Temporarily So Called Turkey and the World: Perceptions, Relations...

[Siamanto]

Re: Temporarily So Called Turkey and the World: Perceptions, Relations...

Is Erdogan Bluffing?

WHY TURKEY'S ARMY WILL STAY HOME

THE KOREA HERALD
October 23, 2007 Tuesday
Korea

Just when the smoke from Turkey's domestic political conflicts of
the past year had begun to clear, another deadly attack by Kurdish
separatists on Turkish soldiers has the government threatening military
attacks inside northern Iraq. That prospect raises risks for Turkey,
Iraq, and the United States. But there are reasons to doubt that the
situation is as dangerous as recent headlines suggest.

Turkey accuses Iraqi Kurds of harboring between 3,000 and 3,500 of
Turkey's most active Kurdish militants - the PKK separatist guerillas
who are blamed for the deaths of 80 Turkish soldiers so far this
year. The trouble reached the boiling point on Oct. 7, when Kurdish
fighters killed 13 Turkish soldiers near Turkey's border with Iraq.

The Turkish public has demanded action, and Prime Minister Recep
Tayyip Erdogan's government has responded. On Oct. 17, despite pleas
for patience and restraint from Iraq and the United States, Turkish
lawmakers voted 507-19 to authorize Erdogan to order cross-border
military strikes into Iraq at any time over the next year.

Erdogan has sent Iraqi Kurds a forceful message. But, for several
reasons, the Turkish military is likely to limit its operations to
small-scale incursions and air strikes on specific targets rather
than launch an all-out war.

First, the Turkish military has no interest in embracing the risks
that come with involvement in Iraq's sectarian strife. A full-scale
invasion might well provoke Iraq's own Kurdish guerrillas into
a prolonged and bloody battle with Turkish forces that can only
undermine support for Erdogan's government at home and abroad.

Second, Turkey's government hopes to keep the country's bid to join
the European Union moving forward. An invasion of Iraq would bring
that process to a grinding halt. EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana
has made plain that Europe strongly opposes any large-scale Turkish
military operation in Iraq.

Third, Turkey is well aware that an all-out attack inside Iraq is
exactly what Turkey's Kurdish separatists want. What better way to
damage Turkey than to pull its military into conflict with Iraq,
the United States, and the EU? Erdogan has no intention of being
drawn into that trap.

With all that in mind, this latest move by Turkey's parliament should
be seen more as an ultimatum to Iraq's Kurdish Regional Government to
expel the Turkish Kurds and an attempt to persuade the United States
to use its considerable influence there. That's hardball politics,
not a declaration of war.

The parliamentary authorization itself is carefully worded to underline
Turkey's limited aims. It stresses that Turkey's military has no
intention of occupying Iraqi territory or threatening Iraqi Kurds
or their oil infrastructure. An attack would certainly make Iraq's
Kurdish provinces less appealing for foreign investors. But Turkey
has no reason to attack the assets of foreign oil companies.

Iraq's central government is aware of the risks, as well, and is
likely to exercise maximum restraint. A limited Turkish strike into
northern Iraq would probably elicit little reaction beyond public
condemnation and rhetorical assertions of Iraqi sovereignty.

Threats to Iraq's oil infrastructure around the northern Iraqi city
of Kirkuk and other territory under the Kurdish Regional Government's
control are minimal. Turkey's government knows that any move to shut
down the 600-mile pipeline from Kirkuk to Turkey's Mediterranean port
at Ceyhan would have little near-term impact, since most of Iraq's
oil exports flow from the south, hundreds of miles from the country's
border with Turkey.

Furthermore, the Turkish military can increase the pressure on Iraqi
Kurds with far less drastic measures. It can close the two countries'
principal border crossing, an important route for food, fuel, and
other goods headed for Iraqi Kurds. It could also cut exports of
electricity to northern Iraq.

Still, even small-scale military operations would generate risk. If
the PKK is able to launch a major attack on troops or civilians inside
Turkey, the public outcry might leave Erdogan with little choice but
to up the ante.

The issue is complicated further by Turkey's refusal to negotiate
directly with the Kurdish Regional Government in northern Iraq. Such
talks, Turkey fears, would offer tacit acknowledgement that Iraqi
Kurds have won a degree of autonomy from Baghdad. That's a bridge
too far for Turkey's nationalists and its military.

There are risks for Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki as well,
because Turkish military strikes on Iraq's northern provinces could
undermine the Kurdish support on which his government increasingly
depends. Both Sunni Arabs and Kurds already resent al Maliki's mild
reaction to Iran's recent shelling of Iraqi territory - an attempt
to strike at Iranian Kurdish militants fleeing across its border
with Iraq.

There are also risks for the United States. Most supplies headed for
U.S. troops in Iraq and Afghanistan move through the Incirlik airbase
in Turkey. With the threat that the U.S. House of Representatives
will approve a resolution that accuses Turks of genocide against ethic
Armenians nine decades ago, this is a particularly inopportune moment
for the two countries to be at odds over Iraq.

