The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

[Federate]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

Seriously, where do these Evangelical xxx-lovers get off claiming that the xxxs are the only one's who are "God's Chosen People"? Jesus abolished that; Robertson (and all the other Evangelicals) seem to forget that after Jesus came "there is neither Gentile nor xxx, freeman nor slave". But, as always, these Evangelical types find a way to distort the Bible to their Zionist aims.

I've met Armenians online who think exactly like this, that one day God will save the xxxs and what not and that they are the chosen race. Horrible experience. They call themselves Pentecostal and sing Aram Asatryan-style religious songs in church.

[Mizzike]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

Seriously, where do these Evangelical xxx-lovers get off claiming that the xxxs are the only one's who are "God's Chosen People"? Jesus abolished that; Robertson (and all the other Evangelicals) seem to forget that after Jesus came "there is neither Gentile nor xxx, freeman nor slave".

Amen. According to scripture, anybody who believes in Christ is a true xxx. The true Israel is now the church.

They're [evangelical dispensationalists] the same people pushing for constant war in the middle east because the "end is near" and so initiating or perpetuating some catastrophic conflict would sure be a great way to 'hasten Armageddon'. This is revolting to me not simply because of its bare stupidity, and its dangerous influence over American political classes and American religiosity, but also that it stems from their misunderstanding of scripture.

I've met Armenians online who think exactly like this, that one day God will save the xxxs and what not and that they are the chosen race. Horrible experience. They call themselves Pentecostal and sing Aram Asatryan-style religious songs in church.

My mother is one of these people, and it pains me. She isn't necessarily Pentecostal (in the sense of speaking in tongues, and other non-formal practices), but largely matches your description. Rather than actually reading any scripture, she instead relies on Left Behind books, James Dobson, and other run-of-the-mill, pop-dispensationalist propaganda. Hopefully down the road I can remove my frustration with the issue and just explain some of it to her coherently, because I know she'll be quick to think of me as some heretic. Until then I will just be a disheartened pacifist.

Anyway, back to the topic. This seems pretty big...hot off the press.

__________________________________

Russia seen to halt all European transit gas

KIEV (Reuters) - Ukraine's state energy company Naftogaz said on Wednesday that Russia had cut off all gas supplies to Europe via Ukrainian territory at 5:44 a.m. British time.

"At 7:44am (local time) Russian supplies were cut to Sudzha," said Naftogaz in a statement, referring to a compressor station on Ukraine's western border that was the last still pumping supplies to Europe.

http://uk.reuters.com/article/UKNews1/idUKL729057320090107

[Armenian]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

Seriously, where do these Evangelical xxx-lovers get off claiming that the xxxs are the only one's who are "God's Chosen People"? Jesus abolished that; Robertson (and all the other Evangelicals) seem to forget that after Jesus came "there is neither Gentile nor xxx, freeman nor slave". But, as always, these Evangelical types find a way to distort the Bible to their Zionist aims.

I don't want to get into a lengthy theological discussion here but let me just say I accept traditional Christianity, in particular Orthodox Christianity, simply as a national/cultural expression and as one that compared to other so-called Christian faiths most closely represents the true essence of Christ. However, spiritually, I am far from being considered a traditional Christian in that I reject the so-called "Old Testament" (the Hebrew Torah and Tanakh) and its blood thirsty, oppressive and jealous tribal god, Yahweh.

In my opinion, and in the opinion of many early Christians, the divine Trinity we believe in has nothing to do with Hebrew scriptures and even less to do with their Yahweh. The present face/character of traditional Christianity is a direct result of a shrewd political move made by Constantine the Great of Rome at the Council of Nicea in 325 AD with the primary intention of uniting his empire's large Pagan, Christian and Jewish populations. Mainline Christians today are the inheritors of Constantin's theopolitical formulations or manipulations. Thus, in my opinion, as a result of Constantin's actions, traditional Christianity today has inherent flaws and inconsistencies, emanating out of a political attempt by special interests at the time, be it Roman or Hellenized Jew, to combine the story of the Godman Christ with that of the Hebrew Messiah.

A Jewish theologian once said:

"Christians stole our watch, and for two thousand years they have been telling us what time it is."

I agree with him. Let's stop pretending that we Christians of Pagan backgrounds know better than Jews who or what their long awaited Messiah is.

JEWS DO NOT ACCEPT CHRIST AS THE MESSIAH BECAUSE:

1) Christ/Jesus did not fulfill the messianic prophecies
2) Christ/Jesus did not embody the personal qualifications of the Messiah
3) Biblical verses in the Hebrew texts supposedly "referring" to Christ/Jesus are mistranslations
4) Jewish belief system is ethnocentric, it is a national revelation
5) Christianity contradicts core tenants in Jewish theology


Moreover, it needs to be mentioned here that ancient Hebrews originated within the Armenian Highlands. [They were most probably related to the proto-Armenian Huri tribe or the proto-Kurdish Hibaru tribe or more likely, both] Needless to point out, their early sacred literature, from the creation account to the great flood, takes place primarily within the Armenian Highlands. Genetic tests conducted on modern Jews reveal that their phenotype can be traced to Anatolia. It is also very interesting to point out that we Armenians call Hebrews - Hria, which is linguistically the same as Huri, a proto-Armenian tribe that rose to prominence in the second millennium BC around the region of Van.

Nonetheless, since we just celebrate the birth of our Godman Christ in Palestine, I want you to meditate/reflect on this very poignant event: When Christ, our Lord and savior, was born in Bethlehem the Jewish king sought to murder him as three 'Zoroastrian priests' from Persia were searching for Christ to 'worship' him... Unlike Jews, Pagans recognized Christ exactly for who he was - God on earth.

