Armenia, Azerbaijan `Close To Karabakh Deal'

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Azerbaijan Not Ready to Full-Scale War in Next 30-40 Years

/PanARMENIAN.Net/ Stepanakert's participation in the talks over settlement of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict can harm parties' efforts to make progress. At the current phase inclusion of Karabakh in the negotiations is premature, general Arkady Ter-Tadevosyan said in a conversation with a PanARMENIAN.Net reporter. «It will seem to Azerbaijan that it has attained concessions, as the question of participation of the so-called Azeri community of Nagorno Karabakh will inevitably arise and this cannot be admitted,» Arkady Ter-Tadevosyan said.

To add, all statements of Azeri President Ilham Aliyev on a rain of oil dollars, which will help «return the lands» are for internal use only and are aimed at another coil of anti-Armenian hysteria, which has not stopped since 1921. It should be reminded that general Arkady Ter-Tadevosyan (Commandos) was in charge of the operation of liberation of Shushi town May 9, 1991.

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Levon Melik-Shahnazaryan:Kocharian TV Interview Confused Azerbaijan

The TV interview of Armenian President Robert Kocharian became a hallmark event, especially after the Rambouillet meeting. During the past month Azeri politicians lead by President Ilham Aliyev stated anything: Armenia is afraid, Azerbaijan will launch a war and will return territories. It looks like the speech of the Armenian leader dotted his «i's» and crossed his «t's». Political scientist, international law specialist Levon Melik-Shahnazaryan comments on the current state of affairs in relations between the parties to conflict at the instance of PanARMENIAN.Net.
03.03.2006 GMT+04:00
Can Armenian President's speech be considered a response to azeri party's statements and which conclusions will Azerbaijan arrive at after the clear explanation of the situation by him?


Indirectly it may be so. Of course, the President spoke not only about it, however, on the other hand, not responding to permanent militant statements of Azeri officials was not possible any more. I suppose Robert Kocharian’s response was full of sober assessment of the actual state of affairs, dignity and pride for his country.

On the day following Kocharian's news conference I looked through Azeri largest websites and, frankly spoken, I got convinced that the Azerbaijani society is a bit confused. I did not find a single serious answer or comment on Azeri websites. To all appearance, Azerbaijan for the first time received strict response to its calls for military settlement of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict. After all, there are competent people in Azerbaijan, who perfectly know that the next war may end not only in defeat but liquidation of the state called Azerbaijan.


Is that what US Ambassador to Azerbaijan Reno Harnish meant, when he said «war will open way to tragedies in the Caucasus»?


Any war is a humanitarian tragedy and it would have been ideal, if problems between peoples and states were solved over a cup of tea. However, if hostilities resume, I assure you, there will be no Armenia's guilt in it. As of statements of US Ambassador as a representative of a country co-chairing the OSCE MG, it would be desirable that the US pay more attention to the legal aspect of the Nagorno Karabakh issue and not frighten with a war.


In one of his latest interviews former President of Azerbaijan Ayaz Mutalibov was discontent with the course of the talks and Azerbaijan's conduct. What do you think, whose viewpoint does he represent – his one or also that of someone else?


Ayaz Mutalibov never had his own opinion – maybe except a period of directorship at Baku Plant of Air-Conditioners (80s). Having become First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party fo Azerbaijan by means of the Soviet Army, Mutalibov at first fully obeyed Baku town major V. Buniyatov, then to the People's Front of Azerbaijan. Now he voices interests of those, who have sheltered him.

As of the format of the talks, I believe it is not a bad one. Maybe it would be better to involve Iran in the peacemaking activities in the region. It is especially topical taking into account the beginning confrontation between Europe and the Islamic world.


The neighboring republic speaks very much about oil, considering it a panacea for any misfortune. However, where there is oil, there is war. What is your opinion, does not Azerbaijan rely on oil dollars too much?


Robert Kocharian answered that question to a certain degree: «Having oil does not mean having effective economy and battle-worthy army. Liking these two issues directly is not productive. The contrary is even true, one can say that the oil factor often demoralizes the economy in the light of corruption and forming a clan system.»

I will add that oil dollars Azerbaijan hopes for are accumulated in the pockets of the Aliyev clan and another dozen of oil tycoons. The money does not in fact influence the social conditions of Azerbaijan's citizens. Some regions of Azerbaijan are deprived of regular energy supplies even today. The cause is preposterous – there is lack of residual fuel oil…

On the other hand, the Armenian political scientist is sure, the quality of education and intellectual level in Azerbaijan are so low, that the military equipment and communications facilities bought are turned into common scrap metal. We were able to observe it in 1992-94 and we see it now. Thus, murderer Ramil Safarov is recognizes intellectually defective in Budapest. If I am not mistaken the second Azeri cadet suffers from amnesia. Ilham Aliyev realizes that Azerbaijan's hopes for solving the conflict by force have no future. Economy has nothing to do with it.


