The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

[Armanen]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

Taking into consideration regional developments such as last week's comments by Putin and Lavrov regarding Nagorno Karabakh and this week's court ruling in Armenia concerning the protocols (see below), our nation's so-called opposition, including the ARF, is beginning to look really foolish now, to say the least... From day one it was obvious, for some of us at least, that a major regional geopolitical shift was responsible for bringing all the unwilling parties to the negotiating table. From day one it was obvious that Yerevan was approaching Ankara from a position of strength. From day one it was obvious that our authorities in Yerevan were not about to betray our nation's interests. From day one it was also obvious that official Yerevan had the full backing of Moscow in all this. As I have been saying since September 2008, as a result of its successful war against Georgia the Kremlin is using Armenia as a platform from which to project its economic and political might throughout the region and the West, now powerless in the Caucasus, is basically going for the ride; because it desperately needs regional stability, not to mention access to its energy resources. This is a historic opportunity the kind of which Armenia has not seen in centuries. Moreover, despite what Bolshevik obsessed mindsets think, there are no indicators that Moscow will somehow undermine Armenia or Nagorno Karabakh. As a matter of fact, according to strong signals coming from the Kremlin, for the foreseeable future, Moscow will continue using Armenia as its base of operation regardless of its lucrative trade deals with Ankara or Baku. Moscow fears expansion of Turkish/Islamic influence into the Caucasus just as much as we Armenians do, if not more. Nonetheless, if Turkish authorities prolong ratifying the protocols Ankara will soon find itself on the hot seat not only in Moscow but in Brussels and Washington as well. Say what you will, but official Yerevan is playing a very sophisticated diplomatic game and thus far it has been very successful. However, observing Armenians these days discuss these political developments is like taking a long walk through absurdistan. For many of us, especially here in the diaspora, the battle has been lost and it's only a matter of time before Armenia becomes Turkey's eastern most province... These types of primitive reactions have proven yet again that we Armenians, as a people, including some of our best and brightest, are still very far from having a healthy understanding of the political world around us. As in many parameters of life, paranoia, hysteria, unbridled cynicism and destructive criticism rules the Armenian mindset today. Thank God there still are a few courageous politicians in Armenia willing to risk their careers, if not their lives, for our republic's future.


Arevagal

Turkey Calls Armenian High Court Ruling ‘Unacceptable’

Armenia's Constitutional Court discusses the protocols on establishing diplomatic ties with Turkey. Ankara in turn rejected Yerevan's approval.


January 19, 2010

The Turkish Foreign Ministry has rejected the formal ruling handed down on January 12 by the Armenian Constitutional Court approving the protocols signed by the two countries on establishing and developing formal diplomatic relations. In a brief statement posted on January 18 on its website, the ministry states that the Armenian ruling "contains preconditions and restrictive provisions which impair the letter and spirit of the protocols. The said decision undermines the very reason for negotiating these protocols as well as their fundamental objective."

The Armenian Constitutional Court ruling found the two protocols, signed in Geneva on October 12 by the Armenian and Turkish foreign ministers, to be "in conformity with the Constitution of the Republic of Armenia." That statement was preceded by several pages of explanation, summarizing the text of the two protocols and their significance and implications in international law. Two aspects of that argumentation may be unacceptable to Turkey. First, paragraph 4 of the preceding argumentation concludes that the mutual obligations undertaken by the two countries "are, under the principles of international law, exclusively of a bilateral nature, and cannot concern, or by various references be attributed to, any third party or the relations with such third party of the signatories of the protocols."

That formulation has been construed in Yerevan as a rejection of the argument, repeatedly adduced in recent months by Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, that ratification of the protocols by the Turkish parliament must be contingent on concessions by Armenia in the Karabakh peace process, specifically, the withdrawal of Armenian forces from seven districts of Azerbaijan they currently control. Second, as veteran commentator David Petrosian pointed out on January 18, paragraph 5 of the Armenian Constitutional Court argumentation affirms that the protocols "cannot be interpreted...in a way that would contradict the provisions of the preamble to the Republic of Armenian constitution and the requirements of Paragraph 11 of the [1990] Declaration of Independence of Armenia." That paragraph reads: "The Republic of Armenia is for the international recognition of the Armenian genocide of 1915 committed in Ottoman Turkey and Western Armenia."

