Energy in Azerbaijan

[Vrej1915]

Re: Energy in Azerbaijan

Azerbaijan: Unemployment Rises as Economy Teeters
Feb 24th, 2016


http://www.eurasianet.org/node/77516

Now come and belive that this state's reserve fund has still untapped 30 billion ....
As credible as the 9 million population, with a working population of 5.8 million....., while only in russia, there are 3 million registered azarbaijanis, ....

[Mher]

Re: Energy in Azerbaijan

Fitch Downgrades Azerbaijan to 'BB+'; Outlook Negative
Markets | Fri Feb 26, 2016 4:05pm EST Related: FINANCIALS


(The following statement was released by the rating agency) LONDON, February 26 (Fitch) Fitch Ratings has downgraded Azerbaijan's Long-term foreign and local currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDR) to 'BB+' from 'BBB-'. The Outlooks are Negative. The issue rating on Azerbaijan's senior unsecured foreign currency bond has also been downgraded to 'BB+' from 'BBB-'. The Country Ceiling has been revised to 'BB+' from 'BBB-' and the Short-term foreign-currency IDR has been downgraded to 'B' from 'F3'.

The downgrade of Azerbaijan's IDRs and Negative Outlook reflects the following key rating drivers and their relative weights: HIGH Low oil prices have caused a significant deterioration in the fiscal position. The consolidated general government budget deficit was 5.3% of GDP in 2015 and Fitch expects deficits of 12.5% of GDP in 2016 and 7.5% of GDP in 2017. Receipts from oil and gas, which averaged more than 50% of consolidated budget revenues over the past five years, fell by an estimated 40% in 2015 and Fitch expects them to drop by a further 30% in 2016. At an oil price of USD 25/b, the revised draft 2016 budget projects a consolidated deficit of 15% of GDP. The share of estimated oil revenue going to the budget moves with the oil price and has also declined, even as devaluations of 30% in February 2015 and 50% in December 2015 have left the local currency price of oil largely unchanged compared with 2014. Devaluation has also created urgent social pressures, and the government intends to spend an additional 2% of expected 2016 GDP to compensate the parts of society whose purchasing power has been most hurt by the devaluation. Fitch expects current expenditure in the 2016 state budget to rise 40% to around AZN8.6bn, while capital spending will be slashed by 40% to around AZN5.3bn. The draft of the revised government budget calls for sharper reductions of capital spending (50%) but implies that current expenditures in the state budget will almost double. Buffers are being drawn down to finance fiscal deficits. Assets of the State Oil Fund of Azerbaijan (SOFAZ) were USD34.7bn (68% of GDP) at end-3Q2015, from USD37.1bn (50% of GDP) at end-2014 and Fitch expects them to fall further to around USD31bn by 2017. However, the ratio of SOFAZ assets to GDP has increased and will rise further because lower oil prices have depressed the nominal value of GDP. Currency devaluation reduces the draw on SOFAZ assets, since its transfer to the government is denominated in manat, but the government will be under pressure to increase transfers from the fund. General government debt, which includes explicit contingent liabilities, jumped to 28.3% of GDP in 2015 from 11.2% of GDP at end-2014. The increase is driven by a guarantee on the bonds of state-owned bank Aqrarkredit, which will buy up the troubled assets of the International Bank of Azerbaijan. Fitch expects the debt ratio to stay at this level in 2016-17.

