Armenia and Israel throw down a gage to Iran and Turkey
1:15 Yerevan | 21:15 GMT | Saturday 21 January 2006
Armenia and Israel Challenge Iran and Turkey
Global Challenge Research
This week, for the first time in history of bilateral relations, the Armenian Air Lines board landed in the Israeli
Ben Gurion airport, our sources in Tel Aviv informed. According to the same sources, this air company hereafter plans to launch one Yerevan-Moscow-Tel Aviv flight a week. It is expected that at the beginning the outturn of this project will not be considerable, with regard of the fact that the contacts between the two countries are too limited. However, appearance of the Armenian liner in the central Israeli airport has political implications, rather than economic ones. In spite of the fact that the local mass media did not notice this event at all, it is a result of the gradual and soft-pedal thaw in relations between Armenia and the xxxish State.
Natural opponents
After the USSR collapse in 1991, the new geopolitical realities guaranteed Armenia's position in the camp of the xxxish State's opponents. Decisive role in this was played by the relations of both states with Turkey and Iran.
Armenia-Turkey-Azerbaijan
Developments that took place in the Ottoman Empire short before its decay, and that are known from the Armenian historiography as Armenian genocide, to a large extent defined further identity evolution of this Caucasian people. Ankara's categorical refusal to agree with such evaluation of the past was the reason of confrontation between Turkey and young sovereign Armenia. Simultaneously, against the background of the Upper Karabakh conflict, there took place a rapid rapprochement between Ankara and Baku. During the first years of Azerbaijan's independence, Turkey took upon itself the role of a patron of the neighboring Turkic republic. After the USSR collapse, the power in the latter passed into the hands of the National Front leaders – the fervid partisans of Pan-Turkism. Strategic partnership of Ankara and Baku promoted even greater tension in Armenian-Turkish relations.
Turkey-Russia-Armenia
In parallel, Turkey aspired to extend its influence over the Turkic and Caucasian nations of the post-Soviet space. This provoked a confrontation between Ankara and Moscow. At the same time, the Russian-Azerbaijani relations started worsening. The Kremlin showed an extremely negative attitude toward cooperation of Baku with the western oil companies, as well as toward rapprochement of the Azerbaijani leadership with Ankara. As a consequence, Russia's and Armenia's regional interests have coincided. All the more so, Georgia has also headed toward strengthening of ties with Turkey and the West.
Yerevan has remained the only strategic ally of Moscow in the Southern Caucasus.
Armenia-Iran-Turkey
Armenia's reliance on Russia, though strengthening the international positions and military capacity of the former, could not cardinally improve the situation in this South Caucasian republic. Not having a common border with its northern ally, Armenia practically found itself in a Turkish-Azerbaijani blockage from the South and from the East. Moreover, Ankara and Baku, with Washington's assistance, tried to draw Tbilisi into the camp of the Moscow-Yerevan alliance's opponents. Such development threatened to close up Armenia's northern border, which would considerably harden its connections with Russia. In such a situation, Tehran naturally appeared to be Yerevan's most important regional partner.
Iran has been Turkey's historical contestant over the influence in the Caucasus and Central Asia. In the first half of the 1990s, the antagonism between Ankara and Tehran was nourished by strengthening of American-Turkish military and strategic cooperation. After 1979 revolution, Iranian leaders proclaimed the USA "the Big Satan", and the relationship between Tehran and Washington turned into an everlasting confrontation. Approach of Islamic Republic to American-Turkish alliance became even more militant after the Iranian aspirations concerning the independent Azerbaijan gave disappointment.
Azerbaijan-Iran-Armenia
Of all the Muslim republics of the former Soviet Union, Iran firs of all tried to disperse its influence over its north-western neighbor, and only after it – over Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and the other newly established states.
"Azerbaijani factor" had a special role in guaranteeing of Iran's security. In XIX century, the Russian and the Persian Empires divided Azerbaijan between them. Its northern part passed under the control of the Russians, while the southern one was subordinated to the Shah. Northern Azerbaijan gaining independence in 1991 threatened to revive the separatist moods in Southern Azerbaijan. Tehran thus had a goal of including Baku in the zone of its influence. Ayatollahs regime staked on the religious community of the Azerbaijanis and the Iranians represented by the Shiah Islam. The latter, however, even in procommunist period, had played rather unimportant role in socio-political life of Northern Azerbaijan. In the Soviet period the influence of religion was definitely reduced merely to household issues. Revival of the Azerbaijanis' national identity in the 1980s, however, promoted dispersal of the Pan-Turkist moods. This fact in the first half of the 1990s guaranteed Turkey a victory in the battle over influence in the most important state of the Southern Caucasus. Baku then started patronizing the south-Azerbaijani separatists. Moreover, independent Azerbaijan was then regarded as a potential bridgehead for the USA and Israel on the Iranian track. This caused tension in the relations between Tehran and Baku.