The second of the two protocols signed in Geneva stipulates that the two sides agree to "implement a dialogue on the historical dimension with the aim to restore mutual confidence between the two nations, including an impartial scientific examination of the historical records and archives to define existing problems and formulate recommendations." It does not specifically mention the massacres of 1915. The Turkish Foreign Ministry statement reaffirms Ankara's "adherence to the primary provisions" of the protocols, and makes clear that it expects the same from Armenia. The protocols do not, however, differentiate between "primary" and "secondary" provisions.

Source: http://www.rferl.org/content/Turkey_...e/1933592.html

Protocol of Intent May be Signed in Moscow

Another protocol of intent similar to the Mayendorf declaration may be signed during the Armenian-Azerbaijani-Russian presidential meeting likely to be held in Moscow, Chairman of the Democratic Party of Armenia (DPA) Aram Sargsyan told a press conference.

However, he said, the document will not contain fundamental principles of settling the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. “The fundamental principles can hardly be signed in only a Russian representative’s presence,” Sargsyan said. Speaking of the settlement process, the DPA leader pointed out that Armenia should be bolder. “If they say to us ‘give our lands back’, we, for our part, must raise a similar issue and demand Nakhchevan. If they speak of the necessity for return of refugees, we, I turn, must raise the problem of our 400,000 refugees. When they speak of occupation, we must remind them that Nakhchevan was only placed under Baku’s patronage,” Sargsyan said. Speaking of Nagorno-Karabakh’s involvement in the negotiations, A. Sargsyan pointed out that Nagorno-Karabakh was to be negotiator from the very beginning. He does not rule out that, giving consent to Nagorno-Karabakh’s return to the negotiating table, Yerevan is employing a strategy of rejecting a settlement scheme by claiming Nagorno-Karabakh to be against it.


Source: http://news.am/en/news/russia/12464.html

Russian Military Base to Remain in Armenia

No matter the Armenian-Turkish relations develop, the issue of the Russian military base in Armenia will not be considered, Alexander Iskandaryan, Director of the Institute of Caucasus, stated during a Yerevan-Moscow space bridge. He pointed out that the Russian military base in Gyumri will not be dismantled though its presence is not so topical after the bases in Akhalkalak and Batum were wound up and the five-day war took place. “I do not know what will happen in 50 or 100 years, but I cannot imagine that the Armenian-Turkish relations will change so much that Armenia will demand the Russian military base to be withdrawn,” Iskandaryan said. He pointed out that the situation will not change radically if Russia “continues showing will.” Iskandaryan also said that the military base is playing a symbolic role for Armenian-Turkish relations – it is part of these relations. He reminded the participants that Armenia is a member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), Armenian servicemen maintain permanent contacts with Russian servicemen, and the Armenian frontier troops are closely cooperating with Russian troops.

Source: http://news.am/en/news/russia/12408.html

[Armanen]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

The following is Stratfor's take on recent political developments in the Ukraine. Naturally, there are many holes in Stratfor's Washington-centric rhetoric regarding Russia, such as the last paragraph concerning Russia's population shrinkage which in reality has been improving as Kremlin officials have begun tackling the problem. Nevertheless, even for Russophobic Stratfor analysts, the writing is clearly on the wall. The West's multi-billion dollar anti-Russian agenda in nations of the former Soviet Union has finally begun to collapse. While this agenda was crushed by military action in Georgia in the summer of 2008, in the Ukraine, on the other hand, the same agenda was crushed bloodlessly, from a societal level and via economic pressure. It was only a matter of time before the Western funded "orange revolution" in the Ukraine died. However, its death came sooner than anyone had expected. Thankfully, the artificially induced disease that infected Ukraine and Georgia for the past several years was not able to infect Armenia thanks to the strong leadership of the Kocharyan and Sargsyan administrations. This artificially induced disease is now beginning to recede, and the region in question is now all but fully under Russian suzerainty. This means Ankara and Baku no longer have any leverage against Moscow and by extension, Yerevan. Perhaps this is the reason why we have been hearing aggressive talk coming out of Armenia's defense and foreign ministries regarding Artsakh. Perhaps this is the reason why official Yerevan is confidently pushing forward its agenda concerning Turkey. What all well-meaning Armenians who oppose the political steps taken by the current administration in Armenia need to realize is that under the old "Western inspired" geopolitical climate in the region Armenia had remained politically marginalized and economically stagnant. The current geopolitical climate we are witnessing developing in the region is an opportunity the likes of which Armenia has not seen in centuries. Finally, we Armenians need to understand that Rome was not built in a single day and former Soviet republics need political evolution - not a CIA sponsored revolution.


