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Genocide recognition by Turkey - not necissarily EU entry for it - but certainly the Turks are figuring out that the issue of the Genocide (denial) could very well end up derailing their bid...
ZAMAN
12.21.2005 Wednesday - ISTANBUL 19:57
[COMMENTARY]
Midnight Diplomacy:
On Turkish Relations with Europe
by
Hilal Elver & Richard Falk
With the drama of a last minute break in the deadlock created by Austrian opposition to the start of negotiations with the European Union to arrange Turkish membership a historic page has been turned.
Or has it? There is a clear sense that the majority of European governments want the negotiations to go forward, and at the end of the long road of at least a decade, see Turkey become a member, or if not that, at least remain engaged in a negotiating process that demonstrates that Europe is resolved to be a global actor, and not merely a Christian club.
There are many sharp curves and checkpoints on the road, and it needs to be remembered that for Turkey to be accepted the vote of governments must be unanimous, a prospect that cannot be reliably foreseen in the mists that cloud the future. Nor is failure a sure thing, and thus now is the time for the Turkish government and citizenry to do what it can to enhance the prospects for membership, but also to understand that the failure of the process is likely to be more of a setback for Europe than it is for Turkey.
Understanding the difficulties is a first step to moving forward on the negotiating road. Perhaps, the greatest difficulty at the present moment is the opposition of public opinion in many of the important European countries. It is hard to imagine success, whatever concessions Turkey makes on the substantive issues, given the results of the recent respected German Marshall Fund of the U.S. poll that reported that 11% in France, 15% in Germany, and only 32% in Britain favored Turkish membership. These are hard numbers to overcome, and at least in France, cannot be overcome if a promised referendum on membership produces a negative result. There are also signs that future political leadership in France and Germany is likely to be responsive to this anti-Turkish public opinion, making negotiating progress a near impossibility. At the same time, public opinion and politicians are fickle, can change course dramatically if perceived interests switch. The demographics of Europe favor such a swing. Within a decade, population declines in key European countries, will make Europe desperate to find an expanded labor pool to sustain its economies. Also if the Turkish continues its present impressive achievements of robust economic growth and legal reform, public attitudes are almost certain to become more favorable. Such an optimism is also likely to be encouraged if anxieties about Islamic political extremism diminish, which could happen if a new American leadership emerges that pursues a more moderate foreign policy that is sensitive to the grievances of the peoples of the Middle East, above all ending the Palestinian ordeal.
At the same time, there are a series of issues that need to be understood, and acted upon as constructively as possible. To begin with, the Austrian opposition to the negotiations, seems mainly symbolic, with deep historic roots. Austria, now a minor country in Europe, remembers that its greatest moment was in 1658 when it stopped the Ottoman expansion at the gates of Vienna, the start of a rollback of Turkish influence that took centuries of struggle. Is it too farfetched to suppose that by seeking to block Turkey’s peaceful entry into Europe in 2005 it is experiencing a taste of its former glory! There is nothing much that Turkey can or should do about this Austrian posture. Perhaps, down the line there are bargaining possibilities, given Austria’s support for EU membership for its historic Balkan ally, Croatia.
But on the more substantial issues that appear to be roadblocks there are steps to be taken: on the Armenian issue, on Kurdish rights, and on Cyprus. Each of these issues is complex, concerns Turkish domestic politics at least as much as it does relations with Europe, and should be addressed by Turkey outside the framework of formal negotiations with the EU. But there are steps forward that would both help Turkey, and possibly remove the roadblock.
On the Armenian issue it seems useful for the Turkish government to make a unilateral declaration of acknowledgement and apology in relation to the 1915-1918 events that resulted in the death of more than 800,000 Armenians. In line with Murat Belge’s recent suggestion, it is not necessary to enter the domain of high emotion by officially describing this ethnic tragedy as ‘genocide.’ There are genuine doubts about whether the killings of Armenians were accompanied by the sort of specific intent that the crime of genocide legally requires. (my/editors comment: bull xxxx!) Such a recommended declaration will not entirely satisfy the Armenian communities around the world, but it will be seen as a genuine effort, as it would be, by the Turkish government to own up to its responsibilities for these events. If it were accompanied by tangible gestures, such as the establishment of a museum to honor the Armenian heritage (editors/my comment: more then just this certainly - an Armenian genocide museum perhaps as well as very clear and unambigous acknowledgement and apology - not only for the Genocide - but for the smameful and hurtful dneial since...), and a diplomatic move toward reconciliation with the state of Armenia, real progress could result. Such a Turkish initiative must not be made in response to external pressures, and it would have to cope with an undoubted domestic backlash from ultra-nationalist sectors of Turkish public opinion. Despite such difficulties, it is a step worth taking, and consistent with the overall effort of the current Turkish leadership to improve Turkey’s human rights record.
