Georgian-South Ossetian conflict

[Federate]

Re: Georgian-South Ossetian conflict

Pacific Island Recognizes Georgian Rebel Region


SUKHUMI, Georgia (Reuters) - The tiny Pacific island of Nauru recognized the rebel Black Sea region of Abkhazia on Tuesday, throwing its weight behind a Russian drive to win international recognition for Georgia's breakaway territories.

The island of 14,000 people joined Russia, Nicaragua and Venezuela in recognizing Abkhazia, following a five-day war last year between Russia and Georgia over breakaway South Ossetia.

"We have established relations with the world's biggest nation (Russia), and now with the smallest," Abkhaz Foreign Minister Sergei Shamba told Reuters.

But Georgia said Russia had "bought recognition." "It doesn't change anything in international politics," said Minister for Reintegration Temur Iakobashvili. "If someone is happy that Abkhazia is now recognized by the country no one knew about yesterday, let him be happy."

Russia's Kommersant newspaper cited a source on Monday as saying Nauru had asked Russia for $50 million for projects on the island, which once made its money from exporting phosphates mined from fossilized bird droppings.

Asked if Nauru had been paid to recognize Abkhazia, Shamba replied: "You don't establish diplomatic relations like that ... although of course the entire international practice is sheer bargaining to a certain extent."

LOBBYING LATIN AMERICAN

Shamba said Abkhazia was lobbying Latin American countries and the Middle East, but the process was "hampered by mighty forces," such as the United States and European Union.

Russia's RIA Novosti quoted Nauru Foreign Minister Kieren Keke as saying: "I hope that other countries will follow our example and also recognize the independence of Abkhazia."

Nauru, an island of 21 square km (8 square miles), gained independence in 1968 and joined the United Nations in 1999 as the world's smallest independent republic, according to the CIA World Factbook. It is 14,000 km (8,700 miles) from Abkhazia.

Abkhazia and South Ossetia broke away from Georgian rule in wars in the early 1990s after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

After mounting tensions, Georgia launched an assault on South Ossetia in August 2008, triggering a devastating Russian counter-strike.

Russian forces now control the borders of both regions and patrol Abkhazia's coastline, once the playground of the Moscow elite. Both regions are overwhelmingly dependent on Russia for security and economic support.

Nauru has also recognized Western-backed Kosovo, which declared independence from Serbia in February 2008 over Russian objections. Kosovo has so far been recognized by 63 countries.

Venezuela recognized Georgia's rebel regions in September during a trip by President Hugo Chavez to Moscow when he sealed a deal to buy Russian tanks and hardware worth a reported $500 million.

(Additional reporting by Aydar Buribayev in Moscow; Writing by Matt Robinson; Editing by David Stamp)

http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2009/12/15/world/international-us-russia-georgia-nauru.html

[Federate]

Re: Georgian-South Ossetian conflict

Nagorno Karabakh recognises Abkhazia


By Messenger Staff
Wednesday, March 10

Armenian and Russian media outlets have recently reported that the unrecognised 'Nagorno Karabakh Republic' (NKR) has recognised Abkhazia as an independent state. Representatives of the Georgian Government see this as rather a joke. One unrecognised entity has recognised another, so what? This is meaningless. However the Georgian population and some opposition members have reacted angrily to the NKR's declaration, as it is understood that it would not take such a decision without the consent of Yerevan.

The newspaper Asaval-Dasavali comments that neither Bagapsh nor Kokoity takes any serious decisions without Moscow’s consent. Similarly the Karabakh leadership does not take any decisions without Yerevan’s endorsement. What is particularly annoying to Georgians is that this declaration has come just after the Georgian President has hosted his Armenian counterpart in Batumi and the Larsi checkpoint has been reopened, to the great satisfaction of the Armenian side. The popular view is that Georgia has taken Armenia’s interests into consideration but it seems Armenia does not do the same in return. Opposition members are particularly critical of Saakashvili for putting the country in this position.

The report that Abkhazia has been recognised by Karabakh has not been officially confirmed. The outlets saying this are quoting the so-called Foreign Relations Committee Chairman of the Karabakh Parliament Vargam Atanesian, who has allegedly said that so-called Karabakh President Bako Saakian's presence at the inauguration of so-called Abkhazian President Bagapsh is a confirmation of this recognition and in the near future Stepanakert and Sokhumi will establish diplomatic relations.