Arevagal

Ukraine's Election and the Russian Resurgence

http://blog.foreignpolicy.com/files/images/090121_Russia_Ukraine_1.21_resized.jpg

Ukrainians go to the polls Feb. 7 to choose their next president. The last time they did this, in November 2004, the result was the prolonged international incident that became known as the Orange Revolution. That event saw Ukraine cleaved off from the Russian sphere of influence, triggering a chain of events that rekindled the Russian-Western Cold War. Next week’s runoff election seals the Orange Revolution’s reversal. Russia owns the first candidate, Viktor Yanukovich, outright and has a workable agreement with the other, Yulia Timoshenko. The next few months will therefore see the de facto folding of Ukraine back into the Russian sphere of influence; discussion in Ukraine now consists of debate over the speed and depth of that reintegration.

The Centrality of Ukraine


Russia has been working to arrest its slide for several years. Next week’s election in Ukraine marks not so much the end of the post-Cold War period of Russian retreat as the beginning of a new era of Russian aggressiveness. To understand why, one must first absorb the Russian view of Ukraine.


Since the break-up of the Soviet Union, most of the former Soviet republics and satellites found themselves cast adrift, not part of the Russian orbit and not really part of any other grouping. Moscow still held links to all of them, but it exercised few of its levers of control over them during Russia’s internal meltdown during the 1990s. During that period, a number of these states — Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and the former Czechoslovakia to be exact — managed to spin themselves out of the Russian orbit and attach themselves to the European Union and NATO. Others — Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Ukraine — attempted to follow the path Westward, but have not succeeded at this point. Of these six, Ukraine is by far the most critical. It is not simply the most populous of Russia’s former possessions or the birthplace of the Russian ethnicity, it is the most important province of the former Russian Empire and holds the key to the future of Eurasia.


First, the incidental reasons. Ukraine is the Russian Empire’s breadbasket. It is also the location of nearly all of Russia’s infrastructure links not only to Europe, but also to the Caucasus, making it critical for both trade and internal coherence; it is central to the existence of a state as multiethnic and chronically poor as Russia. The Ukrainian port of Sevastopol is home to Russia’s Black Sea fleet, and Ukrainian ports are the only well-developed warm-water ports Russia has ever had. Belarus’ only waterborne exports traverse the Dnieper River, which empties into the Black Sea via Ukraine. Therefore, as goes Ukraine, so goes Belarus. Not only is Ukraine home to some 15 million ethnic Russians — the largest concentration of Russians outside Russia proper — they reside in a zone geographically identical and contiguous to Russia itself. That zone is also the Ukrainian agricultural and industrial heartland, which again is integrated tightly into the Russian core.


These are all important factors for Moscow, but ultimately they pale before the only rationale that really matters: Ukraine is the only former Russian imperial territory that is both useful and has a natural barrier protecting it. Belarus is on the Northern European Plain, aka the invasion highway of Europe. The Baltics are all easily accessible by sea. The Caucasian states of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia are on the wrong side of the Caucasus Mountains (and Russia’s northern Caucasus republics — remember Chechnya? — aren’t exactly the cream of the crop of Russian possessions). It is true that Central Asia is anchored in mountains to the south, but the region is so large and boasts so few Slavs that it cannot be controlled reliably or cheaply. And Siberia is too huge to be useful.

Without Ukraine, Russia is a desperately defensive power, lacking any natural defenses aside from sheer distance. Moscow and Volgograd, two of Russia’s critically strategic cities, are within 300 miles of Ukraine’s eastern border. Russia lacks any natural internal transport options — its rivers neither interconnect nor flow anywhere useful, and are frozen much of the year — so it must preposition defensive forces everywhere, a burden that has been beyond Russia’s capacity to sustain even in the best of times. The (quite realistic) Russian fear is that without Ukraine, the Europeans will pressure Russia along its entire western periphery, the Islamic world will pressure Russia along its entire southern periphery, the Chinese will pressure Russia along its southeastern periphery, and the

Americans will pressure Russia wherever opportunity presents itself.


