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Armenia, diaspora, and facing history
by Taner Akcam
This essay was originally published in Taraf as "Ermenistan, diaspora ve tarihle yüzle?mek" on Nov. 16, 2008 (http://www.taraf.com.tr/haber/21653.htm). The translation is by Fatma Sakarya with additional notes by the author.
Mr. Akcam is the author of A Shameful Act: The Armenian Genocide and the Question of Turkish Responsibility.
There is no doubt that Abdullah Gül's visit to Yerevan was an historical step, and we should applaud both the Turkish leader and Armenian president Serge Sargsian for having shown the courage to take it. It was a big move on their part, and it has cracked open the door to a new beginning in Turkish-Armenian relations. It looks like many people will be able to pass through that door.
It was only seven years ago, in February 2001, when my statement on a television program, that Turkey should apologize to Armenians, created a firestorm of sentiment against me. Now, after Abdullah Gül's visit, retired Ambassador Volkan Vural repeated the same words and stated, "We should apologize," and not a single objection was raised. The words seemed to have been greeted with general acceptance (Taraf, Oct. 18, 2008). As this example shows, with the passage of time, Turkey seems to have made a lot of progress on the subject.
The Ergenekon investigation and arrests play a special role in this progress. If the arrests had not been made, we would have witnessed a serious campaign for the hearts and minds of the public being waged against Abdullah Gül's visit. For the past few years in Turkey the campaigns against the Armenians and 1915 have been led by Ergenekon.[1] It was Ergenekon followers who organized the memorial anniversary for the execution of mayor of Bogazlayan Kemal,[2] the marches for Talat Pasha in Berlin,[3] and the "war of law" in Switzerland.[4] Again, it was they who mobilized the public against the conference we organized in Istanbul in 2005,[5] who dragged us into the courtrooms,[6] and who drove the campaign against Hrant Dink all the way to murder.
[Notes from the author:
1. Ergenekon is the name of a secret organization existing primarily within the military and civil bureaucracy. The organization, which includes retired generals, journalists, bureaucrats, educators, and businesspeople, has been under investigation for several years. In the end, a trial against 86 individuals, 46 of whom are being detained, was begun on October 20, 2008. The defendants have been accused of establishing a terrorist organization called "Ergenekon," and of plotting to effect regime change through a military coup by committing politically motivated crimes and terroristic acts. Although the murder of Hrant Dink does not figure in the charges of the indictment, there are some very strong clues that the organization was involved.
2. Kemal was the kaymakam (county executive) of Bogazl?yan county in the Yozgat district. He was prosecuted by a mlitary tribunal formed in Istanbul in 1919 for having massacred Armenians en masse, was sentenced to death, and executed on April 10, 1919.
3. The committee was formed in 2005 under the leadership of former Prime Minister of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, Rauf Denkta?. A significant number of its board of directors are now under arrest and facing prosecution under the Ergenekon trial. In order to protest the claims of the Armenian Genocide, in Europe, the Committee organized the "Lausanne 2005," "Berlin 2006," "Lausanne 2007," and "Paris 2007" marches and activities.
4. Dogu Perinçek, one of the founders of the Talat Pasha Committee and now a detainee defendant in the Ergenekon trial, had initiated a "legal war" in Switzerland by declaring that "the Armenian genocide did not occur" to protest that country's crime of "denying the genocide." That trial concluded in March 2007 with Perinçek's conviction.
5. On September 23-25, 2005, Bogaziçi, Sabanc?, and Bilgi Universities had organized a conference titled "Ottoman Armenians during the Period of the Empire's Decline: Scholarly Responsibility and Problems of Democracy." The conference, originally planned for August, was initially suspended by court action and a serious campaign against the intelligentsia who had organized the conference, was waged, headed by some government offficials.
6. What is referred to here are the court actions initiated not only against Hrant Dink but also against other well-known journalists and writers, including Orhan Pamuk, Elif ?afak, Murat Belge, Hasan Cemal, and Ismet Berkan, based upon Article 301 and other articles of the Turkish Criminal Code.]
Ergenekon's use of such a painful episode in history, 1915, as a way to confer legitimacy upon itself in society, is extremely significant and meaningful. The connection between those who enforced a policy of annihilation against Armenians in the past and an organization like Ergenekon that organizes hostility against the Armenians today is a subject that deserves to be given a great deal of attention.
Misguided reason
In this short piece, I would like to take up some points that figure prominently in many of the writings that have purported to support Mr. Gül's visit, but which I nevertheless view as misguided. Many of these writings, written by our own enlightened thinkers, are nevertheless poorly conceived. Representing some of the first influential ideas to make it "through the newly opened door" they have the potential for influencing public opinion and for that reason it is imperative that they be critically examined now. Besides presenting a simple critique, I want to create a framework on the subject of how the matter should be approached in the near future. My hope is that I will succeed in laying a stronger foundation to undergird future discourse on the subject matter.
