The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

[Federate]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

Russia to reduce gas price for Armenia



Russia considering Armenia its strategic ally, is ready to aid in overcoming the crisis by reducing prices for Russia-supplied gas. In return, Moscow expects to gain the right for a new nuclear power plant construction in Armenia. The project is estimated from 2 bln Euro to U.S. $5 bln, Russian Kommersant daily reports, referring to its sources.


The day before, Armenian and Russian Presidents canvassed bilateral trade and economic cooperation, as well as the prospects of large economic projects’ implementation. “Armenia suffering severe financial difficulties have already got U.S. $500 m. loan from Moscow. According to the sources close to &‘Gazprom’, monopoly currently negotiates the reduction of gas prices supplied to Yerevan. In 2010 it might decrease from U.S. $200 to U.S. $180 per 1000 mł. However, this abatement is conditioned not only by Russian side good intention, but also by the gas price decrease for Europe next year compared to H1 2009. This enables &‘Gazprom’ to reconsider price policy for Russia’s close partners among post-Soviet states, that Kremlin reckons Armenia in,” the daily reads.


Another topical matter of discussion is construction of a new nuclear power plant instead of the Metsamor power plant that is almost worn out. Tender for NPP prime contractor will be completed by the end of 2009. Russia reckons to have its AtomStroyExport CJSC to construct NPP. “Agreement in principle on NPP construction is achieved and we just have to proceed with the red-tape,” one of the “Rosatom” managers stated.

Presently the plant trust management is implemented by INTER RAO UES, whereas control stock is held by Rosatom. According to the manager, construction of new energy unit will total 2 bln. Euro in case power capacity reaches 1000 MW. “It is a standard price. The cost equals to the one we spend for the construction of NPP in Bulgaria and other states,” said “Rosatom” official.

Vice-President Alezander Glukhov outlined that tender is scheduled for this year. “Armenian side stated earlier that construction will cost U.S. $5 bln, however tender structure is yet unclear,” he concluded.

http://news.am/en/news/6429.html

[Army]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

A strategician said that "Do not forget that Russians are the champions of chess. If things go wrong, they make take Baku to their side."

Maybe I could translate the whole article, dunno. However, the most important thing is, do you think that Russians would consider having Baku by their side as the new partner against US and Turkey in the region while Baku is suspicious -and might be angry- against Turkey?

[Lucin]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

To Armanen,

Thanks for posting the article written by Armenian.

To Armenian,

Thank you very much for taking the time in writing the above article. It definitly does shed some light on what is happening and illustrates things from a perspective that is a bit broader than what our brothers and sisters are fed through the usual daily news channels.

These are confusing times and our compatriots are lost in what is happening. Their emotional outbursts are understandable...

Your latest analysis provides (as always) a clear bearing and sense of guidance to the everyday Armenian who is worried about the well being of his country and compatriotes.

Your return and presence on this forum is more needed than ever during these confusing times that our nation is going through.

I look forward to it.

ZORAVAR

I agree with you Zoravar and I hope yours will not be ignored.

And welcome back Armanen.

[Armanen]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

Thank you Lucin jan!

[Muhaha]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

Is "Armenian" a public figure? I've noticed people on this board sometimes talk about him like he saved a thousand Ethiopian children from a burning hut. Is it just E-Fellowship towards a passionate member(Ex-Member?) or I'm missing something?

[Armanen]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

He is an ex member, one that some of has have known for some time. He also made a lot of good threads and posted a lot of great information, such as this one.

[Muhaha]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

Armenia, Russia interested in deepening energy cooperation

President Serzh Sargsyan received the Director General of the Rosatom State Atomic Energy Corporation, Sergey Kiriyenko.

Discussed were issues related to the Armenian-Russian cooperation in the field of energy. The parties noted that all the agreements reached during the meeting in Yerevan in September 2009 are in the stage of implementation.

Serzh Sargsyan praised the high level of cooperation with the Russian Federation.

