Why Turkey is not in US plans

[Hovik]

Why Turkey is not in US plans
By Burak Bekdil

Kathimerini English Edition
Tuesday August 16, 2005

Ankara has little relevance within emerging energy map of world and
Washington's intentions to shape it

For over half a century the USA has deemed Turkey a staunch ally. The
end of the Cold War sealed the beginning of the end of the once-solid
alliance.

Since the start of the Iraq war, there has been every indication of
mutual mistrust, as well as a visible decay in bilateral ties.

It's perhaps too simplistic to blame the corrosion on Turkey's refusal
to allow US troops to use Turkish soil as a launch pad for an attack
against Iraq. There are broader, more realistic (and less sentimental)
reasons why Turkey does not appear in American plans for the future.

The USA today cannot get any reading on the position of Prime Minister
Recep Tayyip Erdogan's "unreadable" governance. They think the Turks
are keeping their cards "close to their chest." Then again, to the
Turks the United States appears to be an object of hysterical fear and
hatred when viewed from the other side of the Atlantic. The new fight,
disguised as efforts to promote democracy in non-democratic states,
will be for energy.

Although the USA would welcome it if Turkey decided to participate
in Washington's new war on terror at any level they wish, it is hard
to imagine, today, that the Americans want anything but amicable and
business-like relations with Turkey, and at a minimum.

According to well-informed US sources, Turkey has not exerted any
influence in Central Asia on behalf of the effort to support US
anti-terrorism operations and promote democratic reform. Turkey is
sympathetic to the Shanghai Group, which the US thinks solely exists
to advance Chinese and Russian interests against the allied efforts
to stabilize Central Asia.

There is much evidence that this seemingly new conceptual framework
for dealing with the Islamic fundamentalist movement will represent a
large change in how the US will do business around the world. There are
a number of important trends that must be combined into any foreign
policy strategy, and the new Pentagon formulation indicates a "sea
change" in US operations and incorporates these various trends.

The steady rise in energy prices is a trend that will probably continue
until most nations are flat on their backs. Oil should be at $70/bbl
by this winter. In 2006, one may look for prices in the $90 range,
and a deep worldwide depression should set in by 2008. The United
States is quite aware of this trend. Already, drastic conditions are
developing in numerous countries. Indonesia has a shortfall of 20
percent in oil usage which the US thinks is a disaster. The US is
having troubles on its southern border too.

Mounting pressure Mexico is a major source of oil for the US market
and has announced that its largest oil field, El Cantarell, has
reached its peak of production. That field accounts for 62 percent of
Mexican production and is now depleting at a rate of 14 percent per
year. Conservatively, the US absorbs approximately 3 million Mexican
refugees, and the pressure will probably increase.

The stability of China and its international intentions is a major
US preoccupation. Africa is collapsing, and the US intends to protect
the West African oil fields.

Europe, according to US sources, is disarming itself and is of little
to no use beyond its own borders. The US is currently withdrawing
the bulk of its armed forces back to US territory (two divisions are
returning from Germany, leaving only one brigade; three brigades are
returning from South Korea, and probably about 70-90,000 personnel
will withdraw from the Middle East by the end of 2006).

The era of the stabilizing influence of large numbers of US forces
stationed around the world is probably over. The USA is retrenching
and providing its main support to what it deems "reliable/democratic"
allies. And that would be Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Japan,
India and Israel. Otherwise, it is trying to reach out to nations
that wish to assist in anti-terrorist and stabilization efforts on
their own behalf. Turkey does not appear to be in either group.

Also, the US thinks certain places must be protected one way or another
without fail. These are the critical geopolitical pressure points:
that would be Egypt, the Malacca Strait, Panama, the Horn of Africa,
South Africa, US territorial waters and approaches.

Access to Middle Eastern oil is extremely important, but not as
important as one might expect. If it comes to priorities, says one
US expert, and it soon will, West Africa, Mexico, the North Sea,
Trinidad, Canada, Australia, and Japan are more important than what
the United States is doing in the Middle East today.

"Now," the expert says, "if we had reliable allies in Europe and
Turkey, things would look differently. That is not the case. So,
at some point, the problem will belong to Europe and Turkey without
major US participation. If you want oil and stability, you go get it."

He continues, "Frankly, with oil at $90-150 a barrel and even more,
Kurdish Iraq, Armenia, Kazakhstan, and the Azeris may be more important
than Turkey.

