Regional geopolitics

[HyeSocialist]

Re: Regional geopolitics

--- until Russia --- invaded --- Ukraine.
Good western propaganda line, now try the truth ... Us/euro instigated regime change by *** violent subtrafuge *** in Ukraine to install adverse conditions on Russian border.
Russia was paying a fortune to Ukraine for naval base and gas transit fees. Russia made no invasion overtures to Ukraine since Kruschev's idiot move. Russia fully lived up to that dumb move.
NATO --- exclusively organized and fomented Ukraine disaster.
Anyone who thought that conniving move by west in Ukraine was going to lock Russia up in the sea of Azov or allow "missil defense" (lol) on Russia's doorstep was dumb.
Georgia ... You might want to talk to the Ossetians about being invaded, and by who.
You have done nothing more than reiterate western propaganda.

If I'm reiterating Western propaganda then you are surely reiterating Russian propaganda. For what it's worth, the Russians do try to cause ruckus in the West as well. Example: http://www.eurasianet.org/node/77446

The Russians lost their colonies: Poland, The Baltics, Romania, Czechoslovakia. They managed to keep Belarus, Kazakhstan shakely and pretty much treat Armenia as their military base since the Georgians kicked them out. They were going to lose Ukraine too, so they decided to intervene.

[Artashes]

Re: Regional geopolitics

If I'm reiterating Western propaganda then you are surely reiterating Russian propaganda. For what it's worth, the Russians do try to cause ruckus in the West as well. Example: http://www.eurasianet.org/node/77446

The Russians lost their colonies: Poland, The Baltics, Romania, Czechoslovakia. They managed to keep Belarus, Kazakhstan shakely and pretty much treat Armenia as their military base since the Georgians kicked them out. They were going to lose Ukraine too, so they decided to intervene.

Gross error in your evaluation. The various revolutions instigated by us/cohorts is --- not --- Russian propaganda.
Can you see that?

[Azad]

Re: Regional geopolitics

You got to love erdogan for his reasoning

Turkish authorities are mulling over closing the İncirlik airbase to the US-led coalition.

http://www.yenisafak.com/en/news/turkey-considers-closing-incirlik-airbase-2419379

[Artashes]

Re: Regional geopolitics

You got to love erdogan for his reasoning

Turkish authorities are mulling over closing the İncirlik airbase to the US-led coalition.

http://www.yenisafak.com/en/news/tur...irbase-2419379

Ya, he's a bright one. An excellent representative of the turc.
I certainly hope the head hominoid does close that base to us/anglo aircraft. Whats left? Turc,saud, German aircraft. One false move by hominoid erdojerk and without USA at incerlik, it's Russian bombs.
USA is only thing between simi human turc and Russia.
I hope this happens.

[Vrej1915]

Re: Regional geopolitics

Iran Joins Georgia’s Caucasian Gas Circle
February 19, 2016,
by Giorgi Lomsadze

As the price of natural gas keeps declining, competition among Caspian Basin suppliers is picking up.

Georgia, which serves as a crossroads for Caspian Basin energy exports, has become the focal point of a three-way scramble among natural gas exporters. Citing a wintertime shortage of natural gas, Tbilisi is considering deals from Azerbaijan, which already supplies 90 percent of Georgia’s gas; Russia, which provides the other 10 percent as a fee for transiting Russian energy to Armenia; and, now, Iran.

Georgia’s selection could have long-term implications. Diversifying Georgia’s gas supplies would mean moving away from Azerbaijan, thus calling into question the Southern Gas Corridor, an upcoming mega-gas-export tube that crosses Georgian territory en route to Turkey and Europe. Both the European Union and the United States have promoted the corridor as a way to wean Europe off gas imports from Gazprom, Russia’s energy behemoth, and an economic tool often used by the Kremlin for geopolitical purposes.

But Georgian officials now see Gazprom as a potential supplier to meet a growing local demand for gas, estimated at 2.5 billion cubic meters (bcm) per year. Energy Minister Kakha Kaladze met with Gazprom representatives on February 19.