If we examine the general premise behind all of the writings issued thus far, we see that there are serious differences between the Armenian state and the Armenian diaspora, particularly on the issue of the perception of Turkey and the attitude that should be taken toward history. According to what's been written thus far, the Armenian state and the diaspora constitute practically polar opposites. The diaspora is defined as a singular, monolithic entity, and the word diaspora itself is given a negative connotation. The primary reason why the diaspora is "negative" and "bad" is the position it takes on "insisting on recognition of the Genocide." Therefore, in the hands of our intellectuals, the demand for "recognition of the Genocide" and "insistence" on it has become the bogeyman. According to their logic, the more the diaspora stays away from "demanding recognition of the Genocide" and/or refrains from insisting on it as much as possible, the better.
According to the articles being written, the Armenian state has not been very insistent on the subject of "recognition of the Genocide." As the last visit illustrated, our neighbor Armenia is very "good"; it reflected its "goodness" by refraining from use of the word "Genocide" and by not demanding "recognition" during the course of the visit. However, the Armenian state is seriously in the grip of and under the influence of the "bad" diaspora. According to these writers, in order to relieve Turkish-Armenian tension, "our good neighbor Armenia" must be saved from the "bad" diaspora.
The biggest reason why Armenia has fallen under the influence of the "bad" diaspora, so their reasoning goes, is because of poorly conceived Turkish policies. As a result, in order to save Armenia from the diaspora, Turkey must relinquish its bad policies and foster "good" relations with Armenia. Consequently, Armenia will be able to distance itself from the bad policies of the diaspora, policies like "insisting on recognition of genocide." In other words, the key to resolving the matter is in the "genocide-demanding bogeyman." In order to resolve the issue, this demand must disappear.
The intellectuals in our country who share these views describe Turkish-Armenian relations after 1991 in this way. The first president of Armenia, Levon Ter-Petrossian, was soft on the issue of the genocide. He didn't "insist" on its recognition and supported more open policies toward Turkey. For this reason, he had positioned himself against the "bad" diaspora. The reason why Mr. Ter-Petrossian fell from power was that Turkey hadn't supported him. In conclusion, Mr. Ter-Petrossian's loss occurred on an axis between "those who demanded recognition of the Genocide, and those who did not," and the "bad" policies we followed cost him his administration.
I believe that we need to evaluate this viewpoint and repair it. If you sincerely want to resolve this issue, it is imperative that you possess information about each side that resembles the truth. Just to give one example, Mr. Ter-Petrossian's fall from power had little to do with Turkey's policies or its position regarding the issue of genocide. The main reasons for his loss had to do with deteriorating economic conditions (especially irregularities in administration) and his insistence on moving toward a quick resolution of the Karabakh matter.
What is even more important than this is that after Mr. Ter-Petrossian, the policy of the Armenian state towards Turkey has not actually changed. It has in essence stayed virtually the same. The team of Robert Kocharian, both in personnel and in policy, has continued the same political line of the Ter-Petrossian period. The best example of consistency in personnel is Vartan Oskanian, the minister of foreign affairs from the Kocharian period. From the mid-1990s of the Ter-Petrossian administration, Mr. Oskanian performed a very important role in foreign relations and even took on the position of [deputy] minister of foreign affairs in the final years.
The essence of the policies followed by all of the administrations in Armenia following 1991 can be summarized thus: "establishment of diplomatic relations without preconditions." One should not forget that Armenian president Serge Sargsian, the person who invited Mr. Gül in the first place, was Mr. Kocharian's candidate and won the election in opposition to Mr. Ter-Petrossian. This consistency in policy can be deduced from the fact that Mr. Gül's invitation came from a member of the Kocharian team. In contrast, Mr. Ter-Petrossian did not openly support the invitation; in fact, he took a very critical view of it, stating that it was "premature." (The fact that he's part of the political opposition no doubt played a big role in this.)
The point I am trying to make is that possessing information and knowledge about Armenian political developments and about the opposing sides that is accurate, is crucial to moving away from the wrong kinds of presumptions that have been voiced in Turkey. If you represent one side of a problem and you are seeking a solution to that problem, you need to possess at least as much information about your opponent as you possess about yourself. If you do not have a detailed picture of the other side, you will never be able to negotiate a solution.
"Bad" diaspora and "demanding" Genocide recognition
There is another reason that the division between "bad diaspora" and "good neighbor Armenia" needs to be examined more closely.