Not unknown Akif Nagi stated that 60% of residents of Azerbaijan want war…


I doubt that even inside the Karabakh Liberation Organization (KLO) itself the number of those, who want or work for settlement of the issue by force will amount 60%. Demoniac Nagi believes he is inspiring his compatriots that way. Percentage of those supporting resumption of hostilities in Nagorno Karabakh is paltry. I did not hold sociological surveys, however I believe there are less than 5%. However, the Armenian people are able to unite and solve national issues jointly. We observed how much Azerbaijan is ready to such problems in 1992-94.
«PanARMENIAN.Net», 03.03.2006
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Karabakh: for whom the time works? Interview of Armenian President Robert Kocharyan

REGNUM » News » Karabakh: for whom the time…



Armenian President Robert Kocharyan in an interview to TV-channels of Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh told about details of talks with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev in Rambouillet. He also spoke on prospects for the negotiation process on the whole. REGNUM publishes abstracts from the president’s interview with the TV-channels.



Armenian Public TV-channel: Mr. President, after the talks in Rambouillet some disappointment can be felt in society. The expectations have not been justified. What is your assessment of results of the talks in Rambouillet?



There was nothing tragic in Rambouillet. We failed to agree on one important principle. However, this was not for the first time: there have always been some issues at our meetings on which we agreed and on which we disagreed. Of course, a question arises: where does this disappointment come from? I am sure it comes from excessive hopes. Of course, we should note where these expectations come from.



First of all, they derive from optimistic statements made repeatedly by the mediators, as well as by various international institutions on the threshold of the meeting in Rambouillet.



The expectations were inspired by the mere fact of our meeting in Rambouillet, as before, for two years already, all our meetings had been held in frameworks of various international forums, where presidents of various countries gathered. Of course, such expectations were not inspired at that time. The invitation by the French president and his involvement has also inspired some expectations. All this created the atmosphere, when everyone started expecting a culmination, what did not happen.



In reality, the negotiation process was not adequate to such expectations. It is unambiguous. Another question can arise: for what this atmosphere was created. The answer here is simple: great expectations are connected with the year of 2006. There objective reasons for it. There will be no elections either in Armenia or in Azerbaijan. 2007-2008 will be difficult years for Armenia, and the Karabakh problem can become hostage to pre-election attitudes. Willingness to come to an agreement on principles before the G8 meeting in Saint-Petersburg has also played a serious role. It is quite an important factor, and the co-chairs thought that that if we manage to come to agreement on basic principles before the G8 summit, it will be the best guarantee that the international community would do its best in assisting to implement these agreements in all the aspects of security, and economic, financial, and political assistance. These time constraints urged to speed up the process to some extent. Actually, the reason is in it, and this willingness was justified by all the things that the parties could have won if they had come to an agreement. It did not happen. What’s next? Of course, we shall continue the talks. After a meeting of the foreign ministers it will be clear, at what pace.



Armenian Public TV-channel: So, it was not a Key West. But by creating such an atmosphere, the co-chairs, henceforth, should have worked for these expectations to come true. Did they carry out such activity?



No doubt, they did. And they had the expectations also because there had been some agreement on a number of principles. But we did not have great expectations that we would overcome the barrier on this very issue we failed to agree. For example, I did not have such expectations, that is why I declared in Sweden that I foresaw the meeting with cautious optimism, adding – with very cautious optimism. To be objective, it should be noted that we have managed to make through some positive way, but the settlement process is so complicated that we can agree on, say, 15 principles, and absence of an agreement on only one issue will mean that the process has not been started. Thus, it is impossible to either revise the whole package or continue searching for solutions on this very one issue.



Artsakh (Nagorno Karabakh — REGNUM) Public Teveision: Mr. President, do you think that the current format of talks is the most effective one? It is time to involve the Karabakh side in the negotiation process, isn’t it? It will be more profitable to for us that instead of the Armenian leadership leaders of Nagorno Karabakh hold negotiations with Azerbaijan, won’t it?



I think that there is some misunderstanding here. In reality, Karabakh does participate in negotiation process, however, its participation has asymmetric nature and is not full-fledged. However, when the co-chairs visit the region, they always have meetings with the NKR leadership. The same thing concerns the OSCE chairman-in-office. It never happened, that after talks with Azerbaijani side I escaped consultations with the NKR president. The same thing happens after meetings of foreign ministers. It means that Karabakh, undoubtedly, is involved in the process and does not participate only in talks of Armenian and Azerbaijani presidents. We should try to understand that the format of talks does not correspond with the format of the conflict. However, does the current format of talks bear only negative results or does it have some positive resource? Where are the negative things? First of all, Azerbaijan is trying to use the format to accuse Armenia of aggression and occupation of its territories. In fact, it is a negative factor. I can unambiguously state that these arguments are not interesting to anyone else, the essence of the conflict is clear, and everyone understands that Azerbaijan’s refusal to hold talks with Karabakh is a result of psychological barrier caused by consequences of war. All the rest negative factors are to some extend neutralized by giving more information on the conflict.



What we gain in this situation? The first and most important thing is, Armenia can defend interests of the Armenian party much more effectively. During the talks, status of the parties is extremely important, and it is easier to ignore interests of an unrecognized state that of a recognized one. There is a question of status behind the negotiation table. Secondly, I as an active party in the talks gain more opportunity to represent the Karabakh party during my visits and meetings, being a subject that bears direct responsibility of these talks. The same thing concerns the Armenian foreign minister. Probably, no one doubts that the level and frequency of contacts of the Armenian president and foreign minister can be hardly compared to the level of contacts of the NKR president and foreign minister. It is a great advantage.