“Azerbaijan is our strategic partner and friend, but it is also a virtual monopolist on the Georgian market,” Kaladze told EurasiaNet.org. He claimed that Baku does not have the technical capacity to make additional gas deliveries, which are needed due to rising demand in rural Georgia and higher electricity production. Georgian officials have said the country currently suffers from a gas shortfall of 2.5 million cubic meters, a tiny fraction of overall annual use. The seemingly small deficit raises questions about why Georgian officials are considering new gas deals.

After the price of Azerbaijani gas for corporate clients increased last spring by roughly 30 percent (to $318 per 1,000 cubic meters), Tbilisi approached Gazprom, and received “a very competitive offer,” he said.

The prospect of increased purchases from Gazprom heightens fears among many Georgians. Enmity for Russia remains widespread in Georgia since the two countries fought a brief war in 2008. Kaladze has downplayed the notion that a deal with Gazprom would compromise Georgian sovereignty in any way.

“At best, it may go from 10 to 12 percent [of the Russian share in Georgia’s gas imports],” Kaladze told EurasiaNet.org. Only a handful of corporate gas consumers would benefit from Russian gas, he added.

Kaladze said he took Gazprom’s proposal back to Baku, hoping to negotiate a price match, but that, as yet, has not happened. Georgia and Azerbaijan for now have agreed to redistribute supplies so that Georgia gets less Azerbaijani gas in summer and more in winter, when consumption peaks.

Meanwhile, enter Iran.

Following the lifting of international sanctions, Tehran has proposed selling Georgia up to 14 million cubic meters per day via Armenia, which is currently dependent on Russian-supplied gas.

Normally protective of its own status, Russia seems surprisingly amenable to Iran’s moves. So far, Gazprom has voiced no objections to the South Caucasus’ energy pie expanding to include Iran.

Energy analyst Ara Marjanian, president of the E-Cub, an energy think-tank in the Armenian capital, Yerevan, believes that the partnership between Iran and Russia in Syria, as well as the end of sanctions against Iran, explains Gazprom’s apparent tolerance.

“Let’s not jinx it, but the new geo-strategic and economic realities made Russia more cooperative,” Marjanian commented.

Not all Georgians welcome the idea of obtaining Iranian gas via Armenia. Liana Jervalidze, an independent energy analyst in Tbilisi, believes that energy security, economic benefit and geo-strategy dictate that “It is in Georgia’s best interest to remain a place for gas transit to Armenia, not the other way round.”

Kaladze earlier had claimed that, to push Tbilisi to accept cash rather than gas as a transit fee, Gazprom had threatened to stop supplying Armenia altogether and let Armenia get its gas from Iran. Whether Iran’s proposal and Gazprom’s alleged threat are related is not known.

Taking Iran up on its offer does not seem immediately feasible for Tbilisi. For now, Armenia’s Gazprom-run pipeline to Iran can handle only about 1.1 bcm per year, and its line to Georgia takes only Russian gas. No mention has been made of building a second pipeline.

Steve LeVine, energy commentator and adjunct professor of security studies at Georgetown University, calculates that any Moscow-Tehran cooperation in Armenia, where Moscow has carefully cultivated a dependence on Russian energy, will be limited.

“There is no history of Russia, certainly modern-day Russia … deserting an intimate ally in that manner,” LeVine said.

“I don’t see Iran and Russia going hand-in-glove,” he continued. “They are rivals; Iran will act in its own interest.”

Nonetheless, even the notion of using Armenia as a transit country for Iranian gas enrages its foe, Azerbaijan, Georgia’s dominant gas supplier.

Already miffed by Kaladze’s talks with Gazprom, Baku, to keep its cards in play, has promoted Azerbaijan’s own potential as a conduit for Iranian gas – an idea deemed “common sense” by a columnist for the government-aligned Trend news agency.

On February 17, while on a trip to Tehran, Kaladze announced that Tbilisi could consider this option, too.

Pipelines from Azerbaijan to Georgia and on to Turkey and Europe might appear an additional attraction for Iran, but Tehran has expressed no official interest in such an export route.