Serzh Sargsyan and Sergey Kirienko highly appreciated the level of cooperation in the field of atomic energy and the implementation of development-targeted programs. They voiced confidence that the accomplishment of the ongoing programs would allow Armenia to reinforce its position as an electricity exporting country.

Touching upon the activity of the Armenian Nuclear Power Plant, the head of Rosatom noted that it is in a brilliant condition, all measures have been taken to guarantee its secure and reliable exploitation.

The parties discussed issues connected with the construction of a new energy unit.

http://www.armradio.am/news/?part=off&id=16001

[Armanen]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

Russia, Iran and the Biden Speech

By George Friedman and Peter Zeihan

U.S. Vice President Joe Biden toured several countries in Central Europe last week, including the Czech Republic and Poland. The trip comes just a few weeks after the United States reversed course and decided not to construct a ballistic missile defense (BMD) system in those two countries. While the system would have had little effect on the national security of either Poland or the Czech Republic, it was taken as a symbol of U.S. commitment to these two countries and to former Soviet satellites generally. The BMD cancellation accordingly caused intense concern in both countries and the rest of the region.

While the Obama administration strongly denied that the decision to halt the BMD deployment and opt for a different BMD system had anything to do with the Russians, the timing raised some questions. Formal talks with Iran on nuclear weapons were a few weeks away, and the only leverage the United States had in those talks aside from war was sanctions. The core of any effective sanctions against Iran would be placing limits on Iran's gasoline imports. By dint of proximity to Iran and massive spare refining capability, the Russians were essential to this effort -- and they were indicating that they wouldn't participate. Coincidence or not, the decision to pull BMD from Poland and the Czech Republic did give the Russians something they had been demanding at a time when they clearly needed to be brought on board.

The Biden Challenge
That's what made Biden's trip interesting. First, just a few weeks after the reversal, he revisited these countries. He reasserted American commitment to their security and promised the delivery of other weapons such as Patriot missile batteries, an impressive piece of hardware that really does enhance regional security (unlike BMD, which would grant only an indirect boost). Then, Biden went even further in Romania, not only extending his guarantees to the rest of Central Europe, but also challenging the Russians directly. He said that the United States regarded spheres of influence as 19th century thinking, thereby driving home that Washington is not prepared to accept Russian hegemony in the former Soviet Union (FSU). Most important, he called on the former satellites of the Soviet Union to assist republics in the FSU that are not part of the Russian Federation to overthrow authoritarian systems and preserve their independence.

Related LinkU.S. Vice President Joe Biden on America, Central Europe, and Partnership in 21st Century
(STRATFOR is not responsible for content from other Web sites.)
This was a carefully written and vetted speech: It was not Biden going off on a tangent, but rather an expression of Obama administration policy. And it taps into the prime Russian fear, namely, that the West will eat away at Russia's western periphery -- and at Russia itself -- with color revolutions that result in the installation of pro-Western governments, just as happened in Georgia in 2003 and Ukraine in 2004-2005. The United States essentially now has pledged itself to do just that, and has asked the rest of Central Europe to join it in creating and strengthening pro-Western governments in the FSU. After doing something Russia wanted the United States to do, Washington now has turned around and announced a policy that directly challenges Russia, and which in some ways represents Russia's worst-case scenario.

What happened between the decision to pull BMD and Biden's Romania speech remains unclear, but there are three possibilities. The first possibility is that the Obama administration decided to shift policy on Russia in disappointment over Moscow's lack of response to the BMD overture. The second possibility is that the Obama administration didn't consider the effects of the BMD reversal. U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates said the one had nothing to do with the other, and it is possible that the Obama administration simply failed to anticipate the firestorm the course reversal would kick off in Central Europe and to anticipate that it would be seen as a conciliatory gesture to the Russians, and then had to scramble to calm the waters and reassert the basic American position on Russia, perhaps more harshly than before. The third possibility, a variation on the second scenario, is that the administration might not yet have a coordinated policy on Russia. Instead, it responds to whatever the most recent pressure happens to be, giving the appearance of lurching policy shifts.