The third advantage. Such involvement of the Armenian president in the process, of course, elevates Armenia’s responsibility in relations with NKR at a higher level. Actually, the whole potential of Armenia, diplomatic, economic, defense one, works for settlement of the issue. It is a serious argument. By these three things the fact is explained that Armenia’s involvement has had a positive effect concerning the fact that we receive proposals that can become ground for negotiations. Otherwise, we could have said that Armenia agrees to this variant of settlement that is supported by Azerbaijan and Nagorno Karabakh. This exactly was done in its time. But then we received the proposals that should have been rejected from the start.



At present stage we should work about involving Karabakh into the peace process more actively. Of course, the best variant would be that presidents of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Nagorno Karabakh sit to the negotiation table. Nagorno Karabakh should be represented by its legitimate authorities, but not by members of its communities, be it the Armenian or the Azerbaijani one, what they tried to do in early 1990s. It is the worst scenario. We should try to involve Karabakh more actively, but not at the expense of Armenia, not instead of it, not weakening Armenia’s role. Otherwise, we shall have great loss. I would like to stress specially for Karabakh people: they should start worrying only after the Armenian president starts evading responsibility, try to step aside and play a role of a contributor. Only then Nagorno Karabakh resident will have a reason for concern, as it will mean that the Armenian president either does not believe in successful result of the talks, or does not have enough power to carry out the process. Separate statements that can be heard these days show only one thing: either their authors have no idea of these nuances, or derive from their own goals and try to catch something here, although it is not an appropriate place for it.



Armenia’s Second TV-Channel: Mr. President, the idea has been disseminated recently that the Kosovo precedent can applied to other conflicts. Is such idea appropriate for us?



I’ll try to answer the question in a wider context. Actually, I consider quite positive the trends we see today in settlement of these conflicts. Today, in conflict settlement much more attention is paid to the principle of nation’s self-determination. And if we analyze the ways of settlement applied recently, all of them have been solved taking into consideration this principle. Independence of Erithrea and East Timor through a referendum… Processes taking place today around Kosovo leave no doubt in what solution the conflict will have. A referendum in Montenegro is expected, the question of the Palestinian Autonomy causes no doubt. The agreement signed in Sudan on the North-South conflict. The principle of self-determination is in the ground of all solutions to these conflicts, and in this connection our positions in the negotiations have been strengthening from year to year. Today it is much easier to speak of settlement of the Karabakh conflict in terms of principles, references and drawing parallels. The trends on the Nagorno Karabakh conflict are also favorable, because everybody understands: principle of territorial integrity, being a very important one, is often used for violence and justifying violence over national minorities. From this point of view, I foresee continuation of the talks with more optimism, as examples we have today, undoubtedly, give an opportunity to the Armenian party to work more effectively in this direction.



Armenian Public TV: How would you evaluate effectiveness of activities of OSCE Minsk Group co-Chairs? And second question: how would you comment on statement of Russian president, made during his visit in Baku, that he would invite you to Moscow for consultations on Karabakh problem? The statement was rather sharply reacted in Armenia, where it was evaluated as disrespectful attitude towards you and Armenia, having imperial character, because impression often develops, that Russia does not sometimes recognize, it is not an empire any more and the fact disturbs it. What is your evaluation?



As for co-Chairs, they do the utmost, allowed them by mandate. They should assist conflict parties to find problem’s solution. I sometimes ask myself – how would I act in their place? Frankly speaking, I find it difficulty to answer the question. The co-Chairs have clear circle of powers and they may act within the framework. The co-Chairs have not been showing any contradictions or attempts – let name them to catch initiative from each other – for last 6-7 years. Exactly this is cause of fact that, despite difficulties, there is some success in settlement process for last years. Also, it caused situation in Key-West in 2001, where the parties were rather close to conflict settlement. And there was Rambouillet in 2006, where we also approached the problem settlement.



As for the statement of Russian President, I know reaction in Armenia. Actually, after his returning from Baku to Moscow, he called me by phone and shared his impressions concerning part of his meeting with president of Azerbaijan, devoted especially to Karabakh problem. I did not feel any pressure in the talk, any attempts to impose anything on me, especially anything imperial. It was friendly exchange of views. What happened in Baku? During discussions, the president of Russia received impression, that barrier, which had led to failure in Rambouillet, could be removed. So impressed, he made such statement at a press-conference in Baku – he would call by phone and invite. It was wish of man, who sincerely wanted to solve and to settle the conflict.



It is clear, why there was such reaction in Armenia. May be impression developed, that Aliyev and Putin met in Baku, agreed upon something and decided to impose certain decision on Armenia, unfavorable for Armenian side – one with traitorous nuances. It is not so. Our relations with Russia, my personal relations with the Russian president, exclude such things. I and the Russian president still did not agree on meeting date, but by phone, we went to the heart of the matter of settlement details and decided additionally to connect and to agree on meeting to continue the problem’s discussion. You see what passion can occur in connection with such delicate question. I am sure, Vladimir Putin did not suppose, that his statement would be so reacted in Armenia.