If Iran’s ultimate market is Europe, commented Baku-based energy analyst Ilham Shaban, director of the Caspian Barrel energy-research center, it can connect directly from the northwestern Iranian city of Tabriz to the Turkey-based Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline, the midsection of the 3,500-kilometer-long Southern Gas Corridor, designed for pumping Azerbaijani gas through to Europe.

Meanwhile, Tbilisi is pursuing yet another option – increasing its take from the South Caucasus Pipeline, the Corridor’s initial section. If that works, Kaladze stated on February 18, then Georgia would not buy Iranian or additional Russian gas.

Editor's note: Giorgi Lomsadze is a freelance journalist based in Tbilisi. He is a frequent contributor to EurasiaNet.org's Tamada Tales blog.

[Vrej1915]

Re: Regional geopolitics

Azerbaijan, On Syria, Walking Tightrope Between Russia And Turkey
February 19, 2016,
by Joshua Kucera

Azerbaijan is walking a narrow line on Syria, trying not to offend either of its powerful neighbors, offering apparently contradictory statements this week about where its sympathies lie.

In an interview with an Austrian newspaper, Deputy Foreign Minister Araz Azimov expressed qualified support for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. "Currently, President Assad is the only guarantor of the integrity and security of Syria," Azimov said. "His army is a legal institution. We welcome a political process, in which Assad would remain in power until the election of his replacement."

Azimov also criticized Russian airstrikes in support of Assad: "I believe that the Russian airstrikes are inefficient and costly." But Azimov's comments were overall seen as surprisingly favorable to Russia. "This may req some explaining before #Azerbaijan Pres Aliyev comes to Washington," former U.S. ambassador to Baku Richard Kauzlarich wrote on his twitter account.

"Support for Assad means that the country is together with Russia and Iran, defending the dictatorship. It is also important that Azerbaijan and Turkey expressed the opposite position on the Syrian issue. In the whole ... interview Azimov confirms that Azerbaijan is close to the dictatorial regimes, such as Russia and Iran, and it is against the position of the free world," said Azerbaijani oppositionist Isa Gambar.

As it happens, Turkish foreign minister Mevlut Cavusoglu visited Baku just two days after Azimov's comments were published. There was no mention of Assad in the public comments by Cavusoglu and his Azerbaijani interlocutors, but Foreign Minister Eldar Mammadyarov reiterated that Azerbaijan is considering joining the Saudi-led Islamic "anti-terror coalition" in Syria."No decision has been made on this issue so far," Mammadyarov said.

Russia has taken a dim view of that Saudi-led coalition, which also includes Turkey and which opposes Assad. Responding to Mammadyarov's comments, Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova said the issue “is the sovereign right of Azerbaijan and depends on Azerbaijani authorities,” but added that “it is not known what the need for a new coalition is. The creation of a new coalition is the process for the sake of process.”

Cavusoglu, in Baku, tried to paper over any differences with Azerbaijan. "We will continue our struggle until the last terrorist. In this issue there is no disagreement with Azerbaijan," he said.

Azerbaijan is in an unenviable position with its two big neighbors holding diametrically opposed views on Syria, not to mention moving closer and closer to actual conflict. It has expressed interesting in mediating that conflict, though that seems beyond Baku's (or anyone else's) diplomatic capabilities at the moment. So far neither Russia nor Turkey seems inclined to push Azerbaijan to pick a side, but Baku's balancing act is getting more and more precarious.

[Vrej1915]

Re: Regional geopolitics



Notice:
1- The recent impressive, yet less publicised gains by the Kurds of Syria in Hasake province, virtually all the province is under their control by now, and they may even reach Deir Zor...., this part of their progress is US sponsored. Do not forget the US base in Roava already mentioned is north of Hasake/Qamishli. We are no more talking of a band of territory unders Kurdish control... it's virtually a country being shaped.
This same effort in Hasake might be the reason, or the diversion to avaoid using the extra strenght of this entity west of the Yeprad, in Manbij-Jarablus-Azaz direction.
Effort of the US to calm Turkey??

2- Notice that the whole progress in Latakia province, very loudly covered by the media, involving all the potentials of the regime and its allies, managed to recapture all in all, in 5 mounths, 750 Km2 of montains in Latakia province, killing, according sources something of 300-500 islamists...
Given the huge disbalance of firepower, air and ground (Mlrs, buradino/tos 1...)... it only values our past victories, like Karvadjar, when in a couple of weeks, we did capture 3500 Km2, with virtually nothing...

