The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

[Armenian]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

Russia Resumes Patrols by Nuclear Bombers


(Tu-160 and Tu-95 Strategic bombers in flight over Russia)

New York Times by By ANDREW E. KRAMER

President Vladimir V. Putin said Friday that the Russian Air Force would resume regular, long-range patrols by nuclear-capable bombers over the world’s oceans, renewing the practice after a 15-year hiatus in another sign of Russia’s growing assertiveness. In the first flight, 14 bombers and six supporting airplanes took off at midnight on Friday, Mr. Putin said, in remarks carried on state television. Mr. Putin said such patrols would continue “from this day on.”

The sortie on Friday included Tu-160 and Tu-95 airplanes, known by their NATO appellations as Blackjacks and Bears, according to a statement posted on the Russian Defense Ministry Web site. The Russian bombers were flying Friday over the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans and the North Pole, and were being escorted by NATO fighter jets, the site said, recalling cold war-era standoffs. After the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia would periodically send its aging bomber fleet on missions, but only during major military training exercises; the country was too poor to fly the planes often.

That is no longer the case. Now the bombers, capable of carrying nuclear weapons, will regularly fly missions far from Russian soil separately from scheduled training exercises. Mr. Putin suggested Friday that the decision was a response to military threats to Russia. This month, Russian bombers flew near the American military base on the Pacific island of Guam. Gen. Pavel V. Androsov, the commander of long-range aviation, boasted that the sortie prompted the United States to scramble fighter jets that flew so close to the Russians that the pilots, “smiled at each other and then peacefully went their separate ways.” The Pentagon confirmed that Russian airplanes had been spotted but said that no fighter jets had been sent to intercept them.

In July, Russian Tu-95 bombers flew toward Scotland but turned back before entering British airspace. In that case, the Royal Air Force confirmed it had scrambled fighter jets in response. The American the response on Friday was muted. “Militaries around the world engage in a variety of different activities,” Gordon D. Johndroe, the White House spokesman, told reporters in Crawford, Tex., according to a transcript. “It’s not entirely surprising that the Russian Air Force, the Russian military, might engage in this kind of activity.”

Russian television showed images of sleek bombers soaring into the air, refueling and landing, though it was unclear whether the images depicted the sorties that took off Friday. Russia has 79 strategic aircraft, capable of carrying 900 cruise missiles, Russian television reported, far fewer than at the height of the cold war. Still, the resumption of bomber flights was the latest in a series of assertive gestures by Russia, emboldened by windfall petroleum wealth and angered over what it has called American and NATO aggressiveness, including plans for a missile-defense system in the Czech Republic and Poland, analysts said.

Earlier this year, Russia backed out of a major arms pact, the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty, and defied British demands to extradite the principal suspect in the radiation poisoning of a Russian security service defector in London. “They believe, with some legitimacy, that they are a rising power,” Cliff Kupchan, a Russia expert at the Eurasia Group in Washington, a political risk advisory and consulting firm, said in a telephone interview. “Until they feel they are playing their due role in international relations, we will continue to see assertive behavior from Russia.” “It’s a symbolic gesture, but it stands for something very real, which is a resurgent Russia,” he said of the resumption of strategic bomber patrols.

Source: http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/18/wo...russia.html?hp

[Armenian]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

More on Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, one of the contenders for the Russian presidency - who also happens to be half-Armenian.

Armenian

************************************************** ********

From Russia With Love?: Foreign Minister’s visit an opportunity for assessment



By Aris Ghazinyan, ArmeniaNow Reporter

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov was on an official visit to Yerevan the past two days. His first visit to Armenia fell on the historical stage when pro-Western sentiments not traditional for the overwhelming majority of Armenians are on the rise in the public and political life of the republic. The first time these sentiments made themselves felt as a special internal political factor was during the latest presidential elections in 2003. However, now there are a dozen political and public organizations in the republic demonstratively stating the need for Armenia’s new orientation towards the West and NATO. Never before have such sentiments made themselves felt so strongly in Armenia.

On the day of the Russian minister’s arrival in Yerevan, the leader of the Liberal-Progressive Party of Armenia (LPPA) Hovhannes Hovhannisyan called a press conference during which he stated: “Armenia’s security is in NATO, since Armenia’s strategic partner, Russia, proceeding from its interests, may change its position towards Yerevan at any moment. Revolutions in the post-Soviet space are unavoidable in the next year or two. There will be a revolution in Armenia too.” Representatives of other opposition parties also speak about the need to reorient Armenia’s foreign policy towards the West.

“It is remarkable that while new pro-Western political structures have already been formed in Armenia, no party openly propagandizing the Russian vector of foreign policy has appeared in the country yet,” Vardan Mkhitaryan, a historian and researcher at the Chair of the History of the Armenian People of the Yerevan State University, said in this connection. Meanwhile, the political structures traditionally inclined towards boosted Armenian-Russian relations for their part accentuate attention on the insufficient level of development of these ties. What is particularly pointed out is Russia’s neutral, at best, position on Nagorno Karabakh, which, in the opinion of Armenian parties cannot correspond to the officially declared level of strategic relationship. According to political analysts, also symptomatic is the fact that while 2005 is declared the Year of Russia in Armenia, in Russia this year is determined as the Year of Azerbaijan. This was stated in Moscow by President Vladimir Putin and President Ilham Aliyev of Azerbaijan on the same day Lavrov arrived in Yerevan.

“What is striking in this connection is that the visits of high-ranking Russian officials to Armenia, as a rule, are chronologically replaced by equally ‘high-level’ meetings already on the plane of Russian-Azeri ties,” says Mkhitaryan. “The visit of the Russian Foreign Minister to Yerevan is not an exception: on February 16-17 Putin and Aliyev discussed the Karabakh settlement in Moscow.” The presidents of Russia and Azerbaijan met four times in 2004, while Putin and Armenian President Robert Kocharyan had two meetings. A total of 17 government delegation of the Russian Federation visited Baku during last year, and the commodity turnover between Russia and Azerbaijan increased by 60% and made $735 million. During the same period, the commodity turnover between Russia and Armenia grew by 12.9% and made $266.2 million.

But the greatest annoyance in Armenia is caused by the position repeatedly voiced by the Kremlin about Russia’s support for Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity. In August of last year Lavrov himself told an AzerTaj’s correspondent: “Russia has been supporting consistently and in full measure the principle of territorial integrity. This applies to Azerbaijan as well.” Nevertheless, the recent visit of Russia’s foreign minister to Baku deserves special attention. Answering on February 2 the question of an Azeri journalist about Russia’s priorities in the principles of “territorial integrity” and “the right of nations to self-determination”, Lavrov said: “One should not set off these two principles against each other, since both of them are stated in the UN Charter and should not be applied to the detriment of each other.” Some Azeri mass media already then hurried to “interpret” such a reply of the Russian diplomat in the context of his Armenian origin, reminding that during last year’s visit of Armenia’s Foreign Minister Vardan Oskanian to Moscow, Lavrov said:

“Yes, I have Armenian blood in my veins. My father is an Armenian from Tbilisi.”

That he has Armenian blood his veins Lavrov also repeated in Yerevan during a meeting with students of the Russian-Armenian Slavonic University yesterday. However, at the same time he made it clear that his Baku statement was not understood quite correctly. He made it clear that Russia supports Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity, for “Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity is recognized by the international community, including by the UN and other international structures.” Thursday Lavrov met with Kocharyan, Prime Minister Andranik Margaryan and Oskanian. Four main subjects were discussed during the meetings: the Karabakh problem, bilateral cooperation, regional cooperation and cooperation within international structures.