The why of Washington decision-making is always interesting, but the fact of what has now happened is more pertinent. And that is that Washington now has challenged Moscow on the latter's core issues. However things got to that point, they are now there -- and the Russian issue now fully intersects with the Iranian issue. On a deeper level, Russia once again is shaping up to be a major challenge to U.S. national interests. Russia fears (accurately) that a leading goal of American foreign policy is to prevent the return of Russia as a major power. At present, however, the Americans lack the free hand needed to halt Russia's return to prominence as a result of commitments in Afghanistan and Iraq. The Kremlin inner circle understands this divergence between goal and capacity all too well, and has been working to keep the Americans as busy as possible elsewhere.

Distracting Washington While Shoring Up Security
The core of this effort is Russian support for Iran. Moscow has long collaborated with Tehran on Iran's nuclear power generation efforts. Conventional Russian weapon systems are quite popular with the Iranian military. And Iran often makes use of Russian international diplomatic cover, especially at the U.N. Security Council, where Russia wields the all-important veto.

Russian support confounds Washington's ability to counter more direct Iranian action, whether that Iranian action be in Lebanon, Afghanistan, Iraq or the Persian Gulf. The Obama administration would prefer to avoid war with Iran, and instead build an international coalition against Iran to force it to back down on any number of issues of which a potential nuclear weapons program is only the most public and obvious. But building that coalition is impossible with a Russia-sized hole right in the center of the system.

The end result is that the Americans have been occupied with the Islamic world for some time now, something that secretly delights the Russians. The Iranian distraction policy has worked fiendishly well: It has allowed the Russians to reshape their own neighborhood in ways that simply would not be possible if the Americans had more diplomatic and military freedom of action. At the beginning of 2009, the Russians saw three potential challenges to their long-term security that they sought to mitigate. As of this writing, they have not only succeeded, they have managed partially to co-opt all three threats.

First, there is Ukraine, which is tightly integrated into the Russian industrial and agricultural heartland. A strong Ukrainian-Russian partnership (if not outright control of Ukraine by Russia) is required to maintain even a sliver of Russian security. Five years ago, Western forces managed to short-circuit a Kremlin effort to firm up Russian control of the Ukrainian political system, resulting in the Orange Revolution that saw pro-Western President Viktor Yushchenko take office. After five years of serious Russian diplomatic and intelligence work, Moscow has since managed not just to discredit Yushchenko -- he is now less popular in most opinion polls than the margin of error -- but to command the informal loyalty of every other candidate for president in the upcoming January 2010 election. Very soon, Ukraine's Western moment will formally be over.

Russia is also sewing up the Caucasus. The only country that could challenge Russia's southern flank is Turkey, and until now, the best Russian hedge against Turkish power has been an independent (although certainly still a Russian client) Armenia. (Turkish-Armenian relations have been frozen in the post-Cold War era over the contentious issue of the Armenian genocide.) A few months ago, Russia offered the Turks the opportunity to improve relations with Armenia. The Turks are emerging from 90 years of near-comatose international relations, and they jumped at the chance to strengthen their position in the Caucasus. But in the process, Turkey's relationship with its heretofore regional ally, Azerbaijan (Armenia's archfoe), has soured. Terrified that they are about to lose their regional sponsor, the Azerbaijanis have turned to the Russians to counterbalance Armenia, while the Russians still pull all Armenia's strings. The end result is that Turkey's position in the Caucasus is now far weaker than it was a few months ago, and Russia still retains the ability to easily sabotage any Turkish-Armenian rapprochement.

