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Sounds like double-talk to me. Why are these f*ckers so annoying?
1. `There are no victories and defeats when there is no solution.'
Interview by Tatul Hakobyan
Interview with Heikki Talvitie, former EU special representative
in the South Caucasus (2003-2006), Finnish former co-chair of
the OSCE Minsk Group (1995-1996)
Mr. Talvitie, what were, in general, the positions of the parties
during your co-chairmanship of the OSCE Minsk Group? In other words,
were the three conflicting parties ready to make daring compromises
for the sake of establishing peace in the region?
In those days when Finland was in the co-chairmanship, the system
was a little bit different from the present one. Russia and Finland
were co-chairs, and the Finnish co-chair was supported by the EU,
the US and Turkey within the Minsk Group. In the negotiations the
parties were Armenia, Azerbaijan and Nagorno Karabakh. Then Nizami
Bahmanov [representative of the Azerbaijani minority of Nagorno Karabakh]
was a silent partner in the Azeri delegation. So, this was the set-up.
We really had negotiations; we had a kind of basic document which was
finalized between the Russian and Finnish co-chairs and then discussed
in the Minsk Group. Basically, the dilemma was that, O. K. the parties
could not really agree, there was a general feeling that outside powers
were trying to impose a solution on Armenia, Azerbaijan and NK. So, you
had two difficulties. The parties could not get an agreement; secondly,
the parties together felt that outside powers had agreed on something to
impose on them. In that way we could not proceed very much.
You mean that the big powers were trying to impose some kind of a solution?
Not big powers but co-chairmen and the Minsk Group, because we were in
agreement, we had one text agreed upon, a kind of a basic document. At
that time, because the parties could not agree, they felt that somebody
was imposing a ready-made blend on them. Even though we continued to have
these negotiations all the time Finland was co-chair, basically these
efforts failed.
Former Russian mediator Vladimir Kazimirov confirms that then there were
contradictions between the co-chairs. In particular, the US was using
`neutral' Sweden to keep Russia from its aspirations to be the only
mediator. Do you remember contradictions between Russia on one hand
and the Minsk Group on the other?
When Finland was in the co-chair, then we agreed that once Kazimirov came
to the South Caucasus and was one of the co-chairmen then he had to consult
the Finnish co-chairmanship; that was the policy. But Kazimirov had another
hat; he was representing the President of Russia, and there we agreed that
if he acted in that capacity, that was the business of Russia, but that he
was the co-chair in consultations with the others.
As I understand, there were two Russias in the negotiation process.
Basically, yes.
In those days,what was the general formula for the solution of the conflict?
Was the maintenance of Azerbaijan's territorial integrity a priority?
You have always had this situation where you have two very strong principles-
the territorial integrity of a state and the self-determination of the
people. At that time we used both terms, we used the territorial integrity
of Azerbaijan and we used the term of self-determination of the people,
because at that time there was no real understanding of what would be the
status of NK. So, we used both terms.
Was there a point in 1995-1996 when the parties were extremely close to the
resolution of the conflict?
No, no, even not near a solution. Later you had a situation in Key West where,
very many people believed that the solution was very near, but I don't think
that Heidar Aliyev ever, let us say, accepted that. Basically, I think that
when returning home he understood that it would be hard there. So, it was near,
but basically it was not near. Now there is a situation where you have momentum,
let's say a creative Prague process, but there are outstanding questions
which are not solved and it is very hard to say whether you are near or whether
you are not near, because you are near when you can solve it, but up to now
nobody can say that.
Many countries recognize the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, but on the
other hand, for example, the United States does not prejudge the results of
the negotiations. In the mid-1990's did you discuss a kind of solution
whereby NK was not under Azerbaijani control?
No we did not discuss this because we never arrived at a situation where
there should be a clear picture of what kind of status NK should get. That is
why we used the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and at the same time the
self-determination of NK, because nobody knew whether it was autonomy,
independence, or together with Armenia, whether it was in the framework of
Azerbaijan. All these possibilities were open. There should be a balance
between those two basic principals, so that both principles will be valued.
Do you see any connection between the solution of the NK conflict and
regulation of Armenian-Turkish relations? Do you believe this two principal
issues in some way are connected?
There is a certain solidarity between Turkey and Azerbaijan. In that way the
NK conflict is connected with Turkish-Armenian relations, but this is not the
whole picture, because then you have Turkish-Armenian bilateral relations and
also you have some problems. Turkey has been in the Minsk Group and involved
in that way in conflict resolution and Armenia and Turkey have conducted some
bilateral discussions. In that way they are separate but belong together.
You were at the Lisbon summit in 1996. In Armenia some people believe that
Lisbon happened because of fraud in the 1996 presidential elections in Armenia.
What is your assessment; do you believe that because of rigged elections we
got Lisbon?
The Lisbon document afterwards was considered a victory for Azerbaijan and
a defeat for Armenia. And Armenia had domestic reasons why it was difficult
to arrive at a better document. That might be so, but in this conflict
resolution there are no victories and defeats when there is no solution.