It is cooperation within international structures that is one of the most delicate problems in Armenian-Russian relations. It is commonly known that all initiatives of the Azeri delegation in the PACE (Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe), including on Nagorno Karabakh, as a rule find support of the Russian delegation, while none of the initiatives of the Armenian delegation has yet been supported by the Russian delegation. Does this state of affairs correspond to the “strategic” level of relations between Armenia and Russia? “The parliamentary delegation of Russia to the PACE, just like other delegations, does not receive any instructions,” said Lavrov on this account. In his meeting with Lavrov, Margaryan expressed his concern over the building of communications projected within the framework of the “North-South” transit corridor, bypassing Armenia. In particular, he pointed to the Russian-Azeri-Iranian consortium building a railroad in the direction of Astara (Azerbaijan) – Resht (Iran) – Kazvin (Iran).

In reply to this remark of the Armenian premier, Lavrov said that from now on Russia would consider also Armenia’s interests in developing its transport strategy. He promised to notify Russia’s Minister of Transport about it. Last autumn Russia limited the use of the only stable motorway connecting Armenia with Russia through Georgia at Upper Lars checkpoint (North Ossetia, Russia) – Kazbek. Thus, Lavrov’s official visit to Yerevan also exposed flaws in the officially declared policy of strategic partnership. We will be able to judge as to how these flaws can be put right only after Putin’s visit to Armenia. The date of this visit has not been set yet, but as the Russian minister said the sides will come to agreement as to the terms of the visit within the coming weeks after which the date will be declared.

Source: http://www.armenianow.com/archive/20...o=print&id=554

Sergey Lavrov laid wreath to Genocide Memorial



Today Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov visited Tsitsernakaberd Memorial Complex, where he laid a wreath to the Memorial of Armenian Genocide victims. The head of Russian MFA also planted a memorable fir-tree in the alley near the Memorial. Armenian and Russian Ambassadors Armen Smbatyan and Nilolai Pavlov accompanied Sergey Lavrov.

Source: http://www.panarmenian.net/news/eng/...ate=2007-04-03

Lavrov: We Are and Have Been Allies with Armenia




Historical and spiritual closeness of the two peoples is the pledge for Armenian-Russian union, Russian FM Sergey Lavrov stated in Moscow on the Public TV Company of Armenia at a reception in honor of celebration of the 15th anniversary of Armenia’s Independence. “We are and we have been allies with Armenia. Historical and spiritual closeness of the two peoples is the pledge for Armenian-Russian union,” he said. “Many Armenians now work and live in Russia. Call the name of Armen Jigarkhanyan – there is no Russian, who does not know or love him,” the Minister remarked. “Of course we have separated as republics of the USSR, however we are overcoming that hard period,” Sergey Lavrov added, reported PanARMENIAN.Net.

Source: http://www.yerkir.am/eng/index.php?s...s_arm&id=26853

Russia Signals Opposition To Regime Change In Armenia



Russia signaled on Tuesday its opposition to regime change in Yerevan, with Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov pointedly declining to deny speculation that Moscow supports Defense Minister Serzh Sarkisian’s apparent plans to become Armenia’s next president. Lavrov, in Yerevan on a two-day official visit, stressed the need for continuity in policies pursued by the current Armenian leadership. During a joint news conference with Foreign Minister Vartan Oskanian he was asked to comment on growing assertions by Russian media and prominent analysts that the widely anticipated handover of power from President Robert Kocharian to Sarkisian suits the Kremlin.

“The official position of Russia coincides with the unofficial position of Russia,” Lavrov replied. “We are sincerely interested in seeing Armenia stable and prosperous and seeing it continue to move down the path of reforms. As far as we can see, the results [of those reforms] are already felt in the socioeconomic sphere.” “So we wish Armenia success in this endeavor,” he added. “We want the next phase of the constitutional process to lead to the creation of conditions for a continued movement in that direction.” Kocharian is thought to have enjoyed Russian backing throughout his nearly decade-long presidency. Both he and Sarkisian stand for Armenia’s continued military alliance with Russia, while seeking closer security ties with the West. The Kocharian administration has also helped to significantly boosted Russia’s economic presence in the country in recent years. The Russian minister’s visit to Armenia was officially dedicated to the 15th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two former Soviet republics. The unresolved Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was high on the agenda of his talks with Oskanian. Russia co-heads the Minsk Group of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe together with the United States and France.

Oskanian told reporters that he and his Azerbaijani counterpart Elmar Mammadyarov will again later this month or early next in a fresh attempt to narrow the conflicting parties’ differences over the Minsk Group’s existing peace proposals. “The goal is to continue to work on the document and to prepare for the likely meeting of the presidents [of Armenia and Azerbaijan] in June,” he said. The international mediators hope that the Armenian-Azerbaijani summit will yield a breakthrough. Lavrov said that Karabakh peace is facilitated by what he described as the absence of any differences on the issue between the three mediating powers. “This is probably the only conflict where the interests of Russia, the United States, and the European Union absolutely do not contradict each other and the interests of the conflicting parties themselves,” he said. Lavrov further assured journalists that his country is trying hard to ease Armenia’s geographic isolation which has been aggravated by the continuing Russian transport blockade of neighboring Georgia. He pointed to the upcoming launch of a rail ferry service between the Georgian Black Sea port of Poti and Russia’s Port-Kavkaz. The ferry link will be primarily used by Armenian exporters and importers.

One of Russia’s priorities – relations with Armenia - Lavrov

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said on Wednesday relations with Armenia is one of Russia’s priorities. “We believe that stability in the Caucasus depends in many respects on Armenia’s situation,” he told a meeting with students and professors of the Yerevan State University. “It is possible to ensure such stability not by means of creating a certain bloc, but by means of joint efforts,” he said. “Within the framework of the Collective Security Treaty Organization we do not try to fence off ourselves from others or work against anyone,” he said. The Collective Security Treaty Organization is “aimed at stability, counteraction to terrorism and drugs trafficking and open cooperation with the countries interested in resolving these tasks,” Lavrov said. He pointed out that Russia is interested in calm on its borders, stable development of neighbouring countries and “mutually advantageous and equal cooperation with them proceeding from the interests of our economies and our countries.”

Source: http://www.itar-tass.com/eng/level2....2515&PageNum=0

Sergei Lavrov: "Armenian Brandy Is Better Than French Cognac"

[Armenian]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

Russia rejects fears that air-defense systems sold to Syria can end up in Iran


Pantsyr S1 - Air Defence Missile/Gun System

Russia has begun delivery of modern air-defense units to Syria while rejecting speculation that some of the weapons could be forwarded secretly to Iran, a newspaper reported Friday. "The first part of the delivery to Syria has started," the centrist daily Nezavissimaya Gazeta reported, quoting information from a domestic military information agency. A spokesman for Russia's arms export agency Rosoboronexport, contacted by AFP, declined to comment on the newspaper report.

The report acknowledged that the delivery of the weapons, the Pantsyr-S1E self-propelled short-range missile air-defense system, was particularly sensitive in light of Israeli claims last year that Russian arms sold to Syria had ended up in the hands of Lebanese resistance movement Hizbullah. Israel fought a war with Hizbullah fighters in Lebanon in the summer of 2006 and afterward accused Russia of indirectly supplying Hizbullah with relatively sophisticated anti-tank weapons, an accusation Moscow denied. Nezavissimaya Gazeta quoted an official involved in Russian arms-export policy as describing concerns that Russian air-defense weapons could be re-exported to Iran as "silly rumors."