Merry Christmas

How could one reconcile or associate the following natures and characteristics of Christ and Christianity with classical Judaism? A brief look at the non-Jewish nature of Christianity as it existed at the time of Christ:

The Holy Trinity (had similar counterparts only within the Pagan world)

The Holy Spirit (appears exclusively within the Christian Gospel and the only other place that such a being is mentioned is within the Zoroastrian Avesta)

God being all good, not capable of evil (exclusively Zoroastrian in nature)

The Son of God (a non-Jewish concept that was ubiquitous within the Pagan world)

The nature and order of the angelic world in Christianity (exclusively Zoroastrian in nature)

Nature of the spirit world (Pagan)

The virgin giving birth to God (exclusively Pagan)

God descending to earth to dwell with mankind (Pagan in nature)

God being all-good, compassionate and loving (exclusively Zoroastrian in nature)

Last judgment at the end-days (Pagan)

A savior coming to earth to save all of mankind (Pagan)

Cleansing and purification rites through water (Pagan)

Partaking in a communal meal as ritual (Pagan/Mithraic)

The nature of Satan, heaven and hell (exclusively Zoroastrian in nature)

Divine numerology, symbolic numbers such as forty, seven, three, twelve, etc. found throughout Christian and Hebrew scriptures (Pagan)

If you wish, we can discuss this topic here:http://forum.hyeclub.com/showthread.php?t=10028

[Armenian]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

The Black Sea: A Net Assessment

Summary

The Black Sea, long an arena for geopolitical conflict, has recently seen a flurry of naval activity. This activity underscores the region’s central military and economic role for the surrounding nations. It also highlights the Black Sea’s and critical importance to Russia, which makes it likely that the body of water would be a major point of conflict in any Russian-Western flare-up.

Analysis

The American destroyer USS McFaul pulled into the Georgian harbor of Batumi on Aug. 24 to begin distributing humanitarian supplies. The McFaul and the Polish frigate Gen. Kazimierz Pulaski passed through the Dardanelles late Aug. 22, one day after the Spanish frigate Adm. Don Juan de Bourbon and the German frigate FGS Luebeck exited the Bosporus into the Black Sea. The Pulaski and the other two NATO vessels are headed to the Romanian seaport of Constanta, where they will conduct a preplanned, routine visit to the Black Sea region, according to an official NATO announcement. The McFaul, by contrast, is part of a planned three-U.S. vessel humanitarian mission to Georgia that within days will include the frigate USS Taylor, which passed through the Dardanelles on Aug. 25. And finally, the Russian flagship cruiser Moskva left the Ukrainian port of Sevastopol and re-entered the Black Sea again Aug. 25 for weapons and communications systems testing, while the USS Mount Whitney and the US Coast Guard cutter Dallas reportedly were headed to the Black Sea.

With all of this activity, the Black Sea, long an arena for geopolitical conflict, is getting crowded. In ancient times, the Greeks termed the body of water an “inhospitable” or “hospitable” sea depending on the level of Greek control over its shores. The last significant military campaign conducted in the Black Sea took place in 1916. One must go even further back for the last time the West and Russia squared off across the shores of the Black Sea, to the Crimean War (1854-1856), when the combined forces of France, the United Kingdom and the Ottoman Empire invaded Russia. Moscow’s dramatic defeat forced it to undergo its greatest reform ever under Czar Alexander II. Though the Black Sea has now experienced almost a century of calm, it might be becoming inhospitable once again.

Recent events in Georgia have brought into sharp focus the strategic value of the Black Sea, a vital body of water in the middle of a resource-rich area. This region is particularly strategic from the Russian perspective, meaning any fight flaring up between the West and Russia would likely see the Black Sea as a major point of conflict. A review of the strategic importance of the Black Sea for the various interested powers is therefore in order. The Black Sea forms roughly the southern and the eastern boundaries of Europe with the Middle East and Asia respectively, and it is the major body of water between the Caspian Sea and the Mediterranean. It is connected to the Mediterranean via the Bosporus and the Dardanelles, two straits that form a maritime bottleneck separating Europe from Asia. The Turkish coast forms the southern coastline of the Black Sea, while the northern coast of the sea is split almost equally between Russia and Ukraine. The Russian-populated, but Ukrainian-owned, Crimean Peninsula juts into the middle of the sea, affording whoever controls it crucial access to the Russian and Ukrainian plains. To the sea’s east are the Georgian coast and the Caucasus, while in the west lie the Balkan states of Bulgaria, Romania and landlocked Moldova.

The Black Sea is essential to any attempt at force projection in the region because the Carpathian Mountains in Romania and the Caucasus Mountains constrain any land-based moves against Russia from the south. The Black Sea is therefore the only path through which a potential enemy could threaten Russia’s core without, of course, driving across Poland and the North European plain straight to Moscow — a path Napoleon and Hitler found was not so direct after all. Because the Black Sea is close to the Caucasus and directly below Russia’s oil-producing regions of Tatarstan and Bashkorostan, it also affords any Russian enemy a direct line toward the energy lifeline of the Russian military. For Europe, the Black Sea has never been a major military route of invasion and has often in fact acted as a buffer against land-based armies. But many invaders have managed to go around the Black Sea. These included the Ottomans, who found it easier to march across the Balkans to Vienna then to take the Black Sea route to Ukraine. The Ottomans did hold the Crimean Peninsula from 1441 to 1783, but only nominally, affording the local Crimean Tatars considerable autonomy — more than was customary even for the Ottoman Empire — until the Russian Empire usurped Turkish overlordship.

As a trade route, by contrast, the Black Sea is vital for the Europeans. During the Cold War, Black Sea shipping was minimal, as the lower Danube River fell into the Soviet sphere. But with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the cessation of hostilities in former Yugoslavia, the Danube has returned as a key transportation route, particularly for Germany. Now, Central European manufacturing exports can be floated down the river to the Black Sea, which is much cheaper than transporting them to the Baltic Sea by land. Any renewed closure of this transportation route would certainly be a big problem for Europe. For Ukraine, the Black Sea is both economically and militarily vital. Ukraine is perhaps the only former Soviet Union state with useful rivers, the Dniepr and the Dniester. Both are navigable and drain in the Black Sea, which does not freeze in the winter, unlike the seas Russia’s rivers drain into. It is no wonder that the first powerful Russian/Ukrainian state, the Kievan Rus, emerged in this economically viable and fertile region in the 9th century.