The situation in Lisbon, in Key West - I mean you can always say the other
side was gaining and the other side was losing, but basically I don't
really buy this theory because if one side loses a lot, that is very bad
for the other side. It means you are not close to the solution, because
there is discrepancy of the interest and in that way I remember Finns
tried to calm down the situation in Lisbon. Basically, in Lisbon, Armenia
was isolated.
You are a former co-chair, now acting EU representative in the South Caucasus.
You knew the situation in the mid-1990s and you are aware of what is going
on now in the negotiation process. You met the former president of Armenia,
now you meet the acting president. What is your assessment - Who is more
flexible? There are lot of speculations that the first president, Levon
Ter-Petrossian, was much more flexible than Robert Kocharyan.
I don't see it this way. I met Ter-Petrossian when I was a co-chair, I met
him the time when I was here; I know what Ter-Petrossian wanted to do. At
that time it was really difficult to do that, also because of domestic
reasons in Armenia. Now when President Kocharyan is trying to solve this
problem, time is very different, very different. You cannot compare with
flexible and with not flexible if the time is different, if the political
situation is different. Basically, both presidents tried their best for
Armenia and NK to achieve a kind of solution that it could last. As you see,
so far there is no breakthrough in any negotiations because it is very
difficult. I confess it.
How did the format of the negotiations under the framework of the Minsk Group
change after Lisbon?
Everybody thought, because earlier on the Russians had told us also that they
were ready to accept the US as a co-chair. Everybody thought that the US was
a candidate. In the final moment of the Lisbon conference the US said that
they were not ready, and just to save the situation France said OK, we will
take it. So France saved the situation. After a few weeks the Americans said
that then they were ready. But France said they were co-chairman. That is why
we have three co-chairman.
Do you think that the co-chairs work in full harmony? Do you believe that a
Russian peace will be acceptable to the Americans or an American peace will
be acceptable to the Russians?
If you take Russia, the US and France, most probably those countries have
different ideas how the conflict should be solved. But if you take the
co-chairs, they have worked together, so they have to find solutions which
are attractive to the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan. Basically,
the co-chairs work in a way that they ask Armenia and Azerbaijan what might
be possible and they draft something and see whether it is possible. If
Armenia and Azerbaijan find a solution, then everybody will accept it.
The international community will accept it.
Can you recall any curious moments during your co-chairmanship?
The main curious situation came when the co-chairmen and the Minsk Group had
this joint position. When we came to Baku, Yerevan and Stepanakert, we found
out that all three were against us. They joined forces against us. The real
decision belongs to Armenia and Azerbaijan. Mediators can only assist.
February 21, 2006
1. `There are no victories and defeats when there is no solution.'
Interview by Tatul Hakobyan
Interview with Heikki Talvitie, former EU special representative
in the South Caucasus (2003-2006), Finnish former co-chair of
the OSCE Minsk Group (1995-1996)
Mr. Talvitie, what were, in general, the positions of the parties
during your co-chairmanship of the OSCE Minsk Group? In other words,
were the three conflicting parties ready to make daring compromises
for the sake of establishing peace in the region?
In those days when Finland was in the co-chairmanship, the system
was a little bit different from the present one. Russia and Finland
were co-chairs, and the Finnish co-chair was supported by the EU,
the US and Turkey within the Minsk Group. In the negotiations the
parties were Armenia, Azerbaijan and Nagorno Karabakh. Then Nizami
Bahmanov [representative of the Azerbaijani minority of Nagorno Karabakh]
was a silent partner in the Azeri delegation. So, this was the set-up.
We really had negotiations; we had a kind of basic document which was
finalized between the Russian and Finnish co-chairs and then discussed
in the Minsk Group. Basically, the dilemma was that, O. K. the parties
could not really agree, there was a general feeling that outside powers
were trying to impose a solution on Armenia, Azerbaijan and NK. So, you
had two difficulties. The parties could not get an agreement; secondly,
the parties together felt that outside powers had agreed on something to
impose on them. In that way we could not proceed very much.
You mean that the big powers were trying to impose some kind of a solution?
Not big powers but co-chairmen and the Minsk Group, because we were in
agreement, we had one text agreed upon, a kind of a basic document. At
that time, because the parties could not agree, they felt that somebody
was imposing a ready-made blend on them. Even though we continued to have
these negotiations all the time Finland was co-chair, basically these
efforts failed.
Former Russian mediator Vladimir Kazimirov confirms that then there were
contradictions between the co-chairs. In particular, the US was using
`neutral' Sweden to keep Russia from its aspirations to be the only
mediator. Do you remember contradictions between Russia on one hand
and the Minsk Group on the other?
When Finland was in the co-chair, then we agreed that once Kazimirov came
to the South Caucasus and was one of the co-chairmen then he had to consult
the Finnish co-chairmanship; that was the policy. But Kazimirov had another
hat; he was representing the President of Russia, and there we agreed that
if he acted in that capacity, that was the business of Russia, but that he
was the co-chair in consultations with the others.
As I understand, there were two Russias in the negotiation process.
Basically, yes.
In those days,what was the general formula for the solution of the conflict?