The 57E6 Aurface-to-Air Missile Used by the Pantsyr S1.

"This is not possible," Vitaly Shlykov, a member of the state committee on foreign and defense policy, was quoted as saying. "One of the conditions for every deal is the prohibition on transfer of the weaponry to a third country." Officially, the contract was for the sale of 50 Pantsyr units for about $900 million. Media reports have put the number of units sold to Syria at around 36. In May, the London-based arms specialist magazine Jane's Defense Weekly reported that Syria had agreed to send Iran at least 10 of the Pantsyr units. That report was categorically denied by a range of top Russian officials including First Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov.

Source: http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article....icle_id=84607#

Iran set to obtain Pantsyr via Syria

Jane's Information Group By Robin Hughes

Iran is set to acquire at least 10 96K6 Pantsyr-S1E self-propelled short-range gun and missile air-defence systems as a derivative of a major deal struck between Syria and Russia earlier this year. A source close to the deal told Jane's that Russia has agreed to sell Damascus "some 50 Pantsyr-S1E systems", with initial deliveries set to begin later in 2007. Syria is understood to be receiving the Pantsyr-S1E equipped with the latest Roman I-Band fire control radar. While the source noted that most of the Pantsyrs are earmarked for the Syrian Air Defence Command, "the end user for 10 of the systems is Tehran". These should reach Iran, via Syria, in late 2008, the source told Jane's. According to the source, Iran will part finance the Syrian acquisition along with payment for its own 10 systems to recompense Damascus for its compliance in the deal.

Syria is understood to have signed a contract with Russia, with an estimated value of USD730 million, for the supply of the Pantsyr-S1E. While Tehran has indicated to Damascus the urgency of the requirement, the source said that the 10 systems to be transferred will not be taken from the first ones supplied to Syria but from later deliveries. The source added Iran has also disclosed plans to acquire at least 50 Pantsyr-S1E systems and is currently now exploring potential options to realise this. He additionally confirmed that Iran has now acquired at least two longer-range S-300PMU-1/2 Favorit (SA-10c/d 'Grumble') air-defence systems. Syrian consent to enable Iran to procure the Pantsyr-S1E systems through Syria is an implementation of the military and technological co-operation mechanism stipulated in a strategic accord signed by both countries in November 2005.

Source: http://www.janes.com/defence/news/jd...0522_1_n.shtml

[Armenian]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

Russia resurgent


(Russian Soldiers During Military Parade)

When we look back at the end of the Western stand-off with Soviet Russia that dominated global politics for half a century, we can see it as a spending competition that a lumbering communist autocracy could never hope to win. In short, we were able to maintain the edge in a terrifying game of brinkmanship with the Russians because our economic system worked and theirs did not: the West generated wealth, while the Soviet Union could only bleed itself dry trying to keep up. In the end, as Mikhail Gorbachev realised, the only solution for Russia was a programme of economic and social reform that was dependent for its success on the friendship of her enemies.
advertisement

But as Lilia Shevtsova pointed out in these pages yesterday, that friendship was offered more grudgingly than it might have been, and there was too much suspicion and too little magnanimity shown in our dealings with the defeated power. Now that Russia can not only pay its bills but also invest heavily abroad, and is able to use its energy reserves to blackmail its neighbours, we are paying the price for the coolness of that early welcome. President Vladimir Putin is a proud man, and one who cares little for the good opinion of his peers. But he is also a former Cold Warrior who knows that, if there was one weapon that enabled the Soviet Union to survive as long as it did, that weapon was fear.

So now that he can afford to restore the strategic bomber patrols that were abandoned in 1992, he has done so; he taunts the West by engaging in cosy military exercises with the Chinese; his aircraft have restarted the game of forcing American planes to scramble from Guam. The message is that Russia is neither bankrupt nor contrite, and that east-west diplomacy is once more a potentially deadly contest of equals. And there is a lesson for us in Mr Putin's domestic policies as well, for the return of that climate of dread in which Soviet citizens lived for so long has now become the medium for a calculated insult to Britain.

As we report today, the last Russian radio station to broadcast the BBC World Service on FM has been told to desist, on pain of closure; and although the service will still be accessible on shortwave and via the internet, we can't help but fear the consequences for Russians who use it too publicly. Meanwhile Mr Putin has shown just how far Western unity has crumbled since the Cold War, for there has been no coherent response to his sabre-rattling. Russia is back, but Reagan and Thatcher have gone. Maybe now it's our turn to catch up.

Source: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/opinion/m.../18/dl1802.xml

And this from FOX

Moscow’s New Military Assertiveness Isn’t Just Talk


(Liang Guanglie (front L), chief of the general staff of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, and Yury Baluyevsky (front R), chief of the general staff of the Russian armed forces, and representatives of the veterans of the WWII review the honor guard of Russia's Pacific Fleet in Russia's Vladivostok on August 18, 2005.)


FOX News, By Lt. Col. Oliver North

Washington, D.C. — The Great Horned Owl is a magnificent raptor with feathers so soft its prey can’t even hear it coming until it’s too late. But, even this superb hunter has a major challenge to overcome — it cannot move its eyes. To scan forest or field for danger — or its next meal — the owl, with its eyes fixed straight ahead, must rotate its head. Today, the U.S. national security apparatus is much like an owl with a stiff neck. For more than three years now, our White House, State Department and Pentagon have been fixated on America’s adversaries in the Middle East and Southwest Asia. Our preoccupation has been on Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, Syria, Lebanon and Gaza. Unfortunately, we seem to have missed what’s happening in Russia. Not to carry the wildlife metaphor too far — but the bear is back.

Last week, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that Moscow would build a new air defense radar system in St. Petersburg, to be “the first step in a large-scale program,” and that it will be “carried out before 2015.” This follows Mr. Putin’s threat to re-target Russian nuclear weapons on Europe if Washington goes ahead with plans to deploy missile defense radars in the Czech Republic and anti-missile interceptors in Poland. As usual, the "Blame America First" crowd claims that the U.S. ICBM shield is precipitating a “crisis.” Perhaps, but the Euro-critics and our own foreign policy wonks — like owls that can’t turn their heads — may be missing what’s really happening in Mr. Putin’s world.

In July, the Russian president told newly promoted military and security officers at the Kremlin that “one of our absolute priorities is an all-round strengthening of the armed forces.” Mr. Putin added that, “both the situation in the world and internal political interests demand that Russia's foreign intelligence service constantly increases its resources, above all in the field of information and analytical support for the country's leadership.” And last week, Adm. Vladimir Masorin, Russia’s navy chief, declared intentions to “restore a permanent naval presence in the Mediterranean Sea,” a capability Moscow has not had since the Cold War.

But Moscow’s new assertiveness isn’t just talk. Sales of Russian military hardware to Iran, Syria, Venezuela and North Korea are up more than 25 percent in the past two years. In July, Russian explorers planted a flag on the seabed at the North Pole "claiming" the region for Moscow — despite angry protests from the U.S., Canada, Denmark and Norway. Last week Pentagon officials acknowledged Moscow’s boast that two Russian Tu-95 long-range turbo-prop bombers had “buzzed” U.S. military bases on Guam. And this week Russia and China began a massive joint military exercise — only the second ever — and the first to be held on Russian soil.

What’s going on here? What’s “the bear” doing behind “the owl’s” back? Is Vladimir Putin bent on starting a new Cold War? The fact is, we don’t know. Our human intelligence resources are so thin that “we have no idea what’s happening inside the Kremlin,” according to one retired senior intelligence officer. But what we do know for certain should be alarming enough to make us pay attention.