Armenia, diaspora, and facing history
by Taner Akcam
This essay was originally published in Taraf as "Ermenistan, diaspora ve tarihle yüzle?mek" on Nov. 16, 2008 (http://www.taraf.com.tr/haber/21653.htm). The translation is by Fatma Sakarya with additional notes by the author.
Mr. Akcam is the author of A Shameful Act: The Armenian Genocide and the Question of Turkish Responsibility.
There is no doubt that Abdullah Gül's visit to Yerevan was an historical step, and we should applaud both the Turkish leader and Armenian president Serge Sargsian for having shown the courage to take it. It was a big move on their part, and it has cracked open the door to a new beginning in Turkish-Armenian relations. It looks like many people will be able to pass through that door.
It was only seven years ago, in February 2001, when my statement on a television program, that Turkey should apologize to Armenians, created a firestorm of sentiment against me. Now, after Abdullah Gül's visit, retired Ambassador Volkan Vural repeated the same words and stated, "We should apologize," and not a single objection was raised. The words seemed to have been greeted with general acceptance (Taraf, Oct. 18, 2008). As this example shows, with the passage of time, Turkey seems to have made a lot of progress on the subject.
The Ergenekon investigation and arrests play a special role in this progress. If the arrests had not been made, we would have witnessed a serious campaign for the hearts and minds of the public being waged against Abdullah Gül's visit. For the past few years in Turkey the campaigns against the Armenians and 1915 have been led by Ergenekon.[1] It was Ergenekon followers who organized the memorial anniversary for the execution of mayor of Bogazlayan Kemal,[2] the marches for Talat Pasha in Berlin,[3] and the "war of law" in Switzerland.[4] Again, it was they who mobilized the public against the conference we organized in Istanbul in 2005,[5] who dragged us into the courtrooms,[6] and who drove the campaign against Hrant Dink all the way to murder.
[Notes from the author:
1. Ergenekon is the name of a secret organization existing primarily within the military and civil bureaucracy. The organization, which includes retired generals, journalists, bureaucrats, educators, and businesspeople, has been under investigation for several years. In the end, a trial against 86 individuals, 46 of whom are being detained, was begun on October 20, 2008. The defendants have been accused of establishing a terrorist organization called "Ergenekon," and of plotting to effect regime change through a military coup by committing politically motivated crimes and terroristic acts. Although the murder of Hrant Dink does not figure in the charges of the indictment, there are some very strong clues that the organization was involved.
2. Kemal was the kaymakam (county executive) of Bogazl?yan county in the Yozgat district. He was prosecuted by a mlitary tribunal formed in Istanbul in 1919 for having massacred Armenians en masse, was sentenced to death, and executed on April 10, 1919.
3. The committee was formed in 2005 under the leadership of former Prime Minister of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, Rauf Denkta?. A significant number of its board of directors are now under arrest and facing prosecution under the Ergenekon trial. In order to protest the claims of the Armenian Genocide, in Europe, the Committee organized the "Lausanne 2005," "Berlin 2006," "Lausanne 2007," and "Paris 2007" marches and activities.
4. Dogu Perinçek, one of the founders of the Talat Pasha Committee and now a detainee defendant in the Ergenekon trial, had initiated a "legal war" in Switzerland by declaring that "the Armenian genocide did not occur" to protest that country's crime of "denying the genocide." That trial concluded in March 2007 with Perinçek's conviction.
5. On September 23-25, 2005, Bogaziçi, Sabanc?, and Bilgi Universities had organized a conference titled "Ottoman Armenians during the Period of the Empire's Decline: Scholarly Responsibility and Problems of Democracy." The conference, originally planned for August, was initially suspended by court action and a serious campaign against the intelligentsia who had organized the conference, was waged, headed by some government offficials.
6. What is referred to here are the court actions initiated not only against Hrant Dink but also against other well-known journalists and writers, including Orhan Pamuk, Elif ?afak, Murat Belge, Hasan Cemal, and Ismet Berkan, based upon Article 301 and other articles of the Turkish Criminal Code.]
Ergenekon's use of such a painful episode in history, 1915, as a way to confer legitimacy upon itself in society, is extremely significant and meaningful. The connection between those who enforced a policy of annihilation against Armenians in the past and an organization like Ergenekon that organizes hostility against the Armenians today is a subject that deserves to be given a great deal of attention.
Misguided reason
In this short piece, I would like to take up some points that figure prominently in many of the writings that have purported to support Mr. Gül's visit, but which I nevertheless view as misguided. Many of these writings, written by our own enlightened thinkers, are nevertheless poorly conceived. Representing some of the first influential ideas to make it "through the newly opened door" they have the potential for influencing public opinion and for that reason it is imperative that they be critically examined now. Besides presenting a simple critique, I want to create a framework on the subject of how the matter should be approached in the near future. My hope is that I will succeed in laying a stronger foundation to undergird future discourse on the subject matter.