In a world of extremely high-priced oil and diminishing supplies,
who knows, even Turkey might find that its eastern provinces are a
bigger liability than they are worth."

All that should ring alarm bells in Ankara. It may, soon. But there
is little Turkey can do in an emerging energy map of the world and
US intentions to shape it - especially at a time when the Americans
think Turkey has been cast adrift by US policy.

[Gavur]

US-Israeli pact may hurt Turkish defense procurement

Israel's move to agree to consult with the United States before attempting to sell weapons technology to other nations may complicate Turkish-Israeli deals, analysts say.

WASHINGTON/ANKARA – Exclusive by TDN Defense Desk


A recent defense accord under which Israel pledges to consult with the United States in advance on arms exports to third countries may diminish the Jewish state's role as an attractive defense equipment supplier for Turkey and complicate future deals, analysts say.

The document, signed Aug. 16 by U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld in Washington and Israeli Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz in Israel, aims to remove spats between the two close allies over Israel's arms sales -- mainly to China, which is seen as the United States' future strategic rival. Under the deal, Israel has agreed to inform the United States of all its future arms export plans and to “take Washington's position into account.”

Turkish officials so far have declined to comment on the U.S.-Israeli pact, but some analysts pointed to a number of drawbacks for future Turkish deals with Israeli companies.

“Although the agreement's apparent target is China, it's not very good news for Turkish procurement from Israel, either,” said one defense analyst. “Since the mid-1990s, when the two countries began to develop their strategic partnership, Turkey has seen Israel as a good alternative to Western suppliers in terms of defense equipment acquisition. The Turks thought that if you negotiate a deal well and pay the price, you could buy almost anything from Israel, unlike the case with the United States.”

In the past 10 years, Ankara has encountered difficulties with Washington over export licenses and technology transfers on several defense deals, and at times the United States has refused to sell some critical equipment.

“With the business-minded Israelis, the Turks knew that they would confront no such problems, politics was not a matter of dispute. And Turkey believed that it could buy from Israel a number of items that it wouldn't be able to acquire from the United States,” the analyst said. “But now with the signing of the U.S.-Israeli accord, any major Turkish defense deal with Israel must win Washington's direct, or at least indirect, approval. Also, the secrecy is gone.”

One example is Israel's radar-finding Harpy drones, any equivalent of which the United States would be unwilling to deliver to Turkey.

Turkey and Israel so far have been involved in arms sales and modernization programs worth billions of dollars, including Israeli upgrade of Turkish F-4 and F-5 fighters and M1A1 main battle tanks, purchase of Popeye air-to-surface precision missiles and joint production of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) systems.

“Another problem concerns competition between U.S. and Israeli companies in Turkish defense programs. In the past, for example, when U.S. firms lost Turkish deals to their Israeli counterparts, they complained about unfair competition,” the analyst said. “After the signing of the U.S.-Israeli document, it's not clear what will happen in cases where U.S. and Israeli interests are in conflict.”

One recent example is Turkey's April decision to buy three UAV systems worth $183 million from an Israeli group of Israeli Aircraft Industries (IAI) and Elbit Systems, which was competing against the United States' General Atomics. Possible follow-up agreements may raise the contract's value considerably.

The Turkish move angered General Atomics, which said it had found it impossible to comply with the “extremely unrealistic terms and conditions demanded by the Turkish government as a condition for accepting a contract to provide (General Atomics') Predator aircraft to meet the requirements.”

The Turkish contract had called for the payload to be made by a local firm. General Atomics refused to accept technical and financial responsibilities for a critical part a local company would develop, but the Israeli team agreed to the condition.

Also, when Turkey three years ago offered a $670 million contract to Israel Military Industries (IMI) to upgrade 170 Turkish M1A1 tanks, the U.S. government and General Dynamics -- the Israeli company's U.S. rival -- were furious because the platforms had been manufactured by General Dynamics and donated by Washington to Ankara in the early 1990s.

“The U.S.-Israeli agreement may diminish the significance of Israeli deals for Turkey, but the problem is that Turkey doesn't have another option to replace Israel's role,” the defense analyst said.

The U.S.-Israeli pact came after the Pentagon complained about several potential Israeli sales to China, including an Israeli plan to service spare parts for unmanned Harpy aircraft. The Pentagon regards the Chinese military as a potential long-term adversary and opposes Western countries providing China with military upgrades. The Harpy deal eventually failed.

