The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

[North Pole]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

Russia ‘Not Worried’ About Armenia’s NATO, Georgia Ties

[/CENTER]

Russia is not alarmed by Armenia’s growing cooperation with NATO and welcomes its main regional ally’s efforts to expand economic ties with Georgia after the recent Russian-Georgian war, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said on Friday.

So Armenia wants to be in NATO too. Well.... well... well....

NATO Build-Up On Russia's Borders Worst Treachery Since Munich 1938

by Valentin Zorin

Allow me to start off with a personal recollection. I accompanied Mikhail Gorbachev on his visit to the United States of America almost seventeen years ago, and attended, as another adviser, Gorbachev’s meetings with George Bush Sr., and that gave me a rare chance to watch what historians of the future will surely be inclined to describe as the biggest breach of confidence and compare to the notoriously known Munich agreement between France and Britain, on the one hand, and Nazi Germany, on the other.

Mikhail Gorbachev and George Bush Sr. focused on the reunification of divided Germany. President Bush saw the reunification of Germany as a fundamental factor of continental stability and global detente.

He repeatedly assured Soviet leader Gorbachev that the reunification of Germany would never take the North Atlantic Alliance closer to the Soviet border. I can still open my old notebook or play back an old tape to recall what he said: “The allied forces will not be inching closer to your border.”

The arrival of NATO forces at the border of Russia translates into more than a threat to the Russian Federation. Russia will find a way to meet this threat. The American super-hawks had better remember that Russia remains a powerful country with impressive stocks of nuclear missiles.

READ MORE - http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.p...xt=va&aid=4918

[Armanen]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

No, Armenia has no intentions to join nato. Lavrov meant that Armenia's foreign policy of complimentarity doesn't bother Moscow. And Russia understands that a majority of Armenia's economic activity goes thru georgia, therefore in the near future Armenia isn't going to antagonize georgia.

[Armenian]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

So Armenia wants to be in NATO too. Well.... well... well...

Stop acting silly, NP. Had you 'read' past the headline you would have see this comment by Lavrov.

“We too maintain the formats of our relationships with NATO countries. We have a Russia-NATO council that continues to exist, even though some members of the alliance would like to suspend discussion of important issues.”

And this.

“We have no differences with our Armenian friends on what kind of a NATO we want to interact with and how,” he said. Lavrov added that Russia “can only welcome” Armenian-Georgian economic agreements that were reportedly reached during President Serzh Sarkisian’s visit to Tbilisi earlier this week... “I hope that these agreements will prevent a repeat of situations during the Caucasian crisis that resulted in artificial obstacles on Georgian territory to the traffic of goods to Armenia,” Lavrov said. “I think these agreements will contribute to the economic development of our ally.”

Official Yerevan has repeatedly stated that it has no intentions of seeking NATO membership. And realize this, if Moscow somehow loses Armenia's genuine friendship, it will lose the entire Caucasus.

[TomServo]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

From 2003 Armenian Forum (it would be great to find the actual article):

Chaliand: Armenia and Russia Must Stand Together in Spite of Iraq War

Respected Strategist is Featured in Armenian Forum

Princeton, NJ (30 May 2003)—The occupation of Iraq diminishes the importance of Turkey to the United States, acknowledges Gérard Chaliand, one of the world’s leading authorities on geopolitics. It does not, however, diminish the importance of the Armenia-Russia alliance, he warns. Chaliand’s comments appear in the current issue of Armenian Forum: A Journal of Contemporary Affairs, released in late May.

In a wide-ranging conversation with the journal’s editor, Vincent Lima, Chaliand discusses the war and what it means for Iraq’s neighbors, including Armenia and Gharabagh. Making a vital point often neglected in Armenian political discourse, Chaliand underscores the importance of Armenia to Russia.

Chaliand has been a participant observer in numerous conflicts—from Africa to Afghanistan, from Vietnam to Kurdistan. He is the author of many books, including Revolution in the Third World (1977), Strategic Atlas: A Comparative Geopolitics of the World’s Powers (with Jean-Pierre Rageau, 1992), and The Art of War in World History (1994). His latest book is America Is Back: Les nouveaux césars du pentagone (with Arnaud Blin, 2003).

Turkey Defies the United States

On the eve of the war in Iraq, Turkey withheld staging rights from American forces seeking to mount a northern front against Iraq. In doing so, Turkey jeopardized its special relationship with the United States and, most immediately, a thirty billion dollar American investment in Turkey’s troubled economy. Why did it do so?