But the blessing of having rivers that drain into the Black Sea is also a curse for Ukraine. This is in large part because the Crimean Peninsula, populated and controlled by Russians, sits where the rivers enter the sea. The Crimea is essentially a giant, immovable military fortress at the mouth of some of the most vital transportation routes for Ukraine. Whoever controls this “fort” controls Ukraine. Russia can interdict the Ukrainian links to the Black Sea easily from its Black Sea naval headquarters in Sevastopol, and its control over the peninsula is secure because the population of Crimea is heavily ethnically Russian and pro-Russian. The Black Sea is similarly vital for Georgia, whose only access to Europe is via the sea, due to the rugged terrain of the Caucasus and through Russian hostility.

For Russia, the key strategic value of the Black Sea lies in controlling the energy resources in the Caucasus and around the Caspian Sea. Russia’s population in the region is concentrated on the coasts of the Black Sea, both on the Russian side of the coast and in Ukrainian-controlled Crimea. There is very little population along the shore of the Caspian Sea, which is the eastern portion of the land bridge between the two seas. Therefore, if a naval operation were to project power from the Black Sea toward the Don River corridor between Rostov-on-Don and Volgograd (better known by its former name, Stalingrad), Moscow would be cut off from the Russian Caucasus and the region’s immense energy resources. French and British expeditionary forces tried to do just that during the Crimean War, first invading Crimea and taking Sevastopol and then trying to get to Rostov-on-Don through the Sea of Azov. In the nuclear age, a similar land invasion of Russia would of course be out of the question, but the trajectory of possible power projections still stands: through the Black Sea to Crimea and into the Rostov-on-Don/Volgograd Don River corridor. By attacking Moscow’s control over the Don River corridor, an enemy essentially would cut off the Caucasus from the Kremlin, setting the stage for further force projection inland.

For Turkey, the Black Sea is really all about the Dardanelles. Turkey’s population is sparse on its Black Sea coast due to the rugged Pontic Mountains, so trade links are not as vital as those that flow into the Mediterranean. Control of maritime access to the Black Sea gives Turkey leverage over countries that need to use the Black Sea to access the rest of the world, namely the Central Europeans (although they have costlier alternate routes) and Russia. Militarily, the Black Sea was always a much simpler theater of operations for the Ottomans than the Mediterranean, because the forces arrayed against them in the Black Sea (Russians, Ukrainians, the Balkan nations) were much weaker than those in the Mediterranean (Italians, French, British, Venetians, Genoese, etc.). Ottoman control over the northern coast of the Black Sea, particularly Crimea, simply never was vital to the core of the empire as was control of the Balkans, from where the Ottomans tried to advance on Europe.

The struggle for control over these straits has been the root cause of many previous military campaigns, including the Crimean and the Russo-Turkish Wars in the 19th century and the Allied Dardanelles campaign of World War I. Throughout its history, Russia has never been able to exit the Black Sea through the straits at will. In part, this is because Turkey was either strong enough to resist Russia or propped up by a Western power hoping to keep Russia out of the Mediterranean. Contemporary politico-military arrangements in Europe dictate that the Black Sea is essentially a NATO-controlled lake. The bottleneck of the Dardanelles/Bosporus is, for all intents and purposes (nuances of current international treaties such as the Montreux Convention aside), fully under the control of NATO member Turkey. Just south of the crucial straits lies the Aegean Sea — also NATO-controlled — a confining body of water that further entrenches NATO’s power in the region. Even if Russia were to miraculously break through the Dardanelles, the maze that is the Aegean would prove impossible to escape. Also, the entire Mediterranean is a NATO lake, given the predominance of its navies there along with the fact that the entire sea is in range of land-based airpower.

The extent of Russian naval and military power today lies in its ability to conduct precisely the sort of power projection witnessed in Georgia. Russia can play on its side of the Black Sea, particularly in Georgia and Ukraine; the strategic Crimean Peninsula and the naval base of Sevastopol act as a xxxxpit from which Russia controls the northern shores of the sea. Combined with air superiority on its side, Russia can certainly dominate the Caucasus and Ukraine. Russia also dominates these regions by virtue of its land power and contiguous territory. Doctrinally, Russia rolls in on the ground, maintaining direct land links to its home territory.

But this cuts both ways, and the Black Sea is the perfect platform through which to project military power into the very heart of Russia. Oceans and seas, in general, are the modern highways of war that a powerful state can use to project its power to any point on the planet. Without the Black Sea, the closest anyone could get to the Russian underbelly would entail marching through the North European Plain or the Balkans, prospects with a historically very low rate of success — and brutally high human and military costs. Alternatively, a modern navy, such as those possessed by the United States and some of its NATO allies, could easily park its fleet in the Black Sea thanks to Turkish control of the Dardanelles. This would put the fleet within easy striking distance of Moscow’s energy-rich Caucasus region, all without the need to invade Russia proper as during the Crimean War. This option has only appeared with the advent of modern guided missiles and carrier-launched aircraft, which perhaps accounts for the increased importance of the Black Sea Fleet, nominally the Kremlin’s least-favored fleet.

At present, the West also has overall superior military power in the Black Sea. By controlling the Dardanelles, the formidable U.S. and Turkish navies control the sea’s entrance as well as its waters. Turkish and U.S. air forces also have presence in the region. The U.S. air force has a hub in the southern Turkish air base at Incirlik, and airfields in Greece, Bulgaria and Romania could easily host decisive airpower from any number of NATO member countries, which could be used to establish air superiority over the entire sea and devastate the Russian naval presence. Turkey’s air force is also well-drilled and well-equipped. Modern weapons systems such as submarine- and ship-launched cruise missiles and carrier-launched jets would be able to target the very heart of Russia once the supremacy of the Black Sea was assured.