3- The events east of Haleb are not that much covered, but here, there are 2 main risks for Turkey and its islamist merceneries by now:
a- A kurdish junction between Azaz (mainly russian cover?) and Manbij/Jarablus (US cover??): This may prove once for all the behind the scene deal between Russia and the US?? Or their fight for the Kurdish factor?? Noticebly till now, the "beseiged" Afrin is much more agressive in Azaz front (Russia) ,, while those under US cover are standing still under Manbij.

b- An other, less talked about risk is a Syrian Arab Army advance, this time slightly south, from Itriha to the shores of the Assad dam, capturing ill famed Genocide site Meskene or directly the dam Al Tharwah. Here it is flat desert terrain, virtually no villages, perfect for mechanised division equipped with the newest russian T-90.
If done, effectively they would cut the Isis/Turkey land connection, since reaching the shores of the Assad dam will be enough to cut the land roads between Rakka and Aynteb/Urfa, as long as the Kurds still keep their foothold on the Tishrin dam and their poket west of the Yeprad, at the doors of Manbij.

c- A much costly option would be the capture of Deir Hafer plateau this time from Khanasser airbase, to reach the shores of the lake, and this time make dirsct contact with Kurds of Kobane....

[Vrej1915]

Re: Regional geopolitics

Արցախյան պատերազմի անհայտ ու առեղծվածային էջեր

[Artsakh]

Re: Regional geopolitics

Turkey’s increasingly desperate predicament poses real dangers

ISTANBUL — Turkey is confronting what amounts to a strategic nightmare as bombs explode in its cities, its enemies encroach on its borders and its allies seemingly snub its demands.

As recently as four years ago, Turkey appeared poised to become one of the biggest winners of the Arab Spring, an ascendant power hailed by the West as a model and embraced by a region seeking new patrons and new forms of governance.

All that has evaporated since the failure of the Arab revolts, shifts in the geopolitical landscape and the trajectory of the Syrian war.

Russia, Turkey’s oldest and nearest rival, is expanding its presence around Turkey’s borders — in Syria to the south, in Crimea and Ukraine to the north, and in Armenia to the east. On Saturday, Russia’s Defense Ministry announced the deployment of a new batch of fighter jets and combat helicopters to an air base outside the Armenian capital, Yerevan, 25 miles from the Turkish border.

Blowback from the Syrian war in the form of a string of suicide bombings in Istanbul and Ankara, most recently on Wednesday, has brought fear to Turkish streets and dampened the vital tourist industry.

The collapse of a peace process with Turkey’s Kurds has plunged the southeast of the country into war between Kurds and the Turkish military just as Syrian Kurds carve out their own proto-state in territories adjacent to Turkey’s border.

The economy is in the doldrums, hit by fears of instability and by sanctions from Moscow targeting such goods and revenue sources as Turkish tomatoes and tourism in retaliation for the downing of a Russian plane in November.

Worries that the tensions could escalate further are spreading, both in Turkey and in the international community, prompting French President François Hollande to warn on Friday that “there is a risk of war between Turkey and Russia.”

“Turkey is facing a multifaceted catastrophe,” said Gokhan Bacik, professor of international relations at Ankara’s Ipek University. “This is a country that has often had problems in the past, but the scale of what is happening now is beyond Turkey’s capacity for digestion.”

A rift with the United States, Turkey’s closest and most vital ally, over the status of the main Syrian Kurdish militia, the People’s Protection Units (YPG), has further exposed Turkey’s vulnerability. A demand by President Recep Tayyep Erdogan that Washington choose between NATO ally Turkey and the YPG, its main Syrian ally in the fight against the Islamic State, was rebuffed by the State Department this month, despite Turkish allegations that the YPG had carried out the bombing in Ankara.

On Saturday, Turkey dug in, demanding unconditional support from the United States. “The only thing we expect from our U.S. ally is to support Turkey with no ifs or buts,” Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu told journalists in Ankara.