But, worst-case scenarios aside, a Turkish invasion of northern Iraq
can only serve the interests of Turkey's Kurdish separatists. That's
why cooler heads are likely to prevail. Limited cross-border operations
are increasingly likely. A war between Turkey and Iraqi Kurds is not.

Ian Bremmer is president of Eurasia Group, a global political risk
consultancy. - Ed.

http://groong.usc.edu/news/msg208022.html

OBSERVATIONS ON: TURKEY
Martin Fletcher

New Statesman, UK

http://www.newstatesman.com/200710250017

Oct 25 2007

Those wondering when Turkey will launch a military offensive against
Kurdish rebels in northern Iraq should heed the old rhyme: "Remember,
remember the fifth of November." Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the Turkish
prime minister, is due to visit Washington that day. It is scarcely
conceivable that he would order an incursion before that point.

To do so would involve sending troops from Nato's second-biggest army
into a country controlled by Nato's largest army, and destabilising
the only peaceful region of Iraq. Erdogan could expect a White House
welcome several degrees below zero. Why, then, is he sounding so
belligerent?

When I interviewed him for the Times this past weekend, he talked of
a military operation as if it was inevitable. He pointed out that the
Turkish parliament had voted 507-19 to authorise military action. He
said that Turkey had repeatedly asked the governments of the US and
Iraq to crack down on the separatist Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK),
but they had done nothing, and that Turkish patience was exhausted.

"Whatever is necessary will be done," he declared. "We don't have to
get permission from anybody."

Such comments are designed to assuage the fury of Erdogan's intensely
nationalistic countrymen following not only a rash of PKK attacks on
Turkish soldiers, but a move by the US Congress to define the mass
killing of Armenians in Ottoman Turkey during the First World War
as genocide.

More importantly, Erdogan's belligerent rhetoric is intended to avert
the very action he threatens. He is trying to generate such alarm in
Washington and Baghdad that they tackle the PKK themselves.

Erdogan is no fool. He knows that the arguments against a Turkish
incursion into northern Iraq far outweigh those in favour. Such
a drastic move would cause a major breach with Washington, fuel
opposition to Turkish membership of the EU, split Nato and compound
the chaos in Iraq. It would reverse the progress Turkey has made
towards integrating its own Kurdish minority.

And it would stand scant chance of success. The Turkish army has
never been able to crush the PKK in its own territory, let alone in
the rugged terrain across the border. Erdogan has acknowledged that
24 previous cross-border operations gained nothing. In all likelihood
the 3,500 PKK guerrillas in northern Iraq would simply melt into the
mountains or seek to destroy the pipelines carrying Iraqi oil into
Turkey, while their comrades north of the border stepped up their
attacks on Turkish targets.

So far Erdogan's strategy appears to be paying off. Washington did
launch what the US State Department called a "diplomatic full-court
press". President Bush, the secretary of state, Condoleezza Rice,
and the defence secretary, Robert Gates, all begged their Turkish
counterparts for restraint and promised US support. The Iraqi
government pledged its full co-operation. Envoys shuttled frantically
between capitals.

The outcome is still far from clear. Neither the US nor the Iraqi
government has surplus troops to send to northern Iraq. They are
instead pressuring Iraq's Kurdish leaders to curtail PKK activities
in their semi-autonomous region, arguing that the relative security
they have achieved since the overthrow of Saddam Hussein will be at
risk if they alienate Turkey.

Is the regional government willing to crack down on fellow Kurds,
stop their cross-border raids and arrest their commanders? Does it have
the capability to do so? If the answers to those two key questions are
"no" - and they may be - Erdogan's bluff will be called. His nation's
anger will leave him with little choice but to follow through on his
threat, whatever the cost.

[Siamanto]

Re: Temporarily So Called Turkey and the World: Perceptions, Relations...

TURKEY: TOO MUCH SUCCESS
Ian Bremmer - The New York Times Media Group

The International Herald Tribune, France
October 20, 2007 Saturday

Just as Turkey seems to be emerging from a stretch of political
discontent, it finds itself drawn into a pair of potential
international conflicts.

In Washington, a resolution pending before the House of
Representatives, which would formally recognize the Armenian genocide,
has threatened to generate serious new tension between Washington
and Ankara.

And in Ankara, the Parliament voted Wednesday to authorize the
government to send troops into northern Iraq against Kurdish rebels
hiding there. Such an operation is fervently opposed by the Bush
administration.

Still, I was surprised to discover on a recent visit to Istanbul
that the real emerging risks in Turkey have more to do with domestic
politics than with all this foreign-policy turmoil.

Over the past three months, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's
Justice and Development Party (AKP) secured a solid parliamentary
majority, got its man elected president and developed a good working
relationship with at least one of the major opposition parties. The
ruling party now also appears to be enjoying a truce with Turkey's
military, still a key player in the country's politics.

Markets responded to Erdogan's resounding July victory with
jubilation. Prices on Turkey's largest stock exchange rose, and the
value of Turkey's currency reached its highest level against the
dollar in more than two years.