Presence of the influential Armenian community in Iran, the competition with Turkey, and the growing confrontation with Azerbaijan predetermined a rapprochement between the Ayatollahs regime and Yerevan.
In parallel with this, Iran and Russia were strengthening their ties, the latter being Armenia's strategic partner.
Israel – Turkey
In the first half of the 1990s the relations between Israel, Turkey, and Iran were completely the opposite if the Armenia-Turkey-Iran relations. The generalship that had a special influence in Ankara stood for broadening of cooperation with the USA and Israel. Formation of a triple military-strategic alliance was promoted by Turkey's regional rivalry with Iran and Russia, as well as by the permanent tension on the Turkish-Syrian border. Israel, having lost its allies, - the Iraqi Kurds, the Iranian Shah and the Lebanese Christians, during the 1970s and 1980s, saw Turkey as the only remaining strategic partner in the Middle East.
Israel - Iran
After coming to power in 1979, the Ayatollah's regime declared the xxxish State to be the "Small Satan". In the first half of the 1990s, Tehran refused to recognize the results of the Israeli - Palestinian arrangements. The Islamic and left wing radical organizations opposing Yasser Arafat, began to enjoy the Iranian patronage. Verbal battles between Tehran and Tel Aviv grew into a direct confrontation of their secret services in Lebanon and Jordan, and a bit later - in the Palestinian territories.
The Geopolitical Axes
As a result of the abovementioned geopolitical configuration, two contradictory axes were generated on the "Big Middle East" up to the middle of the 1990s (the third one: the USA - Saudi Arabia - Pakistan - Afghanistan appeared one and a half decades prior to that, and is irrelevant to our issue). One of them consisted of Russia, Iran, and Armenia, then joined by Syria. Participation by Damascus had two causes; first, the traditionally maintained close relations with Tehran and Moscow, and second, the fact that Syria was in confrontation with Israel and Turkey. Besides, there is a large Armenian community in this Arab country, and that, together with concurrence of geopolitical orientation, promoted development of relations between Yerevan and Damascus. This axis was actually joined by Greece and Greek Cyprus. Both these states actively cooperated with Russia and Syria, in particular in the military sphere, while being in confrontation with Turkey and Turkish Cyprus.
The second axis included the USA, Israel, Jordan, Turkey, and Azerbaijan. Uzbekistan was considered as potential member.
In such a situation in the region Armenia and the xxxish State, though they had no reasons for enmity, appeared on the different sides of the barricade. These conditions prevented any normal development of mutual relations, especially when any attempts at dialogue between them were perceived by Turkey and Iran as "treachery", and were met by powerful pressure to cease.
The Peak of Confrontation
The geopolitical configuration described above did not change throughout the 1990s, as the structure of the axes and the confrontations were maintained. The peak of confrontation occurred during the period between 1996-98.
1996: Russia sold two nuclear reactors to Iran and started delivering tanks to the Greek Cypriots. At the same time an agreement on selling of the Russian anti-aircraft missile systems to Athens was signed and the Greek-Armenian military cooperation began.
On the other hand, in the summer Turkey and Israel concluded the contract on military strategic partnership. Soon Israeli aircraft began to appear in immediate proximity to the borders of Iran and Syria. At the same time, Turkey and Azerbaijan signed an agreement on military cooperation. A group of advisers - more than 70 officers of the Turkish army - was sent by Ankara to Baku.
1997: This year began with the signing of the agreement on delivery of the S300 anti-aircraft – missile complex (SA-10 Grumble) by Russia to Greek Cyprus, provoking so-called "missile crisis on Cyprus" which continued for two years. Later Russia carried out joint air defence drills with
Syria and for the first time since the Soviet period it renewed large deliveries of arms to Damascus. In the summer, Moscow and Yerevan signed the contract "On Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Aid". At the end of the year the tripartite agreement on interaction in a number of areas was concluded between Armenia, Greece, and Iran.
On the other side, the first ever joint Naval Forces and the Air Forces manoeuvres by Israel, Turkey, and the USA, with participation of Jordanian representatives, took place. Soon after, Ankara declared its readiness for a preventive air strike on Greek Cyprus in case the Russian anti-aircraft – missile complex were to be placed there. Turkish generals also declared Syria and Iran to be "strategically hostile states", in connection with their support of the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) and radical Islamic groups in Turkey.
1998: In the autumn the confrontation between Turkey and Syria almost became a direct military conflict, and two Israelis were detained on Greek Cyprus, charged with espionage. Military drills by Turkey, Israel, and the USA again took place. In addition, Ankara signed a Memorandum on Strategic Partnership with Tbilisi, and the Protocol on Security Cooperation with Baku.
continuing..