Armenian 2nd TV-Channel: Recently, being interviewed by one of Turkish newspapers, Ilaham Aliyev stated, that nearly main task of Azerbaijan is retardation of talks process, because time works for them and after certain period of time they will be able to solve the question in their favor…



If Azeri side is sure, that time works for it, why does it participate in talks process? There is a variant, they purely imitate it and failure of talks can be explained by the fact. But, another explanation is possible. Any decision means taking of difficult decisions in Azerbaijan, Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh. Situation arose, to which sides seem to have adjusted themselves. There are some problems, but the sides have adjusted themselves. Changing of the situation will create new problems for both internal and foreign policy, it will demand taking of new decisions. And if you are not ready to act on sufficient political volition – of course, the following sentence may be one of best basis: “Time works for us, hence, why should we take decisions, if, later, we can receive more?” I can say the same to base position of “avoidance”. Additionally, they say:" We have oil, we will enrich and after achievement of stronger positions we will be able to force our decision." Budgets of Armenia and Azerbaijan are compared.



I would like to express myself concerning substance of the question. To have oil – does not mean to have effective economy and effective army. In any case, world experiences show that the most successful countries do not possess oil reserves. It is unproductive to connect immediately these two questions. Even, on the contrary, it may be said, that factor of oil often demoralizes economy both in aspect of corruption and of clan system’s establishing. Also, it is obvious, that oil sector diminishes adherence to reforms. We should speak about effective economy, depth of reforms, which can lead to rise of countries competitive capacity in region.



As for moral side of question, I can not imagine, that, for example, Armenian society could consider as a hero a criminal, who beheaded with axe a sleeping person. Such thing is impossible here. I am sure, that society, being in such psychological condition, just can not achieve success. Our biggest advantage and our power consist in the fact.



Artsakh Public TV: Mr. President, let us to suppose, the talks on some questions reach a deadlock and end. What kind of steps may be taken by us in such case?



It will be the worst scenario. But, Armenian side should be ready even for it. I would not like to precise details of such scenario in context of some tactical failures – it was not arrived in Rambouillet, but still there are chances. But if moment will come, when Azerbaijan will really unambiguously declare – “time works for us, we strengthen our army and, later, solve Karabakh question by force” – then, our steps will be the following ones:



First of all, it must be de jure recognition of Nagorno Karabakh Republic by Republic of Armenia. Second step: legal formulation of Armenia’s responsibility for guarantees of NKR people’s security, i.e. signing of number of agreements, which will mean, that encroachment on Nagorno Karabakh is encroachment on Armenia. Third – it is complex strengthening of security zone around Nagorno Karabakh and strengthening of the zone, using absolutely new approaches. I would not like to disclose brackets here. And, of course, more active integration in spheres of defense, development of economy has to begin. Realizing this, we should work on reforms, guarantee economic growth. Armenian people have potential for this.


Permanent news address: www.regnum.ru/english/599743.html
16:13 03/03/2006

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Aimless Antagonism in Armenia

March 10, 2006: There seems to be a pattern here, in the post-Cold War confrontation between Armenia and Azerbaijan. One side or the other cranks up the rhetoric, then there's a border incident or two, then both sides dampen down the flames. On March 7th, troops from Azerbaijan and Armenia fired machine-guns and mortars across the border. One Azerbaijani soldier was killed, and several wounded.



Both countries continue to disagree over possession of Nagorno-Karabakh, a 4,400 square kilometer district, full of Armenians, surrounded by Azerbaijani territory. Technically, there has been a truce between Armenia and Azerbaijan since 1994. But it has been a hot truce. Between 1991 and 1994 there was a war between the two countries over Nagorno-Karabakh, which Armenia won. Some 20,000 people died, and over a million (400,000 Armenians and 700,000 Azerbaijanis) fled their homes as Armenia occupied 31,000 square kilometers of Azerbaijani territory, to connect Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia. Most of the refugees were from areas dominated by one group, who drove out the minority. Some 40,000 Azerbaijani civilians were driven from Nagorno-Karabakh. The situation was humiliating for Azerbaijan, who saw it as yet another example of more powerful and wealthier (via oil fields) Moslems being defeated by a smaller number of armed and more capable Christians. The Armenians have survived, although surrounded by Moslems, for centuries. But the Armenian economy is a disaster, particularly since Turkey and Azerbaijan have closed their borders with Armenia. Since the early 1990s, the best educated Armenians have been immigrating. They join a three million strong community of expatriate Armenians. This group can raise millions of dollars on short notice, and have provided the emergency funds when needed for the fighting against Azerbaijan. Some twelve percent of the 150,000 Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh are armed and organized to defend the mountainous area, and are backed up by even more troops in Armenia. .



But Azerbaijan is making a serious effort to create an effective military. In the early 1990s, better trained, led and organized Armenian troops defeated more numerous, but inferior Azerbaijani. This defeat was largely caused by Azerbaijani corruption and double dealing among themselves. Moreover, the Armenians have a military tradition going back centuries.