First, we know that Russia is awash in gas and petro-dollars. Thanks to the worldwide spike in oil and natural gas prices, Moscow is raking in Euros and fueling military and intelligence expenditures that were previously financially impossible. Second, we know that long-term, Russia is in very serious trouble — because it is simply running out of Russians. To sustain economic growth, a nation needs a growing population; increasing the number of people requires either babies be born in sufficient numbers or immigration — or both. Moscow’s problem is that it has neither. Even neutral population growth requires 2.1 live births per couple. Russia’s birth rate is less than 1.6 — and nobody immigrates to Russia.

According to the CIA, Russia also has one of the lowest average life-spans on the planet — 66.6 years. Absent a dramatic increase in birth-rate, longevity and/or massive immigration, the population of 141.3 million Russians will continue to decline at a rate of about 700,000 per year. This population implosion means that in little more than a decade there will simply be too few Russians to control one-sixth of the world’s land mass and perhaps one-third of the world’s petroleum and natural gas reserves. To further complicate the situation, to the south, energy starved China — population 1.4 billion — already has 70 million more men than women — and a military more than double the size of Russia’s.

We don’t seem to know what Vladimir Putin has decided to do about his country’s precarious future — but it would be naïve for us to ignore the enormous potential for miscalculation. Better intelligence is a must. Even owls move their heads to look around. Maybe that’s why they are said to be wise.

Source: http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,293506,00.html

[skhara]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

By the way, not long ago I read an article about rewards from the Kremlin for having children.

[Armenian]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

Russia's economic growth led to baby boom


(Traditional Russian Family)

Pravda, 2004-04-21

One could hardly meet women with newly-borns in Moscow in the 1990s. But today women with small children can be increasingly seen in the streets. Experts say that a baby boom has begun in Russia. New shops for newly-borns are opening. According to head of the Moscow Health Department Andrei Seltsovsky, last year 87,600 babies were born in the Russian capital, or 8% more than in 2002.

Since 1999 the birth rate has been on the rise in Russia. Experts attribute this growth to economic recovery and the increase of real incomes of the population. According to data of the State Statistics Committee, last year the birth rate increased by 6.1% on 2002 to 1,359,800 babies, or 76,700 more than in the previous year.

Today there are 10.4 newly-borns per thousand of the population.

Middle-aged rather than young women living in Moscow account for the largest number of births. "This is the realization of the first and second births postponed in the economically difficult 1990s," head of the laboratory for reproduction analysis and forecasting with the Center of Demography and Human Ecology of the Russian Academy of Sciences Sergei Zakharov says. Last year women above 30 years of age accounted for 45% of births. "Today female Muscovites venture to give birth at the age of 40, 45 and even 50," chief gynecologist-obstetrician of the Moscow Health Department Mark Kurtser says. In the 1990s, when alternative medicine prospered in Russia, it was popular among women to give birth at home and in the water. Now, according to Mark Kurtser, Russian women insist "on the continuity of traditional in-patient and out-patient clinics, individual approaches, anaesthesia during birth-giving, comfort and the availability of the intensive care baby therapy."

Today I have reached a certain level of prosperity and can give my child everything he needs," says 29-year old Moscow female journalist Olga Sokolova who gave birth to her first baby two months ago. This example is illustrative: a fashion for late "planned babies" is spreading in Russian megalopolises. During the Soviet period, young people used to begin their labour and family life simultaneously, at the age of just over 20. Now young people start a family much later. "At the dawn of the 1990s, a crisis of the family as an institution broke out in Russia; the number of unregistered marriages is on the rise; women first try to make a career, reach financial stability and only then give birth to children," renowned demography expert Yevgeny Andreyev says.

To stimulate birth rate growth, it is necessary "to raise the prestige of families with many children and stipulate various benefits for families with children," head of the chair of the family sociology at the sociology department of Moscow State University Anatoly Antonov says. His opinion is shared by deputy chairman of the State Duma committee for public associations and religious organizations Alexander Chuyev: "We shall ask the new government to raise child allowances, grant housing credits to young families, increase benefits for families with many children and promote family values." Representatives of public organizations, the church, scientists and doctors proposed at a recent round table discussion in the State Duma entitled 'Demography and the Protection of the Woman's Reproductive Health' to create a Council for Demographic Policy under the President of Russia.

Some Central, Volga Area and Siberian regions are trying to stimulate births by economic methods. In addition to federal one-time allowances for newly-borns (4,500 rubles at the place of work, 2,000 rubles at the place of residence plus a 500-ruble monthly child care allowance; 1 US dollar equals 28.5 rubles), they pay bonuses to young families for heirs. In Moscow parents under 30 get an extra payment for the first baby in the amount of 16,000 rubles. The payment for the third baby equals 32,000 rubles.

"In St. Petersburg a family where a baby is born gets 8,000 rubles as a one-off payment and 1,500 rubles monthly for baby food and baby attendance articles," head of the city's health committee department for medical and preventive treatment assistance to mothers and children Anatoly Simakhodsky says. As a result, such a family gets 26,000 rubles per year. Money is first remitted to the personal credit card. Then parents can go to any of the 54 Healthy Baby shops to purchase what their newly-born needs." As in Moscow, St. Petersburg authorities help young parents find jobs. Some regions, for example, Bashkiria and Udmurtia, issue loans to young families for the purchase of housing with the possibility of loan amortization in the event more babies are born, stipulate tax privileges and benefits for the payment of housing and utilities services.


"As a result of these measures, the birth rate exceeds the number of deaths in 22 regions of the country now," first deputy health and social development minister Galina Karelova says.

Source: http://newsfromrussia.com/main/2004/04/21/53546.html

Baby boom the answer for Russia?

The New York Times By C.J. Chivers (MAY 14, 2006)

MOSCOW President Vladimir Putin of Russia drew from the Soviet past last week when he championed the role of motherhood in preventing Russia from becoming a state short of citizens. The Russian population is shrinking, and demographers warn that it is within a generation of plummeting. If the most pessimistic models hold, the decline could make the country a vast, underpopulated state within four or five decades, a country with too few healthy people for a competitive work force or a capable army. Russian life, for the peasantry and the proletariat alike, has always been unforgiving. And in a speech reminiscent of Soviet pledges of the state helping the masses so that the masses might help the state, Putin chose the familiar Soviet solution of encouraging stalwart reproduction, telling the obedient Russian Parliament to enact programs of financial incentives to women to have more children.

The Kremlin-friendly news media here - a place that often feels like the land of the single-child family - crowed in approval. The president had spoken: Here is the money, he had essentially said. Russian mothers, fulfill your role. Beneath the enthusiasm was a question Putin did not address. Will cash incentives work? The data would say: not quite. There is little doubt that for Russia to be a power through the 21st century its demographic trends must be reversed. There also seems to be no question that Russian mothers, short of feats of fertility unseen in the industrialized world, cannot save Russia alone.

"You have to do this in a variety of ways," said Murray Feshbach, a demographer at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, in Washington, who studies the Russian population and its health.

The problems can be found in the numbers. Russia has roughly 143 million people, and the population drops an average of 700,000 each year, largely because of the wide gap between the number of those born and the number who die. More babies will help. But as the population shrinks, Feshbach said, it risks an accelerating collapse that fertility itself cannot reverse. This is in part because the low birthrate is more than two decades old, and the number of women ages 20 to 29, the most fecund segment of the population, has already fallen to 12 million, he said. In the next several years, women that age will fall to 8 million or fewer - a small contingent to bear the next generation. And as analysts at the World Bank and the United Nations have pointed out, the threat to the population is not just low birthrates, but high death rates.