1:15 Yerevan | 21:15 GMT | Saturday 21 January 2006
Armenia and Israel Challenge Iran and Turkey
Global Challenge Research
This week, for the first time in history of bilateral relations, the Armenian Air Lines board landed in the Israeli
Ben Gurion airport, our sources in Tel Aviv informed. According to the same sources, this air company hereafter plans to launch one Yerevan-Moscow-Tel Aviv flight a week. It is expected that at the beginning the outturn of this project will not be considerable, with regard of the fact that the contacts between the two countries are too limited. However, appearance of the Armenian liner in the central Israeli airport has political implications, rather than economic ones. In spite of the fact that the local mass media did not notice this event at all, it is a result of the gradual and soft-pedal thaw in relations between Armenia and the xxxish State.
Natural opponents
After the USSR collapse in 1991, the new geopolitical realities guaranteed Armenia's position in the camp of the xxxish State's opponents. Decisive role in this was played by the relations of both states with Turkey and Iran.
Armenia-Turkey-Azerbaijan
Developments that took place in the Ottoman Empire short before its decay, and that are known from the Armenian historiography as Armenian genocide, to a large extent defined further identity evolution of this Caucasian people. Ankara's categorical refusal to agree with such evaluation of the past was the reason of confrontation between Turkey and young sovereign Armenia. Simultaneously, against the background of the Upper Karabakh conflict, there took place a rapid rapprochement between Ankara and Baku. During the first years of Azerbaijan's independence, Turkey took upon itself the role of a patron of the neighboring Turkic republic. After the USSR collapse, the power in the latter passed into the hands of the National Front leaders – the fervid partisans of Pan-Turkism. Strategic partnership of Ankara and Baku promoted even greater tension in Armenian-Turkish relations.
Turkey-Russia-Armenia
In parallel, Turkey aspired to extend its influence over the Turkic and Caucasian nations of the post-Soviet space. This provoked a confrontation between Ankara and Moscow. At the same time, the Russian-Azerbaijani relations started worsening. The Kremlin showed an extremely negative attitude toward cooperation of Baku with the western oil companies, as well as toward rapprochement of the Azerbaijani leadership with Ankara. As a consequence, Russia's and Armenia's regional interests have coincided. All the more so, Georgia has also headed toward strengthening of ties with Turkey and the West.
Yerevan has remained the only strategic ally of Moscow in the Southern Caucasus.
Armenia-Iran-Turkey
Armenia's reliance on Russia, though strengthening the international positions and military capacity of the former, could not cardinally improve the situation in this South Caucasian republic. Not having a common border with its northern ally, Armenia practically found itself in a Turkish-Azerbaijani blockage from the South and from the East. Moreover, Ankara and Baku, with Washington's assistance, tried to draw Tbilisi into the camp of the Moscow-Yerevan alliance's opponents. Such development threatened to close up Armenia's northern border, which would considerably harden its connections with Russia. In such a situation, Tehran naturally appeared to be Yerevan's most important regional partner.
Iran has been Turkey's historical contestant over the influence in the Caucasus and Central Asia. In the first half of the 1990s, the antagonism between Ankara and Tehran was nourished by strengthening of American-Turkish military and strategic cooperation. After 1979 revolution, Iranian leaders proclaimed the USA "the Big Satan", and the relationship between Tehran and Washington turned into an everlasting confrontation. Approach of Islamic Republic to American-Turkish alliance became even more militant after the Iranian aspirations concerning the independent Azerbaijan gave disappointment.
Azerbaijan-Iran-Armenia
Of all the Muslim republics of the former Soviet Union, Iran firs of all tried to disperse its influence over its north-western neighbor, and only after it – over Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and the other newly established states.
"Azerbaijani factor" had a special role in guaranteeing of Iran's security. In XIX century, the Russian and the Persian Empires divided Azerbaijan between them. Its northern part passed under the control of the Russians, while the southern one was subordinated to the Shah. Northern Azerbaijan gaining independence in 1991 threatened to revive the separatist moods in Southern Azerbaijan. Tehran thus had a goal of including Baku in the zone of its influence. Ayatollahs regime staked on the religious community of the Azerbaijanis and the Iranians represented by the Shiah Islam. The latter, however, even in procommunist period, had played rather unimportant role in socio-political life of Northern Azerbaijan. In the Soviet period the influence of religion was definitely reduced merely to household issues. Revival of the Azerbaijanis' national identity in the 1980s, however, promoted dispersal of the Pan-Turkist moods. This fact in the first half of the 1990s guaranteed Turkey a victory in the battle over influence in the most important state of the Southern Caucasus. Baku then started patronizing the south-Azerbaijani separatists. Moreover, independent Azerbaijan was then regarded as a potential bridgehead for the USA and Israel on the Iranian track. This caused tension in the relations between Tehran and Baku.