MEDIUM The Central Bank's unsuccessful policy of defending the manat contributed to a fall in its official foreign exchange reserves to USD6.1bn or 3.4 months of import cover at end-2015 from USD15.8bn at end-2014. This compared unfavourably with a 'BBB' category median of 5.6 months of import cover. Reserves fell a further USD1.2bn in January due to capital flight after a 50% devaluation in late December. In response, the Central Bank ordered the closure of currency exchange shops and parliament passed a law imposing a 20% tax on foreign currency transfers abroad. The law was later rejected by the President on grounds of protecting investor interests. Fitch expects real GDP to contract by 3.3% in 2016, even as the median 'BBB' country will grow by 2.6%. Oil output will fall slightly as the long-term trend of declining production in Azerbaijan's oil fields is exacerbated by a fire on a key platform on SOCAR's Guneshli field. Fitch expects non-oil activity to contract by 4%, as the government cuts back on spending, bank lending comes to a stop and consumer confidence and purchasing power fall. However, much of the fall in spending should be absorbed through a reduction in imports. The government estimates that real GDP expanded by 1.1% in 2015, with growth evenly split among oil and non-oil sectors. Consumer prices jumped 4.3% month on month in December and a further 5.8% in January. Fitch expects annual average consumer price inflation to reach 14% year on year in 2016, after a 4% year on year increase in 2015. There are reports of prices of some products quickly adjusting by 50%, indicating that the consumer price index may understate actual inflation. Price increases and generally deteriorating economic conditions triggered isolated protests across the country. The weakness of the banking sector, which Fitch's Banking System Indicator rates at 'b', will be exacerbated by the devaluation and shrinking economy. With deposit dollarisation climbing to 85% in December, there is also an underlying shortage of local currency liquidity and the monetary transmission mechanism is impaired. To encourage deposit growth and confidence in the financial system, the authorities lifted taxes on deposit interest and provided a full guarantee to all bank deposits. The guarantee creates a contingent liability to the sovereign, as the deposit compensation fund could borrow from the Central Bank under a state guarantee. However, the banking sector is small enough for the authorities to easily provide support if needed, with assets of 50% of GDP. The Central Bank also revoked the licences of seven banks that did not meet capital requirements. It is stepping up long-standing efforts to encourage consolidation among the remaining (almost 30) banks. The Central Bank also increased the refinancing rate from 3% to 5% to encourage growth of manat deposits, highlighting the trade-off it faces between exchange rate and macroeconomic stability. Azerbaijan's 'BB+' IDRs also reflect the following key rating drivers: Although diminished, Azerbaijan's sovereign net foreign assets of 63% of GDP distinguish it from 'BB' and 'BBB' category peers and remove any doubt about the country's ability to finance its budget deficits in our forecast period. Although there is increased pressure on SOFAZ assets, the authorities have shown commitment to preserve them. The country is a net external creditor, and Fitch expects that import compression will help it maintain current account surpluses of around 5% of GDP in 2016-2017, after an estimated 1% of GDP in 2015. Fitch expects official foreign exchange reserves to rise to 4.9 months of import cover from 3.4 months in 2015. Fitch expects growth to pick up in 2017 and particularly in 2018, when the Shah Deniz Stage Two gas development is expected to begin to come on-stream. Key energy and transport infrastructure projects are being prioritised and maintained. Restoration of price competitiveness following the devaluation should aid non-oil growth, particularly in tourism and agriculture. Structural indicators are mixed relative to 'BB' peers. Even after devaluation, GDP per capita is in the top half of the 'BB' category. Ease of Doing Business scores are above the peer median and the authorities are taking steps to address key regulatory bottlenecks. Governance indicators, as measured by the World Bank, are significantly below the peer median.

RATING SENSITIVITIES The main factors that, individually or collectively, could trigger negative rating action are: - A failure to adjust expenditure or revenue to the lower oil price environment, resulting in a more rapid draw-down of external assets. - A further fall in hydrocarbon prices, or a prolongation of the current price weakness. The main factors that, individually or collectively, could trigger positive rating action are: - An improvement in the budgetary position, beyond the measures currently envisaged, sufficient to increase Fitch's confidence in the longer-term sustainability of Azerbaijan's sovereign balance sheet strengths. - A sustained rise in hydrocarbon prices that restores fiscal and external buffers. - Improvements in governance and the business environment, and progress towards diversifying the economy away from hydrocarbons.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS Fitch assumes that Brent crude will average USD 35/b in 2016 and USD 45/b in 2017 and rise to long-term average of USD 65/b. Fitch assumes no major domestic or regional instability, notably no full-scale conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh.

http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSFit950328

[Joseph]

Re: Energy in Azerbaijan

http://mobile.reuters.com/article/idUSKCN0VZ1CE

Oh Bryza!