(It should be pointed out, however, that when it comes to U.S. ship-, submarine-, and air-launched cruise missiles, the Black Sea presents an additional vector of attack but is not decisive for attacking Russia’s European core given U.S. access to the Barents, Baltic, Mediterranean and Aegean seas.)

The Black Sea could become an advantage for Russia only if Moscow somehow managed to neutralize Turkey and its control of the straits. Thus far, Russia has never been able to do this, either militarily or diplomatically. Moscow’s geography has always hindered its naval development, and despite trying on and off for more than a century, it has never been able to secure the Black Sea, instead living with it as a buffer, just as it uses Ukraine as a buffer. Today, more than ever, Turkey holds decisive military control over the only sea access to the Black Sea, and as such is the absolute arbiter of outside naval intervention. Turkish alliance with the West is therefore the key to NATO’s — and thus the West’s — continued denial of the Black Sea to Russia as anything more than a buffer, a reality that has not changed much throughout the centuries.

Source: http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/bla...net_assessment

[Armenian]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

Moscow reconsidering military-reform plans

On October 14, 2008, Russian Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov announced a plan for overhauling the country's Armed Forces. However, this ambitious military reform is currently being reconsidered. On December 4, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin told a live question-and-answer session that officers would not be discharged en masse. Only those officers on the verge of retirement and college-and-university graduates who have served their two-year military obligation will be discharged. Warrant officers and sub-lieutenants will receive their walking papers after serving out their contract, unless they agree to civilian jobs with higher wages.

Colonel General Viktor Zavarzin, chairman of the State Duma Defense Committee, told foreign military attaches in Moscow that the government would reconsider the military-reform plans. Army General Nikolai Makarov, Chief of the Russian Armed Forces' General Staff, discussed the projected army reform at the General Staff Military Academy. He said a new national military doctrine would be drafted in parallel with the military reform. "They are now working actively on the document which, I think, will be more applied and specific," Makarov said.

The Russian Security Council is working on the new military doctrine. Former General Staff Chief Army General Yury Baluyevsky, who with other analysts criticized the current military doctrine for its vague and verbose provisions, now heads a board that will edit the new document. Moreover, General Makarov said the military-reform plan had been drafted long before the August 2008 Russian-Georgian conflict. Naturally, the conflict facilitated and expedited the army reform. The Russian Army conducted a peace enforcement operation after Georgian forces attacked Russian citizens and peacekeepers in South Ossetia.

The operation's lessons show that the Armed Forces require all-out and prompt modernization, which can no longer be postponed. The problems encountered by the 58th Russian Army during the Georgian conflict convinced skeptics that the four-tier troop-control system comprising military districts, armies, divisions and regiments had to be replaced with a more rational and effective three-tier system that would comprise military districts, tactical commands and brigades.

General Makarov said a three-year experiment to assess the effectiveness of regional commands was now over. There were plans to establish the West, South and East regional commands. From now on, military districts will be vested with strategic-command functions. Each military district will become an independent operational strategic element and will control all local Army, Navy, Air Force and Air-Defense units on its territory. Technically speaking, any military district must be able to fight small wars in its own zone of responsibility, without involving other districts. Each military district will have an assault/airborne brigade. In all, there are plans to deploy 80 brigades, including 40 general-purpose Army brigades. Each brigade will become a permanent-readiness unit and will be expanded to war-time strength.

Unlike previous decisions, cadre-strength regiments will not be abolished completely. Some of them will be converted into logistics-support centers and military-equipment depots, and will still be subordinated to military-district commanders and, if necessary, will facilitate pre-war mobilization. All divisions will be disbanded and converted into brigades, which, in turn, could be re-deployed to other sectors. The self-contained modular brigades would be expected to fight independently of other units in preset sectors using a variety of weapons and military equipment. They will use radio-electronic warfare systems and will be supported by nuclear, chemical and biological (NBC) protection units, combat-engineer and logistics-support units and the Air Force tactical-support units mostly comprising attack and transport helicopters.

General Makarov said these units could be re-integrated into the Army similar to the U.S.-style format after all obsolete helicopters are replaced with the more advanced Mil-28N Havoc, Kamov Ka-50 Hokum (Black Shark) and Ka-52 Hokum (Alligator) attack helicopters and Mil Mi-35 Hind helicopter gunships. General Makarov said only contract soldiers would serve on the southern theater of operations, and that they would be reinforced by conscripts in other areas. Tactical commands, an intermediate element between military districts and general-purpose brigades, must be ready to fight in any theater of battle and not just its immediate location.

In 2009, military units will be transferred to unfamiliar training centers during every strategic exercise involving the variety of military equipment used by general-purpose brigades. Forced marches along rugged and mountain terrain will also be conducted during such exercises. It is intended to hold comprehensive training-center and headquarters exercises involving computers and topographic maps. Commanders at all levels will learn to use and control motorized-rifle, tank, artillery, surface-to-air missile (SAM), telecommunications, reconnaissance, radio-electronic warfare and combat-engineer/sapper units. They will also be trained to use Global Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS), drone data and radio intercepts and will learn many other practical skills.

In 2009, the Defense Ministry and the General Staff will hold several comprehensive strategic exercises, including those involving Belarusian Army units in the western sector. Such exercises will be scheduled regularly. General Makarov said not all divisions would be disbanded. The Army will retain at least one artillery/machine-gun division currently deployed on the Kurile Islands in Russia's Far East. The Strategic Missile Force's 12 divisions will be reduced to nine by 2012. Airborne divisions will also be retained. The Special Forces Command, formerly called the Moscow Air-Defense District, will become part of the Air Force and will form the mainstay of the Aerospace Command, an Air Force component.

