The Globe and Mail, Canada
July 29 2005
Turks and Armenians: Is reconciliation possible?
By OZAY MEHMET
Special to Globe and Mail Update
On Oct. 3, Turkey will start accession talks for European Union
membership. These talks will be long and hard because Ankara will
have to settle, in addition to far-reaching economic, social and
political reforms, some difficult questions relating to Cyprus, Kurds
and the Aegean, as well as Armenian claims of genocide in 1915.
Of all the issues facing Ankara, the most sensitive is the Armenian
one. Until recently, the Turkish government has taken a narrow
perspective, saying this matter should be left to historians to
settle. This is no longer adequate. Realizing this, Ankara is now
taking cautious steps that may well bring about Turkish-Armenian
reconciliation. Ankara should be encouraged in this direction.
The new element is that Ankara wants to normalize its relations with
Armenia. It has already opened an air corridor between Istanbul and
Yerevan, and appears willing to open a border gate for movement of
goods and people.
But, in return, Ankara has a number of demands of Yerevan. It wishes
to see: (1) progress in talks with Azerbaijan over the thorny issue
of Nagorno-Karabakh, an Azeri territory now under Armenian
occupation; (2) Armenia's endorsement of a joint historical
commission to settle the dispute over 1915; (3) suspension of
"genocide" claims pending the work of the proposed joint commission;
and (4) recognition of current borders and renouncement of implied
territorial claims by Armenia.
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The Europeans have given initial support to Turkish Prime Minister
Recep Tayyip Erdogan's proposal for a joint historical commission,
but the future of Turkish-Armenian relations is indexed to the issue
of "genocide" claims. This is an exceedingly sensitive matter
precisely because it is interwoven with national pride and
self-identity on both sides.
Modern Turkish identity, as much as the Armenian one, is the product
of the same historical circumstances. It is a case of competing
nationalism: the Turkish nation, led by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk,
capping the successful war of independence (1919-23) with the peace
treaty at Lausanne that replaced the stillborn Sèvres Treaty that
promised a Greater Armenia in eastern Turkey (an area heavily
Kurdish, by the way).
By contrast, the Armenian nation ended up as a tiny country outside
Turkish borders, and became a victim of the 1917 Bolshevik
Revolution. Landlocked, next door to Georgia and Azerbaijan, Armenia
was, until 1991, a country under Soviet occupation. It needs Turkish
co-operation to open to the rest of the world. It has one of the
poorest, stagnant economies in the Caucasus, shut out of the pipeline
from the Azeri capital of Baku to the Turkish port of Ceyhan as a
result of its adversarial relations with Ankara and Baku.
Where does the future of Turkish-Armenian relations lie? The
initiative remains primarily in Ankara's hands. It is the dominant
regional power and, as it inches toward full EU membership (expected
around 2015), it must normalize ties with all of its neighbours. The
main obstacle is division in Turkey itself. Nationalist extremism is
not only on the side of Armenians or in Turkey's other neighbours.
There are, sadly, extremists within Turkey as well, some carrying
influence in high places. Anti-Turkish camps in the EU only serve to
strengthen these extremist forces.
Just weeks ago in Istanbul, there was the case of a cancelled
alternative conference of academics to discuss the history of Ottoman
Armenians. The justice minister, a member of the nationalist faction
of the ruling Justice and Development Party and evidently out of step
with Mr. Erdogan's open-door policy, harshly criticized this academic
event, obliging the hosting university to drop it. By his action, the
minister weakened his government's Armenia policy and provided
ammunition for Turkey's opponents in Europe and beyond.
This regressive step conflicts with the ideal of Turkey as a full
democracy, one that respects freedom of speech. Showing intolerance
for alternative views, whether by academics on the Armenian question
or by novelists such as Orhan Pamuk on controversial topics, is
incompatible with the democratic freedoms and rule of law that
Turkey, as a future EU member, must embrace.
As far as the Armenian "genocide" claims go, Turkey must stay the
course outlined by Mr. Erdogan to face history and promote
reconciliation. Buried in the tragic history of 1915, there is too
much suffering for Turks and Armenians alike. The way to
reconciliation is for both sides to acknowledge that too many lives
were lost in this war period and that the memory of the dead, whether
Turk or Armenian, deserves respect. The time for mutual mourning has
come.
Ozay Mehmet is professor emeritus of international affairs at
Carleton University in Ottawa.