[HyeSocialist]

Re: Energy in Azerbaijan

http://mobile.reuters.com/article/idUSKCN0VZ1CE

Oh Bryza!

What a neocon tool, man. Right after his nonsensical ass kissing the Norwegian lays it out flat and straight.

[Azad]

Re: Energy in Azerbaijan

Good to know

U.S. shale's message for OPEC: above $40, we are coming back

http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-oil-shale-idUSKCN0W20JH

If price of oil does go up, it will have hard time going over $45.
azeri's break even was $50 plus pipeline fees to two countries, it will make it less competitive with other producers.

[Joseph]

Re: Energy in Azerbaijan

http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/azerbaijan-caucasus-gas-georgia-russia-gazprom

FROM FEAST TO FAMINE IN AZERBAIJAN

Azerbaijan’s decision to suspend development work on its planned 12bn m3/yr oil, gas, refining and petrochemical project highlights the complexity of getting the gas balance right in the Caucasus both now and in the long-term.

While the long-term future for gas supplies from indigenous sources looks promising, right now there are acute shortages forcing the region to look realistically at imports from Russia and optimistically at imports from Iran.

In the long-term, should energy prices recover, the state oil company of Azerbaijan (Socar) intends to proceed with developing the massive $7bn oil and gas refining and petrochemical complex (OGPC) planned to be built alongside the existing oil and gas terminal at Sangachal.

But in the short-term, it’s a very different picture, with the region in general, and Azerbaijan in particular, facing immediate gas shortage problems. These problems were epitomised when Socar’s vice president for strategic development Tofig Gahramanov announced on February 19 that "active work on the Socar OGPC project has been temporarily frozen."

The problem for the Azerbaijani authorities, and particularly for Socar, is that even though the energy minister Natiq Aliev has said that overall output will increase modestly from 29.1bn m3 in 2015 to 29.3bn m3 in 2016, a fall in Socar's own production means that existing export commitments risk leaving it short of gas for domestic use.

Azerbaijan has three main sources of gas. There is gas from the giant offshore BP-operated Shah Deniz field, but most of this is contracted for export with 6.6bn m3/yr of existing output from Shah Deniz Phase I (SD1) being delivered to Turkey, and around 0.8 m3/yr delivered to Georgia. With 2015 production totalling 9.9bn m3, this leaves around 2.5bn m3 available for transfer to Socar for domestic consumption. According to Aliev, 2016 is expected to see SD1 output rise to 10.1bn m3, although BP’s country head Gordon Birrell has said he expects output to remain essentially unchanged at around 10bn m3/yr.

Then there is the Azeri Chirag Guneshli (ACG) oil field. This produced 12.3bn m3 of associated gas in 2015, and is expected to produce 12.9bn m3 in 2016, but the gas is overwhelmingly required for reinjection to maintain oil production levels; last year only 3.3bn m3 were transferred to Socar for domestic consumption. With the ACG field facing increasing production constraints, the extra gas produced by the field in 2016 is likely to be used primarily for reinjection.

Finally there is the gas that Socar produces itself. This amounted to just under 6.9bn m3 last year but Aliev has said that it is expected to fall to 6.3bn m3 this year. Moreover, Socar is committed to supplying Georgia with an additional 0.4bn m3/yr from its own resources.

This means that so long as Azerbaijan’s domestic demand remains at around 10-11bn m3/yr, Socar's ability to supply it remains on a knife edge. It is no longer sufficient to meet Azerbaijani domestic demand; hence the widespread speculation concerning imports from Russia.

In September 2015, AzMeCo, an Azerbaijani methane company, agreed to buy 2bn m3/yr of gas from Gazprom Export. Following that announcement, in December 2015, Gazprom said that talks with Socar CEO Rovnag Abdullaev had included discussions on a possible increase in Gazprom supplies to Azerbaijan.

Subsequent reports that Socar itself was planning to buy Russian gas prompted an immediate rebuttal from Socar’s vice president for investments and marketing, Elshad Nasirov, that Socar had no need to import gas from anywhere, but that any other Azerbaijani company – Nasirov specifically mentioned AzMeCo and state-owned electricity company Azerenergy – who intended to purchase gas from Gazprom could use Socar infrastructure to secure their imports.