Turkey now stands completely isolated, trapped in a maze of quandaries that are partly of its own making, said Soli Ozel, professor of international relations at Istanbul’s Kadir Has University.

“It has so alienated everyone it cannot convince anyone to do anything,” he said. “It is a country whose words no longer carry any weight. It bluffs but does not deliver. It cannot protect its vital interests, and it is at odds with everyone, including its allies.

“For a country that was until very recently seen as a consequential regional power, these facts strike me as quite disastrous,” he added.

Most immediately, Turkey is agonizing over the fast-changing dynamics along its southern border with Syria, where Russia is bombing, Kurds are advancing and the rebels it has supported against President Bashar al-

Assad for the past five years are facing defeat.

Sending troops into Syria, as Ankara has hinted it might, would risk a confrontation with Russia that Turkey would almost certainly lose. The downing of a Russian plane in November was, in retrospect, a major miscalculation, analysts say, one that has hamstrung Turkey’s ability to project its influence into Syria and prevented it from flying missions there, even in support of the U.S.-led coalition against the Islamic State.

Not to intervene would mean bowing to the inevitability of an autonomous Kurdish enclave in northern Syria bordering Turkey’s own restive Kurdish region, as well as the defeat of the rebels Turkey had hoped would topple Assad and project Turkish influence into the Arab world.

For now, Turkey has confined its response in Syria to artillery shelling against the advancing Kurdish forces and efforts to reinforce the rebels. A rebel fighter in the border town of Azaz, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because the issue is sensitive, confirmed multiple reports that Turkey has facilitated the deployment of several hundred rebel fighters from the province of Idlib into Aleppo, via Turkish territory.

At the same time, Erdogan has sought, without success, to revive pressure on the United States to agree to long-standing Turkish proposals for the creation of a safe zone in northern Syria that would protect Syrian civilians who have sought refuge from the fighting along Turkey’s border.

Most observers think direct Turkish intervention unlikely, at least for now. There is no public support for a war and no support for one within the Turkish armed forces. A group of more than 200 academics signed a petition this past week urging Turkey not to go to war in Syria, and the military has publicly stated that it is not willing to send troops across the border without U.N. Security Council approval.

But that has not deterred Erdogan from continuing to threaten action, drawing supposed red lines and seemingly digging Turkish policymakers deeper into a hole from which there is no obvious escape. He recently said the fall of rebel-held Azaz to the advancing Kurds would be a “red line” and vowed that Turkey would not allow the creation of a refuge for militant Kurds in Syria.

Turkey’s predicament is not entirely self-inflicted. Some of the broader global trends — such as Russia’s increasing assertiveness and the United States’ waning interest in the Middle East — could not readily have been foreseen when Turkey set about crafting its ambitious foreign policy earlier in the decade, analysts say.

But Erdogan appears to have misjudged the extent to which the shifting parameters have constrained Turkey’s room to maneuver, according to Henri Barkey, a Turkey expert at the Wilson Center in Washington.

“Erdogan has mismanaged foreign policy because of hubris,” Barkey said. “He was overconfident in 2010 that Turkey was the darling of the world, and that went to his head. There are setbacks that are not of his doing, but how he managed those setbacks are his doing.”

When Erdogan is also confronting unforeseen challenges to his domestic ambitions, notably his plans to amend Turkey’s constitution to enhance his presidential powers, further Turkish missteps cannot be ruled out, said Bacik, the professor in Ankara.

“I’m not saying that Turkey has lost its mind and is poised for war, but the posture in Ankara is very strange and could lead to surprises,” he said. “What’s happening in Syria is a question of survival for Erdogan, so it is not possible to rule anything out.

“For Turkey,” he added, “there is no good scenario from now on.”

http://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/turkey%e2%80%99s-increasingly-desperate-predicament-poses-real-dangers/ar-BBpKzS0?li=BBnbcA1&ocid=HPCDHP

[Vrej1915]

Re: Regional geopolitics

Turkey’s increasingly desperate predicament poses real dangers


http://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/...A1&ocid=HPCDHP

Good article, thank you.
Notice: it ends with an other bluff/threat: the "card of the madness".....