Azerbaijan has been debating this sorry situation for over a decade, but there was no popular will for another round of fighting. That is changing, and the government is putting lots more money into the military (from $175 million in 2004, to over $500 million this year.) A new generation of Azerbaijani commanders, trained in the West, not Russia, are in charge. Corruption is still a crippling presence in the Azerbaijani army, but there is more attention to training, and preparing for another round of fighting. This time, the Azerbaijanis are talking about invading Armenia itself.



There's no certainty that the more numerous, wealthier, and now motivated Azerbaijanis would be able to push the Armenians back. Maybe not this decade, maybe not this generation. But it's the attempt you have to watch out for. The Azerbaijanis can afford to buy lots of artillery, warplanes and foreign advisors. Moreover, Azerbaijan is a dictatorship, and there's no better way to distract an unhappy population than a little more war over Nagorno-Karabakh.

http://www.strategypage.com/qnd/pothot/articles/20060310.aspx

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Karabakh: Peace Deal Doubts

The Karabakh Armenians voice their concerns over elements of a peace agreement.

By Ashot Beglarian in Stepanakert (CRS No.330, 9-Mar-06)

Following the recent unsuccessful peace talks on the Nagorny Karabakh dispute in Paris, the Karabakh Armenians are demanding a greater say in the peace process that will decide their future.

Having kept quiet on the eve of the talks, the leadership of the territory is insisting that the Karabakh Armenians must now be allowed to negotiate directly with the government in Baku.

“When Azerbaijan negotiates with Armenia and rejects dialogue with Nagorny Karabakh it is clear that they have one goal - to portray Armenia as an aggressor,” Arkady Gukasian, president of Karabakh told journalists. “I regard that as propaganda. As soon as Azerbaijan begins negotiations with Nagorny Karabakh it will become obvious that Baku is moving away from propaganda.”

Gukasian said that he supported the peace negotiations chaired by the American, French and Russia mediators of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe but they should not be a substitute for “direct talks between the parties of the conflict” – which he says are Nagorny Karabakh and Azerbaijan.

The Karabakh Armenians are currently excluded from the peace talks. Baku refuses to talk directly to them, saying that Armenia has annexed the territory of Azerbaijan and it will only negotiate with the government in Yerevan. The Karabakh Armenians says they are in a direct confrontation with Azerbaijan.

Nagorny Karabakh proclaimed itself an independent state in 1991, but is not recognised by the international community and is linked to the outside world via Armenia.

On this issue, there is a unified position in Karabakh. Parliamentary deputy and former general Vitaly Balasanian said, “It is illogical to keep silent when your own fate is being decided.” Gegam Bagdasarian, a member of the opposition parliamentary faction ARF Dashnaktsutiun-Movement-88, said, “We ought not to have allowed the problem to move onto the Armenia-Azerbaijan plane.”

High hopes were placed on the peace talks in Rambouillet outside Paris last month but they ended without result and with mutual recriminations. The mediators met again in Washington this week and US officials are expected to visit Azerbaijan next week to explore new ideas.

Since the talks failed, top officials in Azerbaijan, including the minister of defence, have said that if the peace process fails Baku reserves the right to go back to war to re-conquer Karabakh.

The Karabakh military leadership said that they were ready to respond to this.

“Naturally we are concerned by the militaristic declarations coming from Baku,” said defence minister Seiran Ohanian. “However in terms of our equipment and modernisation our army is no worse than the Azerbaijani one and as head of the military I declare that we are ready to fight for every inch of our land. In case of necessity, our army is ready to organise defence, to counter-attack and make preventative strikes.”

At Rambouillet the Armenian and Azerbaijani presidents, Robert Kocharian and Ilham Aliev, discussed a peace plan which reportedly involves the phased withdrawal of Armenian forces from seven territories around Nagorny Karabakh, the introduction of peacekeepers and a referendum to be held at a future date on the status of Karabakh.

The issue of status, which has been at the heart of the dispute since it began in 1988, again appears to be the biggest stumbling block.

Karabakh’s foreign minister Giorgy Petrosian told IWPR, “Any status lower than independence is unacceptable for us. The participation of the Karabakh side in negotiations is important and necessary, as there is a series of questions which cannot be decided without Nagorny Karabakh.”

Despite their closeness to Armenia, the Karabakh Armenians are also setting out a distinct position on a series of key issues under discussion in the negotiations.

Rudolf Hairapetian, chairman of the parliamentary commission on state legal issues, told IWPR that holding a referendum was “a waste of time and money” because Karabakh had held one in 1991 and voted to secede from Azerbaijan.

“In the 14 years which have passed since we proclaimed independence, no processes have occurred which suggest that public opinion has changed by a single iota. Any person on our streets can confirm that,” he said.

The Karabakhis also have worries about the prospect of withdrawal of forces from the regions of Kelbajar and Lachin that lie immediately between Nagorny Karabakh and Armenia.

“All our rivers that feed the population of Nagorny Karabakh begin in Kelbajar,” said political analyst David Babayan. “If it is returned to the control of Baku it will be easy to carry out an act of biochemical sabotage to poison the rivers. It is absolutely impossible to return the Lachin region, as it is our means of contact with the outside world.”