On the Kurdish issue, the moves made by Ankara toward granting cultural and social rights to the Kurdish minority seem to be moving in the right direction. It is important to sustain this momentum, and not allow extremist elements among the Kurds and Turks, possibly manipulated by outside or inside forces, to define official policy. The most effective Turkish policy would be to combine support for Kurdish rights with a policy of increased investment in the development of a modern infrastructure in the Kurdish region and in social services, especially education and health.
On Cyprus, progress at present is more difficult. Turkey has pursued a creative path, culminating in the acceptance of the so-called ‘Annan Plan’ backed by the United Nations. There may some gain by seeking to reopen negotiations with Greek Cyprus based on the contours of an accommodation set forth there, dropping the explicit reference, but trying to revive a diplomacy of compromise. As with the other issues, Turkey should not move beyond its sense of Turkish interest and values, and should avoid the impression and reality of offering concessions as a means to ‘buy’ its way into the EU. The process has domestic risks, as well, including possible Kemalist anxieties that as negotiations with the EU go forward the old traditional secular parties will feel permanently excluded from political power, and in anticipation of such marginalization, may press for the reassertion of the military in Turkish political life, thereby derailing both the EU negotiations and the promise of Turkish democratization.
In the end, and this is our main point, Turkey does not need EU membership to move ahead. It has other options, including other regional groupings, either developing closer ties with neighbors or forming an economic and cultural community with likeminded countries such as Malaysia, Indonesia, possibly Singapore, even South Africa, Russia, China, and Brasil. Some of these possible alignments may sound farfetched at present, but the annals of international relations are filled with the unpredicted and unpredictable. At the same time, moving ahead means deepening and civilianizing democracy, advancing human rights, equitable development, and active regional and global diplomacy, which is fully consistent with trying hard to make the EU negotiations surmount the present array of formidable difficulties, and in the process making Turkey a stronger and more successful country. It may even be that learning and benefiting from the negotiating process may prove more valuable to Turkey than whether it ends with membership or not.
12.21.2005
ZAMAN
12.21.2005 Wednesday - ISTANBUL 19:57
[COMMENTARY]
Midnight Diplomacy:
On Turkish Relations with Europe
by
Hilal Elver & Richard Falk
With the drama of a last minute break in the deadlock created by Austrian opposition to the start of negotiations with the European Union to arrange Turkish membership a historic page has been turned.
Or has it? There is a clear sense that the majority of European governments want the negotiations to go forward, and at the end of the long road of at least a decade, see Turkey become a member, or if not that, at least remain engaged in a negotiating process that demonstrates that Europe is resolved to be a global actor, and not merely a Christian club.
There are many sharp curves and checkpoints on the road, and it needs to be remembered that for Turkey to be accepted the vote of governments must be unanimous, a prospect that cannot be reliably foreseen in the mists that cloud the future. Nor is failure a sure thing, and thus now is the time for the Turkish government and citizenry to do what it can to enhance the prospects for membership, but also to understand that the failure of the process is likely to be more of a setback for Europe than it is for Turkey.
Understanding the difficulties is a first step to moving forward on the negotiating road. Perhaps, the greatest difficulty at the present moment is the opposition of public opinion in many of the important European countries. It is hard to imagine success, whatever concessions Turkey makes on the substantive issues, given the results of the recent respected German Marshall Fund of the U.S. poll that reported that 11% in France, 15% in Germany, and only 32% in Britain favored Turkish membership. These are hard numbers to overcome, and at least in France, cannot be overcome if a promised referendum on membership produces a negative result. There are also signs that future political leadership in France and Germany is likely to be responsive to this anti-Turkish public opinion, making negotiating progress a near impossibility. At the same time, public opinion and politicians are fickle, can change course dramatically if perceived interests switch. The demographics of Europe favor such a swing. Within a decade, population declines in key European countries, will make Europe desperate to find an expanded labor pool to sustain its economies. Also if the Turkish continues its present impressive achievements of robust economic growth and legal reform, public attitudes are almost certain to become more favorable. Such an optimism is also likely to be encouraged if anxieties about Islamic political extremism diminish, which could happen if a new American leadership emerges that pursues a more moderate foreign policy that is sensitive to the grievances of the peoples of the Middle East, above all ending the Palestinian ordeal.