Even on the North European Plain, Russia has made great strides. The main power on that plain is the recently reunified Germany. Historically, Germany and Russia have been at each other's throats, but only when they have shared a direct border. When an independent Poland separates them, they have a number of opportunities for partnership, and 2009 has seen such opportunities seized. The Russians initially faced a challenge regarding German Chancellor Angela Merkel. Merkel is from the former East Germany, giving her personal reasons to see the Russians as occupiers. Cracking this nut was never going to be easy for Moscow, yet it succeeded. During the 2009 financial crisis, when Russian firms were snapping like twigs, the Russian government still provided bailout money and merger financing to troubled German companies, with a rescue plan for Opel even helping Merkel clinch re-election. With the Kremlin now offering to midwife -- and in many cases directly subsidize -- investment efforts in Russia by German firms such as E.On, Wintershall, Siemens, Volkswagen and ThyssenKrupp, the Kremlin has quite literally purchased German goodwill.

Washington Seeks a Game Changer
With Russia making great strides in Eurasia while simultaneously sabotaging U.S. efforts in the Middle East, the Americans desperately need to change the game. Despite its fiery tone, this desperation was on full display in Biden's speech. Flat-out challenging the Central Europeans to help other FSU countries recreate the revolutions they launched when they broke with the Soviet empire in 1989, specifically calling for such efforts in Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Armenia, is as bald-faced a challenge as the Americans are currently capable of delivering. And to ensure there was no confusion on the point, Biden also promised -- publicly -- whatever support the Central Europeans might ask for. The Americans have a serious need for the Russians to be on the defensive. Washington wants to force the Russians to focus on their own neighborhood, ideally forgetting about the Iranians in the process. Better yet, Washington would like to force the Russians into a long slog of defensive actions to protect their clients hard up on their own border. The Russians did not repair the damage of the Orange Revolution overnight, so imagine how much time Washington would have if all of the former Soviet satellites started stirring up trouble across Russia's western and southern periphery.

The Central Europeans do not require a great deal of motivation. If the Americans are concerned about a resurgent Russia, then the Central Europeans are absolutely terrified -- and that was before the Russians started courting Germany, the only regional state that could stand up to Russia by itself. Things are even worse for the Central Europeans than they seem, as much of their history has consisted of vainly attempting to outmaneuver Germany and Russia's alternating periods of war and partnership.

The question of why the United States is pushing this hard at the present time remains. Talks with the Iranians are under way; it is difficult to gauge how they are going. The conventional wisdom holds that the Iranians are simply playing for time before allowing the talks to sink. This would mean the Iranians don't feel terribly pressured by the threat of sanctions and don't take threats of attack very seriously. At least with regard to the sanctions, the Russians have everything to do with Iran's blase attitude. The American decision to threaten Russia might simply have been a last-ditch attempt to force Tehran's hand now that conciliation seems to have failed. It isn't likely to work, because for the time being Russia has the upper hand in the former Soviet Union, and the Americans and their allies -- motivated as they may be -- do not have the best cards to play.

The other explanation might be that the White House wanted to let Iran know that the Americans don't need Russia to deal with Iran. The threats to Russia might infuriate it, but the Kremlin is unlikely to feel much in the form of clear and present dangers. On the other hand, blasting the Russians the way Biden did might force the Iranians to reconsider their hand. After all, if the Americans are no longer thinking of the Russians as part of the solution, this indicates that the Americans are about to give up on diplomacy and sanctions. And that means the United States must choose between accepting an Iranian bomb or employing the military option.

And this leaves the international system with two outcomes. First, by publicly ending attempts to secure Russian help, Biden might be trying to get the Iranians to take American threats seriously. And second, by directly challenging the Russians on their home turf, the United States will be making the borderlands between Western Europe and Russia a very exciting place.

http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20091026_russia_iran_and_biden_speech?utm_source=GWeekly&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=091026&utm_content=readmore

[Armanen]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

RUSSIA-USA-IRAN AND ENERGY SECURITY OF ARMENIA

By Vahe Davtyan, Noravank Foundation, 26 October 2009

The intersection of the geopolitical interests of great powers in South Caucasus region is one of the main factors influencing the formation and provision of the energy security of Armenia. Since the collapse of the USSR and till our days the constant competition of such states as Russia, the US, Iran and etc, directed to the strengthening of the political and economic positions in the region, anyhow, had influenced and continue to influence the formation of the stable energy system in the Republic of Armenia.
The questions and problems which appeared as a result of the aforementioned competition need detailed scrutiny.