Ukraine by contrast has the Carpathians to its west, a handy little barrier that has deflected invaders of all stripes for millennia. These mountains defend Ukraine against tanks coming from the west as effectively as they protected the Balkans against Mongols attacking from the east. Having the Carpathians as a western border reduces Russia’s massive defensive burden. Most important, if Russia can redirect the resources it would have used for defensive purposes on the Ukrainian frontier — whether those resources be economic, intelligence, industrial, diplomatic or military — then Russia retains at least a modicum of offensive capability. And that modicum of offensive ability is more than enough

to overmatch any of Russia’s neighbors (with the exception of China).

When Retreat Ends, the Neighbors Get Nervous


This view of Ukraine is not alien to countries in Russia’s neighborhood. They fully understand the difference between a Russia with Ukraine and a Russia without Ukraine, and understand that so long as Ukraine remains independent they have a great deal of maneuvering room. Now that all that remains is the result of an election with no strategic choice at stake, the former Soviet states and satellites realize that their world has just changed.


Georgia traditionally has been the most resistant to Russian influence regardless of its leadership, so defiant that Moscow felt it necessary to trounce Georgia in a brief war in August 2008. Georgia’s poor strategic position is nothing new, but a Russia that can redirect efforts from Ukraine is one that can crush Georgia as an afterthought. That is turning the normally rambunctious Georgians pensive, and nudging them toward pragmatism. An opposition group, the Conservative Party, is launching a movement to moderate policy toward Russia, which among other things would mean abandoning Georgia’s bid for NATO membership and re-establishing formal political ties with Moscow.


A recent Lithuanian power struggle has resulted in the forced resignation of Foreign Minister Minister Vygaudas Usackas. The main public point of contention was the foreign minister’s previous participation in facilitating U.S. renditions. Vygaudas, like most in the Lithuanian leadership, saw such participation as critical to maintaining the tiny country’s alliance with the United States. President Dalia Grybauskaite, however, saw the writing on the wall in Ukraine, and feels the need to foster a more conciliatory view of Russia. Part of that meant offering up a sacrificial lamb in the form of the foreign minister.


Poland is in a unique position. It knows that should the Russians turn seriously aggressive, its position on the Northern European Plain makes it the focal point of Russian attention. Its location and vulnerability makes Warsaw very sensitive to Russian moves, so it has been watching Ukraine with alarm for several months.


As a result, the Poles have come up with some (admittedly small) olive branches, including an offer for Putin to visit Gdansk last September in an attempt to foster warmer (read: slightly less overtly hostile) relations. Putin not only seized upon the offer, but issued a public letter denouncing the World War II-era Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaty, long considered by Poles as the most outrageous Russian offense to Poland. Warsaw has since replied with invitations for future visits. As with Georgia, Poland will never be pro-Russian — Poland is not only a NATO member but also hopes to host an American Patriot battery and participate in Washington’s developing ballistic missile defense program. But if Warsaw cannot hold Washington’s attention — and it has pulled out all the stops in trying to — it fears the writing might already be on the wall, and it must plan accordingly.


Azerbaijan has always attempted to walk a fine line between Russia and the West, knowing that any serious bid for membership in something like the European Union or NATO was contingent upon Georgia’s first succeeding in joining up. Baku would prefer a more independent arrangement, but it knows that it is too far from Russia’s western frontier to achieve such unless the stars are somewhat aligned. As Georgia’s plans have met with what can best be described as abject failure, and with Ukraine now appearing headed toward Russian suzerainty, Azerbaijan has in essence resigned itself to the inevitable. Baku is well into negotiations that would redirect much of its natural gas output north to Russia rather than west to Turkey and Europe. And Azerbaijan simply has little else to bargain with.


Other states that have long been closer to Russia, but have attempted to balance Russia against other powers in hopes of preserving some measure of sovereignty, are giving up. Of the remaining former Soviet republics Belarus has the most educated workforce and even a functioning information technology industry, while Kazakhstan has a booming energy industry; both are reasonable candidates for integration into Western systems. But both have this month agreed instead to throw their lots in with Russia. The specific method is an economic agreement that is more akin to shackles than a customs union. The deal effectively will gut both countries’ industries in favor of Russian producers. Moscow hopes the union in time will form the foundation of a true successor to the Soviet Union.