So while Azerbaijan was as recently as 2013 exporting some 1.4bn m3 of gas to Russia – and with agreements to take that level to 3bn m3/yr – the situation now is that Azerbaijan needs Russian gas to fuel its petrochemicals industry and perhaps its power plants, even if Socar does not require it to meet the needs of other Azerbaijani customers.

Nor can Azerbaijan expect to secure a solution from the giant $22bn upstream development of the giant Shah Deniz Phase II (SD2) programme. While this phase is set to boost the field’s output by a stunning 16bn m3/yr, all of it is already committed for export, with 6 m3/yr going to Turkey and 10bn m3/yr headed for European customers beyond Turkey, notably Italy.

This means that for Azerbaijan to revive its ambitious plans for gas-fuelled petrochemicals development, it needs to bring new gas fields on stream, notably the giant Absheron field.

France’s Total, which is the operator at Absheron, has presented the Azerbaijani authorities with an outline plan under which production could start as early as 2021. But this is overly ambitious, both in terms of a compressed timetable and because of the lack of rigs available for drilling production wells. With no final investment decision for Absheron expected until 2017 at the earliest, it seems highly unlikely that the field will start significant production much before 2025.

In the meantime, of course, this will encourage Socar in its revived efforts to see whether it can secure the input of gas from Turkmenistan via a trans-Caspian gas pipeline.

Georgia's Import Considerations

Then there is Georgia. Georgia’s energy minister Kakha Kaladze acknowledged on February 8 what had, in fact, long been presumed: that he was negotiating with Gazprom on importing gas. But neither on that date, nor on February 19 when he spoke of signing “soon” a memorandum of understanding with Gazprom, did he say how much gas Georgia expected to import.

Because of political anxieties about reliance on Russian gas – the Georgians remember not only the 2008 war with Russia but also the January 2006 cut-off of Russian gas during the coldest winter for 20 years – there has been considerable public concern about Kaladze’s persistence in pursuing a revived relationship with Gazprom.

In recent years, Gazprom has had to rely on Georgia as a transit route for its regular gas deliveries to Armenia and has paid the Georgians a transit fee in the form of gas deliveries. Now Gazprom wants to pay a flat fee to Georgia for transit – and for Georgia to pay commercial terms for both existing gas flows and for increases in gas supplies.

As a result, Kaladze has suggested Georgia might import gas from Iran, as it did in the wake of the 2006 cut-off. While the minister suggested one import route that would pose few problems, namely through Azerbaijan, he also suggested gas might transit through Armenia.

Iran does indeed supply Armenia with gas, but Russia put pressure on Armenia to limit the size of that pipeline so that Iran would never be able to deliver more than about one-quarter of Armenia’s domestic requirements, let alone have anything spare for onward delivery to other neighbours, notably Georgia.

Meanwhile, however, Tbilisi has secured the agreement of Azerbaijan to adjust its existing agreement under which 60% of promised gas deliveries take place in the wintry half of the year and 40% in the summery half, to a 70-30% split. In effect, this will raise Azerbaijani deliveries over a 90-day period from around 385mn m3 to 450mn m3 – not a tremendous amount but nonetheless contributing to the squeeze on Azerbaijani resources.

There are, still, ambitious suggestions for a major readjustment of regional gas flows. These include the long-standing proposals for a Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline to enable Turkmen gas to access regional markets and, indeed, to fulfil a 1999 contract to supply as much as 16bn m³/yr to Turkey (and also deliver a further 14bn m³/yr to European countries beyond Turkey). They also include proposals for large volumes of Iranian gas to access the TransAnatolia Pipeline project across Turkey via Azerbaijan, although it would be much easier for Iran and Tanap’s promoters to build a direct connection alongside the existing Iran-Turkey gas line.

But the problem remains that long-term ambitions for major new external supplies will not resolve the immediate issue: how to secure domestic demand in Azerbaijan and to provide for peak winter requirements in Georgia. Right now, Gazprom seems to be the only game in town.