Presence of the influential Armenian community in Iran, the competition with Turkey, and the growing confrontation with Azerbaijan predetermined a rapprochement between the Ayatollahs regime and Yerevan.
In parallel with this, Iran and Russia were strengthening their ties, the latter being Armenia's strategic partner.
Israel – Turkey
In the first half of the 1990s the relations between Israel, Turkey, and Iran were completely the opposite if the Armenia-Turkey-Iran relations. The generalship that had a special influence in Ankara stood for broadening of cooperation with the USA and Israel. Formation of a triple military-strategic alliance was promoted by Turkey's regional rivalry with Iran and Russia, as well as by the permanent tension on the Turkish-Syrian border. Israel, having lost its allies, - the Iraqi Kurds, the Iranian Shah and the Lebanese Christians, during the 1970s and 1980s, saw Turkey as the only remaining strategic partner in the Middle East.
Israel - Iran
After coming to power in 1979, the Ayatollah's regime declared the xxxish State to be the "Small Satan". In the first half of the 1990s, Tehran refused to recognize the results of the Israeli - Palestinian arrangements. The Islamic and left wing radical organizations opposing Yasser Arafat, began to enjoy the Iranian patronage. Verbal battles between Tehran and Tel Aviv grew into a direct confrontation of their secret services in Lebanon and Jordan, and a bit later - in the Palestinian territories.
The Geopolitical Axes
As a result of the abovementioned geopolitical configuration, two contradictory axes were generated on the "Big Middle East" up to the middle of the 1990s (the third one: the USA - Saudi Arabia - Pakistan - Afghanistan appeared one and a half decades prior to that, and is irrelevant to our issue). One of them consisted of Russia, Iran, and Armenia, then joined by Syria. Participation by Damascus had two causes; first, the traditionally maintained close relations with Tehran and Moscow, and second, the fact that Syria was in confrontation with Israel and Turkey. Besides, there is a large Armenian community in this Arab country, and that, together with concurrence of geopolitical orientation, promoted development of relations between Yerevan and Damascus. This axis was actually joined by Greece and Greek Cyprus. Both these states actively cooperated with Russia and Syria, in particular in the military sphere, while being in confrontation with Turkey and Turkish Cyprus.
The second axis included the USA, Israel, Jordan, Turkey, and Azerbaijan. Uzbekistan was considered as potential member.
In such a situation in the region Armenia and the xxxish State, though they had no reasons for enmity, appeared on the different sides of the barricade. These conditions prevented any normal development of mutual relations, especially when any attempts at dialogue between them were perceived by Turkey and Iran as "treachery", and were met by powerful pressure to cease.
The Peak of Confrontation
The geopolitical configuration described above did not change throughout the 1990s, as the structure of the axes and the confrontations were maintained. The peak of confrontation occurred during the period between 1996-98.
1996: Russia sold two nuclear reactors to Iran and started delivering tanks to the Greek Cypriots. At the same time an agreement on selling of the Russian anti-aircraft missile systems to Athens was signed and the Greek-Armenian military cooperation began.
On the other hand, in the summer Turkey and Israel concluded the contract on military strategic partnership. Soon Israeli aircraft began to appear in immediate proximity to the borders of Iran and Syria. At the same time, Turkey and Azerbaijan signed an agreement on military cooperation. A group of advisers - more than 70 officers of the Turkish army - was sent by Ankara to Baku.
1997: This year began with the signing of the agreement on delivery of the S300 anti-aircraft – missile complex (SA-10 Grumble) by Russia to Greek Cyprus, provoking so-called "missile crisis on Cyprus" which continued for two years. Later Russia carried out joint air defence drills with
Syria and for the first time since the Soviet period it renewed large deliveries of arms to Damascus. In the summer, Moscow and Yerevan signed the contract "On Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Aid". At the end of the year the tripartite agreement on interaction in a number of areas was concluded between Armenia, Greece, and Iran.
On the other side, the first ever joint Naval Forces and the Air Forces manoeuvres by Israel, Turkey, and the USA, with participation of Jordanian representatives, took place. Soon after, Ankara declared its readiness for a preventive air strike on Greek Cyprus in case the Russian anti-aircraft – missile complex were to be placed there. Turkish generals also declared Syria and Iran to be "strategically hostile states", in connection with their support of the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) and radical Islamic groups in Turkey.
1998: In the autumn the confrontation between Turkey and Syria almost became a direct military conflict, and two Israelis were detained on Greek Cyprus, charged with espionage. Military drills by Turkey, Israel, and the USA again took place. In addition, Ankara signed a Memorandum on Strategic Partnership with Tbilisi, and the Protocol on Security Cooperation with Baku.
continuing..
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