Lima suggests that the Turkish Parliament was being “admirably responsive to popular sentiment.” Also, as Turkey hopes to join European Union, it was being sensitive to the concerns of France and Germany, which opposed the war. Another possibility is that Turkey wanted to accompany American forces as they occupied northern Iraq, where Kurds enjoy autonomy. Perhaps Turkey withheld its permission as long as the U.S. refused to let the Turkish military come along, Lima conjectures.

Chaliand dismisses the notion that Turkey was concerned with European opinion: “Turkey has no other choice than to remain an ally of the United States.” He agrees, however, that the “United States was absolutely against any Turkish military involvement in northern Iraq.” Such involvement “would have created a war within the war in a situation that was already complex.”

Does the occupation of Iraq by the United States change things for Armenia and Gharabagh? Does it, for example, diminish the importance of Turkey to the United States? “Turkey will remain an important ally of the United States, though less important than yesterday,” Chaliand asserts. Thus, for instance, “United States air bases in Iraq will lessen the importance of the Incirlik base in Turkey.”

Lima suggests that this diminished importance takes pressure off Armenia. It creates new opportunities for the Armenian lobby in the U.S. to press Turkey to lift the blockade of Armenia and open the border. Chaliand does not address the question, but he warns against an overly heavy reliance on the United States.

Russia Needs Armenia

Armenia’s “alliance with Russia is important to Russia because the southern Caucasus is the key to the northern Caucasus (Chechnya, Ingushetia, Dagestan, etc.) It protects the northern part of the Caucasus up to Stavropol',” says Chaliand. “On the other hand, what is Armenia for the United States? It has no oil like Azerbaijan, and is less than willing to act against Russian interests like Georgia.

“While it is wise to have good relationships with both Russia and the United States, it is Russia, I think, that would do something to protect Armenia if needed.”

The conversation covers other important ground as well. Lima and Chaliand discuss the prospects for the establishment of a Kurdish state as well as Turkey’s chances of admission to the European Union.

Lima recalls that in August 2002, writing in Le Monde, Chaliand was able to say with assurance that the United States will invade Iraq in April 2003. Will the U.S. invade Iran or Syria, as the saber rattling in the Bush administration insinuates? No, says Chaliand, because “Iraq is enough of a burden for now.”

“Turkey, Armenia, and the War in Iraq: A Conversation” appears in the Spring 2003 edition of Armenian Forum: A Journal of Contemporary Affairs. The journal is available by calling toll-free 1-888-927-6369 (from the United States or Canada), by sending E-mail to [email protected] or by writing to Armenian Forum, PO Box 208, Princeton NJ 08542.

[Hye_Psycho]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

wonderfull article. thanks TS, i'll certainly use some of Gérard Chaliand's quotes for my geopolitics essay

[Armenian]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

Critical analysis on Russia's submarine fleet.

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What is the future for Russia's submarine fleet?

Dmitry Medvedev's remarks that Russia is resuming production of nuclear submarines for its Navy have been widely commented on. The country's submarine fleet is in critical condition and calls for renewal. The president's words raise hopes for an early change. Submarines play a special role in Russia's Navy. In the late 1950s, following the death of Josef Stalin, the new Soviet leaders opted for a nuclear missile equipped submarine fleet, and now it forms the core of the Navy's might. A drastic cut in the number of warships coupled with the freezing of construction of new units (only ship construction projects already started were completed) has led to a situation where Russia's submarine fleet is now facing the retirement of many vessels due to age. The construction of new submarines, which has resumed in recent years, is, unfortunately, outpaced by the decommission rate of outdated vessels. Medvedev made special mention of nuclear-powered submarines equipped with cruise missiles plus multi-role submarines. These classes of boats have suffered the heaviest cuts in the previous years, and while Project 955 submarines are now being built for strategic forces, the situation with cruise-missile and multi-role submarines is more disquieting.