Today Russia, the US and Iran should be considered as different angles of a peculiar geopolitical triangle which sides pursue the same goal: direct influence on the formation of the geopolitical architecture of South Caucasus. And Iran is the main, upper angle of that triangle because through this state both Russia and the US aspire to implement their geopolitical strategy in the region. As for the position of Iran itself, the latter, undoubtedly, pursuing its own interests (we will speak about them below), is a kind of ground for the controversy between two super powers or, to be more exact, it plays the role of a kind of an apple of discord between them. But more or less detailed analysis of the existing situation shows that Iran is a state, which lay a claim to the role of the regional super power and which pursues rather ambitious goals. This is mostly favoured by the vast hydro-carbon resources in Iran. As it is known this country takes the second place in the world by the natural gas reserves which are estimated in 21 trillion m3, i.e. more than 14% of the world reserves.

Turning, particularly, to the intersection of the interests of Russia and Iran in South Caucasus, it is necessary to mention that the rivalry between those two states has deep historic roots. In the 18-19th centuries the relations between two biggest at that time Caspian powers, Russia and Persia, were regulate by bilateral interstate treaties which were adjusted depending on international events. But generally they promoted to the protection of the Russian interests. In 1813 the Gulistan treaty was concluded and according to that treaty Persia confirmed its refusal from the power in Eastern Georgia, Dagestan, some Eastern Armenian territories, including Karabakh, and in 1828 the Turkmenchay treaty was signed. The latter summed up Russian-Persian war of 1826-1828 which ended in victory of Russia and transfer of Eastern Armenia to Russia.

The diplomacy carried out by today’s Iran in regard to the countries of South Caucasus and Russia has its own peculiarities which add up to the partnership in military, energy, transport and other spheres. Today, Russia and Iran actively discuss the prospects of collaboration and carry out mega-projects which are important for both parties. But can we say that the projects realized by Russia and Iran are the manifestation of full-fledged and open partnership? Is there any element of competitiveness which sometimes acquires rather tough character? What part does the American factor play in all that? And, at last, what does Armenia get from that partnership?

In order to reveal all the aforementioned questions, let us stop on some of the most significant Armenian-Iranian-Russian projects.

In 1995 Iran and state concern “Armrusgasprom” concluded a treaty according to which the annual 1 billion cubic meters of gas was planned to be supplied to Armenia in the following 15 years. But due to the absence of appropriate financial and other resources the project had remained on paper for a long time. Only in 2005 the Republic of Armenia and the Iranian “SANIR” gas company signed a contract on the construction of 42 kilometers long Meghri-Kajaran gas pipeline. For the implementation of the initial stage of the project Iran’s Export Development Bank granted necessary credits. The opening of the first section took place in March 2007. But the construction of the 42km long gas pipeline was not enough to provide the supply of the necessary amount of gas to the thermal power plants of the country. Hence, it became necessary to build a new section of the pipeline which length would be 1974km, and for its realization “Armrusgasprom” CJSC1 carried out necessary research, project and building works. At current moment the second section of the pipeline has already been built and put into operation.

Since the beginning of the construction of the first section of the pipeline the leading Armenian experts and politicians have started to talk about the transition of the Iranian gas to the third countries through the territory of Armenia. The following transit rout was supposed to be carried out: Iranian gas, which was transported through the territory of Armenia, should go to Georgia and later on the ground of the Black Sea to Ukraine and a number of European countries.

But the scenario of the Iranian gas transportation to the third countries through the territory of Armenia shook after the visit of the president of “Gasprom” OJSC A. Miller to Armenia. The latter stated about the possibility of participation of Russian gas giant in the implementation of Iran-Armenia gas pipeline project [1].