General Makarov said the global financial crisis had affected many aspects of Russian life, including the Armed Forces. However, officers will receive housing, no matter what. And the Government will also purchase state-of-the-art weapons and military equipment despite the crisis. The 2007-2015 state rearmament program will be implemented on schedule and will equip the Armed Forces with essential weapons systems.

Source: http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20090105/119294287.html

[Armenian]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

The next five-ten years will be crucial for the armed forces of the Russian Federation.

*****************************

Russian army not fit for modern war: top general

Russia's war with Georgia showed that most of its senior officers are not equipped or trained to fight a modern war, Russia's top soldier said on Tuesday. Russia easily defeated its Western-leaning neighbor and briefly occupied large parts of the country after a five-day war in August, triggered by Tbilisi's attempt to retake its rebel pro-Moscow South Ossetia region by force. But the conflict exposed a lack of modern equipment, poor communications and other shortcomings in Moscow's Soviet-era war machine, Nikolai Makarov, chief of the general staff, said.

"To find a lieutenant-colonel, colonel or general able to lead troops with a sure hand, you had to chase down officers one by one throughout the armed forces, because those career commanders in charge of 'paper regiments and divisions' just could not resolve the tasks set," Makarov was quoted as saying by Russian news agencies.

"When they were given personnel and equipment, they simply lost their heads, while some even refused to fulfill the given tasks," Makarov told Russia's Academy of Military Sciences.

"So I have a question: 'Do we need such officers'?"

Foreign analysts and critics at home have expressed doubts Russia will be able to defeat a stronger force than Georgia, while the Defense Ministry unveiled a military reform plan aimed at creating a smaller, but better equipped and mobile army. Russia's army inherited a largely Soviet-era military structure, in which many units are run mainly or exclusively by officers, existing mostly on paper and ready to be mobilized with reservists in case of a large-scale war.

"PAPER UNITS," AMBITIOUS GOALS

Makarov said 83 percent of today's Russian army were numerically incomplete and only 17 percent were combat-ready. "Of those 150 regiments in our air forces, there are only five ones permanently combat-ready and capable of fulfilling all tasks set, albeit with limited numbers -- operating just 24 aircraft instead of 36," he said. Makarov said a similar gloomy picture was seen in the navy, where "one half of warships stands idle at anchor."

The defense ministry aims to trim the army to 1 million people in 2012 from today's 1.13 million. Makarov said some 100,000 officers would be demobilized "in the nearest time." He said Russia would struggle to modernize 30 percent of its weapons by 2012 and up to 70 percent by 2020. But as long as Russia's conventional forces were in a poor state, Moscow would continue to rely heavily on its formidable arsenal of strategic nuclear forces.

"We attach and will continue to attach priority significance to our strategic nuclear forces," Makarov said. "Under the cover of this shield, we must be guaranteed we will be able to implement the reform of our armed forces."

Source: http://www.reuters.com/article/GCA-P...4BF5JM20081216

[ZORAVAR]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

Opening up the Arctic region and Russia's submarine fleet

Author: Golosov, Rear Admiral (retired)

Does Russia need the Arctic region? The question might seem odd and irrelevant now that Russia finds itself in a difficult economic and military-political situation following diverse reforms since the early 1990s. But the answer is not all that simple. Attitude to the Russian North and the Arctic reflects one of the aspects of Russia's development strategy. But how the problem of the country's strategic national interests is treated and should be treated by all agencies of public administration is another matter.

The world's northern region occupies over 20 million square kilometers. In the early 1990s the largest northlands--Russia, Canada and the United States--accounted for 11 million square kilometers and a population of 9 million, 7 million square kilometers and a population of 0.6 million, 1.5 million square kilometers and a population of 0.6 million, respectively.* Now that the Soviet Union has broken up, the northern region accounts for 65% of Russia's territory (the corresponding figure at the time of the Soviet Union was 49%). These little-developed Russian territories are the world's largest treasure house of natural resources. According to a UN estimate, Russia has 28 trillion dollars' worth of natural reserves, with the country's north accounting for 70 to 80 percent. Nearly 100% of the explored reserves of nickel, cobalt, tin and rare earth elements are in the North. Incidentally, the resources of the United State are estimated at 8 trillion dollars. Expert estimates put Russian offshore deposits in the Arctic at scores of billions of tons of oil and scores of trillions of natural gas. The oil and gas content of the Barents Sea and the Kara Sea alone is estimated at 50-60 billion tons of standard fuel (Russia's annual production of oil and gas equals no more than one billion tons of standard fuel). By way of comparison, the widely publicized reserves of the Caspian Sea amount to 10-12 billion tons of standard fuel.

However, access to the North's wealth depends on enormous long-term efforts by the state with due account of an entire spectrum of problems ranging from financial and economic problems to social and life conditions. From its very inception the Soviet Union made a lot of efforts to develop the North by providing adequate funding, and they did pay off. For instance, from the 60s to the 80s of last century its export of West-Siberian oil alone fetched 400-500 billion dollars. The Magadan Region ensured the country's might in terms of international reserves by supplying nearly one third of the world's gold production during 1932-1994. Today the North accounts for 50-60 percent of Russia's foreign trade turnover and supplies foreign currency to pay for the enormous imports of commodities needed by the country's industry and agriculture.

But the North is not just a treasure of natural resources. The shortest line of communications between the Atlantic ports of northern Europe and the ports of Japan, China and other Asian countries is the Northern Maritime Route (NMR), which runs along the Russian coast of the Arctic Ocean. Ships sailing from St. Petersburg to Vladivostok via the NMR save 9,000 kilometers as distinct from those going via the Suez Canal. Besides, the NMR makes it possible for the Russian Navy to maneuver between the Atlantic and Pacific Theaters of Military Operations, a factor of crucial strategic importance. (1) The shortest air routes link America to Europe and Asia via the North Pole. Foreign ships piloted by Russian icebreakers and other infrastructure systems along the NMR and support for air traffic in Russia's air space may significantly replenish the country's treasury.