Although Project 885 cruise-missile submarines (the first of them was named Severodvinsk) and later between one and three sister ships (according to various sources) began to be built, so far not even the first one has joined the Navy. Many reasons are cited, including one that the design was raw and needed updating when construction began. The fact, however, is that no submarine is yet commissioned, and eight Project 949A submarines, built in the 1980s-1990s, make up the force intended to confront aircraft carriers. These are excellent vessels, loved by their crews and boast high performance characteristics, but they are all slowly aging. The situation with multi-role submarines is even worse. No new vessels designed to engage hostile submarines, surface ships and to hit shore-based targets with strategic cruise missiles are under construction. At the moment, the Navy has 19 boats of this class, of three projects: 671RTMK (four units), 945(945A) (three units), and 971 (twelve units). Most of these submarines were built in the late 1980s to mid-1990s. They can still be considered modern, but the end of their service life is not far off. Some of the shipbuilding design bureaus are known to be developing new multi-role projects, but specifics about dates and specifications are not reported.

How many cruise-missile and multi-role submarines does the Russian Navy need? Estimates vary, but the figure of 30 to 40 non-strategic submarines is considered optimal. At least 20 non-strategic nuclear submarines need to be constructed to maintain the strength of the submarine branch at the required level, considering that about half of the 27 cruise-missile and multi-role submarines currently in service will retire after reaching the end of their service lives. In theory, such rates are not too demanding - Russia has several shipyards that can build submarines - Sevmash, Admiralty Wharves, Komsomolsk and even Red Sormovo, which has the necessary experience. The real problems lie elsewhere: in cooperating enterprises and, most important of all, in personnel, whose numbers and training quality have been drastically reduced. It is to be hoped that all these problems will be solved, and soon.

Source: http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20081001/117370532.html

In related news:

Russian Navy to get 8 new-generation submarines by 2015

The Russian Navy will receive at least eight new-generation submarines as part of a state armaments program through 2015, its deputy commander said on Thursday. "We have already built a new-generation nuclear powered submarine," Adm. Alexander Tatarinov said, without giving any details. Asked how many warships would be built in total, he said that would depend on the Navy's needs. "So far a series of eight warships are being planned - possibly more," he said. The current 2007-2015 state armament program calls for the development of "across-the-board" new-generation weapon systems by 2011. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev said last Thursday that the modernization of the Armed Forces needed to move faster, with priority being given to new, advanced weaponry and improvement of conditions for service personnel. "We are planning to launch large-scale production of warships, primarily nuclear submarines with cruise missiles, and multi-purpose attack submarines," Medvedev said. Russia, with a current defense budget of $40 billion, is reportedly planning to increase its defense spending by 50% in the next three years.

Source: http://en.rian.ru/russia/20081002/117393965.html

Russia's warships head for exercise with Venezuelan navy

Russia displayed its military strength in the Mediterranean yesterday after warships heading to Venezuela passed through the Strait of Gibraltar in the second deployment of Russian naval vessels in the waterway since the Cold War. The nuclear-powered missile cruiser Peter the Great, accompanied by the Admiral Chabanenko, an anti-submarine destroyer, as well as a reconnaissance vessel and a support ship, are destined for a maritime exercise with the Venezuelan navy. En route, however, the aim appears to be to demonstrate to the West and Nato that Russia is once again back in business as a blue-water power. “It's all about strutting your stuff and xxxxing a snook at the West, in the same way that the Bears [Russian strategic bombers] have been doing since they began patrolling again,” said Andrew Brookes, of the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies. Jason Alderwick, naval analyst at the institute, said that the Russian warships, which set off from their base at Severomorsk, near Murmansk on the Arctic coast, were Cold War “legacy ships”, not the modern vessels deployed by Western navies with advanced communications and surveillance systems. "This is a case of naval diplomacy rather than a demonstration of capability,” he said. Mr Alderwick said that the only other occasion since the Cold War when Russian warships had passed through the Strait — coming within a few miles of the strategically important British naval base — was last year, when Russia's sole aircraft carrier, the Admiral Kuznetsov, and five other ships were deployed from Severomorsk. The dispatching of the Peter the Great was a significant event, he said, particularly because Moscow had clearly decided to make its presence felt in the Mediterranean before engaging with the Venezuelan navy during the exercise. The Russian naval force is due to call at the Libyan port of Tripoli and the Syrian port of Tartus, which played host to Soviet ships during the Cold War. Reports suggested that the warships may have made a stop-off in Tartus, but this was not confirmed by Moscow. The flotilla may also visit the Syrian port of Latakia, where the Russians are helping to build a new facility. The arrival of the four Russian warships in the Mediterranean comes after Moscow's military operation in Georgia. After the defeat of Georgia in August, Moscow made it clear that it intended to deploy its military on regular manoeuvres around the world. It has also moved to intensify contacts with Venezuela, Cuba and other Latin American countries. Russia has signed weapons contracts worth more than $4 billion with Venezuela since 2005 to supply fighter jets, helicopters and 100,000 Kalashnikov AK47 assault rifles. Despite the new muscular approach, there was evidence yesterday of Russian withdrawals from Georgia. Russian troops began dismantling checkpoints in the “security zones” they have occupied in Georgia since the brief war in the former Soviet republic. Russia is supposed to be pulling back its troops under the terms of a deal brokered by President Sarkozy of France on behalf of the European Union. Moscow has said that it still plans to keep thousands of troops inside the two breakaway regions of Georgia — South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Russia has formally recognised the independence of both regions.