In retaliation, the U.S. Defense Department restricted Israel's access to the Joint Strike Fighter (F-35) program, which aims to create a new multirole jet fighter designed to replace the F-16 for the United States, Israel, Turkey and several European fighter inventories. Turkey is a member of the U.S.-led program's system development and demonstration phase and plans to buy the next generation fighter. Under the new agreement Israel also agreed to exercise greater control over arms exports by restructuring its internal processes for approving them. Several ministries will now work with the Israeli Defense Ministry before those exports are approved, Pentagon spokesman Bryan Whitman said.

Whitman said the agreement would begin to restore U.S. confidence in Israel's ability to protect sensitive technologies; however, Israel will not immediately be reinstated to the F-35 program.

In a statement the Pentagon and Israeli Defense Ministry said the agreement was “designed to remedy problems of the past that seriously affected the technology security relationship between our defense establishments and which begins to restore confidence in the technology security area.”

Whitman said the United States would not have veto power over any possible arms sales, but U.S. officials would be informed and have a chance to express their opinion. But analysts said that despite the Pentagon spokesman's remarks, the consultation mechanism apparently would give major leverage for Washington.

The understanding “ends the dispute” and “fully restores the confidence of the United States,” Israeli Ambassador to the United States Daniel Ayalon said. He said the understanding did not encompass details of any proposed deal. “It deals with principles,” Ayalon said. “And the major principle is mutual consultation.”

News reports said Israeli officials fear the agreement is likely to have a negative impact on the country's defense industry because of additional red tape, new problems with third countries in the negotiation process and the loss of secrecy.

Last year Israeli companies exported $3.5 billion in weapons. The largest exporters are Israeli Aircraft Industries, Rafael Armament Development Authority, Israel Military Industries and Elbit Systems. China, Turkey and India are among the Israeli defense industry's largest customers.

U.S. concern over sales to China has been longstanding. In 2000, even in the absence of the latest consultation pact, the Pentagon effectively vetoed a multi-billion-dollar sale by Israel of Phalcon airborne reconnaissance systems to China.

[Gavur]

U.s. Role As Top Turkish Arms Supplier Jeopardized By Diplomatic, Technical Issues

Selcan Hacaoglu

AP Worldstream
Jun 21, 2006

For the first time ever, there are no U.S. bidders for a major Turkish
arms contract, signaling serious snags in one of the world's closest
military-commercial partnerships.

For more than 50 years, the United States and U.S. firms have been
the main arms suppliers to Turkey, a lynchpin of NATO's southern
flank during the Cold War. Turkey, in a rough neighborhood that
includes Iran, Iraq, Syria as well as traditional rival Greece,
has also been eager to snatch up weapons to supply its large army,
which is also dealing with a domestic Kurdish insurgency.

At the heart of the problems today are both diplomatic and technical
issues rooted in Turkey's ambition to gain control over its military
technology.

Turkey is going through a low point in defense relations with
Washington following its refusal to host U.S. troops for the invasion
of Iraq in 2003. It has actively sought out other potential arms
suppliers, making Turkey's business less attractive for U.S. companies.

If they last, the frictions threaten to make U.S arms companies
reluctant to support Turkish lobbying efforts in Washington, analysts
and defense sources say.

Next week, firms from South Africa, Russia, France and Italy are
competing for a US$2 billion (A1.6 billion) tender to deliver attack
helicopters to Turkey. U.S. makers Bell Helicopter Textron, Boeing
Co. and Sikorsky Aircraft Corp. did not even offer proposals after
evaluating tough tender conditions.

The new bidding rules included full access to the aircraft's specific
software codes _ which the United States considers a security risk _
and a written guarantee from the provider's government that there
will be no political obstacles to the export of the arms. However,
the U.S. government can only seek the consent of Congress for a deal
after the sale is finalized.

It was not clear whether Turks would be satisfied with an initial
letter from the government assuring them there would be no political
problems.

"As far as Boeing is concerned, some of the conditions in the tender
are such that we simply could not agree to (them), and that we felt
would make the program from a Boeing perspective very difficult,"
Greg Pepin, Vice President of Boeing Turkey said in an interview.

Pepin explained that sharing the software was problematic because it
was partly owned by other U.S. suppliers as well as the U.S. government
_ and the other owners would likely balk at sharing the technology
even if Boeing were willing.

