Financial Times, UK
Oct 1 2005
Talking Turkey
Published: October 1 2005 03:00 | Last updated: October 1 2005 03:00
It is no surprise that the European Union's plan to start membership
talks with Turkey on Monday should be a cliff-hanger right to the
end. The desultory courtship between Brussels and Ankara, over nearly
40 years, reflects the controversy surrounding Turkey's candidacy.
For, if or when Turkey takes its seat in Brussels in a decade or
more, it would be the Union's poorest and most populous member, with
the biggest vote in the Council of Ministers. To complicate matters
further, the onus on Turkey to prove its European values will be
heavier than it was for previous accession candidates within the
conventional boundaries of Europe
The cliff-hanger arises from Austria's insistence that, in the
negotiating mandate that EU governments must agree for accession
talks to open, Turkey should be offered an explicit "partnership"
alternative to full membership. All 24 other EU states, and the Turks
themselves, are content for the mandate to contain only a vaguely
worded fall-back to create the "strongest possible bond" between
Ankara and the EU if in the end full membership talks fail. Britain,
desperate to chalk up the first achievement of its half-year EU
presidency by launching Turkish accession talks, has called a special
foreign ministers meeting tomorrow night to press Austria to back
down.
Austria's behaviour is part tactical; it is holding out for parallel
accession talks with its neighbour, Croatia. But it is also visceral
for some Austrians who see themselves saving Europe from the Turks,
as at the gates of Vienna in 1683, and certainly share an allergy to
further enlargement with voters in the French and Dutch referendums.
But diluting the potential prize for Turkey would be a serious
mistake. The only way the EU can exert full leverage on Turkey to
reform is to keep the carrot of full membership dangled in front of
it.
At the same time, however, the Turks must realise at the outset what
EU full membership means. Some of them seem to be under the illusion
that negotiating it is a bit like bargaining in the bazaar: haggle
and then split the difference. But in accession talks EU policies and
rules are largely non-negotiable; the main argument concerns only how
long the applicant is given to adopt them.
In Turkey's case, it is particularly important the EU stands firm in
three areas. First, Turkey must show itself a functioning democracy
that upholds human rights and freedom of religion and non-belief.
Ankara has taken big strides in this field recently, but still has
far to go. Second, it must have a working market economy. Turkey has
a decade-old customs union with the EU, but is hardly
corruption-free. Third, it must settle minority and historical issues
better than it has so far managed to come to terms with its Kurds and
the Armenian question.
No one can now know if Turkey will make it into the EU. But Brussels
has designed its mandate to ensure Turkish progress along the way. It
will wait for reforms to be adopted and implemented in Turkey before
closing each part of the negotiations.
This is undoubtedly a tougher approach to Turkey than to previous
applicants. But the challenge is tougher; Turkey is too big for
Brussels to botch its incorporation. The times, too, are tougher. At
least one EU country, France, will make its final verdict on Turkish
entry by referendum. And if Turkey's application has not been
thoroughly tested by EU negotiators, it will not survive such a vote.
Oct 1 2005
Talking Turkey
Published: October 1 2005 03:00 | Last updated: October 1 2005 03:00
It is no surprise that the European Union's plan to start membership
talks with Turkey on Monday should be a cliff-hanger right to the
end. The desultory courtship between Brussels and Ankara, over nearly
40 years, reflects the controversy surrounding Turkey's candidacy.
For, if or when Turkey takes its seat in Brussels in a decade or
more, it would be the Union's poorest and most populous member, with
the biggest vote in the Council of Ministers. To complicate matters
further, the onus on Turkey to prove its European values will be
heavier than it was for previous accession candidates within the
conventional boundaries of Europe
The cliff-hanger arises from Austria's insistence that, in the
negotiating mandate that EU governments must agree for accession
talks to open, Turkey should be offered an explicit "partnership"
alternative to full membership. All 24 other EU states, and the Turks
themselves, are content for the mandate to contain only a vaguely
worded fall-back to create the "strongest possible bond" between
Ankara and the EU if in the end full membership talks fail. Britain,
desperate to chalk up the first achievement of its half-year EU
presidency by launching Turkish accession talks, has called a special
foreign ministers meeting tomorrow night to press Austria to back
down.
Austria's behaviour is part tactical; it is holding out for parallel
accession talks with its neighbour, Croatia. But it is also visceral
for some Austrians who see themselves saving Europe from the Turks,
as at the gates of Vienna in 1683, and certainly share an allergy to
further enlargement with voters in the French and Dutch referendums.
But diluting the potential prize for Turkey would be a serious
mistake. The only way the EU can exert full leverage on Turkey to
reform is to keep the carrot of full membership dangled in front of
it.
At the same time, however, the Turks must realise at the outset what
EU full membership means. Some of them seem to be under the illusion
that negotiating it is a bit like bargaining in the bazaar: haggle
and then split the difference. But in accession talks EU policies and
rules are largely non-negotiable; the main argument concerns only how
long the applicant is given to adopt them.
In Turkey's case, it is particularly important the EU stands firm in
three areas. First, Turkey must show itself a functioning democracy
that upholds human rights and freedom of religion and non-belief.
Ankara has taken big strides in this field recently, but still has
far to go. Second, it must have a working market economy. Turkey has
a decade-old customs union with the EU, but is hardly
corruption-free. Third, it must settle minority and historical issues
better than it has so far managed to come to terms with its Kurds and
the Armenian question.
No one can now know if Turkey will make it into the EU. But Brussels
has designed its mandate to ensure Turkish progress along the way. It
will wait for reforms to be adopted and implemented in Turkey before
closing each part of the negotiations.
This is undoubtedly a tougher approach to Turkey than to previous
applicants. But the challenge is tougher; Turkey is too big for
Brussels to botch its incorporation. The times, too, are tougher. At
least one EU country, France, will make its final verdict on Turkish
entry by referendum. And if Turkey's application has not been
thoroughly tested by EU negotiators, it will not survive such a vote.
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