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Re: Nagorno-Karabagh: Military Balance Between Armenia & Azerbaijan
A somewhat realistic view
Armenia's collective security role makes new war 'unlikely'
Thu 26 August 2010 | 13:42 GMT Text size:
CSTO
News.Az interviews the editor of the Moscow Defense Brief, Mikhail Barabanov.
How do you assess the current military balance of power in the region? Is it militarized? Who holds military superiority - Armenia, Azerbaijan or Georgia?
The militarization of the South Caucasus has long since gone beyond what is natural in the modern world and now the region is among the most militarized, which gives cause for concern. All three South Caucasus states have a very high level of defence expenditure, diverting large resources from the needs of economic development.
Georgia is currently in an unusual state, since its loss in the 2008 war and Russia’s readiness to defend the former Georgian SSR's autonomous regions has almost deprived Saakashvili's militarism of any prospects. It is clear that Georgia cannot expect to get its autonomies back and has no real chance of successful military resistance against Russia. Therefore, Georgian military construction has lost its purpose, to a greater extent, though Saakashvili’s regime boasts of its concept of total defence and so on. But in fact we can see a decline in Georgian military expenditure, a reduction in purchases, which may continue or even accelerate if Saakashvili leaves politics. The military factor in Georgian policy will decline, because it is paralysed by Russia’s position and the absolute superiority of its military power. It is now largely unimportant to Georgia whether it has an army or not, since the Georgian armed forces are unable to achieve their objectives (protection of the state and regime and “restoration of territorial integrity”) when Russia is ready to use force.
As for Azerbaijan and Armenia, it is clear that Azerbaijan is investing a great deal in military construction in an attempt to convert its resource superiority over Armenia into military superiority. Armenia’s success in the Karabakh war was mostly achieved through better organization, unification and motivation of its armed forces compared to Azerbaijan's. The Armenian victory was achieved through the human factor. This mostly comes from the overall level of very high ethnic solidarity of the Armenian nation. Therefore, the main issue of the balance of powers between Armenia and Azerbaijan is whether Azerbaijan will be able to compensate for Armenia’s excellence in organization and unity by numerical and technical superiority in its military construction.
It is impossible to talk about who has military superiority without examining real war. But on the whole, I think Azerbaijan's military construction is based on the consideration mentioned above and is logical and correct. The resource consolidation and efforts at technical modernization of the armed forces of Azerbaijan are impressive in scope and naturally tip the scales in favour of the Azerbaijani side. On the other hand, it is currently unclear whether this is enough to achieve political or at least military success. I think Azerbaijan has not yet managed to “intimidate” Armenia with its military construction, while the possibility of an attempt at a military solution of the Karabakh conflict remains unlikely.
Russia is to supply Baku with S-300 Favorit anti-missile complexes, while Belarus has supplied Azerbaijan with five SU-25 attack planes and nine self-propelled howitzers. Baku is also planning to purchase military hardware from China. What is Azerbaijan preparing for?
Azerbaijan is preparing for the expansion of its political capacities in an attempt to bring the “military factor” back into its relations with Armenia, which in fact gives broad scope for pressure on Armenia. Strong Azerbaijani armed forces will shake Armenia's confidence in the preservation of Karabakh and the overall opportunity of preserving the status quo.
The possibility of an attempt at purely military revenge by Azerbaijan does not seem very likely to me, since Azerbaijan will hardly be able to wage a blitzkrieg to invade Karabakh and all the territories occupied by the Armenians even with its increased armed forces. A new long-term war will not give anything to Azerbaijan and just worsen its international situation, leading to the involvement of Russia, the international community and so on. The world recognizes facts only if it is made to face them. This is why everything would have to be settled in days. I do not believe that Azerbaijan would be able to create sufficient military superiority over the Armenians to settle everything in just a few days.
May Azerbaijan be involved in a military conflict with Iran, if military confrontation were to start between Iran and the US?