John Roberts

Chief Analyst, Natural Gas Europe

[Vrej1915]

Re: Energy in Azerbaijan

http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/azer...russia-gazprom

FROM FEAST TO FAMINE IN AZERBAIJAN



Chief Analyst, Natural Gas Europe

Thank you for this.
Keep on quality postings

[Joseph]

Re: Energy in Azerbaijan

Yup, the cash is drying up

http://www.rferl.org/content/former-us-congressman-dan-burton-quits-azerbaijan-lobby-group-nonpayment/27585777.html

Ex-U.S. Congressman Quits Azerbaijani Lobby Group, Citing Nonpayment

By Carl Schreck
March 02, 2016

WASHINGTON -- A former U.S. congressman has resigned as chairman of a central player in the multimillion-dollar Azerbaijani lobbying effort to court American support for the ex-Soviet republic's authoritarian government, saying he has not been paid for his services "in a year."

Former U.S. Representative Dan Burton (Republican-Indiana) this week resigned from the Azerbaijan America Alliance, a group founded by tycoon Anar Mammadov, son of the oil-rich Caucasus nation’s transport minister, that has paid U.S. lobbyists more than $12 million since 2011.

"As I have not heard from you or Anar, and have not been paid for a year, please consider this e-mail as a letter of resignation as Chairman of the Azerbaijan American Alliance," Burton wrote in a March 1 e-mail to James Fabiani, whose Washington-based firm lobbies for the group in the United States. The e-mail was seen by RFE/RL.

Fabiani did not respond to an e-mail seeking comment or to a voicemail left with his office, and no one answered the phone at the number listed on the Azerbaijan America Alliance’s website.

Mammadov, a recent business partner of U.S. Republican presidential front-runner Donald Trump for the construction of a 33-floor, sail-shaped luxury hotel in Baku, did not respond to a Facebook message, and no one answered the phone at the number listed on his website.

Burton’s resignation follows months of speculation about the fate of the Azerbaijan America Alliance, a prominent pillar of a broader Azerbaijani lobbying campaign in the United States to portray Azerbaijan as a stable energy and security partner for the West. The lobby involves both private and state money.

Baku's detractors accuse President Ilham Aliyev's government and its proxies of trying to paper over an abysmal human rights record with "caviar diplomacy," using gifts, vacations, and other expensive incentives to gain friends and curry favor with foreign officials.

Aliyev recently removed broad powers from the Transport Ministry, overseen by Mammadov’s father, suggesting the family’s influence in the government is waning.

Several reports in the Azerbaijani media since August have cited unidentified sources as saying that Mammadov planned to shutter the Azerbaijan America Alliance due to financial difficulties amid the broader economic crisis Azerbaijan is grappling with due to plunging energy prices.

Burton’s predecessor as the group’s chairman, Azerbaijani businessman Khayal Sharifzadeh, denied those reports, saying the organization "continues its activity as usual and even in a larger scale."

Wining And Dining

Over the past five years, the Azerbaijan America Alliance has poured a total of $12.3 million into U.S. lobbying efforts, according to the public-interest website Opensecrets.org, having wined and dined Washington's elite and pushed Baku’s interests in meetings with senior members of Congress.

Fabiani & Company’s work for the group has made the Top 10 list of priciest U.S. lobbying contracts every year since the organization’s launch in 2011, according to rankings compiled by Opensecrets.org.

The organization, which is not formally affiliated with the Azerbaijani state but has hewn closely to the Aliyev government’s line, has continued this spending, paying $1.46 million for U.S. lobbying services in 2015, most of which went to Fabiani & Company, according to public lobbying disclosures.

Precisely how that money is being spent remains unclear. The group’s public activities appear to have ground to a halt. It has not updated its social media accounts or the news feed on its website since November, and it did not stage its lavish annual gala dinner in 2015 as it had the previous three years.


The group spent $430,000 for its 2012 dinner, which was attended by then-House of Representatives speaker John Boehner (pictured with Mammadov at left) and 15 other members of Congress, including Burton, according to a 2013 filing under the U.S. Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA).