Other places continue to show resistance. The new Moldovan prime minister, Vlad Filat, is speaking with the Americans about energy security and is even flirting with the Romanians about reunification. The Latvians are as defiant as ever. The Estonians, too, are holding fast, although they are quietly polling regional powers to at least assess where the next Russian hammer might fall. But for every state that decides it had best accede to Russia’s wishes, Russia has that much more bandwidth to dedicate to the poorly positioned holdouts.


Russia also has the opportunity. The United States is bogged down in its economic and health care debates, two wars and the Iran question — all of which mean Washington’s attention is occupied well away from the former Soviet sphere. With the United States distracted, Russia has a freer hand in re-establishing control over states that would like to be under the American security umbrella.


There is one final factor that is pushing Russia to resurge: It feels the pressure of time. The post-Cold War collapse may well have mortally wounded the Russian nation. The collapse in Russian births has halved the size of the 0-20 age group in comparison to their predecessors born in the 1970s and 1980s. Consequently, Russian demographics are among the worst in the world.


Even if Russia manages an economic renaissance, in a decade its population will have aged and shrunk to the point that the Russians will find holding together Russia proper a huge challenge. Moscow’s plan, therefore, is simple: entrench its influence while it is in a position of relative strength in preparation for when it must trade that influence for additional time. Ultimately, Russia is indeed going into that good night. But not gently. And not today.


Source: http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20100...ian_resurgence

[Eddo211]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

[I]Taking into consideration regional developments such as last week's comments by Putin and Lavrov regarding Nagorno Karabakh and this week's court ruling in Armenia concerning the protocols (see below), our nation's so-called opposition, including the ARF, is beginning to look really foolish now, to say the least... From day one it was obvious, for some of us at least, that a major regional geopolitical shift was responsible for bringing all the unwilling parties to the negotiating table. From day one it was obvious that Yerevan was approaching Ankara from a position of strength. From day one it was obvious that our authorities in Yerevan were not about to betray our nation's interests. From day one it was also obvious that official Yerevan had the full backing of Moscow in all this.........

Obvious my a$$ giving all of us an heart attack here..........I am convinced now that this whole protocol thing is nothing but a stunt.

[Armanen]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

Obvious my a$$ giving all of us an heart attack here..........I am convinced now that this whole protocol thing is nothing but a stunt.

More and more it seems that those in the Armenian nation who were saying and predicting the worst about the Protocols are now looking quite silly and childish.

[Haykakan]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

Can i say it now? I told you so!

[KanadaHye]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

The protocols seem to be nothing more than a distraction. It's like focusing on the magician when the real magic is being done around him.

[gegev]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

The protocols seem to be nothing more than a distraction. It's like focusing on the magician when the real magic is being done around him.

Now, eventually, Turks agree to approve the protocol in their parliament, because they have been told (by ???), that the Constitutional Court ruling doesn’t have the force of being legally binding in international relations, if they are not ratified by the Armenian parliament.

Therefore if CC ruling wouldn’t be approved by the Armenian Parliament, after the protocols are approved, the Turkish preconditions still would be there and later on they will be enforced by Turks.

[Haykakan]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

Now, eventually, Turks agree to approve the protocol in their parliament, because they have been told (by ???), that the Constitutional Court ruling doesn’t have the force of being legally binding in international relations, if they are not ratified by the Armenian parliament.

Therefore if CC ruling wouldn’t be approved by the Armenian Parliament, after the protocols are approved, the Turkish preconditions still would be there and later on they will be enforced by Turks.

You still dont get it. Regardless of the protocals being accepted or rejected, Armenia wins either way. There is a potential for more benefit if they are accepted but either way its a win-win situation for Hayastan.

[Eddo211]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

.......Later on this year, the Russians will reveal their own 5th generation fighter. The program codename is PAK-FA. We know next to nothing about it. Some say it is an F-22 beater, others believe that is in the same class as the F-35. Anyways, first flight is scheduled for this year and the first units will enter squadron service somewhere around 2015. India, who is financially contributing to the program, will also receive a downgraded version of the PAK-FA.

Well looks like the wait is over buddy. the T-50(?) just made its first flight. Nice looking bird. Must be a prototype for now until she gets all her trimmings.

Congrats to the PAK-FA team.






First flight full video:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S67zfmEqGxQ&fmt=18

[Haykakan]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

lookslike it has a stealth design incorporated into it. I wonder what its radar sig looks like.