Azerbaijan will hardly be involved in such a conflict; neither Azerbaijan, Iran nor Russia have an interest in it. The United States may be partially interested in this involvement but President Aliyev will assume responsibility. Azerbaijan could take the US side in such a conflict, if the United States conditionally promised to return Karabakh, but the United States would not be able to return Karabakh to Azerbaijan anyway.
Armenia is concerned that Azerbaijan may start military actions in Nagorno-Karabakh, considering Baku’s armament rate. Meanwhile, Yerevan has prolonged the term of the Russian military base in Gyumri. Would Armenia use the Russian military presence as a shield if Baku attempted to restore its territorial integrity by force?
Certainly, the whole meaning of the presence of Russian troops in Armenia is that they are guarantors primarily against Azerbaijan, and, secondly, against Turkey.
These Russian troops can hardly be a shield but they make Russia's intervention in the conflict inevitable and would most likely prevent an Azerbaijani offensive against Armenia proper (the territory of the Armenian SSR).
In response to Azerbaijan's bellicose statements, Yerevan systematically refers to the Collective Security Organization Treaty (CSTO) and the organization's involvement in an armed conflict if Baku were to liberate its occupied lands through war. Is CSTO involvement in the Karabakh conflict realistic and would Russia take this step?
I think that in the main Armenia’s participation in the CSTO makes it unlikely that Azerbaijan would start a new war, even if the Azerbaijani leadership was confident about military superiority over the Armenians (which is, I think, far from the case now). Russia remains free on this issue, which forces both conflict parties to consider it as a balancing factor and actively appeal to the Russian side. Thus, some vagueness in position is profitable for Russia. Naturally, if the Russian leadership were to face a real conflict, it would have a dilemma. Therefore, Russia would bring pressure to bear to end hostilities and return to the status quo. Therefore, I would like to repeat that if a decision were taken to start war, Azerbaijan would have only a few days for this war. Azerbaijan would hardly be able to defeat the Armenians, occupy Karabakh or liberate part of its land in this period. Therefore, a solution purely by force is highly unlikely and not promising for Azerbaijan.
B.A
News.Az
A somewhat realistic view
Armenia's collective security role makes new war 'unlikely'
Thu 26 August 2010 | 13:42 GMT Text size:
CSTO
News.Az interviews the editor of the Moscow Defense Brief, Mikhail Barabanov.
How do you assess the current military balance of power in the region? Is it militarized? Who holds military superiority - Armenia, Azerbaijan or Georgia?
The militarization of the South Caucasus has long since gone beyond what is natural in the modern world and now the region is among the most militarized, which gives cause for concern. All three South Caucasus states have a very high level of defence expenditure, diverting large resources from the needs of economic development.
Georgia is currently in an unusual state, since its loss in the 2008 war and Russia’s readiness to defend the former Georgian SSR's autonomous regions has almost deprived Saakashvili's militarism of any prospects. It is clear that Georgia cannot expect to get its autonomies back and has no real chance of successful military resistance against Russia. Therefore, Georgian military construction has lost its purpose, to a greater extent, though Saakashvili’s regime boasts of its concept of total defence and so on. But in fact we can see a decline in Georgian military expenditure, a reduction in purchases, which may continue or even accelerate if Saakashvili leaves politics. The military factor in Georgian policy will decline, because it is paralysed by Russia’s position and the absolute superiority of its military power. It is now largely unimportant to Georgia whether it has an army or not, since the Georgian armed forces are unable to achieve their objectives (protection of the state and regime and “restoration of territorial integrity”) when Russia is ready to use force.
As for Azerbaijan and Armenia, it is clear that Azerbaijan is investing a great deal in military construction in an attempt to convert its resource superiority over Armenia into military superiority. Armenia’s success in the Karabakh war was mostly achieved through better organization, unification and motivation of its armed forces compared to Azerbaijan's. The Armenian victory was achieved through the human factor. This mostly comes from the overall level of very high ethnic solidarity of the Armenian nation. Therefore, the main issue of the balance of powers between Armenia and Azerbaijan is whether Azerbaijan will be able to compensate for Armenia’s excellence in organization and unity by numerical and technical superiority in its military construction.
