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The European Union And Minority Problems
Written by Walter R Hunziker
Newropeans Magazine, France
May 11 2006
The EU has few subjects that nobody in Brussels likes to talk about,
among which we find minority problems. Corsica and the Bask country may
serve as examples for many others that are less visible or audible...
Paris and Madrid don't mind, or actually demand EU subsidies to
help the economic development of its regions. However, they would
oppose vehemently any questioning by the EU parliament concerning
the political situation of these minorities, which they consider to
be a purely national affair.
Where democratic representation is involved, there are no national
affairs that do not concern the EU. The EU is to be a coherent body,
all its members being part of the total living community, like a human
body which cannot have totally independent members, legs or hands.
Can it be a real national affair if those concerned do not consider
themselves part of that "National"community? In such cases a higher
supranational instance such as the EU is the logical place to deal
with the matter.
Switzerland, a confederation of some 25 cantons, had a minority
problem with the French-speaking minority inside the canton of Bern.
Like Corsica , they had an independence movement with bombings,
demonstrations, etc. After years of repression, the minority was
finally permitted to create its own canton of Jura, thus adding a new
canton to the Swiss confederation, a solution that satisfied everybody.
There is no reason not to give any of the concerned European minorities
a chance to create their own state community within the EU, if after
careful comprehensive socio-economic studies, the inhabitants of a
region democratically vote and approve such a change.
What are the motivations for secession? Why do national governments
want to prevent such regional political formations? Is it a question
of national pride, historic patriotism etc. France, e.g. because of
Napoleon being a French icon, might oppose a Corsican secession. Is
it matter of regional egotism, the rich not wanting to share with the
poor as may be the case in northern Italy and Spain's Catalonia ? Or is
it a cultural entity fearing to lose its character, its language , its
religion, or on the contrary an oppressed minority demanding liberty?
The EU should develop clear criteria to deal with these situations
faced within its present borders, including Wallonia, Bretagne, Kosovo
and many more regions, before engaging new more complex problems in
new eastern EU candidate countries such as Turkey , which faces three
big minority problems:
1. The Armenian genocide, although a historic event, is still being
denied by the Turkish government and people. This problem must be
overcome by a clear revelation and acceptance of the truth, e.g.
as established by an international court procedure, before Turkey
can join the EU.
2. The Cypress problem concerning its Turkish and Greek
communities. The EU and UN reunification proposal , which was accepted
by the north and rejected by the south shows a deep psychological
barrier. The immediate economic and practical advantages of
reunification could not overcome an anxiety concerning the unknown
risks of joining a Turkish minority in Cypress with 62.7 mi. more
Turks living on the close-by mainland. Would they not use Cypress as
the entrance door to Europe? The proposal was too much of an academic
dream. A unified Cypress can only come after Turkey joins the EU.
3. The EU adhesion of Turkey as it is now would probably solve the
Cypress question, but a much greater problem would arise with the Kurd
minority on its eastern borders. With Constantinople as the capital
of the Eastern Roman Empire, Turkey displays a cultural historic role
in Europe. Kurdistan however is definitely not part of it. In Turkey,
there are some 15 mi. Kurds, in Iran 6.6 mi., in Irak 6 mi, in Syria
2 mi, in Germany 0.6 mi., in Armenia and Azerbaijan some 50 000,
and elsewhere another 1.1 mi. a total of 31.l mi. Kurds.
They aspire an independent state; there is no population of that size
on earth that has not its own state.
If Turkey would give independence to its 15 mi Kurds, this would
reduce its population to some 45 mi, this could be perhaps more
easily acceptable by the EU, and it might lead to the formation of
a new Kurdistan together with the Kurds from Iraq, Iran, Syria, etc.
and thus create a new stable buffer state to Iran.
Kurd population dispersed over Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Azerbaijan
and Armenia
Such geostrategic thoughts must be included in the debates on
the eastern extension of the EU, if we are not to fall into an
"IMPERIALISTIC TRAP". The EU has no business in Kurdistan except to
help the Kurds to become independent, and possibly to have new good
friends in this oil-rich region. We must remind our parliament in
Brussels that the EU is not in need of more territory, it needs to
create more democratic, and efficient administrative structures, it
should develop closer and better relations with all its neighbours and
specially with those that are part of our cultural family, wherever
they are. In today's world territorial closeness or distance means
less than cultural affinity.