In 2013, the Azerbaijan America Alliance terminated its FARA registration, which had required it to provide detailed accounts of its expenditures and contacts with government officials, journalists, and other individuals while lobbying.

Its spending is now reported under the U.S. Lobbying Disclosure Act, which requires a far less detailed account of a lobbying activities than FARA. Fabiani & Company’s filings reporting its work for the Azerbaijan America Alliance in each quarter of 2015 indicate only that contacts were made with the U.S. State Department and both houses of Congress.

‘I Didn’t Want To Be Involved Anymore’

Burton was named chairman of the Azerbaijan America Alliance in February 2013, a month after he left office after a 30-year career in Congress. He told RFE/RL this week that Fabiani introduced him to Mammadov, chairman of Garant Holding, a conglomerate with interests that include construction firms, hotels, and insurance companies.

Investigations by RFE/RL have previously revealed that Anar Mammadov's business interests are tied to the ministry overseen by his father, Ziya Mammadov.

Burton said that he did not engage in lobbying during his time with the Azerbaijan America Alliance, but that he would occasionally invite members of Congress to “social functions” staged by the group.

Burton was still listed as chairman on the group's website as of March 2.
Burton was still listed as chairman on the group's website as of March 2.
He also published opinion articles supporting the Azerbaijani government. One such piece in The Washington Times was singled out by Washington Post media reporter Erik Wemple, who noted that it failed to mention Burton’s affiliation with the Azerbaijan America Alliance.

In his resignation e-mail, Burton said that while he believes "it is very important that there be a strong business and government relationship between the United States and Azerbaijan, I still must resign" due to nonpayment.

He declined to say how much he was paid as the organization's chairman.

He told RFE/RL that he has not been paid for his services since February 2015.

“I hope they don’t have my name still as chairman of the Azerbaijan America Alliance. I told them that I didn’t want to be involved anymore,” he said in a March 1 telephone interview.

As of March 2, Burton was still listed as chairman of the Azerbaijan America Alliance on the organization's website.

[Haykakan]

Re: Energy in Azerbaijan

Yup, the cash is drying up

http://www.rferl.org/content/former-us-congressman-dan-burton-quits-azerbaijan-lobby-group-nonpayment/27585777.html

Ex-U.S. Congressman Quits Azerbaijani Lobby Group, Citing Nonpayment

By Carl Schreck
March 02, 2016

WASHINGTON -- A former U.S. congressman has resigned as chairman of a central player in the multimillion-dollar Azerbaijani lobbying effort to court American support for the ex-Soviet republic's authoritarian government, saying he has not been paid for his services "in a year."

Former U.S. Representative Dan Burton (Republican-Indiana) this week resigned from the Azerbaijan America Alliance, a group founded by tycoon Anar Mammadov, son of the oil-rich Caucasus nation’s transport minister, that has paid U.S. lobbyists more than $12 million since 2011.

"As I have not heard from you or Anar, and have not been paid for a year, please consider this e-mail as a letter of resignation as Chairman of the Azerbaijan American Alliance," Burton wrote in a March 1 e-mail to James Fabiani, whose Washington-based firm lobbies for the group in the United States. The e-mail was seen by RFE/RL.

Fabiani did not respond to an e-mail seeking comment or to a voicemail left with his office, and no one answered the phone at the number listed on the Azerbaijan America Alliance’s website.

Mammadov, a recent business partner of U.S. Republican presidential front-runner Donald Trump for the construction of a 33-floor, sail-shaped luxury hotel in Baku, did not respond to a Facebook message, and no one answered the phone at the number listed on his website.

Burton’s resignation follows months of speculation about the fate of the Azerbaijan America Alliance, a prominent pillar of a broader Azerbaijani lobbying campaign in the United States to portray Azerbaijan as a stable energy and security partner for the West. The lobby involves both private and state money.

Baku's detractors accuse President Ilham Aliyev's government and its proxies of trying to paper over an abysmal human rights record with "caviar diplomacy," using gifts, vacations, and other expensive incentives to gain friends and curry favor with foreign officials.