Source: http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/new...cle4887728.ece

[Armenian]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

Russian Defense Minister Visits Armenia

Russian Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov paid a brief and apparently unplanned visit to Yerevan over the weekend to discuss his country’s close military ties with Armenia. The Armenian Defense Ministry said Serdyukov arrived in Yerevan late Friday and flew back to Moscow the next day after meeting with Defense Minister Seyran Ohanian. A short ministry statement said the two men discussed “issues relating to bilateral military cooperation.” It gave no details. Russia’s Defense Ministry could not be reached for comment on Monday, and its website had no information about the talks. The Russian embassy in Armenia had no comment on their details. Serdyukov traveled to Armenia as Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov wrapped up a two-day trip to Yerevan that focused on the aftermath of the Russian-Georgian war and the future of the Russian-Armenian relationship. Lavrov and his Armenian counterpart Eduard Nalbandian reaffirmed their government’s intention to strengthen its military and economic components. Unlike Lavrov, the Russian defense chief did not meet President Serzh Sarkisian and avoided any contacts with media during the trip. He went into talks with Ohanian as Armenia hosted NATO-led military exercises reflecting its growing defense and security links with the West. The Armenian government has made clear that it will not reconsider those ties despite the Georgia-related spike in tensions between NATO and Russia, Armenia’s closest military ally. Lavrov indicated on Friday that Moscow is not concerned about the development of NATO-Armenia ties seeing as Yerevan is not seeking eventual membership in the U.S.-led alliance. Armenia’s official military doctrine, unveiled last December, states that Yerevan will increasingly work together with the armed forces of NATO member states in reforming its military and contributing to international security. It commits the Armenian military to expanding its involvement in Western-led peace-keeping operations abroad. But the doctrine makes it clear that “strategic partnership” with Russia will remain the bedrock of Armenia’s defense policy. It says the two countries will continue to maintain close military ties both on a bilateral basis and within the framework of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Armenia assumed the rotating presidency of the Russian-led alliance of six former Soviet republics last month.

Source: http://www.armenialiberty.org/armeni...9E2AFF6B4A.ASP

[Armenian]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

Germany signals it would oppose NATO membership for Ukraine and Georgia? Interesting...

*****************************

The German Question

German Chancellor Angela Merkel went to St. Petersburg last week for meetings with Russian President Dmitri Medvedev. The central question on the table was Germany’s position on NATO expansion, particularly with regard to Ukraine and Georgia. Merkel made it clear at a joint press conference that Germany would oppose NATO membership for both of these countries, and that it would even oppose placing the countries on the path to membership. Since NATO operates on the basis of consensus, any member nation can effectively block any candidate from NATO membership. The fact that Merkel and Germany have chosen this path is of great significance. Merkel acted in full knowledge of the U.S. view on the matter and is prepared to resist any American pressure that might follow. It should be remembered that Merkel might be the most pro-American politician in Germany, and perhaps its most pro-American chancellor in years. Moreover, as an East German, she has a deep unease about the Russians. Reality, however, overrode her personal inclinations. More than other countries, Germany does not want to alienate the United States. But it is in a position to face American pressure should any come.

Energy Dependence and Defense Spending

In one sense, Merkel’s reasons for her stance are simple. Germany is heavily dependent on Russian natural gas. If the supply were cut off, Germany’s situation would be desperate — or at least close enough that the distinction would be academic. Russia might decide it could not afford to cut off natural gas exports, but Merkel is dealing with a fundamental German interest, and risking that for Ukrainian or Georgian membership in NATO is not something she is prepared to do. She can’t bank on Russian caution in a matter such as this, particularly when the Russians seem to be in an incautious mood. Germany is, of course, looking to alternative sources of energy for the future, and in five years its dependence on Russia might not be nearly as significant. But five years is a long time to hold your breath, and Germany can’t do it.