Russia stands to benefit from the northern region in other ways too. The region's importance should grow as a result of continuous scientific surveys there, which is the principal prerequisite for the region's effective development today, let alone the future. Such surveys are unlikely to be resumed soon although they were the hallmark of Soviet oceanography and the Soviet research fleet. Meanwhile, some problems are already clamoring for recognition. For example, Russia has a real chance to establish an external boundary of the continental shelf in the eastern part of its polar domain all the way to the North Pole. This would shore up Russia's sovereign right to prospect for and develop natural resources on a 1.5 million square km. shelf and increase its oil and gas potential by 15-20 billion tons of standard fuel. For that to happen, it is necessary to compete the surveys conducted in the early 1990s and submit documentation substantiating Russia's rights to a UN commission. In accordance with the UN Convention on Maritime Law the documentation should be submitted within ten years of Russia's ratification of the Convention in 1997. Should a foreign oil and gas company start production before Russia gains a foothold in regions of its interests, further haste might prove useless, especially considering that Canada, Norway, Denmark and especially the United States are already laying claim to the Arctic shelf.

Other pressing problems include the need to delineate a disputed area between Russia and Norway at the site of the very rich Fedynsk oil and gas field in the central part of the Barents Sea. Russo-Norwegian relations over Spitsbergen are quite tense. Every effort is being made to oust Russia from there.

The future of the NMR is not cloudless either. As has been said before, it has been a Russian national strategic line of communications since it was launched. As soon as it was opened to foreign ships in 1991 there were calls for the NMR to be given the status of an international shipping lane. An international symposium to that effect was held in Tokyo in 1995. The United States, Germany, Norway and China are actively engaged in the study of physical and geographic conditions on the route. It is obvious that preparations are being made to set up an international consortium with predominantly foreign capital for the operation of the NMR. In the near future Russia might even have to pay for the right of Russian ship to use the route instead of benefiting from it commercially.

Areas in the Bering Sea have not been delineated with the United States yet. An agreement signed by Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and his U.S. counterpart Baker in 1990 deprived Russia of a considerable part of the Bering Sea bottom rich in oil and gas and also a water area convenient for productive fishing. The agreement was due to come into force after its ratification. Being aware of the fact that it served its interests, the U.S. Congress ratified it without delay. Regrettably, the Bering Sea was not among Russia's priorities at the time. When at long last the State Duma got down to considering the agreement in 1996, it refused to ratify it after it saw its illegitimate and defective character. In February 1999 the State Duma again refused to ratify it and passed a resolution intended to restore Russia's rights. Today the Americans are making active efforts to assimilate the illegitimate acquisition. The main legal argument is that ships of the U.S. Coast Guard seize Russian trawlers trying to fish in the area in question. This serves as another reminder of the fact that in the modern world he who is strong is right rather than he who pins hopes on universal "values."

Generally speaking, some quarters are out to take advantage of Russia's temporary economic and military weakness in a clear effort to curtail Russia's presence in the Arctic region. Our "friends" are pursuing two strategic goals: first, undermine Russia's economy still further and, second, open up the Arctic Ocean as a potential springboard for strikes at Russian territory involving nuclear-powered submarines carrying cruise and ballistic missiles in the event of a military conflict. It should also be borne in mind that under the terms of the START-2 Treaty ratified by Russia, this country has the right to deploy 50% of its strategic nuclear potential aboard nuclear-powered submarine missile-carriers. Most of them are incorporated into the Northern Fleet, and the zone of their operations is the Arctic region. Destroying them in the event of a war as a matter of priority is one of the main tasks of the U.S. Navy and NATO.

The United States is engaged in the most vigorous exploration and development of the Arctic region. It accounts for 90% of the funds spent by foreign countries on the exploration of the Arctic Ocean. The U.S. Arctic program pursued in 1996-2001 is a component part of the Federal program for the exploration and development of the World Ocean. Arctic surveys involve twelve Federal government departments and other agencies and some thirty universities and other research institutions. In 1995-1999 the United States implemented Skysacks, a broad program to study the Arctic region with the help of nuclear-powered submarines carrying scientific equipment. During that period four submarines visited the Arctic region on five occasions to spend a total of about six months there. The U.S. Navy Secretary visited one of the submarines in 1999 when it was operating in the Chuckchee Sea, and in 1993 U.S. Vice President Gore took part in a cruise to the Arctic. Top-ranking officials participating in Arctic cruises by nuclear-powered submarines highlight the importance of the work being conducted in the area.2 Today nuclear-powered submarines are the most effective instrument of research in the Arctic basin.

The Soviet Navy accumulated a rich experience transferring diesel submarines and other vessels along the Northern Maritime Route. With the development of nuclear-powered submarines, they began operating under the ice of the central Arctic on an increasing scale in fulfillment of various missions. The experience gained during all those cruises is a substantial contribution to Arctic exploration and development.
The first attempt to transfer three medium diesel submarines from the Northern Fleet to the Pacific Fleet in the post-war period was undertaken in 1949. They failed to cover the route within the space of one navigation because of a difficult ice situation and inadequate experience. The submarines spent the winter in Tiksi Bay and reached Vladivostok the following year. Another group consisting of three similar Northern Fleet submarines left base in the town of Polyarny in early July 1950. The group skirted Novaya Zemlya from the north without icebreaker support and spent several days at the port of Dixon (I myself took part in the cruise as a young lieutenant serving as navigator aboard one of the submarines). The group was then piloted by a linear icebreaker until it reached clear water in the Chuckchi Sea. On the whole the cruise under ice came off without a hitch although tragedy could have struck in the Vilkitsky Strait where the icebreaker came to a halt to raise stream in the boilers after making its way through heavy ice. The submarines following in its wake came to a halt too. All of a sudden the ice began shifting, and the submarines found themselves in an ice trap. It took only a minute for the submarines' hulls to sink under the ice while their light bridges were still visible. Another thrust from the ice, even a weak one, would have crushed the bridges, and the submarines with their topmost hatches open (it was impossible to close them because of the ice) would have found themselves under the ice. I hate to imagine what might have happened after that. What saved the situation was that at that moment the ice stopped shifting. In that emergency they quickly raised steam on the icebreaker, and it went alongside the submarines to avert a possible new attack by the ice. Emergency measures succeeded in returning the ice-covered subs to normalcy. On September 30 the submarines moored at Vladivostok where they were welcomed by the crews of submarines which had arrived there a week earlier after starting from the North a year before. That useful experience helped a lot in organizing subsequent cruises along the Northern Maritime Route by large numbers of surface ships and submarines.