In February 2005 during the panel session of the Federation Council the vice-president of “Gasprom” OJSC Alexander Ryazanov stated that Iran-Armenia pipeline might compete with “Blue Stream” Russian-Turkish gas project. “If “Gasprom” does not participate in the construction of Iran-Armenia gas pipeline, then it is not known where that gas will go”. – said A. Ryazanov [2]. Let us remind you that “Blue Stream” belongs to «Blue Stream Pipeline BV» in the face of “Gasprom” and Italian ENI. The European Nabucco project, which is planned as a gas pipeline going round Russia and directed to the reduction of the dependence of the EU countries on the Russian resources, is regarded as the main competitor of “Blue Stream”. By preliminary estimate the gas pipeline is planned to be brought into operation by 2014. It is obvious that “Gasprom” OJSC, being a state corporation, would not like to allow such a development of the scenario. Let us remind you that the American party is the main initiator of the Nabucco project which once more comes to prove that there is a complicated and multi-vector geopolitics. Initially, it was supposed that the pipeline should export gas from Azerbaijan, Central Asia, Egypt and Iraq. In 2005 Iraq fell out of the project as an instability zone. As for Azerbaijan and Central Asia, due to the active foreign policy of Russia, they cannot decide yet on the participation in the project. It becomes clear that the participation of Iran in the project may give more or less real outlines to the project. The idea of Iran’s participation in the project was also actively promoted by Turkey. At the beginning of 2009 Turkish prime-minister R. Erdogan made a statement in Brussels, saying that Nabucco makes no sense without the participation of the Iranian party. It can be supposed that this very approach to the solution of problem for the West compelled B. Obama to offer the establishment of the partnership relations with Iran right after being elected as a president of the United States. But the official negotiations on the participation of Tehran in the project have not been started yet. The latter, in our opinion, is connected with the issue of regulation of the Russian-American relations. Watching the activation of the partnership in energy, military and other spheres between Russia and Iran and being aware of the loss of the pro-American candidate Mir-Hossein Mousavi on the presidential elections in June 2009, the US were compelled to offer Russia the scenario of the “reset” of the relations2. This was particularly expressed during the official visit of the president Obama to Moscow in June 2009.

In the opinion of the authors of the “Geopolitics of the Caspian region” study, “the interest of many counties in the usage of the territory of Iran for the pipelines building is restrained by the USA which believe, not without reason, that vast inventory of hydro-carbons in the South of the country and its profitable geographic position will cause the abrupt growth of Tehran’s authority in the Caspian region and, respectively, the serious geopolitical changes”. “Hence, - the authors continue, - the long-term interest of Russia consists in making Iran one of its allies in the region” [3]. So the significance of the Iranian factor in the settlement of very complicated geopolitical combinations between Russia and the US is obvious, Iran, in its turn, also realizes its significance in this complicated geopolitical game and takes advantage of that successfully.

There is an opinion in the Armenian political thinking according to which Armenia has definite chances to become a part of the Nabucco project. “Amid the normalization of the Armenian-Turkish dialogue and activation of the negotiations on Nagorno-Karabakh, an impression may be created that, perhaps, Nabucco pipeline will go through the territory of Armenia” [4], - writes the Armenian political scientist S. Sarukhanyan. The author thinks that at the current stage we can speak about the joining of Armenia to Nabucco. Though he makes a reservation saying that even in case of fiasco, the activation of the political dialogue in that direction may pay Armenia some dividends.

It seems that the discussions on possible joining of the Armenian party to the Nabucco today have no strong reasons. Armenia is a strategic partner of Russia, and they are connected with strong political and economic ties. The manifestation of the slightest interest by Armenia to Nabucco is fraught with serious risks.