The German move is not just about natural gas, however. Germany views the U.S. obsession with NATO expansion as simply not in Germany’s interests. First, expanding NATO guarantees to Ukraine and Georgia is meaningless. NATO and the United States don’t have the military means to protect Ukraine or Georgia, and incorporating them into the alliance would not increase European security. From a military standpoint, NATO membership for the two former Soviet republics is an empty gesture, while from a political standpoint, Berlin sees it as designed to irritate the Russians for no clear purpose.

Next, were NATO prepared to protect Ukraine and Georgia, all NATO countries including Germany would be forced to increase defense expenditures substantially. This is not something that Germany and the rest of NATO want to do. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Germany spent 1945-1992 being the potential prime battleground of the Cold War. It spent 1992-2008 not being the potential prime battleground. Germany prefers the latter, and it does not intend to be drawn into a new Cold War under any circumstances. This has profound implications for the future of both NATO and U.S.-German relations. Germany is thus in the midst of a strategic crisis in which it must make some fundamental decisions. To understand the decisions Germany has to make, we need to understand the country’s geopolitical problem and the decisions it has made in the past.

The German Geopolitical Problem

Until 1871, Germany was fragmented into dozens of small states — kingdoms, duchies, principalities, etc. — comprising the remnants of the Holy Roman Empire. The German-speaking world was torn apart by internal tensions and the constant manipulation of foreign powers. The southeastern part of the German-speaking world, Austria, was the center of the multinational Hapsburg Empire. It was Roman Catholic and was continually intruding into the predominantly Catholic regions of the rest of Germany, particularly Bavaria. The French were constantly poaching in the Rhineland and manipulating the balance of power among the German states. Russia was always looming to the east, where it bordered the major Protestant German power, Prussia. (Poland at the time was divided among Prussia, Russia and Austria-Hungary.) Germany was perpetually the victim of great powers, a condition which Prussia spent the roughly half-century between Waterloo and German unification trying to correct.

To unify Germany, Prussia had to do more than dominate the Germans. It had to fight two wars. The first was in 1866 with the Hapsburg Empire, which Prussia defeated in seven weeks, ending Hapsburg influence in Germany and ultimately reducing Austria-Hungary to Germany’s junior partner. The second war was in 1870-1871, when Prussia led a German coalition that defeated France. That defeat ended French influence in the Rhineland and gave Prussia the space in which to create a modern, unified Germany. Russia, which was pleased to see both Austria-Hungary and France defeated and viewed a united Germany as a buffer against another French invasion, did not try to block unification.

German unification changed the dynamic of Europe. First, it created a large nation in the heart of Europe between France and Russia. United, Germany was economically dynamic, and its growth outstripped that of France and the United Kingdom. Moreover, it became a naval power, developing a substantial force that at some point could challenge British naval hegemony. It became a major exporting power, taking markets from Britain and France. And in looking around for room to maneuver, Germany began looking east toward Russia. In short, Germany was more than a nation — it was a geopolitical problem. Germany’s strategic problem was that if the French and Russians attacked Germany simultaneously, with Britain blockading its ports, Germany would lose and revert to its pre-1871 chaos. Given French, Russian and British interest in shattering Germany, Germany had to assume that such an attack would come. Therefore, since the Germans could not fight on two fronts simultaneously, they needed to fight a war pre-emptively, attacking France or Russia first, defeating it and then turning their full strength on the other — all before Britain’s naval blockade could begin to hurt. Germany’s only defense was a two-stage offense that was as complex as a ballet, and would be catastrophic if it failed.

In World War I, executing the Schlieffen Plan, the Germans attacked France first while trying to simply block the Russians. The plan was to first occupy the channel coast and Paris before the United Kingdom could get into the game and before Russia could fully mobilize, and then to knock out Russia. The plan failed in 1914 at the First Battle of the Marnes, and rather than lightning victory, Germany got bogged down in a multifront war costing millions of lives and lasting years. Even so, Germany almost won the war of attrition, causing the United States to intervene and deprive Berlin of victory. In World War II, the Germans had learned their lesson, so instead of trying to pin down Russia, they entered into a treaty with the Soviets. This secured Germany’s rear by dividing Poland with the Soviet Union. The Soviets agreed to the treaty, expecting Adolf Hitler’s forces to attack France and bog down as Germany had in World War I. The Soviets would then roll West after the bloodletting had drained the rest of Europe. The Germans stunned the Russians by defeating France in six weeks and then turning on the Russians. The Russian front turned into an endless bloodletting, and once again the Americans helped deliver the final blow.