Georgian Minister of Reintegration Temur Iakobashvili has called the reports misinformation. Political analyst Mamuka Areshidze also thinks that an oral statement not confirmed by a document has no meaning at all. He also doubts that the Armenian leadership would allow such a thing to happen. If the report is just a vague warning we should analyse who it is targeted at, but if the report is true Tbilisi will need to clear the matter up with Yerevan. Maybe misinformation has been deliberately put out to see what Georgia’s reaction would be, but if the report is true Moscow will be the main beneficiary of the NKR's action, because it will help it further its divide and rule policy, as if it needs any more help.

Some analysts think that Russia actually wanted to keep the recently reopened Larsi checkpoint closed, as this made it a source of potential confrontation between Armenia and Georgia. In the event of such a conflict Russia would have even more opportunities to intervene and chop up the territories of its neighbours. All this might explain Georgia's desire to reopen it, but you can only reopen the checkpoint once. NKR recognising Abkhazia may be nonsense, but there is such a thing as dangerous nonsense.

http://www.messenger.com.ge/issues/2060_march_10_2010/2060_edit.html

[ashot24]

Re: Georgian-South Ossetian conflict

In a matter of ethics, we should recognize Abkhazia's independence. But in a matter of politics and international relationships, we shouldn't. We don't another border closed or another angry enemy that could easily engage itself with other angry enemy with the intention to hurt us.

[Haykakan]

Re: Georgian-South Ossetian conflict

So long as we dont piss off russia we will be fine. Like youkrain we will soon see a change in georgia to.

[Armanen]

Re: Georgian-South Ossetian conflict

So long as we dont piss off russia we will be fine. Like youkrain we will soon see a change in georgia to.

I'm looking forward to that day.

[Haykakan]

Re: Georgian-South Ossetian conflict

KARSI-AKHALKALAKI RAILWAY ISSUES

The Messenger
March 11 2010
Georgia

The Karsi-Akhalkalaki railway connecting Turkey to Azerbaijan via
Georgia which is under construction was initiated and financed
by Turkey and Azerbaijan. The appropriate agreement was signed on
February 7, 2007, but some controversies between the two countries
have delayed its implementation. Now however it seems Turkey is
facing some complications and the railway construction might proceed
more intensively.

Armenia was against this project from the very beginning and the
so-called football diplomacy sessions, at which the Presidents
of Armenia and Azerbaijan visited each other's countries to watch
football matches, have made reopening the borders between Armenia and
Turkey possible. The construction of Karsi-Akhalkalaki almost stopped
completely in 2009 in consequence, however current developments show
that Azerbaijan still needs this railway and Turkey has also realised
the necessity of it, even only as a bargaining tool with Armenia.

The Ministry of Economy of Georgia states that 30-35% of the work on
the Georgian segment is finished but an extra two years are needed to
complete all of it. Georgia is therefore on standby while the major
players clarify their positions.

[Haykakan]

Re: Georgian-South Ossetian conflict

NO MILITARY CARGO THROUGH U.LARS, SAYS GEORGIAN AMBASSADOR

Aysor
March 11 2010
Armenia

"Neither bullet will pass through the Upper-Lars Checkpoint," said at
today's briefing Georgia's Ambassador to Armenia Grigol Tabatadze, when
asked to comment statements by the Azerbaijani side that the checkpoint
will be used for transportation of Russian-made weapons to Armenia.

"I'd like to remind that there is a rule of occupation, which came
in force in Georgia after Parliament's approval, and this rule bans
any military cooperation with Russia. So, neither military cargo will
pass through the Upper-Lars Checkpoint," he stressed.

Ambassador Tabatadze also pointed that the checkpoint's opening
doesn't mark any Georgia-Russia reconciliation, and added that the
talks on Upper-Lars were held in Armenia.

"The talks were held in Armenia, but they were not direct, and the
Armenian side was a mediator," said Georgian Ambassador.

He also said of the fact that Georgia will receive neither financial
nor economic profit from the opening of the Upper-Lars Checkpoint,
as in accordance with the county's law, a transit isn't subjected to
a tax.

[Federate]

Re: Georgian-South Ossetian conflict

New Blueprint Proposed For Georgia, Abkhazia, South Ossetia

August 11, 2010

Writing on August 9 in "The Moscow Times" to mark the second anniversary of the Russia-Georgia war, Moscow Carnegie Center Director Dmitry Trenin proposed a new approach to resolving the deadlock between Georgia and the breakaway republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Trenin suggests that Abkhazia should cede its southeastern Gali province to Georgia in return for formal recognition by Tbilisi of the rest of Abkhazia as an independent state. South Ossetia, by contrast, would have a status similar to that of Andorra, retaining "the trappings of formal independence," but with Georgia maintaining a legal presence and serving as guarantor of the security of Georgian displaced persons who choose to return to the region.