Written by Walter R Hunziker
Newropeans Magazine, France
May 11 2006
The EU has few subjects that nobody in Brussels likes to talk about,
among which we find minority problems. Corsica and the Bask country may
serve as examples for many others that are less visible or audible...
Paris and Madrid don't mind, or actually demand EU subsidies to
help the economic development of its regions. However, they would
oppose vehemently any questioning by the EU parliament concerning
the political situation of these minorities, which they consider to
be a purely national affair.
Where democratic representation is involved, there are no national
affairs that do not concern the EU. The EU is to be a coherent body,
all its members being part of the total living community, like a human
body which cannot have totally independent members, legs or hands.
Can it be a real national affair if those concerned do not consider
themselves part of that "National"community? In such cases a higher
supranational instance such as the EU is the logical place to deal
with the matter.
Switzerland, a confederation of some 25 cantons, had a minority
problem with the French-speaking minority inside the canton of Bern.
Like Corsica , they had an independence movement with bombings,
demonstrations, etc. After years of repression, the minority was
finally permitted to create its own canton of Jura, thus adding a new
canton to the Swiss confederation, a solution that satisfied everybody.
There is no reason not to give any of the concerned European minorities
a chance to create their own state community within the EU, if after
careful comprehensive socio-economic studies, the inhabitants of a
region democratically vote and approve such a change.
What are the motivations for secession? Why do national governments
want to prevent such regional political formations? Is it a question
of national pride, historic patriotism etc. France, e.g. because of
Napoleon being a French icon, might oppose a Corsican secession. Is
it matter of regional egotism, the rich not wanting to share with the
poor as may be the case in northern Italy and Spain's Catalonia ? Or is
it a cultural entity fearing to lose its character, its language , its
religion, or on the contrary an oppressed minority demanding liberty?
The EU should develop clear criteria to deal with these situations
faced within its present borders, including Wallonia, Bretagne, Kosovo
and many more regions, before engaging new more complex problems in
new eastern EU candidate countries such as Turkey , which faces three
big minority problems:
1. The Armenian genocide, although a historic event, is still being
denied by the Turkish government and people. This problem must be
overcome by a clear revelation and acceptance of the truth, e.g.
as established by an international court procedure, before Turkey
can join the EU.
2. The Cypress problem concerning its Turkish and Greek
communities. The EU and UN reunification proposal , which was accepted
by the north and rejected by the south shows a deep psychological
barrier. The immediate economic and practical advantages of
reunification could not overcome an anxiety concerning the unknown
risks of joining a Turkish minority in Cypress with 62.7 mi. more
Turks living on the close-by mainland. Would they not use Cypress as
the entrance door to Europe? The proposal was too much of an academic
dream. A unified Cypress can only come after Turkey joins the EU.
3. The EU adhesion of Turkey as it is now would probably solve the
Cypress question, but a much greater problem would arise with the Kurd
minority on its eastern borders. With Constantinople as the capital
of the Eastern Roman Empire, Turkey displays a cultural historic role
in Europe. Kurdistan however is definitely not part of it. In Turkey,
there are some 15 mi. Kurds, in Iran 6.6 mi., in Irak 6 mi, in Syria
2 mi, in Germany 0.6 mi., in Armenia and Azerbaijan some 50 000,
and elsewhere another 1.1 mi. a total of 31.l mi. Kurds.
They aspire an independent state; there is no population of that size
on earth that has not its own state.
If Turkey would give independence to its 15 mi Kurds, this would
reduce its population to some 45 mi, this could be perhaps more
easily acceptable by the EU, and it might lead to the formation of
a new Kurdistan together with the Kurds from Iraq, Iran, Syria, etc.
and thus create a new stable buffer state to Iran.
Kurd population dispersed over Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Azerbaijan
and Armenia
Such geostrategic thoughts must be included in the debates on
the eastern extension of the EU, if we are not to fall into an
"IMPERIALISTIC TRAP". The EU has no business in Kurdistan except to
help the Kurds to become independent, and possibly to have new good
friends in this oil-rich region. We must remind our parliament in
Brussels that the EU is not in need of more territory, it needs to
create more democratic, and efficient administrative structures, it
should develop closer and better relations with all its neighbours and
specially with those that are part of our cultural family, wherever
they are. In today's world territorial closeness or distance means
less than cultural affinity.
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