The consequence of the war was the division of Germany into three parts — an independent Austria, a Western-occupied West Germany and a Soviet-occupied East Germany. West Germany again faced the Russian problem. Its eastern part was occupied, and West Germany could not possibly defend itself on its own. It found itself integrated into an American-dominated alliance system, NATO, which was designed to block the Soviets. West and East Germany would serve as the primary battleground of any Soviet attack, with Soviet armor facing U.S. armor, airpower and tactical nuclear weapons. For the Germans, the Cold War was probably more dangerous than either of the previous wars. Whatever the war’s outcome, Germany stood a pretty good chance of being annihilated if it took place. On the upside, the Cold War did settle Franco-German tensions, which were half of Germany’s strategic problem. Indeed, one of the by-products of the Cold War was the emergence of the European Community, which ultimately became the European Union. This saw German economic union and integration with France, which along with NATO’s military integration guaranteed economic growth and the end of any military threat to Germany from the west. For the first time in centuries, the Rhine was not at risk. Germany’s south was secure, and once the Soviet Union collapsed, there was no threat from the east, either.

United and Secure at Last?

For the first time in centuries, Germany was both united and militarily secure. But underneath it all, the Germans retained their primordial fear of being caught between France and Russia. Berlin understood that this was far from a mature reality; it was no more than a theoretical problem at the moment. But the Germans also understand how quickly things can change. On one level, the problem was nothing more than the economic emphasis of the European Union compared to the geopolitical focus of Russia. But on a deeper level, Germany was, as always, caught between the potentially competing demands of Russia and the West. Even if the problem were small now, there were no guarantees that it wouldn’t grow. This was the context in which Germany viewed the Russo-Georgian war in August. Berlin saw not only the United States moving toward a hostile relationship with Russia, but also the United Kingdom and France going down the same path.

French President Nicolas Sarkozy, who happened to hold the rotating EU presidency at the time, went to Moscow to negotiate a cease-fire on behalf of the European Union. When the Russians seemed unwilling to comply with the terms negotiated, France became highly critical of Russia and inclined to back some sort of sanctions at the EU summit on Georgia. With the United Kingdom being even more adamant, Germany saw a worst-case scenario looming on the distant horizon: It understood that the pleasant security of the post-Cold War world was at an end, and that it had to craft a new national strategy. From Germany’s point of view, the re-emergence of Russian influence in the former Soviet Union might be something that could have been blocked in the 1990s, but by 2008, it had become inevitable. The Germans saw that economic relations in the former Soviet Union — and not only energy issues — created a complementary relationship between Russia and its former empire. Between natural affinities and Russian power, a Russian sphere of influence, if not a formal structure, was inevitable. It was an emerging reality that could not be reversed.

France has Poland and Germany between itself and Russia. Britain has that plus the English Channel, and the United States has all that plus the Atlantic Ocean. The farther away from Russia one is, the more comfortable one can be challenging Moscow. But Germany has only Poland as a buffer. For any nation serious about resisting Russian power, the first question is how to assure the security of the Baltic countries, a long-vulnerable salient running north from Poland. The answer would be to station NATO forces in the Baltics and in Poland, and Berlin understood that Germany would be both the logistical base for these forces as well as the likely source of troops. But Germany’s appetite for sending troops to Poland and the Baltics has been satiated. This was not a course Germany wanted to take.

Pondering German History

We suspect that Merkel knew something else; namely, that all the comfortable assumptions about what was possible and impossible — that the Russians wouldn’t dare attack the Baltics — are dubious in the extreme. Nothing in German history would convince any reasonable German that military action to achieve national ends is unthinkable. Nor are the Germans prepared to dismiss the re-emergence of Russian military power. The Germans had been economically and militarily shattered in 1932. By 1938, they were the major power in Europe. As long as their officer corps and technological knowledge base were intact, regeneration could move swiftly. The Soviet Union collapsed in 1991 and its military power crumbled. But as was the case in Weimar Germany, the Russian officer corps remained relatively intact and the KGB, the heart of the Soviet state, remained intact if renamed. So did the technological base that made the Soviets a global power. As with Germany after both world wars, Russia was in chaos, but its fragments remained, awaiting reconstruction. The Germans were not about to dismiss Russia’s ability to regenerate — they know their own history too well to do that.