Several longtime observers of the South Caucasus, including Dennis Sammut of the British NGO Links, have repeatedly stressed the need for the international community to demonstrate greater imagination and intellectual boldness in formulating approaches to resolving the region's deadlocked conflicts that have never been applied before, but that would satisfy all parties concerned in terms of an acceptable balance between benefits and concessions.

The EU's new policy with regard to Abkhazia, which entails engagement without formal recognition, is a welcome first step in that direction. But Trenin's "thinking outside the box" goes much further.

'Thinking Outside The Box'

Trenin differentiates clearly between the two breakaway regions, pointing out that Abkhazia could survive and prosper as an independent state, whereas South Ossetia has little hope of doing so. That Moscow too sees the two regions differently is clear from Russian President Dmitry Medvedev's visit to Abkhazia on August 8. No senior Russian political figure paid a comparable visit to South Ossetia.

Trenin does not present his options for Abkhazia and South Ossetia as a two halves of a composite whole, let alone suggest the optimum time frame and sequence for their implementation, or how such agreements should be negotiated and whether they should be put to a referendum among the population of the entities concerned. But insofar as the chances of Georgia agreeing to cede most of Abkhazia are negligible, at least as long as Mikheil Saakashvili remains president, it would make sense to regulate relations with South Ossetia first.

Nor does Trenin discuss in detail what each of the conflict parties, and Russia, would stand to gain and lose. Georgia would lose face by accepting de jure that de facto it lost control of Abkhazia 17 years ago and has little hope of ever regaining it. But partitioning Abkhazia would enable those Georgian displaced persons who have not yet done so to return to Gali. This would remove a potential threat to Georgian political stability, insofar as protests have been reported almost daily in recent weeks by displaced persons summarily evicted from their temporary accommodation. The population of Gali prior to the 1992-93 war was overwhelmingly Georgian.

While the Abkhaz leadership would similarly be reluctant to cede Gali, doing so would avert the prospect of the Abkhaz becoming a minority on their own territory following the repatriation of 150,000-180,000 Georgians. That is one of the arguments the Abkhaz adduce against allowing all Georgian displaced persons to return to Abkhazia.

Giving up Gali would, however, move the border between Abkhazia and Georgia closer to Sukhumi, which would thus become more vulnerable to a new Georgian aggression. Trenin does not discuss the possibility of either making Gali an international protectorate for a limited period prior to ceding it to Georgia, or of deploying an international (preferably EU) peacekeeping contingent along the new border. Either or both might make a partition more palatable to the Abkhaz side.

Tiny, impoverished and isolated, South Ossetia, which is currently dependent on subsidies from Russia for 98 percent of its annual budget, has little hope of surviving as an independent state. Whether its Ossetian population, haunted by memories of the Georgian offensive two years ago, would willingly accept the Andorra-like status and concomitant Georgian presence Trenin proposes is questionable, however. But neither Georgia nor the international community would countenance the only viable alternative -- unification with North Ossetia, either as an independent state or within the Russian Federation.

Russia, which over the past two years has systematically enhanced its long-term military presence in both Abkhazia and South Ossetia, would likewise lose out under Trenin's scenario. Trenin affirms that Georgian recognition of Abkhazia would render a Russian military presence there "less relevant," but does not explain why. That line of reasoning holds up only if one rules out the possibility that a future Georgian leadership might renege on the formal recognition of Abkhaz independence.

Similarly, under the status Trenin proposes for South Ossetia, Russia would have to withdraw its forces north of the Roki Tunnel, although it "would retain the right to protect South Ossetians." That formulation too implies that Tbilisi might renege on any agreement it signed.

For all its flaws, however, Trenin's blueprint is arguably more realistic and more workable than Georgia's "State Strategy for the Occupied Territories" that both Abkhazia and South Ossetia have rejected out of hand.

http://www.rferl.org/content/New_Blueprint_Proposed_For_Georgia_Abkhazia_South_Ossetia/2124966.html

[Federate]

Re: Georgian-South Ossetian conflict

The Abkhazian vice president was wounded in a mortar attack on his village house today. His condition is not life-threatening. No one has been blamed for the attack so far.