Aliyev recently removed broad powers from the Transport Ministry, overseen by Mammadov’s father, suggesting the family’s influence in the government is waning.

Several reports in the Azerbaijani media since August have cited unidentified sources as saying that Mammadov planned to shutter the Azerbaijan America Alliance due to financial difficulties amid the broader economic crisis Azerbaijan is grappling with due to plunging energy prices.

Burton’s predecessor as the group’s chairman, Azerbaijani businessman Khayal Sharifzadeh, denied those reports, saying the organization "continues its activity as usual and even in a larger scale."

Wining And Dining

Over the past five years, the Azerbaijan America Alliance has poured a total of $12.3 million into U.S. lobbying efforts, according to the public-interest website Opensecrets.org, having wined and dined Washington's elite and pushed Baku’s interests in meetings with senior members of Congress.

Fabiani & Company’s work for the group has made the Top 10 list of priciest U.S. lobbying contracts every year since the organization’s launch in 2011, according to rankings compiled by Opensecrets.org.

The organization, which is not formally affiliated with the Azerbaijani state but has hewn closely to the Aliyev government’s line, has continued this spending, paying $1.46 million for U.S. lobbying services in 2015, most of which went to Fabiani & Company, according to public lobbying disclosures.

Precisely how that money is being spent remains unclear. The group’s public activities appear to have ground to a halt. It has not updated its social media accounts or the news feed on its website since November, and it did not stage its lavish annual gala dinner in 2015 as it had the previous three years.


The group spent $430,000 for its 2012 dinner, which was attended by then-House of Representatives speaker John Boehner (pictured with Mammadov at left) and 15 other members of Congress, including Burton, according to a 2013 filing under the U.S. Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA).

In 2013, the Azerbaijan America Alliance terminated its FARA registration, which had required it to provide detailed accounts of its expenditures and contacts with government officials, journalists, and other individuals while lobbying.

Its spending is now reported under the U.S. Lobbying Disclosure Act, which requires a far less detailed account of a lobbying activities than FARA. Fabiani & Company’s filings reporting its work for the Azerbaijan America Alliance in each quarter of 2015 indicate only that contacts were made with the U.S. State Department and both houses of Congress.

‘I Didn’t Want To Be Involved Anymore’

Burton was named chairman of the Azerbaijan America Alliance in February 2013, a month after he left office after a 30-year career in Congress. He told RFE/RL this week that Fabiani introduced him to Mammadov, chairman of Garant Holding, a conglomerate with interests that include construction firms, hotels, and insurance companies.

Investigations by RFE/RL have previously revealed that Anar Mammadov's business interests are tied to the ministry overseen by his father, Ziya Mammadov.

Burton said that he did not engage in lobbying during his time with the Azerbaijan America Alliance, but that he would occasionally invite members of Congress to “social functions” staged by the group.

Burton was still listed as chairman on the group's website as of March 2.
Burton was still listed as chairman on the group's website as of March 2.
He also published opinion articles supporting the Azerbaijani government. One such piece in The Washington Times was singled out by Washington Post media reporter Erik Wemple, who noted that it failed to mention Burton’s affiliation with the Azerbaijan America Alliance.

In his resignation e-mail, Burton said that while he believes "it is very important that there be a strong business and government relationship between the United States and Azerbaijan, I still must resign" due to nonpayment.

He declined to say how much he was paid as the organization's chairman.

He told RFE/RL that he has not been paid for his services since February 2015.

“I hope they don’t have my name still as chairman of the Azerbaijan America Alliance. I told them that I didn’t want to be involved anymore,” he said in a March 1 telephone interview.

As of March 2, Burton was still listed as chairman of the Azerbaijan America Alliance on the organization's website.

I hope the price of oil stays this low. Azeris will be rendered irrelevant.

[HyeSocialist]

Re: Energy in Azerbaijan

I hope the price of oil stays this low. Azeris will be rendered irrelevant.

Even the gas fields that come online are probably going to be a joke. The Turks are going to consume it all for their market and Europe won't even get a trickle.