Was the maintenance of Azerbaijan's territorial integrity a priority?
You have always had this situation where you have two very strong principles-
the territorial integrity of a state and the self-determination of the
people. At that time we used both terms, we used the territorial integrity
of Azerbaijan and we used the term of self-determination of the people,
because at that time there was no real understanding of what would be the
status of NK. So, we used both terms.
Was there a point in 1995-1996 when the parties were extremely close to the
resolution of the conflict?
No, no, even not near a solution. Later you had a situation in Key West where,
very many people believed that the solution was very near, but I don't think
that Heidar Aliyev ever, let us say, accepted that. Basically, I think that
when returning home he understood that it would be hard there. So, it was near,
but basically it was not near. Now there is a situation where you have momentum,
let's say a creative Prague process, but there are outstanding questions
which are not solved and it is very hard to say whether you are near or whether
you are not near, because you are near when you can solve it, but up to now
nobody can say that.
Many countries recognize the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, but on the
other hand, for example, the United States does not prejudge the results of
the negotiations. In the mid-1990's did you discuss a kind of solution
whereby NK was not under Azerbaijani control?
No we did not discuss this because we never arrived at a situation where
there should be a clear picture of what kind of status NK should get. That is
why we used the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and at the same time the
self-determination of NK, because nobody knew whether it was autonomy,
independence, or together with Armenia, whether it was in the framework of
Azerbaijan. All these possibilities were open. There should be a balance
between those two basic principals, so that both principles will be valued.
Do you see any connection between the solution of the NK conflict and
regulation of Armenian-Turkish relations? Do you believe this two principal
issues in some way are connected?
There is a certain solidarity between Turkey and Azerbaijan. In that way the
NK conflict is connected with Turkish-Armenian relations, but this is not the
whole picture, because then you have Turkish-Armenian bilateral relations and
also you have some problems. Turkey has been in the Minsk Group and involved
in that way in conflict resolution and Armenia and Turkey have conducted some
bilateral discussions. In that way they are separate but belong together.
You were at the Lisbon summit in 1996. In Armenia some people believe that
Lisbon happened because of fraud in the 1996 presidential elections in Armenia.
What is your assessment; do you believe that because of rigged elections we
got Lisbon?
The Lisbon document afterwards was considered a victory for Azerbaijan and
a defeat for Armenia. And Armenia had domestic reasons why it was difficult
to arrive at a better document. That might be so, but in this conflict
resolution there are no victories and defeats when there is no solution.
The situation in Lisbon, in Key West - I mean you can always say the other
side was gaining and the other side was losing, but basically I don't
really buy this theory because if one side loses a lot, that is very bad
for the other side. It means you are not close to the solution, because
there is discrepancy of the interest and in that way I remember Finns
tried to calm down the situation in Lisbon. Basically, in Lisbon, Armenia
was isolated.
You are a former co-chair, now acting EU representative in the South Caucasus.
You knew the situation in the mid-1990s and you are aware of what is going
on now in the negotiation process. You met the former president of Armenia,
now you meet the acting president. What is your assessment - Who is more
flexible? There are lot of speculations that the first president, Levon
Ter-Petrossian, was much more flexible than Robert Kocharyan.
I don't see it this way. I met Ter-Petrossian when I was a co-chair, I met
him the time when I was here; I know what Ter-Petrossian wanted to do. At
that time it was really difficult to do that, also because of domestic
reasons in Armenia. Now when President Kocharyan is trying to solve this
problem, time is very different, very different. You cannot compare with
flexible and with not flexible if the time is different, if the political
situation is different. Basically, both presidents tried their best for
Armenia and NK to achieve a kind of solution that it could last. As you see,
so far there is no breakthrough in any negotiations because it is very
difficult. I confess it.
How did the format of the negotiations under the framework of the Minsk Group
change after Lisbon?
Everybody thought, because earlier on the Russians had told us also that they
were ready to accept the US as a co-chair. Everybody thought that the US was
a candidate. In the final moment of the Lisbon conference the US said that
they were not ready, and just to save the situation France said OK, we will
take it. So France saved the situation. After a few weeks the Americans said
that then they were ready. But France said they were co-chairman. That is why
we have three co-chairman.
Do you think that the co-chairs work in full harmony? Do you believe that a
Russian peace will be acceptable to the Americans or an American peace will
be acceptable to the Russians?
If you take Russia, the US and France, most probably those countries have
different ideas how the conflict should be solved. But if you take the
co-chairs, they have worked together, so they have to find solutions which
are attractive to the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan. Basically,
the co-chairs work in a way that they ask Armenia and Azerbaijan what might
be possible and they draft something and see whether it is possible. If
Armenia and Azerbaijan find a solution, then everybody will accept it.
The international community will accept it.
Can you recall any curious moments during your co-chairmanship?
The main curious situation came when the co-chairmen and the Minsk Group had
this joint position. When we came to Baku, Yerevan and Stepanakert, we found
out that all three were against us. They joined forces against us. The real
decision belongs to Armenia and Azerbaijan. Mediators can only assist.
February 21, 2006
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