The Russian people are deeply unhealthy, so much so that there is no demographic group in the industrial world as ailing and prone to fatal injury as the Russian male, whose average age at death is about 59. Abysmal mortality trends separate Russia from other industrial countries that offer incentives to stimulate population growth, including Japan and Australia. Moreover, pernicious infections have entered the Russian population since Soviet times, making the country a growing reservoir of people recently infected with tuberculosis, HIV and hepatitis C. Many of these infections have not yet turned into high rates of disease, but the public health authorities say that as the incubation periods run their course over the next several years, their effects on national health will be evident.

Tuberculosis is already at epidemic levels, and an expected surge in AIDS cases and hepatitis complications could, by the most dire models, kill more than half a million people a year in a generation or two. There are signs that Russia is waking to the problems. Last month, the Kremlin pushed through a roughly twentyfold increase in its paltry financing for AIDS prevention, diagnosis and treatment - a sign of an understanding of the severity of the problem, said Dmitry Rechnov, a deputy director of AIDS Foundation East-West, a private organization here.

"If we keep on this track, there can be a number of positive developments," he said.

Still, the Kremlin's attention to public health has been uneven, and expected increases in mortality related to infectious disease would push up a death rate already driven above norms in industrial countries by high rates of heart disease, cancer, alcoholism, accidents, violence and suicide. The potential consequences are clear. In a report released last year, the World Bank warned that if Russia did not adopt comprehensive public health programs, it risked a shrinking work force, destabilized families, strains on national security and a drain on its gross domestic product. And not everyone agrees that cash incentives, which are not part of a comprehensive health program, will even achieve what the Kremlin hopes - more healthy and productive children.

If Putin's proposals pass, as they almost certainly will, then next year, mothers will receive bonuses worth about $9,000 for giving birth, as well as a graduating scale of monthly cash allowances for infants and subsidies for day care. Putin did not go as far as past Kremlin leaders, like Stalin, who encouraged women to give birth by offering Medals of Maternal Glory to repopulate a country thinned by repression and war. Even were Putin to do so, the numbers suggest, without shifts in attitudes and widespread improvements, the traffic at maternity wards would remain slower than the Russians' rush to the grave.

Source: http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/05/14/news/russia.php

[Armenian]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

We have discussed the Western factor in the bloody Chechen war. We know now that the war in Chechnya was a futile attempt by foreign powers to wrestle away the strategically crucial region of Chechnya away from Russian control. Now a little information on the Turkish factor in Chechnya.

It was well known that for many years Turkish "volunteers," more specifically members of the extremist pan-Turkist paramilitary organization known as the Grey Wolves, were sent into Chechnya to help terrorists there fight Russian forces. Obviously, detailed information about Turkey's role in Chechnya, as well as that of the West's remains classified. As a result, obtaining information about this topic remains elusive, especially information in English. Nevertheless, it was widely known in the region that Chechen terrorists got their financial aid, logistical support, armaments and military training primarily by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Turkey. It was also said that the terrorist organization known as "Al-Qaeda" was partaking in the anti-Russian activities there. Due to political considerations, the West's role was for the most part was delegated to diplomatic support, humanitarian assistance and public relation on the behalf of Chechens.

Nonetheless, during various stages of the conflict it was documented that not only were Chechen terrorists fighting alongside Turks but their wounded personnel were being transported to Turkey via Georgia for treatment and recuperation. Naturally, the same was being done in Azerbaijan. In Azerbaijan, the Grey Wolves were participating in anti-Russian, anti-Iranian and anti-Armenian activities in full compliance with their pan-Turkist ideology. In essence, Turkey, Azerbaijan and Georgia had become safe havens for Chechen terrorists for many years. Of course all this was occurring right under the watchful eyes of the US government and other Western powers. Doing research on this topic one can not help but realize an unmistakable Turkish flavor in the Chechen conflict. And despite the Russian Federation's cordial relations with the Turkish state, Moscow today remains resentful and suspicious of Ankara. It is essential to note here that during the early 90s many officers of the Turkish army and members of the Grey Wolves as well as personal from "Al-Qaeda" also served in and around Artsakh fighting Armenians.

Armenian

************************************************** ************

TURKISH VOLUNTEERS IN CHECHNYA



By Brian Glyn Williams, Feyza Altindag

For several years Kremlin spokespersons have identified Turkey as the primary source of foreign jihadi volunteers (always referred to as naemniky, "mercenaries" in official proclamations) fighting alongside their Chechen adversaries. One spokesman claimed "We keep killing armed Turkish citizens on Chechen territory" and another described Turkey as "a record breaker for producing foreign mercenaries killed in Chechnya." [1] While skeptics might be tempted to dismiss such claims as mere bluster in light of Turkey's well known secular tendencies, the evidence is mounting that Turkish volunteer fighters make up a sizeable component of the foreign element fighting alongside the indigenous Chechen insurgents in Russia.

While it is widely recognized that the 100-200 foreign jihadis fighting alongside the approximately 1,200 Chechen insurgents are led by Arab emirs (commanders) such as the slain Amir Khattab (a Saudi whose mother was Turkish according to jihadist websites), Abu Walid (Saudi killed April 2004), and Abu Hafs al Urdani (aka "Amjet" a Jordanian), the Russian government has consistently maintained that Turks play a prominent role among the foreign "terrorists" in Chechnya. [2]

To support their claims, Russian security services have produced Turkish passports found on the bodies of several slain fighters and have given the names and personal details of Turkish jihadis killed in Chechnya. Among others, Russian spokespersons referenced one Ziya Pece, a Turk who was found dead with a grenade launcher following a fire fight with Federal forces. Russian officials have also provided detailed information on 24 Turkish fighters killed between 1999 and 2004, and Russian soldiers in Chechnya have spoken of engaging a unit of 40 skilled Turkish fighters. [3] If this were not compelling enough evidence, Russian security forces have also produced a living Turkish jihadi named Ali Yaman who was captured in the Chechen village of Gekhi-Chu.

A Turkish Platoon in Chechnya

Surprisingly, this evidence is not refuted by Chechen or Turkish jihadi sources and on the contrary has been corroborated on such forums as the kavkaz.org website produced by Arab and Chechen extremists linked to the field commander Shamil Basayev. The following excerpt from a kavkaz interview with a Turkish jihadi commander in Chechnya is illuminating and suggests the existence of a Turkish jamaat known as the "Ottoman platoon" in the Arab-dominated International Islamic Brigade (it also corroborates the above Russian claim that Federal forces have killed 24 Turks in Chechnya):

"Interview with the Chief of the Turkish Jamaat ‘Osmanly' (Ottoman) fighting in Chechnya against the troops of Russian invaders, Amir (Commander) Muhtar, by the Kavkaz Center news agency: (Interviewer) Are there many Turks in Chechnya today? Some mass media were reporting that there are about 20 of you guys.