"We can't guarantee that the U.S. government will transfer that
technology, we can talk about the technology that we own but we can't
agree to and sign up to assuring that these other owners of technology
would do the same," Pepin said. "That was an issue we had, we simply
cannot guarantee that."

Turkey imposed new bidding rules last year, after it canceled a
previous tender in 2004 when a deal with Bell Helicopter Textron's
"King Cobra," a Turkish version of the AH-1Z Super Cobra used by U.S.





Marines, collapsed over price, technology transfer and licensing
problems.

The new rules empower Turkey to substitute alternative, probably
locally manufactured components such as weapon systems, the mission
computer, avionics and electronic warfare suites, and require the
supplier to integrate other systems or equipment built by Turkish
companies.

"The collapse of one deal is not itself a major crisis, but if Turkey
persists in seeking carte blanche from American suppliers to substitute
its own technology for theirs and asks for impossible terms, U.S. arms
suppliers will not, indeed cannot, bid for Turkey's business, and they
will likely cease their lobbying efforts on Turkey's behalf with both
the White House and Congress," said Ian M.

Cuthbertson, an arms sales expert at World Policy Institute. "U.S.

industry will lose business and Turkey would lose powerful allies
in Washington."

U.S. arms companies have been lobbying for Turkey against Armenians _
who are pressing for recognition of killings of Armenians in the early
20th century as a genocide _ and Kurds _ who complain about Turkey's
alleged human rights violations.

Turkey's concerns over technological control of its weaponry increased
after it faced arms blockades from several countries because of
human rights problems in its fight against autonomy-seeking Kurdish
guerrillas, while Washington demanded Turkish progress on human rights
as a condition for arms sales.

Many Turkish defense authorities also bitterly remember a U.S. arms
embargo following Turkey's invasion of Cyprus in 1974, when Libya
provided Turkey with bombs and spare parts to operate its U.S.-made
jets.

Today, Turkey is keen on having a sovereign helicopter to freely use,
mainly against Kurdish guerrillas in the rugged southeast, without
taking on the risk of outside interference in the aircraft's mission
computer or of political obstacles from Washington to its use.

Turkey's Defense Executive Committee might opt in its next meeting on
June 27 to choose one of the current bidders from France, Italy, Russia
and South Africa _ which lifted an arms embargo against Turkey in
2005 _ to end a decade-long search for Turkey's next attack helicopter.

The options are Tiger of the Franco-German company, Eurocopter,
Mangusta of Italy's Agusta Aerospace, Kamov of Russia and South
African company Denel's Rooivalk.

"If Turkey wants to have a sovereign helicopter, this is the
opportunity," said an official of Likom Defense, the representative
of Denel in Turkey, speaking on condition of anonymity because he
was not authorized to speak to the media.

[Joseph]

EU Negotiations not going well

(Bloomberg)-- The European Union's top expansion negotiator said Tuesday
Turkey
is heading for a "major accident" in its membership bid unless it opens its
ports to ships from Cyprus.
"If we want to avoid a major problem in the autumn, Turkey needs to stick to
its word without hesitation," Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn told the
European Parliament's foreign affairs committee in Brussels. "Turkey should
open its ports to vessels under the flag of all member states, including the
Republic of Cyprus."
The talks hit a snag last week only four days after getting under way when
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan balked at an EU demand that Turkey end its
trade curbs on Cyprus, an EU member since 2004.
Turkey's bid to become the EU's first Muslim country is running into
grassroots opposition as well, amid a backlash against lower-paid immigrants
after the EU's expansion to ex-communist Eastern Europe in 2004.
"I am concerned that the reform process has lost its momentum," Rehn told the
parliamentary panel today. "While there has been legislative progress on the
ground, the implementation of the reforms remains uneven."
Turkey has occupied the northern tier of Cyprus since a 1974 invasion in
response to a Greek-backed coup, and the Mediterranean island's disputed
status
has been the biggest barrier to the EU bid.
Turkey pledged to end trade restrictions on the southern, Greek Cypriot
Government as part of the EU entry process. Erdogan said last week that Turkey
wouldn't honor that promise until the EU drops its own curbs on northern
Cyprus.
"When those who broke their word start to keep it, they'll get an immediate
response from us," Erdogan told lawmakers from his party in Ankara. "But if
promises aren't kept then nobody should expect our ports or airports."
Turkish officials point out that Cyprus remains divided because the Greek
Cypriots voted against a United Nations-backed reunification plan that was
supported by Turkish Cypriots and by Erdogan's Government.
Turkey has per-capita economic production equal to 31 percent of the EU
level,
triggering fears that Turkish migrants could price western workers out of
jobs.
EU unemployment is 8.3 percent, compared to 4.7 percent in the US.
Some 63 percent of Europeans fear that further expansion would push up
unemployment and drive down wages, according to an EU-sponsored poll of 25,000
people conducted between February and March.
Referring to the public discontent, European Commission President Jose
Barroso
told the full Parliament earlier today that "we must make sure that the union
does not simply enlarge by default."
EU pressure is also mounting on Turkey to end the discrimination of the
Kurdish minority, give non-Muslims complete religious freedom, improve media
freedoms, crack down on police brutality, and enhance the status of women.
A resolution debated by the Parliament committee Tuesday "regrets the slowing
down of the reform process" and "deplores the fact that only limited progress
has been reported over the least year as regards fundamental rights and
freedoms."
Turkish legislators Monday delayed until late July debate on a law that would
give non-governmental organizations more rights and freedoms, part of the EU's
catalogue of demands. The government had sought passage of the law by the end
of June.
A progress report to be issued by Rehn's department in October or November
looms as a key test of Turkey's commitment to reshaping its society along
western lines and of the EU's commitment to let Turkey in.