It is impossible to talk about who has military superiority without examining real war. But on the whole, I think Azerbaijan's military construction is based on the consideration mentioned above and is logical and correct. The resource consolidation and efforts at technical modernization of the armed forces of Azerbaijan are impressive in scope and naturally tip the scales in favour of the Azerbaijani side. On the other hand, it is currently unclear whether this is enough to achieve political or at least military success. I think Azerbaijan has not yet managed to “intimidate” Armenia with its military construction, while the possibility of an attempt at a military solution of the Karabakh conflict remains unlikely.
Russia is to supply Baku with S-300 Favorit anti-missile complexes, while Belarus has supplied Azerbaijan with five SU-25 attack planes and nine self-propelled howitzers. Baku is also planning to purchase military hardware from China. What is Azerbaijan preparing for?
Azerbaijan is preparing for the expansion of its political capacities in an attempt to bring the “military factor” back into its relations with Armenia, which in fact gives broad scope for pressure on Armenia. Strong Azerbaijani armed forces will shake Armenia's confidence in the preservation of Karabakh and the overall opportunity of preserving the status quo.
The possibility of an attempt at purely military revenge by Azerbaijan does not seem very likely to me, since Azerbaijan will hardly be able to wage a blitzkrieg to invade Karabakh and all the territories occupied by the Armenians even with its increased armed forces. A new long-term war will not give anything to Azerbaijan and just worsen its international situation, leading to the involvement of Russia, the international community and so on. The world recognizes facts only if it is made to face them. This is why everything would have to be settled in days. I do not believe that Azerbaijan would be able to create sufficient military superiority over the Armenians to settle everything in just a few days.
May Azerbaijan be involved in a military conflict with Iran, if military confrontation were to start between Iran and the US?
Azerbaijan will hardly be involved in such a conflict; neither Azerbaijan, Iran nor Russia have an interest in it. The United States may be partially interested in this involvement but President Aliyev will assume responsibility. Azerbaijan could take the US side in such a conflict, if the United States conditionally promised to return Karabakh, but the United States would not be able to return Karabakh to Azerbaijan anyway.
Armenia is concerned that Azerbaijan may start military actions in Nagorno-Karabakh, considering Baku’s armament rate. Meanwhile, Yerevan has prolonged the term of the Russian military base in Gyumri. Would Armenia use the Russian military presence as a shield if Baku attempted to restore its territorial integrity by force?
Certainly, the whole meaning of the presence of Russian troops in Armenia is that they are guarantors primarily against Azerbaijan, and, secondly, against Turkey.
These Russian troops can hardly be a shield but they make Russia's intervention in the conflict inevitable and would most likely prevent an Azerbaijani offensive against Armenia proper (the territory of the Armenian SSR).
In response to Azerbaijan's bellicose statements, Yerevan systematically refers to the Collective Security Organization Treaty (CSTO) and the organization's involvement in an armed conflict if Baku were to liberate its occupied lands through war. Is CSTO involvement in the Karabakh conflict realistic and would Russia take this step?
I think that in the main Armenia’s participation in the CSTO makes it unlikely that Azerbaijan would start a new war, even if the Azerbaijani leadership was confident about military superiority over the Armenians (which is, I think, far from the case now). Russia remains free on this issue, which forces both conflict parties to consider it as a balancing factor and actively appeal to the Russian side. Thus, some vagueness in position is profitable for Russia. Naturally, if the Russian leadership were to face a real conflict, it would have a dilemma. Therefore, Russia would bring pressure to bear to end hostilities and return to the status quo. Therefore, I would like to repeat that if a decision were taken to start war, Azerbaijan would have only a few days for this war. Azerbaijan would hardly be able to defeat the Armenians, occupy Karabakh or liberate part of its land in this period. Therefore, a solution purely by force is highly unlikely and not promising for Azerbaijan.
B.A
News.Az
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