They also want to raise the issue of the Shaumian region which they regard as being part of Nagorny Karabakh but all of whose Armenian population was driven out by the Azerbaijani offensive of 1992.

Following the meeting in Rambouillet, several round tables were held in Nagorny Karabakh to discuss the implications of the meeting.

Human rights activist Karen Ohanjanian argued for greater democratisation, saying, “The international community is ready within the framework of international law to recognise self-proclaimed republics if they meet sufficient requirements.”

“We need to bring public opinion to the attention of the negotiators and always remember the price that Nagorny Karabakh paid for victory in the war,” said Galina Arustamian, chairwoman of the Union of Relatives of Dead Warriors.

IWPR asked 20 Karabakh residents for their views on the peace process. All were firmly of the view that Nagorny Karabakh should be given a direct role in the negotiations.

“Diplomats ought to find the correct way to solve the problem by means of organising high-level meetings in Baku and Stepanakert and also between figures from the worlds of art and culture, historians, writers, workers, representatives of all levels of society in Azerbaijan and Nagorny Karabakh,” said Arto Saakian, whose son died in the war of 1991-94.

“It won’t be possible to achieve any positive result at top-level Armenia-Azerbaijan meetings until Azerbaijan sits down at the negotiating table with Nagorny Karabakh.”

Most respondents agreed that Azerbaijani refugees ought to be allowed to return when a political settlement was reached. However, several of those questioned in the town of Shushi (which formerly had a majority Azerbaijani population and is known by Azerbaijanis as Shusha) were categorically against this.

“The return of Azerbaijanis conceals the threat of a resumption of war in a few decades, as sooner or later they will begin to present their claims to the land and ‘stab us in the back’,” said Sanasar, an elderly resident.

On the key issue of the status of Karabakh itself, most of those questioned said they favoured the return of territories from their control to that of Azerbaijan only in exchange for a guarantee of the independence of Nagorny Karabakh.

Ashot Beglarian is a freelance journalist in Stepanakert, Nagorny Karabakh. The terminology used in the edited version of this article differs from that used by the author.

http://www.iwpr.net/?p=crs&s=f&o=260194&apc_state=henh

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Azeri Leaders Will Not Risk To Start War Against Armenia: Armenian Fm

YEREVAN, MARCH 11. ARMINFO. The Azeri leaders will not risk to start
war against Armenia, Armenian FM Vardan Oskanyan says in an interview
to Shant TV channel.

We rule out the possibility of war. They cannot scare us by war or to
change our position. Azerbaijan is not ready for war.

If today Azerbaijan is not ready for or cannot run the risk to solve
the problem by compromise, it will never risk to solve it by war.
Azerbaijan can get much through talks by giving something they know
they have already lost. They have tried war twice, the third time will
be the last. War will take much from Azerbaijan and at heart the Azeri
authorities know that war will be hard for them. Today the Azeri
leaders are not ready for risk. Billions have been invested in that
country and now it cannot risk them. Nobody will allow Azerbaijan to
easily start war against Armenia.

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Viktor Yakubyan: “Karabakh cart” – an obstacle in the Iranian highway

REGNUM » News » Турция » Viktor Yakubyan: “Karabakh…



Right after the presidential talks in Rambouillet, it became clear that no miracle happened in the Karabakh process, things in Armenia were about to fall back into place, but the place turned out to be displaced. In Azerbaijan it also got harder to fall back into. You may call Rambouillet as you are pleased to – fiasco, failure, unexpected off-the-way or logical half-way, but the fact is that the two societies have suddenly realized that they have come to a new stage they need to comprehend.



Dangerous cart



2006 was preceded by resounding statements by western non-governmental and then official organizations about early Karabakh agreement. The talks in France have seen no success, but the time is not over yet. One can be sure that the western “optimists” will not give up that easily and will bend over backwards to get this heavy cart – the Karabakh process — off the ground. But they also know that there is one very important peculiarity about it – once they get the cart moving they will hardly be able to stop it, even more, predict where it will move.



Theoretically, in Rambouillet one should have expected a face-off of Armenian constructivism, “sure” that inapplicable, and Azeri radicalism, affected, that’s why inapplicable.



But for all the schemes and theses proposed, the zero result was obvious and quite correctly forecast by both Armenian and Azeri analysts. Then what were the mediators so optimistic about? There can be only one answer. Namely… Their optimism was for show, but, more importantly, for purpose. Their purpose was obviously not to cheer up the presidents, to put them off their guard and to slip the cherished agreement for their signing. Not at all. It was to create acoustics that would make “a zero” in Rambouillet sound dully dissonant with the whole logic, mood, and, if you please, “the new reassuring freshness” in of the sore negotiating process. They got their purpose… And what did the co-chair states (Russia, France, the US) get net? They got a new reality — something some, if not all, of them sought.