[Mos]

Re: Georgian-South Ossetian conflict

New Blueprint Proposed For Georgia, Abkhazia, South Ossetia

August 11, 2010

Writing on August 9 in "The Moscow Times" to mark the second anniversary of the Russia-Georgia war, Moscow Carnegie Center Director Dmitry Trenin proposed a new approach to resolving the deadlock between Georgia and the breakaway republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Trenin suggests that Abkhazia should cede its southeastern Gali province to Georgia in return for formal recognition by Tbilisi of the rest of Abkhazia as an independent state. South Ossetia, by contrast, would have a status similar to that of Andorra, retaining "the trappings of formal independence," but with Georgia maintaining a legal presence and serving as guarantor of the security of Georgian displaced persons who choose to return to the region.

Several longtime observers of the South Caucasus, including Dennis Sammut of the British NGO Links, have repeatedly stressed the need for the international community to demonstrate greater imagination and intellectual boldness in formulating approaches to resolving the region's deadlocked conflicts that have never been applied before, but that would satisfy all parties concerned in terms of an acceptable balance between benefits and concessions.

The EU's new policy with regard to Abkhazia, which entails engagement without formal recognition, is a welcome first step in that direction. But Trenin's "thinking outside the box" goes much further.

'Thinking Outside The Box'

Trenin differentiates clearly between the two breakaway regions, pointing out that Abkhazia could survive and prosper as an independent state, whereas South Ossetia has little hope of doing so. That Moscow too sees the two regions differently is clear from Russian President Dmitry Medvedev's visit to Abkhazia on August 8. No senior Russian political figure paid a comparable visit to South Ossetia.

Trenin does not present his options for Abkhazia and South Ossetia as a two halves of a composite whole, let alone suggest the optimum time frame and sequence for their implementation, or how such agreements should be negotiated and whether they should be put to a referendum among the population of the entities concerned. But insofar as the chances of Georgia agreeing to cede most of Abkhazia are negligible, at least as long as Mikheil Saakashvili remains president, it would make sense to regulate relations with South Ossetia first.

Nor does Trenin discuss in detail what each of the conflict parties, and Russia, would stand to gain and lose. Georgia would lose face by accepting de jure that de facto it lost control of Abkhazia 17 years ago and has little hope of ever regaining it. But partitioning Abkhazia would enable those Georgian displaced persons who have not yet done so to return to Gali. This would remove a potential threat to Georgian political stability, insofar as protests have been reported almost daily in recent weeks by displaced persons summarily evicted from their temporary accommodation. The population of Gali prior to the 1992-93 war was overwhelmingly Georgian.

While the Abkhaz leadership would similarly be reluctant to cede Gali, doing so would avert the prospect of the Abkhaz becoming a minority on their own territory following the repatriation of 150,000-180,000 Georgians. That is one of the arguments the Abkhaz adduce against allowing all Georgian displaced persons to return to Abkhazia.

Giving up Gali would, however, move the border between Abkhazia and Georgia closer to Sukhumi, which would thus become more vulnerable to a new Georgian aggression. Trenin does not discuss the possibility of either making Gali an international protectorate for a limited period prior to ceding it to Georgia, or of deploying an international (preferably EU) peacekeeping contingent along the new border. Either or both might make a partition more palatable to the Abkhaz side.

Tiny, impoverished and isolated, South Ossetia, which is currently dependent on subsidies from Russia for 98 percent of its annual budget, has little hope of surviving as an independent state. Whether its Ossetian population, haunted by memories of the Georgian offensive two years ago, would willingly accept the Andorra-like status and concomitant Georgian presence Trenin proposes is questionable, however. But neither Georgia nor the international community would countenance the only viable alternative -- unification with North Ossetia, either as an independent state or within the Russian Federation.

Russia, which over the past two years has systematically enhanced its long-term military presence in both Abkhazia and South Ossetia, would likewise lose out under Trenin's scenario. Trenin affirms that Georgian recognition of Abkhazia would render a Russian military presence there "less relevant," but does not explain why. That line of reasoning holds up only if one rules out the possibility that a future Georgian leadership might renege on the formal recognition of Abkhaz independence.

Similarly, under the status Trenin proposes for South Ossetia, Russia would have to withdraw its forces north of the Roki Tunnel, although it "would retain the right to protect South Ossetians." That formulation too implies that Tbilisi might renege on any agreement it signed.

For all its flaws, however, Trenin's blueprint is arguably more realistic and more workable than Georgia's "State Strategy for the Occupied Territories" that both Abkhazia and South Ossetia have rejected out of hand.

http://www.rferl.org/content/New_Blu...a/2124966.html

Georgia should agree to something like this, after the 2008 war there's no way they're going to get back those territories (unless they want the other half of their country invaded.)