July 29 2005
Turks and Armenians: Is reconciliation possible?
By OZAY MEHMET
Special to Globe and Mail Update
On Oct. 3, Turkey will start accession talks for European Union
membership. These talks will be long and hard because Ankara will
have to settle, in addition to far-reaching economic, social and
political reforms, some difficult questions relating to Cyprus, Kurds
and the Aegean, as well as Armenian claims of genocide in 1915.
Of all the issues facing Ankara, the most sensitive is the Armenian
one. Until recently, the Turkish government has taken a narrow
perspective, saying this matter should be left to historians to
settle. This is no longer adequate. Realizing this, Ankara is now
taking cautious steps that may well bring about Turkish-Armenian
reconciliation. Ankara should be encouraged in this direction.
The new element is that Ankara wants to normalize its relations with
Armenia. It has already opened an air corridor between Istanbul and
Yerevan, and appears willing to open a border gate for movement of
goods and people.
But, in return, Ankara has a number of demands of Yerevan. It wishes
to see: (1) progress in talks with Azerbaijan over the thorny issue
of Nagorno-Karabakh, an Azeri territory now under Armenian
occupation; (2) Armenia's endorsement of a joint historical
commission to settle the dispute over 1915; (3) suspension of
"genocide" claims pending the work of the proposed joint commission;
and (4) recognition of current borders and renouncement of implied
territorial claims by Armenia.
Advertisements
The Europeans have given initial support to Turkish Prime Minister
Recep Tayyip Erdogan's proposal for a joint historical commission,
but the future of Turkish-Armenian relations is indexed to the issue
of "genocide" claims. This is an exceedingly sensitive matter
precisely because it is interwoven with national pride and
self-identity on both sides.
Modern Turkish identity, as much as the Armenian one, is the product
of the same historical circumstances. It is a case of competing
nationalism: the Turkish nation, led by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk,
capping the successful war of independence (1919-23) with the peace
treaty at Lausanne that replaced the stillborn Sèvres Treaty that
promised a Greater Armenia in eastern Turkey (an area heavily
Kurdish, by the way).
By contrast, the Armenian nation ended up as a tiny country outside
Turkish borders, and became a victim of the 1917 Bolshevik
Revolution. Landlocked, next door to Georgia and Azerbaijan, Armenia
was, until 1991, a country under Soviet occupation. It needs Turkish
co-operation to open to the rest of the world. It has one of the
poorest, stagnant economies in the Caucasus, shut out of the pipeline
from the Azeri capital of Baku to the Turkish port of Ceyhan as a
result of its adversarial relations with Ankara and Baku.
Where does the future of Turkish-Armenian relations lie? The
initiative remains primarily in Ankara's hands. It is the dominant
regional power and, as it inches toward full EU membership (expected
around 2015), it must normalize ties with all of its neighbours. The
main obstacle is division in Turkey itself. Nationalist extremism is
not only on the side of Armenians or in Turkey's other neighbours.
There are, sadly, extremists within Turkey as well, some carrying
influence in high places. Anti-Turkish camps in the EU only serve to
strengthen these extremist forces.
Just weeks ago in Istanbul, there was the case of a cancelled
alternative conference of academics to discuss the history of Ottoman
Armenians. The justice minister, a member of the nationalist faction
of the ruling Justice and Development Party and evidently out of step
with Mr. Erdogan's open-door policy, harshly criticized this academic
event, obliging the hosting university to drop it. By his action, the
minister weakened his government's Armenia policy and provided
ammunition for Turkey's opponents in Europe and beyond.
This regressive step conflicts with the ideal of Turkey as a full
democracy, one that respects freedom of speech. Showing intolerance
for alternative views, whether by academics on the Armenian question
or by novelists such as Orhan Pamuk on controversial topics, is
incompatible with the democratic freedoms and rule of law that
Turkey, as a future EU member, must embrace.
As far as the Armenian "genocide" claims go, Turkey must stay the
course outlined by Mr. Erdogan to face history and promote
reconciliation. Buried in the tragic history of 1915, there is too
much suffering for Turks and Armenians alike. The way to
reconciliation is for both sides to acknowledge that too many lives
were lost in this war period and that the memory of the dead, whether
Turk or Armenian, deserves respect. The time for mutual mourning has
come.
Ozay Mehmet is professor emeritus of international affairs at
Carleton University in Ottawa.
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