(Amir Muhtar) Out of the first Jamaat that was fighting in 1995-1996 seven mujahideen have remained. Back then there were 13 of us. They are actually the core of the Turkish jamaat in Chechnya today. Twenty-four Turks have already died in this war. Among them was Zachariah, Muhammed-Fatih, Halil…Three mujahideen became shaheeds (martyrs) during the battle with commandos from Pskov in the vicinity of Ulus-Kert. Some died before that in the battles in Jokhar (Grozny). Five were wounded." [4]

In February 2004 a Turkish jihadi website devoted to Chechnya also announced the martyrdom (shehid olmak) of three Turkish mujahideen in just two weeks. [5] Another site that has been removed left the following account of the combat that led to the martyrdom of three Turkish jihadi fighters:

"Last night we had news from verifiable sources that a group of Turkish mujahideen came across Russian soldiers north of Vedeno in a small village. After stumbling on them a fire fight ensued and one Algerian and three Turkish brothers died. The Algerian's name is Hassam and the Turkish brothers' names are Ebu Derda, Huzeyfe and Zennun. These brothers fought in Commander Ramazan's unit in the Dagestan conflict." [6]

For several years now Turkish jihadi websites have actually been posting the martyrdom epitaphs of Turkish fighters who died in the Chechen cihad. Much of the jihadist rhetoric found on these Islamist sites will be familiar to those who follow the martyrdom obituaries of foreign jihadis who have died fighting in Kashmir, Iraq, Afghanistan and other conflict zones. The following account, for example, describes the fate of a Turkish fighter who followed the well worn path of roaming Turkish jihadis in the Balkans before being killed:

"Shaheed Bilal Al-Qaiseri (Uthman Karkush). 23 years old from Qaiseri, Turkey. Martyred during the Withdrawal from Grozny, February 2000:

Bilal fought for six months in Bosnia during 1995 from where he unsuccessfully attempted to travel to Chechnya. He went to fight for the Jihad in Kosova but returned after a month when the fighting ceased. He came to Chechnya in August 1999 where he participated in the Dagestan Operations in Botlikh. After the Mujahideen withdrew, he was planning to return to Turkey when Russia invaded Chechnya. He participated in the fighting in Argun and, subsequently, Grozny. Before and throughout Ramadan he cooked for the Mujahideen in his group. During the fighting he was distinguished for his bravery. After seeing a dream in which he was married, he decided to marry a Chechen, but Shahaadah (martyrdom) was destined for him instead. He was severely injured during the withdrawal from Grozny in the village of Katyr Yurt where his room received a direct hit from Russian Grad Artillery. He was later martyred from his injuries in the village of Shami Yurt."

Ethnicity and Turkish jihad in Chechnya

The following epitah, which describes a Turkish martyr "with some Chechen ancestry" speaks of a deeper and less obvious current in the Turkish jihadi movement that delineates Turkish volunteer fighters from the majority of trans-national Arab jihadis fighting in Chechnya: "Shamil (Afooq Qainar). 25 years old from Istanbul, Turkey.

Martyred in Grozny, November 1999:

With some Chechen ancestory, he deeply loved Chechnya and was more often alongside Chechens than Turks. He had also participated in the Chechen Jihad of 1996-99. With his good manners, polite demeanor and modesty, he got along well with everyone. He also took part in the Dagestan Jihad in the Novalak Region where, notably, his group fought their way out of a Russian siege at a cost of 25 Shaheed (martyrs). He was martyred in the second month of this War (November 1999) in Grozny." [7]

While it might be overlooked, the fact that the slain Shamil is, like many of his compatriots, of Chechen extraction, is of tremendous importance. It would seem that many Turks who volunteer to fight on the behalf of the Chechens do so because they have ethnic origins in the Caucasus region or identify with the Chechens as irkdashlar (kin).

In the 19th century, Tsarist Russia instigated a brutal policy of ethnic cleansing that saw tens of thousands of indigenous Caucasian highlanders expelled to Anatolia. While public expressions of Laz, Circassian, Kosovar, Bosniak, Tatar and Chechen ethnic identity were subsequently discouraged in officially homogenous Republican Turkey, folk traditions such as the famous Caucasian highlander sword dances, Albanian borek (pastry), Crimean Tatar destans (legends), and ritualized commemoration of past victimization at the hands of Russians, Serbs, Bulgarians and others continued.

It was only with the liberalization of Turkey under President Turgut Ozal in the early 1990s that these historical sub-ethnic grievances could be expressed in the public sphere. As this unprecedented celebration of ethnicity and commemoration of past repression took place in a liberalizing Turkey, Turks were confronted with horrifying images from the Balkans and Caucasus. Stories of rape camps in Bosnia, mass graves in Kosovo, and televised images of columns of pitiful Chechen refugees in Russia struck many Turks as a replay of the apocalyptic destruction of millions of Balkan-Caucasian-Ukrainian Muslims by Orthodox Christians in the 19th century.

As a result, informants interviewed by the author in Turkey in the summer of 2004 claimed that many young men from villages in Eastern Turkey inhabited by people of Caucasian origin were told by their family patriarchs to go and fight for their honor, faith, and ancestral homeland in Chechnya. Moreover, with the advent of the internet in Turkey, gruesome images of horribly mutilated Chechen women and children, mass burials and vandalized mosques appeared on Islamist and secular-nationalist websites alike and enraged many traditionalists in the country. In this climate, both nationalists and religious extremists exploited many Turks' sense of ethnic or religious solidarity with their Chechen "brothers and sisters" and invoked strong feelings of namus (a traditional sense of machismo, pride and honor among Turks that comes from the defense of faith, family, motherland, and honor of one's women).

Like the Turks who continue to fight and die in Chechnya, the websites that glorify the defense of the Chechens run the gamut from the anti-American/Zionist rhetoric of the Islamists to the nationalist irredentism of the Pan-Turkists. But the latter predominate. [8] The pro-Chechen websites with an ethnic dimension tend to feature images of Turks wearing traditional Caucasian folk costumes and 19th century anti-Russian heroes. Others with a slightly more nationalist bent (such as www.kafka.4t.com/photos.html) blend images of Ataturk and Alparslan Turkes (the founder of the Turkish xxx Kurt-Grey Wolves extreme nationalist party) with images from Chechnya. As these sites make clear, many Turks who fight in Chechnya are engaging in the same sort of volunteerism that led Albanian Americans to go fight in Kosovo in 1999 under the auspices of Homeland Calling and other widely recognized diasporic organizations.

This ethnic diaspora narrative might also explain some of the Arab jihadi participation in Chechnya. Many Chechen refugees settled in Ottoman Jordan following their expulsion from Russia in the 19th century. Jordanian Arabs of Chechen extraction, such as the influential Sheikh Muhammad Fatih, have played an important role in the Chechen jihad as warriors, preachers, and fund raisers.

Notwithstanding the involvement of Turks in the Chechen conflict, it would be erroneous to interpret this as proof that secular Turkey faces a serious Islamist problem. Turkish jihadis who have fought in Chechnya have found the Wahhabi Puritanism of their Arab jihadi comrades-in-arms unsettling, and many secular Turks partake in "jihad tours" simply to gain prestige at home in their tight knit families or neighborhoods. In addition, the vast majority of Turks interviewed tended to view Chechens as "terrorists" who reminded them of the hated Kurdish PKK/Kadek militants.

Finally, the involvement of two Turkish extremists (Azad Ekinci and Habib Akdas) who had a history of jihadi activity in Chechnya in the bloody al-Qaeda bombings in Istanbul in November 2003 further undermined the Chechen cause in the country. [9] Indeed for all the romantic notions, some Turks have of volunteering to fight on behalf of the Chechens, the carnage wreaked on innocent Turks by El Kaide Turka (Turkish al-Qaeda) clearly demonstrates that jihadism has a potentially unpredictable effect on those who are attracted to it.

