nationalists, based in Iraq, began to launch increasingly bold attacks in Turkey, including military ambushes and civilian bombings.
Turkey's military leaders have been almost powerless to pursue Kurdish nationalists of Turkish origin in Iraq due to Washington's restraining hand. The Bush administration does not want to undermine its Kurdish partners in Iraq by allowing Turkish military operations in Iraqi Kurdistan. This is most likely because many in the Pentagon believe that Iraq's fracture along sectarian lines is unavoidable.
With no leverage over Iraq's Shi'a or Sunnis, Washington's only hope for maintaining military basing rights in Iraq is by cementing its relations with the Kurds. In addition, Turkey's military leadership, headed by General Hilmi Ozkok, has taken a pragmatic approach toward developments in Iraq and the broader implications of these developments for Turkey's E.U. membership. Nonetheless, a red line undoubtedly still exists for the Turkish military in Iraq. This red line is Kurdish independence.
In August 2006, General Ozkok will retire in favor of Turkish Ground Forces Commander General Yasar Buyukanit. General Buyukanit appears to have much more hawkish views toward the birth of an independent Kurdistan and Turkey's Kurds than General Ozkok. Buyukanit raised many eyebrows at home and abroad after stating that he would personally lead the Turkish military into northern Iraq should Iraqi Kurds establish an independent state.
In order to launch a military action against Iraq's Kurds and to contain the threat of secessionist activity by Turkish Kurds, the Turkish military has already begun to militarize southeastern Turkey. With Europeans focusing heavily on Turkey's ability to improve its human rights record, military action against Kurds in Iraq, military action against an independent Kurdistan and renewed oppression of Turkey's own Kurds will bring Istanbul's E.U. accession process to a screeching halt.
Conclusion
The collapse of Turkey's E.U. accession bid can be expected to raise significantly the political heat on the Erdogan government from Turkey's secular establishment. This heat will be amplified as the May 2007 presidential succession approaches. Turkey current president Ahmet Necdet Sezer has acted as a secular bulwark against the Erdogan government, using his power to veto A.K.P.-sponsored legislation and to reject many government appointments made by Erdogan.
Since Turkey's president is appointed by the country's parliament, the political party controlling parliament will decide who replaces Sezer. Barring early elections, this party will be the A.K.P. Turkey's secular establishment is unlikely to accept an A.K.P.-appointed Islamist as the country's next president. The Turkish military may find it quite convenient to intervene politically to prevent this. Intervention could provoke the collapse of the Erdogan government by late 2006 or early 2007.
Report Drafted By:
Jephraim P. Gundzik
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