If we examine the general premise behind all of the writings issued thus far, we see that there are serious differences between the Armenian state and the Armenian diaspora, particularly on the issue of the perception of Turkey and the attitude that should be taken toward history. According to what's been written thus far, the Armenian state and the diaspora constitute practically polar opposites. The diaspora is defined as a singular, monolithic entity, and the word diaspora itself is given a negative connotation. The primary reason why the diaspora is "negative" and "bad" is the position it takes on "insisting on recognition of the Genocide." Therefore, in the hands of our intellectuals, the demand for "recognition of the Genocide" and "insistence" on it has become the bogeyman. According to their logic, the more the diaspora stays away from "demanding recognition of the Genocide" and/or refrains from insisting on it as much as possible, the better.
According to the articles being written, the Armenian state has not been very insistent on the subject of "recognition of the Genocide." As the last visit illustrated, our neighbor Armenia is very "good"; it reflected its "goodness" by refraining from use of the word "Genocide" and by not demanding "recognition" during the course of the visit. However, the Armenian state is seriously in the grip of and under the influence of the "bad" diaspora. According to these writers, in order to relieve Turkish-Armenian tension, "our good neighbor Armenia" must be saved from the "bad" diaspora.
The biggest reason why Armenia has fallen under the influence of the "bad" diaspora, so their reasoning goes, is because of poorly conceived Turkish policies. As a result, in order to save Armenia from the diaspora, Turkey must relinquish its bad policies and foster "good" relations with Armenia. Consequently, Armenia will be able to distance itself from the bad policies of the diaspora, policies like "insisting on recognition of genocide." In other words, the key to resolving the matter is in the "genocide-demanding bogeyman." In order to resolve the issue, this demand must disappear.
The intellectuals in our country who share these views describe Turkish-Armenian relations after 1991 in this way. The first president of Armenia, Levon Ter-Petrossian, was soft on the issue of the genocide. He didn't "insist" on its recognition and supported more open policies toward Turkey. For this reason, he had positioned himself against the "bad" diaspora. The reason why Mr. Ter-Petrossian fell from power was that Turkey hadn't supported him. In conclusion, Mr. Ter-Petrossian's loss occurred on an axis between "those who demanded recognition of the Genocide, and those who did not," and the "bad" policies we followed cost him his administration.
I believe that we need to evaluate this viewpoint and repair it. If you sincerely want to resolve this issue, it is imperative that you possess information about each side that resembles the truth. Just to give one example, Mr. Ter-Petrossian's fall from power had little to do with Turkey's policies or its position regarding the issue of genocide. The main reasons for his loss had to do with deteriorating economic conditions (especially irregularities in administration) and his insistence on moving toward a quick resolution of the Karabakh matter.
What is even more important than this is that after Mr. Ter-Petrossian, the policy of the Armenian state towards Turkey has not actually changed. It has in essence stayed virtually the same. The team of Robert Kocharian, both in personnel and in policy, has continued the same political line of the Ter-Petrossian period. The best example of consistency in personnel is Vartan Oskanian, the minister of foreign affairs from the Kocharian period. From the mid-1990s of the Ter-Petrossian administration, Mr. Oskanian performed a very important role in foreign relations and even took on the position of [deputy] minister of foreign affairs in the final years.
The essence of the policies followed by all of the administrations in Armenia following 1991 can be summarized thus: "establishment of diplomatic relations without preconditions." One should not forget that Armenian president Serge Sargsian, the person who invited Mr. Gül in the first place, was Mr. Kocharian's candidate and won the election in opposition to Mr. Ter-Petrossian. This consistency in policy can be deduced from the fact that Mr. Gül's invitation came from a member of the Kocharian team. In contrast, Mr. Ter-Petrossian did not openly support the invitation; in fact, he took a very critical view of it, stating that it was "premature." (The fact that he's part of the political opposition no doubt played a big role in this.)
The point I am trying to make is that possessing information and knowledge about Armenian political developments and about the opposing sides that is accurate, is crucial to moving away from the wrong kinds of presumptions that have been voiced in Turkey. If you represent one side of a problem and you are seeking a solution to that problem, you need to possess at least as much information about your opponent as you possess about yourself. If you do not have a detailed picture of the other side, you will never be able to negotiate a solution.
"Bad" diaspora and "demanding" Genocide recognition
There is another reason that the division between "bad diaspora" and "good neighbor Armenia" needs to be examined more closely.
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