Source: http://www.jamestown.org/publication...cle_id=2369571

[skhara]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

Armenian, where is the source for the wounded claim. I think it is a very important one, because it puts the Turkish government as a direct player to the conflict. With turkish mercenaries, Ankara can claim no involvement.

[Armenian]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

Armenian, where is the source for the wounded claim. I think it is a very important one, because it puts the Turkish government as a direct player to the conflict. With turkish mercenaries, Ankara can claim no involvement.

There are actually many reports out that document the medical treatment of Chechen terrorists in Turkey, Georgia and Azerbaijan. I would come across a lot of it in the late 1990s early 2000s, after the war had begun to go badly for the Chechens. Don't for once think that authorities in Moscow don't know the full extent of this issue. I think in 2003 Putin even asked Saudi Arabian and American officials to stop their support for the Chechen terrorists in return for not obstructing US war plans against Iraq. As you well know, a lot goes on under the radar screen and away from the mainstream news media. However, you can come across insider information, at times, by reading the essays and reports put out by Washington based "Think Tanks," freelancing journalists and English/Russian language media outlets from overseas.

A few minutes on Google revealed the following relevant articles, I'm sure there are much more:

Ilman’s cousin, Anzor Umaev, fought on the side of the separatists in the first Chechen war, during which he lost an eye and was partially paralyzed on his right side (he walks with a limp and has no use of right arm). As a result of being wounded he also suffers from memory loss and bradyphrenia. In 2001 or 2002, while on the run from the authorities, Anzor traveled to Azerbaijan, from where he planned to travel to Turkey for treatment, but was arrested and convicted of involvement in “illegal armed formations.” In 2004, after three years in a Siberian prison camp, he was amnestied and returned to Chechnya.
Source: http://www.jamestown.org/chechnya_we...icleid=2372452

Reliable sources report that Al-Haramayn emissaries have made an agreement with the Taliban movement in Pakistan for acquisition of 500 units of heavy weaponry for the Chechen bandits. One of the leading functionaries of an international Wahhabi network, Abu Said, recently paid a special visit to Pakistan in order to arrange deliveries of those armaments to Chechnya, and also to recruit Pakistani mercenaries and qualified sappers. The weaponry, money and combat gear will be dispatched to Chechnya via Turkey and Georgia. The Al-Haramayn emissaries are engaged in extensive espionage activities on the territory of Chechnya and help the militants wage the information war against Russia.... December 1999. A report from Riyadh to Chechnya: "Sheikh Jamal is sending you three surgeons with Turkish and Pakistani assistants. The planes with the above on board are on their way to Georgia where they'll land in 2-3 hours."... December, 1999. A message sent by the Al-Haramayn emissary Abdulla Latif from Chechnya to Saudi Arabia: "We need field hospitals, medicines, and medical equipment, as well as facilities for prompt evacuation of the wounded to Georgia. Estimated costs - $3 million. $1 million more will be required to ensure medical treatment of the wounded in Georgia and Turkey. The money shall be channelled to Chechnya and Georgia via Turkey."

Source: http://www.amislam.com/chechnya.htm

At the same press conference on 24 October, Targamadze dismissed as "a lie" reports that Chechen field commander Ruslan Gelaev, identified as leader of the Chechen force said to have been involved in hostilities earlier this month in the Kodori gorge, was taken to Tbilisi by helicopter after having eluded the Abkhaz forces hunting for him, ITAR-TASS and Glasnost-North Caucasus reported on 24 October. Targamadze denied that Gelaev is in any region of Georgia under the control of the country's government. Interfax on 24 October quoted the independent Georgian TV station Rustavi-2 as reporting that residents of the Kodori gorge claimed that military vehicles had transported Chechen fighters out of the upper, Georgian-controlled reaches of the Kodori gorge, and that more than 20 wounded Chechen fighters are being treated at a hospital at the village of Azhara, also in the Georgian-controlled sector of Kodori. LF

Source: http://www.hri.org/news/balkans/rfer...-25.rferl.html

On his return to Baku on 28 February following a visit to the U.S., Heidar Aliev told journalists that a 24 February Russian Foreign Ministry statement that wounded Chechens are undergoing hospital treatment in Baku is correct, Turan reported on 29 February (see "RFE/RL Newsline," 28 February 2000). But Aliev stressed that those Chechens are civilians, not fighters, and that during his last visit to Moscow he had informed acting Russian President Vladimir Putin of their presence in the Azerbaijani capital. Aliev said that it would be "inhuman" to deny the injured Chechens medical care. LF

Source: http://www.hri.org/news/balkans/rfer...-01.rferl.html

From Moscow's point of view, it cannot afford to lose the Caucasus, the pathway to Caspian Sea oil and to Russian influence in the Middle East and Central Asia. While Russia remains, it can block efforts by other powers like Turkey and Iran to become established in the Caucasus. Russia's policy in Chechnya is a part of broader Russian policy across the entire Caucasus designed to freeze out other people and allow Russian influence to come back. By its reconquest of Chechnya, Russia served notice to the US that Russia has stopped retreating from the Caucasus and intends to scuttle US plans to gain control over the region.

Source http://www.worldaffairsboard.com/nat...-chechnya.html

According to unverified sources, Nukhaev commanded a small group of militants during the first months of the 1994-1996 war. It was later claimed that he was wounded in 1995 during the battle for Grozny and sent to Turkey for recovery. While still in Turkey he formed a cabinet of the government of Ichkeria and dealt with problems related to the bringing wounded fighters to Turkey for treatment. In 1996 Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev occupied the post of first Vice-Premier of Ichkeria. Nukhaev handled external economic ties and international relations as well as oil and gas manufacturing. In Spring 1997 he directed the Caucasian-American Trade-Manufacturing Chamber which was registered in Washington DC. He then created the holding Caucasian Common Market and became co-founder of Caucasian Investment Fund.

Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Khozh-Ahmed_Noukhaev

If you have time to read, and the interest, here is a good publication: http://books.google.com/books?id=SSx...SMkw4#PPA27,M1

[Armenian]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

Here is one from the BBC I remember reading many years ago. As I said earlier, all these news reports began coming out after the 1999 Russian military offensive in Chechnya, which was the beginning of the end of the bloody conflict there.

Armenian

************************************************** *********

Turkey succours wounded Chechens



By Chris Morris in Istanbul

Dozens of Chechens here have been treated with the help of Turkish Islamist aid groups. Indeed, 150 new patients are expected to arrive at this hospital soon. In the wards, the patients - all young men - were nervous about being interviewed as they were concerned about the possibility of Russian reprisals against their relatives back home.

Mohamed, a former student, lost his arm during a Russian air raid in Grozny. He would not say exactly how he had come to Istanbul. Real anger is palpable at a big pro-Chechen demonstration in Istanbul where protesters are expressing their frustration at what is happening to fellow Muslims in Chechnya. The Russians allege that financial and material aid to Chechnya is flowing through Turkey, although this is hard to prove. Pro-Islamist groups say their focus is on humanitarian assistance, but they say the government could and should do more.

"No official policy can stand against the will of the people for long", says Bulent Yildirim of the National Youth Foundation. "Turkish public opinion is very sympathetic to the Chechens. So the current government will have to change its policy - or the people will change the government." Turks of Chechen origin are busy helping the few refugees who have made it to Turkey. Bouka Aidamirova escaped across the Chechen mountains and crossed into Georgia with her son, just before the Russians shut the route down. Bouka says she wants to go back - but only when the Russians have gone for good. For the moment however, she is stranded.