Reverting to Iran-Armenia pipeline, let us mention that its impropriety for the transition is mainly conditioned by aforementioned circumstances which emerged round “Iran-Armenia – Blue Stream – Nabucco” scheme. Even more, Iran-Armenia gas pipeline is regarded as a competitor of the so-called northern gas pipeline, which supplies Russian gas to Armenia through the territory of Georgia. Let us also remind about such a no less important circumstance as the restriction of the gas pipeline from 1.4 to 79sm.

The gas pipeline functions on the so-called barter basis, i.e. the natural gas supplied from Iran is converted to the electric power on Hrazdan and Yerevan thermal power plants, which, in its turn is exported to Iran. Thus, for 1 m3 of Iranian gas Armenia pays 3 kWh electric power. Let us mention that even at the Soviet period Armenian electric power system was planned as producing redundant power while neighbouring countries (Turkey, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Iran, and Iraq) has been incurring heavy deficit in electric power.

So, Iran tries to use its energy potential according to his lights in purely political aims. “Tehran, round which the American surrounding ring (Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan and in perspective may be Azerbaijan) is tightened, tends not to allow turning of South Caucasus into the sphere of influence of the American and NATO interests… In this context energy diplomacy is regarded by Tehran as an important tool for the implementation of the general strategic line” [5], - writes A. Vartanyan in his article “Energy Diplomacy of Iran in Transcaucasia”. It may be added that Iran-Armenia gas pipeline has been regarded by Iran as an essential element of the implementation of the mentioned strategic line. But the later developments showed that the gas pipeline lost the geopolitical and geostrategic meaning it had initially .

Despite the Iran-Armenia gas pipeline has not become a transit pipeline it is necessary to appraise its role in setting of the energy security of Armenia. It allowed diversifying the energy system of the republic, which was in a kind of energy dependence on neighbouring Georgia through the territory of which the only corridor for the gas transportation, which supplied Armenia with natural gas, came.

Iran-Armenia gas pipeline is not the only project carried out by the Iranian, Armenian and Russian parties. It is necessary to pay attention to such important projects for Armenia as the building of the oil refinery on the Armenian-Iranian border as well as building of the hydro electric power plant at the border river Araks and the project of the construction of Tabriz-Meghri oil pipeline, which is still at the stage of negotiations. The active approximation of the parties on other energy directions also takes place.

On September 15-20, 2007 in Meghri the Armenian-Iranian-Russian meeting of the experts on the building of the oil refinery was arranged. The meeting took place with the participation of the representatives of the Ministry of Oil and Gas of Iran, Ministry of Economy of the RF and “ArmRusGasprom” CJSC. The decision of the presidents of Armenia and Iran served a basis for the implementation of the project. By estimate of the experts, the building of the refinery with capacity of 7 tonnes in Armenia would cost approximately $600-700 million [6].

After taking the decision about the building of the refinery, a number of political scientists and journalists, analyzing the situation in the region, started to talk about such a motivation of Iran as the preparation of its energy system to operating under the US expansion. Such an approach is, undoubtedly, conditioned by the realities, which exist today in the geopolitics of the region.

[...]

[Armanen]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

[...]

The project of the refinery building became one of the most discussed issues in political and political scientific circles both in Armenia and in Iran. But at the 10th session of Russian-Armenian intergovernmental commission on economic cooperation, which took place in September 2008, the Russian co-chairman of the commission, the minister of transport of the RF Igor Levitin stated officially about the unprofitability of the oil refinery. He mentioned that this project was not profitable, because, firstly, the issue of the outlet was not solved and, respectively, the issues of the raw material supply either [7]. Hereon, the project was laid up. But today the Armenian authorities are searching for the possible ways of bringing it into life. Thus, in March 2009, after the official visit of the president of the RA Serj Sargsyan to Tehran the minister of energy and natural resources of the RA A. Movsisyan made a statement, according to which the project of the realization of building of the oil refinery in Armenia, which cost will be $250-280 million, was accepted. “Oil refinery will be joint Armenian-Iranian enterprise. The realization of the first complex of the works, i.e. the building of the terminal for the oil products in Eraskh and the pipeline for the getting the ready oil products from Tabriz, will be started this year”, - stated the minister [8].