My second experience in a similar cruise took place in the summer of 1957 when I was in command of an oceangoing diesel submarine of Design 611, one of the most advanced submarines of the time. The special-purpose expedition was designed to transfer ships to the Far East that same year and consisted of five squadrons. Two of them constituted a submarine force: 17 medium diesel subs of Design 613, two oceangoing subs of Design 611 and two depot ships. Piloting such an armada was a difficult task because of a very harsh ice situation. At one point executives of the Northern Maritime route even suggested that the convoy spend the winter in an uninhabited bay on Taimyr. The situation was even more complicated in view of the fact that there was no going back because of nuclear tests on Novaya Zemlya. However, everything worked out in the end, but passions had been running high indeed. We reached Kamchatka on October 7. On that occasion pilotage and all types of support were much better organized than in 1950--the experience gained then had not been in vain.

(Continued...)

[ZORAVAR]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

Opening up the Arctic region and Russia's submarine fleet (Part II)

Strategic Nuclear Powered Submarine "Yuri Dolgoruky" (Project 995) before Sea trials (this is the latest photo of this new class of submarine).


...

K-3, the pioneer of the Soviet nuclear-powered submarine fleet, carried out the first mission under the ice in November 1959. The submarine had to return to base, though, after the periscope was damaged because of lack of experience and a faulty design of instruments monitoring the ice situation. But that experience was valuable in that it demonstrated that nuclear-powered submarines could and would perform missions under the ice! On July 17, 1962, K-3 reached the North Pole after all and surfaced close to it. The Soviet flag was hoisted on an ice floe. In September 1963 the nuclear-powered submarine K-115 (Design 627, commander--Captain 2nd rank I.R. Dubyaga) for the first time ever covered the distance from the Northern Fleet to the Pacific Fleet under the ice. Ten days later it was followed by K-178 (Design 658, commander--Captain 2nd rank A.P. Mi-khailovsky), which surfaced several times among ice during the route, including two emersions near Soviet drifting stations SP-10 and SP-12. On September 29, 1963, K-181 (Design 627, commander--Captain 2nd rank Yu.A. Sysoyev) surfaced in the region of the North Pole. All three commanders were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union for those missions. They marked the start of an active and systematic opening-up of the Arctic seas by Soviet nuclear-powered submarines.

In 1978, when I was commander of a flotilla of nuclear-powered submarines of the Northern Fleet, I was put in charge of a cruise by a submarine unit from the North to the Far East under the ice of the central Artic region, the first cruise of its kind in the history of the Soviet Navy. Many separate cruises under the ice had been carried out by that time to become a Navy routine.

In early 1978 the flotilla received orders to get two missile-carrying nuclear-powered submarines of Design 670 ready for a cruise to the Pacific Fleet. Subs of this design had a displacement of 6,000 tons, a submergence depth of over 300 meters and were capable of an underwater speed of up to 26 knots (about 48 km/hour). They were armed with eight sea-launched anti-shipping missiles and a torpedo unit. The crew consisted of 90 men. The distinguishing feature of the submarines was that they had only one nuclear reactor whereas other modifications of Soviet subs had two. In accordance with plans drawn up earlier, the first submarine would cover the designated distance and surface in clear water. Only then would the second sub be allowed to leave base. Meanwhile, various forces and means of support, i.e., ships, aircraft, reserve crews and the like, would be ready to deal with possible emergency situations.

The flotilla's headquarters took the initiative to supplement the plan with a scheme according to which the submarines would be part of a group maintaining underwater communications, with the group's commander stationed aboard one of the subs directing the operation. This would half the operation's duration and cost. Besides, if the nuclear-powered submarines were to operate on their own, an emergency in one of the reactors under the ice would make the sub's situation quite difficult (indeed, almost hopeless) because the storage battery would supply energy to the electric motors and repair work for only a limited period of time. If, however, the subs operated as part of a group, the second sub might help in spotting a water opening making it possible for the first one to surface or else make an ice lane by exploding torpedoes. A joint operation would make for a more accurate navigation, which is crucial to navigation in high latitudes. The morale factor was just as important. It is obvious that joint underwater navigation would call for better standards of training for the crews and proper documentation so that it could subsequently be put to the test at sea. Such documentation drawn up by the flotilla's headquarters had shown its worth in the course of training exercises and cruises, including a 1974 cruise when a detachment of three surface ships and two nuclear-powered submarines navigated through the Atlantic, Indian and Pacific Oceans all the way to the Far East.

I received orders to take charge of the group and oversee the entire operation. Captain 1st rank (later Rear-Admiral) Ye.A. Tomko, division commander, was put in charge of the second submarine. The commanders of the submarines were Captain 2nd rank V.R Lushin and Captain 3rd rank A.A. Gusev.