If Germany were to join those who call for NATO expansion, the first step toward a confrontation with Russia would have been taken. The second step would be guaranteeing the security of the Baltics and Poland. America would make the speeches, and Germans would man the line. After spending most of the last century fighting or preparing to fight the Russians, the Germans looked around at the condition of their allies and opted out. The Germans see their economic commitment as being to the European Union. That binds them to the French, and this is not a bond they can or want to break. But the European Union carries no political or military force in relation to the Russians. Beyond economics, it is a debating society. NATO, as an institution built to resist the Russians, is in an advanced state of decay. To resurrect it, the Germans would have to pay a steep economic price. And if they paid that price, they would be carrying much of the strategic risk.

[...]

Source: http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20081006_german_question

[North Pole]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

Who Exactly Will Inherit The Property Of Last Russian Tsar?

According to the RT article it going to be the Great Duchess Maria Vladimirovna. OK...

But there is no institution of monarchy in Russia....



It’s official - the last Russian Tsar, Nikolay II, and his family have been declared victims of illegal political repression by Russia's Supreme Court. Now, as rehabilitated political prisoners, the royal family is legally entitled to the return of their privately-owned property. And as befits a royal family, the value of their belongings is quite substantial.

Amongst the groups that consider the decision "delayed" or simply "reputation-boosting", there are some that think that the whole process was a clever ploy. According to them the House of Romanov (now based in Spain, along with its head, the Great Duchess Maria Vladimirovna) is seeking to reclaim the ownership of a wide array of royal property which now belongs to the state.

The House of Romanov was one of the richest royal families in the history of Russia. According to Ivan Artsishevsky, a representative of the House of Romanov in Russia, they had an enormous amount of property, estates, houses and land all over the empire.

Amongst their most notable properties was the Hermitage in St. Petersburg, which includes the Winter Palace, both of which have since become key historic landmarks. During the Revolution of 1917, around 100 000 royal properties were seized by the Bolsheviks.

In his interview with the Russian newspaper "Novye Izvestiya", Artsishevsky recalls walking with Count Nikolay, the grand-nephew of Nikolay II, near the Peterhof palace in St. Petersburg's Hermitage, when the Count exclaimed:

"I learned about these places, my dad told me about them. He went for walks here with the Grand Princesses"

However, according to Artsishevsky, speaking of the properties' return to the royal family is bordering on nonsense. The clan's irrefutable interrelationship with the country's history is not a valid enough reason to take the properties away from the state.

"Today, to speak of the return of all this property to the Romanovs is simply ridiculous. They understand full well that this is Russia, not the Baltic states, where people try to do just that," said Artsishevsky in his interview with Novye Izvestiya.

Both Grand Duchess Maria Vladimirovna and the lawyer of the Romanov family, German Lukyanov, have confirmed that restitution is not something that they were aiming for when pushing for the court's decision. According to them, their sole aim was to restore the "good name" of Nikolay II and take another step towards the House of Romanov's return to Russia.

The potential return of the properties to the royal family is made even more unlikely by the unambiguous nature of the Russian law on the issue. The law “On the Rehabilitation of the Victims of Political Repression” does mention that all confiscated property must be returned to the owner, but does not stipulate for any compensation for the descendants of the deceased.

In her interview with the Interfax newsagency, Maria Vladimirovna confirms that restitution has never been her intention:

"There is no connection between the rehabilitation of Emperor Nikolay II and members of his family and any sort of property questions. I sought rehabilitation of the royal passion bearers so that the crime committed by the totalitarian theomachist regime is condemned, and there is no repeat of such horrors in Russia. I pity those who cannot understand that some things in this world can be done for truth, honour and dignity and not for financial gain".

READ MORE -- http://www.russiatoday.com/features/news/31434





Russia’s Supreme Court has ruled that the last Russian emperor, Nicholas II, and his family be rehabilitated, overturning earlier objections. They were killed in 1918 by the Bolsheviks, who feared the Tsar could become the figurehead for royalist opposition.