Turkey must be cautious

Politicians in Ankara may be sympathetic, but Russia is a huge neighbour, and Turkey's second largest trading partner. There are good reasons for treading carefully, according to Fehmi Koru, a political commentator, in a country with its own large minority group, the Kurds. "Turkey is very much dependent on Russian natural gas for example. And also there are people who feel that if Turkey tries to make a fuss about the Chechens, people will bring up the Kurds," Mr Koru says. At the moment, the Turkish government will not pour oil onto troubled waters. But if the war in Chechnya drags on, there may be pressure for a change of heart

Source: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/628272.stm

Turkey and the Chechens

BBC, By Istanbul correspondent Chris Morris

There is a substantial Chechen exile community in Turkey, which is particularly strong in Istanbul, and millions of Turks also trace their ancestry to the Caucasus. During the Russian military campaigns against Chechen rebels in the last few years, there have been persistent allegations from Russia that Turkish organisations have offered financial and material support to the independence movement.

The Turkish and Russian governments recently signed an agreement for closer co-operation against militant groups, and the authorities in Ankara have always insisted that there is no official support for the rebel campaign. But Chechen fighters have been treated in Turkish hospitals, and the ruthlessness of the Russian military has generated considerable sympathy among ordinary Turks for their Chechen brethren.

Turkey has also been dragged unwillingly into several previous hijackings involving the Chechen issue. The most famous occurred in 1996, when a group of pro-Chechen gunmen seized control of a passenger ferry off Turkey's northern Black Sea coast. More than 200 people were held hostage for several days by a gang, which included both Chechens and Turks. The hijackers were eventually imprisoned but all of them later escaped amid strong suspicions that they were allowed to go free.

Source:

THE CHECHEN DIASPORA IN TURKEY

The Jamestown Foundation, By Marc Brody

The Chechen Diaspora is still taking shape. The devastating war in Chechnya that has lasted for ten years has already produced a large number of refugees. Most of them, of course, moved to Russia, while others chose to escape the old Empire and preferred to settle in Georgia, Azerbaijan and Turkey, trying to reach Western Europe from those countries. The second war in Chechnya has been going on for six years, leaving refugees without much hope of returning home anytime soon. They have started organizing themselves, trying to build the basis for a Diaspora, whose main task, like many other Diasporas around the world, is to support the resistance against the enemy.

Turkey may be the best place for those seeking to continue the fight in Chechnya from abroad. During the first Chechen war (1994-1996), Turkish authorities played host to exiled Chechen warlords and allowed several Turkish mayors who were members of the Prosperity Party, an Islamic party, to provide medical aid and general support for the Chechen guerrillas. Within Turkish political society there even emerged a coalition between hardcore Islamists and nationalists who favored Turkish military intervention in Chechnya.

Thus, since the beginning of the second Chechen war in 1999, Turkey has represented a perfect safe haven for Chechen refugees, among them fighters who think that the war should be also supported from abroad and who look for international backing. Some 3,000 to 4,000 Chechens arrived in Turkey between 1999 and 2001. Since then, however, the number has declined. There are now probably only 1,500 Chechens left in the country. While some returned to Chechnya, the vast majority fled to Europe through Bulgaria or Ukraine. The situation for Chechen refugees in Turkey has changed. Political forces have largely given up the Chechen issue. The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks were a factor in this, but not the only one. Today, religious associations, groups and individuals continue to support the Chechen cause as an act of giving Zakat (charity), one of the five pillars of Islam.

Turkish authorities, however, could not politically and openly take the "safe haven" position. Turkey had to increase its commercial and economic relations with Russia; Ankara is seeking to establish a privileged relationship with Moscow, particularly involving natural gas, and cannot allow the Chechen issue to weaken those efforts. Moreover, after September 11 and the start of the global war against terror, Turkish solidarity for Chechnya became difficult to sustain: the hosting of wounded Chechen fighters and arms transits (as was the case between 1994 and 1996, according to many observers and journalists) became hard to justify. Russia's information blockade of Chechnya also made it more difficult to aid the Chechens. It did not mean that the Turkish authorities did not know what was going on there, but it made it more difficult for them to make a convincing case that support from non-governmental associations or groups in Turkey would not be used for "terrorist" purposes.

However, it would be false to say that the moderate Islamist government of Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has totally renounced his country's historical and geopolitical alliance with local Caucasian forces against Russia. Turkey is simply playing a two-level game. On the one hand, Turkey proves to Russia its good intentions by putting pressure on the Chechen Diaspora. On the other, it keeps open opportunities for Chechen resistance groups to act from its territory – for example, by collecting and transferring funds to the Chechen guerrillas. Using this strategy, Turkey retains a powerful tool in its ongoing negotiations with Russia on commercial and economic matters. Through the Chechen Diaspora, Ankara is able to obtain concessions from Moscow. Thus the Turkish government is willing to sacrifice one part of the Chechen Diaspora and allow another part to prosper and act in the interests of the Chechen guerrillas. Erdogan's government needs the Chechens: it needs to keep them active, but not too active.

Two examples illustrate this approach. In February 2004, Turkish Foreign Minister Abdulla Gül brought back from his visit to Moscow a list of 20 Chechens living in Turkey. Within months, several prominent Chechen rebels had either moved or relocated from their homes in Turkey. One of them, Zeindi Umarov, a former bodyguard of Aslan Maskhadov and a close collaborator of Umar Khanbiev, Maskhadov's general representative in Europe (including Turkey and South Caucasus), was resettled in Baku. At the same time, Alla Dudaeva, wife of the first Chechen president, Djokhar Dudaev, is still leaving peacefully in Istanbul; it seems that she is even protected by the Turkish authorities. More generally, some Chechen activists still find a welcoming shelter in Turkey. Zeindi Umarov was sacrificed so that others could stay.

Several days before the NATO summit in Turkey and the visit of President Vladimir Putin to Turkey in June 2004 and in December 2004, respectively, a dozen Chechen refugees from the refugee camps located on the outskirts of Istanbul were arrested by the Turkish special forces and charged with maintaining ties to Islamist groups, al-Qaeda in particular. (The arrests were confirmed by Chechen contacts in Istanbul and by Amnesty International, which provided the author of this article with a list of 12 names, all Chechens, arrested in June 2004.). All were released after the events and none of them had any effective links with international terrorist or Islamist networks. These arrests were only demonstrations of force by Turkish authorities, and probably also a kind of intimidation aimed at Chechens who might be tempted to go beyond the boundaries set by official structures in Turkey.

Playing the Chechen card as a negotiating tool assumes that all Chechen activities are under Turkish governmental control. Both of the above examples illustrate this two-level game. It could be dangerous if some Chechen groups were acting autonomously, outside the Turkish government's political strategy. Turkey lets some Chechens continue the war, but only under conditions imposed by the government in Ankara. That is why the Chechen Diaspora in Turkey is so tightly supervised. There is no political freedom for Chechen refugees, no chances for any Chechen political tendency to organize itself if the Turkish control structures do not allow it. The only political tendency that is unofficially accepted is the Maskhadov-related group. This has created a rift between the "Maskhadovites" and the "Dudaevists", who believe that Aslan Maskhadov, because of his moderation, has led Dudaev's legacy astray. This latter group cannot act freely.

Rifts aside, the active part of the Chechen Diaspora in Turkey – including both fighters and emissaries collecting funds for them – continue to take advantage of their host's two-level game. And this, of course, does not go unnoticed by the Russians (see, for example "Turkish public organizations help Chechen separatists?", RIA Novosti, 5 November 2004).

Source: http://www.jamestown.org/publication...cle_id=2369276