In the early morning of August 22, 1978, both ships left base, and as soon as they reached the sea, they submerged before embarking on their route. It took them two days to reach the ice edge where each of the subs navigated under the ice to test instruments and mechanisms in real conditions. As it turned out, they had demonstrated an almost fault-free performance, and once we sent a report to the headquarters of the North Fleet, we received permission to go under the ice coupled with traditional good wishes for a safe voyage. In the afternoon of August 26 the submarines went down to designated depths and swung into a line abreast. The main phase of the navigation had begun. The ships' mutual position in formation was controlled by sonar instruments. The distance between the ships was kept within 2-4 km. The submergence depth varied from 40 to 200 meters depending on the probability of encountering icebergs. Each of the subs was assigned its own depth echelon to ensure a safe navigation. A sonar telephone was used to maintain communications. Depths, ice thickness, temperatures and the salinity and density of outboard water were continuously monitored all along the route. All parameters characterizing navigation conditions and the work of the submarines' systems and mechanisms were carefully recorded. Special attention was given to measures preventing a fire since during underwater navigation, let alone navigation under ice, anything igniting anywhere in a nuclear-powered submarine creates the most dangerous emergency situation. On the whole the mission was trouble-free--it confirmed the correctness of preliminary plans and a high degree of the equipment's reliability and the crews' professionalism.

Around noon on September 1 both submarines surfaced close to a standby icebreaker in a designated area of the Chuckchee Sea after covering some 3,500 kilometers under ice. In a report sent to our superiors we said the main phase of the cruise had been completed, then we received congratulations, took in a bit of fresh Arctic air and headed for the Bering Strait in surface condition. The strait is too shallow for submerged navigation. Obviously, it can be crossed underwater, but this was not necessary in our case. The Bering Sea welcomed us with stormy weather. The submarines submerged and headed for Kamchatka together just as they had been doing until then.

In the morning of September 8 they moored at the piers of a submarine flotilla where they were to join the Pacific Fleet. An official citation said the submarines' commanders, the division commander and the commanding officer in charge of the mission had been awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union for "the successful fulfillment of a special mission assigned by the commanders and the courage and bravery displayed therewith." Regrettably, both commanders are no longer alive. They certainly deserve eternal glory and remembrance.

Exactly a year later a multi-purpose nuclear-powered submarine set out for the North Pole. The aim was to test the capabilities of the submarine of a new design operating under Arctic ice and continue exploring the navigation region around the pole. This time too I was put in charge of the mission. We spotted a suitable ice lane close to the pole, and on September 1 surfaced there without difficulty. Having fulfilled a designated program of operations and admired to our hearts' content the primordial beauty of the Arctic unharmed by civilization, we submerged and crossed the pole once again. It occurred to me that 29 years before when I was navigator aboard a diesel submarine on the first Arctic mission, I could not have imagined a situation where a submarine would surface at the North Pole in that matter-of-fact and even routine manner! I felt proud of my country and its people and navy.

The experience gained then made it possible for groups of nuclear-powered submarines to fulfill several missions under the ice in the Arctic region, which paved the way for making wide use of nuclear-powered submarines to tackle numerous tasks in the Arctic. In principle, it is possible to create underwater container carriers for a speedy delivery of important cargoes from the Pacific Ocean basin to European ports and back, underwater drilling stations for the development of oil and gas fields on the shelf of the Arctic Ocean, underwater tankers and much else. Such an approach would keep the country's dying submarine-building industry afloat, something that is easy to ruin but difficult to revive. It is obvious that projects of this magnitude could only be shouldered by a strong state with wise leaders who are well aware of the country's national interests and act accordingly.

NOTES:

1. Voenno-morskoi entsiklopedicheskii slovar, Voenizdat Publishers, Moscow, 2003, p. 742.

2. For more detail, see: M.V. Motsak, "O natsionalnykh interesakh Rossii v Arktike," Voenna-ia mysl', No 6, 2000; V.I. Danilin, "Chto nuzhno amerikantsam PLA v Arktike," Morskoi sbornik, No 1, 2000.

Rear Admiral R.A. GOLOSOV (Ret)

Hero of the Soviet Union, Candidate of Military Sciences

Rudolf Alexandrovich GOLOSOV was born in the village of Ustiye, Tver Region, on November 14, 1927. Education: preparatory naval school (1945), Frunze Higher Naval School (1949), Naval Academy (1965), Military Academy of General Headquarters (1971). Service: North and Pacific Fleets--all commanding and staff positions in submarine force from navigator of diesel submarine to commander of flotilla of nuclear-powered submarines. Chief of Staff, Pacific Fleet (1980-1983), head of chair of naval operational art of Military Academy of General Headquarters (1983-1990). Author of over 70 research works. Participant in several unique submarine missions, including first joint mission by group of Soviet nuclear-powered submarines from North Fleet to Pacific Fleet under Arctic ice in 1978.

* These and subsequent figures relating to territory, reserves, and the quantitative characteristics of the natural and energy resources produced in the Arctic regions are cited from: G. Agarang, V. Kotliakov, "Sever--zerkalo mirovykh i rossiiskikh problem," SShA: ekonomika, politika i ideologiia, No. 12, 1996.

[Armenian]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

...According to a UN estimate, Russia has 28 trillion dollars' worth of natural reserves, with the country's north accounting for 70 to 80 percent...

"28 Trillion dollars" in natural reserves is a staggering number... How accurate is this figure?

This also reminds me of a statement that Madeline Albright is said to have uttered regarding Russia, which in essence also underscores the western effort against Moscow - "no one nation should posses this much natural resources"

[ZORAVAR]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

Flying hospital is back in service

It is being towed to be reactivated - December 2007


Back in Service - December 2008

This Ilyushin IL-76MD (registration number RA-86906) flying hospital was for hospitalizing wounded Soviet soldiers. Known as "Skalpel", it is a full hospital with operating room and recovery rooms. Some operations can be done while flying. After the breakup of the Soviet Union, it was no longer used because of the financial situation in Russia. Now it is back in service.