Back to the cart… Quite recently the mediators realized that to get the cart off the ground they will have to remove the ground and as urgently as possible — for they heard something very unpleasant from Russia: about universality of the Kosovo precedent, and had to loosen the hard grip of the Karabakh conflict sides before this might happen and cover the only trump of one of the conflicting sides – the principle of territorial integrity. This principle would simply die then, giving place to a so-far lower quoted card – the right of nations to self-determination — and Azerbaijan would have nothing left but to stop the Karabakh talks and to engage in preventive activities in its other regions. In fact, the task of the West (mostly of the EU) now is either, until the Kosovo status is finalized, to draw an absolutely new line for the Karabakh process to move it outside the conflict of the above principles, or to freeze the Kosovo process until there is clarity in Transdnestr, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Karabakh. (By the way, the sudden death of Milosevic has brought this scenario into focus).



Following the same logic, one can’t help noting that it was exactly the Armenian side – expectedly less cooperative – who came to Rambouillet under the “mask” of readiness for compromise. Such tactics would allow it to blame Baku for the outcome – to say that Azerbaijan has once again refused to meet half-way. On the whole, the Rambouillet talks could develop in two ways: either Ilham Aliyev rejects the proposals of the mediators and the concessions of the Armenian side and continues his militarist populism (a behavior the international community would hardly take as serious) or he agrees to a real dialogue on all key points, leaving no chances for status-quo. The former scenario would allow Kocharyan to complain of Baku’s destructive position and to make off. The latter scenario would see him signing (orally securing) some framework agreement or employing his arsenal of diplomatic tricks to get things right.



Judging from the post-Rambouillet developments, Armenia’s purely tactical constructivism must have come across some illogical maneuver by Azerbaijan. For example, Aliyev might show some real commitment to go from words to actions and, for the beginning, to satisfy the mediator’s proposals on how to overcome the status quo. It was all but just a wish to make some nice surprise. Simply Aliyev had obligations to the West, who was silent when he was breaking the back of his opposition.



Preceding Rambouillet was a rigorous campaign for several key ideas: the deployment of an international peacekeeping contingent in the Karabakh conflict zone, the opening of transport routes, the return of refugees and – a new referendum as a way to determine Nagorno Karabakh’s status. Even if Aliyev agreed to the referendum after all his previous aggressive and radical rhetoric on TV, Kocharyan would rush headfirst to specify details – when, how and on what legal bases the referendum will be held. Or Kocharyan might raise one more hard question – whom the sides want to see in the peacekeeping contingent. And so, Baku’s constructivism might crush against Yerevan’s super-constructivism – quite a risky game: relieving for the sides and tricking for the mediators.



“Post-Rambouillet” — chronology



Back from the talks the Armenian side got down to measures to prevent possible pressure by the US. The US State Secretary’s pre-Rambouillet phone talks with each president were in vain. Something went wrong… In a special interview on Rambouillet Kocharyan said that “the sides failed to agree on one important principle.” What principle he is talking about – the status or the composition of the peacekeeping force – we can only guess. What we can be sure of is that the Armenian president did not mean “Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity.” “In any case, Yerevan has decided not to make further ado and to show its claws – just in case — while Baku has cooled down a bit, preferring to wait and see what will happen next. In fact, after Rambouillet there is no more sense in war bravado – they should either start the war or not even mention it.”



As regards the reaction of Karabakh President Arkady Gukasyan and the following response of Armenian President Robert Kocharyan – this polemic is just to show how elastic the Armenian diplomatic arsenal is. No coincidence that Gukasyan’s interview was broadcast by RFE/RL – it was for export. Gukasyan advises Armenia to withdraw from the talks (which are almost inexistence after Rambouillet) and insists that Karabakh should be involved therein – which is secretly and openly good for Yerevan.



Armenian Ex Foreign Minister Alexander Arzumanyan says that “Gukasyan might have coordinated his statement with Kocharyan and after the failure of the Rambouillet talks this may be a joint threat to Azerbaijan and the world community – a threat to withdraw from the negotiating process.” But, in fact, Gukasyan said what the whole Armenian nation wanted to hear – while Kocharyan’s reaction has raised Armenia’s responsibility to both Karabakh and the OSCE MG co-chairs. In their turn, the Armenian Defense Ministry’s regular reports of state border firing have had a colossal mobilizing effect. As you may see, the Armenian side has taken a whole series of tactical steps to transform the public and negotiating moods.



It would be naïve to think that the US — the key lobbyist of peacekeeping in Karabakh, would be moved by the moves of Yerevan and Stepanakert. Having almost fully brainwashed Azerbaijan, Washington was ready for predictable steps by Armenia and sent right away its leading functionaries to Yerevan. For now — Matthew Bryza (Assistant Undersecretary of State for Europe and Eurasia) and soon — his boss Daniel Fried and OSCE MG US Co-Chair Steven Mann with their situational recognizance. In quite a short time the US Department of State appeared with a row of slating reports that qualified Armenia as a corrupt country whose authorities do not fight drugs trafficking and violate human rights.



Meanwhile, in a Mar 9 meeting in OSCE Yerevan Office the OSCE ambassadors passed an urge to the Armenian authorities not to waste time and to start actively preparing for the parliamentary and presidential elections in 2007 and 2008. “The coming elections will be decisive for Armenia,” that’s what they said. In such a situation, the mediators are meeting in Washington, while the next FM meeting is scheduled for Mar 20 in Istanbul! Why not Baku then? In his turn, OSCE MG US CO-Chair Steven Mann says to AzerTag that if the sides fail to agree in 2006 it will be a tragedy. If the sides miss the chance there will be a tragedy, Mann said, not specifying though what kind of tragedy there will be.