[Gavur]

Turkey Shortlists Denel, AgustaWestland for $2B Helicopter Contest

Posted 06/30/06

By BURAK EGE BEKDIL, ANKARA


The South African and Italian contenders have advanced in the contest to build 50 attack helicopters for Turkey, a contract worth more than $2 billion, Turkish Defense Minister Vecdi Gonul said.
The Ankara government will continue talks with Denel Aviation, Pretoria, maker of the CSH-2 Rooivalk, and AgustaWestland, Cascina Costa, Italy, maker of the Mangusta A129 International, for its attack helicopter program.
“We will hold simultaneous talks with both companies,” Gonul told reporters after a meeting of the country’s Defense Industry Executive Committee, which oversees top procurement decisions. “Our assessment will continue on the basis of both the price and technical capabilities.”
Members of the committee, chaired by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, are Gonul, General Staff chief Gen. Hilmi Ozkok and Murad Bayar, Turkey’s chief procurement official.
The Turkish decision means that EADS subsidiary Eurocopter, maker of the Tiger, and Russia’s Kamov, maker of the Ka-50/2 Black Shark, have been disqualified from the competition.




AgustaWestland’s A129 Mangusta, the first attack helicopter wholly produced in Europe, was designed in 1978 for the Italian Army, which remains its sole user. Its A129 export version, developed later, so far has not scored any export success. In the anti-armor role, the A129 can carry either Hellfire or TOW missiles, or a mixture of both. For the anti-aircraft role, it can be armed with Stinger or Mistral missiles.



Developed in the 1990s, Denel Aviation’s AH-2 Rooivalk is used by the South African Air Force and so far has not been exported. It can carry Mokopa long-range anti-armor missiles and Mistral air-to-air missiles.
Turkey’s plan to buy scores of attack helicopters dates back to the mid-1990s, but efforts so far have come to nothing. Turkey’s new attack helicopter program for up to 50 platforms was launched after a similar project failed last year.
In that now-defunct program, Turkey in 2000 selected Bell to co-produce 50 AH-1Z King Cobras. But after four years of talks failed because of disputes on price, technology transfer and licensing problems, Ankara in May 2004 canceled the whole process, opting to launch a new international tender.

[imported_RUDO]

'US Military is Building New Base in Silopi'

'US Military is Building New Base in Silopi'
By Cihan News Agency
Published: Saturday, July 01, 2006


The London-based 'El Kudus El Arabi' Arabic-language paper has claimed that the United States is building a new military base in the Silopi district of the southeastern Turkish province of Sirnak.

According to 'El Kudus El Arabi', the construction of the military base which was begun last April, is expected to be completed within a year.

Citing Iraqi Kurdish sources, the London-based paper states that the base is being built between Silopi and the Habur border crossing with Iraq.

The paper's report adds that the new U.S. military base near Silopi is to include an airport, a hospital and various amenities for the social activities of American soldiers.

[imported_RUDO]

Ohhhh.Nothing can jeopardise our friendship with U.S.

Because U.S is our big brother.

And we(Turkey)will be ''Small America'' in a short time.

By the way we have sold our country(Anatolia)to U.S.

So U.S must be our ally.

We are all America's puppets.