In connection with the statement of the Russian party concerning the unprofitability of the oil refinery building in Armenia, one can suppose that Armenia, which would have oil refinery on its territory, would have assumed new economic and political significance in the region, which, to a large extent, do not correspond to the geopolitical interests of a number of states.

It is necessary to touch upon the other no less important sphere, which can illustrate the geopolitical context of the energy partnership in the region. In Armenia, as it has already been mentioned, there are no natural resources and the only sources of the electric power are, besides non-traditional sources, hydro energy resources. Potential hydro-energy resources of Armenia are estimated at 21.8 billion kWh [9]. Today, a part of hydro-energy sector of the republic is concentrated in hands of Russian “Inter RAOUES” company3. Despite the obvious monopoly of the Russian business on Armenian energy market, the Armenian authorities still try to diversify its energy system through attraction of the foreign companies to the domestic market. Those companies are mainly Iranian companies which have been involved in the cooperation with Armenia for many times. On October 4, 2007 the Parliament of the RA ratified Armenian-Iranian intergovernmental agreement about the cooperation in building and running of hydroelectric power plant on the Araks River. The agreement was signed on March 19, 2007 in Meghri during the meeting of the presidents Robert Kocharyan and Mahmud Ahmadinejad. According to the agreement the building of two hydroelectric power plants on the border Araks River during six years was planned: one on the territory of Armenia and the other on the territory of Iran.

Today feasibility study of the project is over. The installed capacity of each of the plants will be 130-140 megawatt, and the annual production of the electric power will be 840 million kWh. The feasibility study was prepared by the Iranian company “Mehabots” and the subcontractor in the face of “Armhydroproject” institute. The project is assessed in $250 million. It can be assumed that the energy giant “Inter RAUES”, being one of the key actors on the Armenian energy market, will want to participate in the implementation of the project one way or another. But will it be implemented out of the political context, will the geopolitical interests of the great powers eliminated as far as possible during the construction of the hydroelectric power plant? The later developments will show that. Already today one may speak about the interest of a number of Western companies in hydroelectric power sector of Armenia. Thus, today the US, as well as a number of German, Norwegian, Dutch, British, Ukraine and other companies takes an interest both in hydro- and renewable energy sources of Armenia.

Thus, the competition within the scope of Russian-American-Iranian geopolitical triangle directly influences the formation of the energy security of Armenia adding to this process either positive or negative shades. Of course, any competition is the evidence of healthy market relations. Today one may definitely say that the activity of the Russian companies on the Armenian energy market promotes strengthening energy efficiency of the republic. But should we focus our attention only on economic efficiency and forget about energy and state security? We think that this issue should underlie the solution of a number of foreign and domestic political decisions taken today by the authorities of the Republic of Armenia. Every investment activity is directed to the effectiveness increase of this or that sphere. As for such an important category as security (energy, military, scientific and technical, information, cultural and etc) it should proceed from the interests of the state. Only under the tandem of security and efficiency we can speak about the possible way of development of the particular sphere. Thereat, the security should be taken as a basis on which the efficiency system should be built.

Today the Republic of Armenia is seeking for the ways to carry out it energy potential, which is possible only under the active cooperation with foreign state and private companies. It supposes the exchange of the experience, implementation of innovative technologies, and conduct of the business on mutually favourable terms. This, in its turn, will bring to the transformation of the aforementioned geopolitical triangle into the geopolitical square with the full-fledged participation of Armenia. One can state that the construction of Iran-Armenia gas pipeline, the building of hydroelectric power plant on the Araks River, the building of the oil refinery and other mutual projects in case of their competent economic and political realization will determine, to a large, the further development of the Armenian energy sphere as well as its integration into regional and international energy markets.

http://www.keghart.com/Noravank_Energy_Security_Armenia