Conclusion



The Americans are systematically preparing the South Caucasus for possible excesses in Iran. No doubt they are – judging from their military activity in the region. The Karabakh conflict the way it is now is an impassable jam. The region has in fact been turned into a very inconvenient ground – in both military-tactical and communicational terms. One can say when the US will launch its massive pressure on Iran if one looks at its tactics in the Karabakh peace process. If Washington is forcing the sides to solve the problem in 2006, it will probably close the circle around Iran no later than 2007-2008. Washington needs to take the Karabakh cart off the Iranian highway. Bush simply can’t linger with Iran any longer – he is facing presidential election in 2008. Already today over half of Americans want Bush to resign, blaming him for starting war in Iraq and allowing phone tapping, which is also a part of the “Big Near East” adventure.



Viktor Yakubyan – expert for South Caucasus problems


Permanent news address: www.regnum.ru/english/604756.html
12:52 03/14/2006

[Gavur]

Armenia Never To Give Away Karabakh, Minister Says

Arminfo
13 Mar 06

Yerevan, 13 March: Neither under the threat of war nor if war is
rejected, will Armenia give away territory. Official Yerevan is
ready to discuss the issues of territories and the safety of refugees
only and only when Azerbaijan recognizes the right of the people of
Karabakh to self-determination. Armenian Foreign Minister Vardan
Oskanyan said this in his replies to questions from the on-line
version of the newspaper Azg.

"Karabakh is Armenian land. Only Armenians have lived on that land
for thousands of years and they preserved their sovereignty. There are
no doubts here: this territory has never been part of Azerbaijan and
it will not be. Armenians have no territorial claims outside their
rights. Karabakh has not been part of Azerbaijan and cannot be.

Karabakh has been Armenian and will remain Armenian, especially as
Azerbaijan has no moral right to have any claims on Karabakh because
it lost it in the 1990s when it tried several times to put pressure
on the people of Karabakh militarily and even to subject them to
ethnic cleansing. If it had not been for resistance by Armenians,
there would be no Karabakh today," Oskanyan recalled.

Speaking about compensations to Azerbaijani refugees from Armenia,
Oskanyan stressed that Armenia is ready to discuss this issue within
the framework of allocation of compensations by the Azerbaijani
government to 350,000-400,000 Armenian refugees from Azerbaijan.

[Gavur]

Karabakh War Participants: Yerevan Should Quit Talks With Baku

PanARMENIAN.Net
13.03.2006 23:40 GMT+04:00

/PanARMENIAN.Net/ Any Armenian-Azeri dialogue is possible only if
official Baku stops anti-Armenian hysteria, recognizes Artsakh belongs
to Armenians, Artsakh war participants say. Armenian authorities should
quit the Armenian-Azeri talks over the Nagorno Karabakh settlement,
says an open letter of a group of participants of the Artsakh war. The
message authors are convinced that participation of Artsakh (Nagorno
Karabakh) in the talks is not acceptable either. "We do not trust
these talks and those, who negotiate on behalf of Armenians. Any
Armenian-Azeri dialogue is possible only if official Baku stops
anti-Armenian hysteria, recognizes Artsakh belongs to Armenians, as
well as recognizes its responsibility for violent deportation of Azeri
Armenians and unleashing a war against the autonomy," the statement
says. The document notes that there is no actual settlement of the
Karabakh issue, as during the talks it was not possible to form any
compromise, all OSCE MG proposals contained unilateral concessions
and violated the rights of the Armenian people of Artsakh for living
in their homeland.

[Gavur]

Us Top Diplomat Sees Karabakh War Resumption As Catastrophe For Region

ANS TV, Baku
14 Mar 06

US Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs
Daniel Fried has said that a war between Armenia and Azerbaijan
over Nagornyy Karabakh will be a catastrophe for the region and the
peoples there.

In a news conference in Baku on 14 March, Fried said that "the
Azerbaijani government is ready to find a constructive way out of
the situation. We will discuss this in Yerevan".

Private TV station ANS quoted the visiting US co-chair of the OSCE
Minsk Group, Steven Mann, as saying that the war would not be decisive
now or in 20 years.

"The sides who want war should first ask what would Azerbaijan's
strategic borders be if war starts? What will be the situation in the
energy sphere and the investment flow? I know the Azerbaijani people
very well and don't believe that the Azerbaijani people would want
war again," Mann said.

The TV quoted the Karabakh Liberation Organization (KLO)as saying that
different opinion polls show that over 60 per cent of the population
want war for the resolution of the Karabakh conflict.

"Although they are trying to prepare the Azerbaijani people for a
capitulation, they will fail to achieve this," ANS TV quoted the KLO
as saying.

In remarks to the TV, the head of the Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry
information department, Tahir Tagizada, said that "Azerbaijan's
position is resolute. If talks fail, war will be inevitable".