At the same time, there are a series of issues that need to be understood, and acted upon as constructively as possible. To begin with, the Austrian opposition to the negotiations, seems mainly symbolic, with deep historic roots. Austria, now a minor country in Europe, remembers that its greatest moment was in 1658 when it stopped the Ottoman expansion at the gates of Vienna, the start of a rollback of Turkish influence that took centuries of struggle. Is it too farfetched to suppose that by seeking to block Turkey’s peaceful entry into Europe in 2005 it is experiencing a taste of its former glory! There is nothing much that Turkey can or should do about this Austrian posture. Perhaps, down the line there are bargaining possibilities, given Austria’s support for EU membership for its historic Balkan ally, Croatia.
But on the more substantial issues that appear to be roadblocks there are steps to be taken: on the Armenian issue, on Kurdish rights, and on Cyprus. Each of these issues is complex, concerns Turkish domestic politics at least as much as it does relations with Europe, and should be addressed by Turkey outside the framework of formal negotiations with the EU. But there are steps forward that would both help Turkey, and possibly remove the roadblock.
On the Armenian issue it seems useful for the Turkish government to make a unilateral declaration of acknowledgement and apology in relation to the 1915-1918 events that resulted in the death of more than 800,000 Armenians. In line with Murat Belge’s recent suggestion, it is not necessary to enter the domain of high emotion by officially describing this ethnic tragedy as ‘genocide.’ There are genuine doubts about whether the killings of Armenians were accompanied by the sort of specific intent that the crime of genocide legally requires. (my/editors comment: bull xxxx!) Such a recommended declaration will not entirely satisfy the Armenian communities around the world, but it will be seen as a genuine effort, as it would be, by the Turkish government to own up to its responsibilities for these events. If it were accompanied by tangible gestures, such as the establishment of a museum to honor the Armenian heritage (editors/my comment: more then just this certainly - an Armenian genocide museum perhaps as well as very clear and unambigous acknowledgement and apology - not only for the Genocide - but for the smameful and hurtful dneial since...), and a diplomatic move toward reconciliation with the state of Armenia, real progress could result. Such a Turkish initiative must not be made in response to external pressures, and it would have to cope with an undoubted domestic backlash from ultra-nationalist sectors of Turkish public opinion. Despite such difficulties, it is a step worth taking, and consistent with the overall effort of the current Turkish leadership to improve Turkey’s human rights record.
On the Kurdish issue, the moves made by Ankara toward granting cultural and social rights to the Kurdish minority seem to be moving in the right direction. It is important to sustain this momentum, and not allow extremist elements among the Kurds and Turks, possibly manipulated by outside or inside forces, to define official policy. The most effective Turkish policy would be to combine support for Kurdish rights with a policy of increased investment in the development of a modern infrastructure in the Kurdish region and in social services, especially education and health.
On Cyprus, progress at present is more difficult. Turkey has pursued a creative path, culminating in the acceptance of the so-called ‘Annan Plan’ backed by the United Nations. There may some gain by seeking to reopen negotiations with Greek Cyprus based on the contours of an accommodation set forth there, dropping the explicit reference, but trying to revive a diplomacy of compromise. As with the other issues, Turkey should not move beyond its sense of Turkish interest and values, and should avoid the impression and reality of offering concessions as a means to ‘buy’ its way into the EU. The process has domestic risks, as well, including possible Kemalist anxieties that as negotiations with the EU go forward the old traditional secular parties will feel permanently excluded from political power, and in anticipation of such marginalization, may press for the reassertion of the military in Turkish political life, thereby derailing both the EU negotiations and the promise of Turkish democratization.
In the end, and this is our main point, Turkey does not need EU membership to move ahead. It has other options, including other regional groupings, either developing closer ties with neighbors or forming an economic and cultural community with likeminded countries such as Malaysia, Indonesia, possibly Singapore, even South Africa, Russia, China, and Brasil. Some of these possible alignments may sound farfetched at present, but the annals of international relations are filled with the unpredicted and unpredictable. At the same time, moving ahead means deepening and civilianizing democracy, advancing human rights, equitable development, and active regional and global diplomacy, which is fully consistent with trying hard to make the EU negotiations surmount the present array of formidable difficulties, and in the process making Turkey a stronger and more successful country. It may even be that learning and benefiting from the negotiating process may prove more valuable to Turkey than whether it ends with membership or not.
12.21.2005