READ MORE -- http://www.russiatoday.com/news/news/31214

Maria I Wladimirovna

Head of the Russian Imperial House Her Imperial Highness the Grand Duchess (de jure Empress of all the Russias)

The Head of the Russian Imperial House, Her Imperial Highness the Grand Duchess (de jure Her Imperial Majesty the Empress of all Russias) Maria I Wladimirovna was born the 23rd of December 1953 (new church calendar) in Madrid, Spain. She is the only daughter of the late Head of the Russian Imperial House, H.I.H. Grand Duke Wladimir III Kirillovich, and His Most August Spouse H.I.H. Grand Duchess Leonida Georgievna (born H.R.H. Princess Bagration-Muhkrani of Georgia). Following the tradition of the Imperial Family, the Grand Duchess was brought up in the spirit of the Orthodox Faith and devotion to the interests of Russia.

http://www.imperialhouse.ru/eng/imperialhouse/chipdom/maria.html

Source of photo - http://www.imperialhouse.ru/rus/dyna.../20061205.html




Moscow court refuses to clear name of Russia's last tsar

14:53 | 26/ 06/ 2006

MOSCOW, June 26 (RIA Novosti) - A Moscow district Monday declined to review a ruling refusing to rehabilitate the name of Tsar Nicholas II.

The Tverskoi District Court handed down a ruling May 25 that ignored the request of Great Duchess Maria Vladimirovna, the head of the Russian Imperial House, to recognize Russia's last monarch as a victim of the Bolshevik repression and clear him of all political charges.

Lawyer German Lukyanov, who represents the Russian Imperial House in exile and had asked the court to pass a follow-up judgment on another suit filed by Maria Vladimirovna, said the latest hearing was held without the involvement of representatives of the Prosecutor's Office, and added that he considered the court ruling illegal.

http://en.rian.ru/russia/20060626/50026619.html

[Armanen]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

A little too pessimistic. But I wonder what those sneaking Russians are up to...

Karabakh Peace Precondition to turkey Relations, Echoes Lavrov

MOSCOW (Combined Sources)--In an interview published Tuesday Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, who visited Armenia Friday, echoed Turkey's calls for an immediate resolution of the Karabakh conflict prior to the establishment of diplomatic relations between Turkey and Armenia.

"It [Armenia] really has few geographic and political options. As soon as the Nagorno-Karabakh settlement becomes a fact, Turkey will be ready to help Armenia forge normal links with the outside world, naturally through the establishment of diplomatic relations between Ankara and Yerevan," said Lavrov who was interviewed by a "Rossiiskaya Gazeta" reporter late last week as he flew to Yerevan to meet with Armenia's President Serzh Sarkisian and Foreign Minister Eduard Nalbandian. After the talks with Nalbandian he sounded cautiously optimistic about prospects for a breakthrough in the Karabakh peace process.

Lavrov said that Russia expects the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan to meet again shortly after next week's Azeri presidential election and reach a framework peace agreement on Nagorno-Karabakh.

He stressed the importance of a Nagorno-Karabakh resolution and the normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations for Armenia's security and economic development.

According to Lavrov, Armenia should be keenly interested in a Karabakh resolution in the wake of the crisis in Georgia which he said exposed "the vulnerability of its position" and highlighted the importance of having an open border with Turkey. "Armenia has huge difficulties communicating with the outside world," he said. "It is in the fundamental interests of the Armenian people to unblock this situation as soon as possible.

Lavrov said that after the Russian-Georgian crisis, Turkey saw the "uniqueness of the moment" and the role it can play, as a neighbor to the Caucasus region to broker and actively involve itself in fostering stability in the region.

"There remain two or three unresolved issues which need to be agreed upon at the next meetings of the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan," Lavrov told the "Rossiiskaya Gazeta" daily. "Our understanding is that such meetings will take place shortly after the forthcoming [October 15] presidential elections in Azerbaijan."

"As one of three mediators, we have a sense that an end is quite real," he said, adding that the two other mediating powers, the United States and France, also see a "very real chance" of a resolution of the Karabakh conflict.

The mediators have been trying to get the conflicting parties to accept the basic principles of Karabakh peace that were formally put forward by them in November 2007. Senior French, Russian and U.S. diplomats co-chairing the OSCE Minsk Group discussed the possibility of another Armenian-Azerbaijani summit during the most recent talks with the Armenian and Azerbaijani foreign ministers held in New York late last month.

Lavrov said the future of the so-called Lachin corridor, which provides for the shortest overland link between Armenia and Karabakh, is now the main stumbling block in the peace talks. He did not elaborate.

However, a top aide to Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, struck a cautious note as he commented on Lavrov's upbeat statements in Yerevan. "Major issues have not been agreed upon," Novruz Mammadov told the Azeri Trend news agency.

http://www.asbarez.com/index.html?showarticle=35870_10/7/2008_1