Since AKP first rose to power in 2002, Erdogan has helped deliver
7.4 percent annual growth, lower inflation and bring in unprecedented
levels of foreign investment. A series of reforms have kept Turkey's
bid to join the EU limping forward. The party's new parliamentary
majority, 341 of 550 seats, frees Erdogan to pursue his agenda without
having to compromise with rivals.

Therein lies the real danger. Erdogan looks set to overplay his hand
in ways that upset Turkey's delicate political balance.

An uneasy co-existence has taken hold with a range of domestic
critics who fear that Erdogan's moderate Islamic party will erode the
country's secularist traditions, and that his new strength threatens
their political and economic interests.

If Erdogan moves too far too fast, trouble won't be far behind.

First, Erdogan says he plans to rewrite the country's constitution. The
scale of the AKP's electoral triumph speaks for itself, but efforts
to use the constitution to promote greater religious freedom - by
striking down a ban on the Islamic headscarf in universities, for
example - risk a strong backlash from those who see it as a symbol
of resistance to Turkey's official secularism.

Erdogan's political clumsiness has made matters worse. At a press
conference in September, he invited critics in the universities to
"mind their own business."

The greater danger could come from the military brass, who perceive of
themselves as guardians of Turkey's secularist traditions. The current
constitution, the one Erdogan wants to rewrite, was drafted by the
generals in 1982. The new draft may well undermine the military's
authority.

But if there's an even better way to rile nationalists within the army,
it's by using constitutional changes to win friends among minority
Kurds. One of the AKP's biggest electoral boosts came from a surge
in support from southeast Anatolia, home to much of the country's
restive Kurdish minority. The party won 53 percent of the vote there
this summer, up from just 27.7 percent in 2002.

An early version of Erdogan's proposed constitutional changes, leaked
to the media, includes a proposal to amend the clause that establishes
Turkish as the country's official language, a move that nationalist
critics say will encourage demands for education in Kurdish and other
minority languages.

Given the new tensions over Kurdish separatists in northern Iraq,
these proposed changes have become a major political issue.

But they also pose a more mundane problem for Turkey's reform process:
They're a distraction and a drain on time and political ca

An AKP official I spoke with told me the constitutional reform process
could take up to 18 months. That would force Erdogan to shelve other
reforms, many of them crucial for the EU accession process.

In particular, the measure the EU most forcefully insists must be
scrapped - the law that criminalizes public insults to "Turkishness"
- may not be addressed at all before Erdogan's government puts the
new constitution to a parliamentary vote.

As Turkey debates these controversies, its economy shows early signs
of a slowdown.

The resolution in the U.S. Congress may yet be shelved, and the
Turkish military may limit its strikes in northern Iraq. But Turkey's
domestic political problems are not going away. In fact, these new
opportunities to burnish his nationalist credentials may persuade
Erdogan to continue to press his advantage at home. That's why the
real risks to Turkey's delicate political balance come not from
Washington or Iraq, but from within.

* Ian Bremmer is president of Eurasia Group, a political risk
consultancy, and author of "The J Curve: A New Way to Understand Why
Nations Rise and Fall."

http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/10/19/opinion/edbremmer.php

[Siamanto]

Re: Temporarily So Called Turkey and the World: Perceptions, Relations...

TURKEY: BETWEEN THE IRANIAN-SYRIAN AXIS, ISRAEL, AND THE WEST
Aydan Kodaloglu

Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, Israel
Nov 20 2007

In the 2002 elections in Turkey, the Justice and Development party
came to power with 34 percent of the vote. On July 22, 2007, the
Turkish people gave the Justice and Development party 46.7 percent.

The Justice and Development party has decided to write a new Turkish
constitution that includes lifting the ban on the turban, which is
viewed by the majority of Turkish society as a political symbol.

A few years ago the major mobile phone carrier, Turkcell, was chosen
in a major tender as a carrier for Iran, jointly with the Iranian
government. Turkcell went through all the stages, and as they were
going to merge the system with their local Iranian partners, the
Iranian parliament stopped the joint venture, out of the blue.

Millions of dollars were wasted as a result.

We in Turkey are more afraid of Iran being successful in Iraq than we
are of Iran launching missiles at Turkey. Having an Iranian-influenced
Iraq on our border is the more immediate problem.

However, three hours after the September 6 incident involving Israel
and Syria, the Iranian government sent a warning to Turkey saying
that if it was involved in support of Israel and the United States,
Turkey would not get away unscathed.

Iran is not exporting its Shi'ism into Turkey, but it is exporting
radical Islam into Turkey, feeding it to the Sunni population.

In 1999 after a major earthquake in Turkey, Israel was the first
nation to come to the rescue. They were looked upon as angels and
heroes by the victims of the earthquake and they saved many lives.

This has really touched the hearts of the Turkish people. We should
build on this positive relationship.



Rise of the Justice and Development Party

In the 2002 elections in Turkey, the Justice and Development party
came to power with 34 percent of the vote and a good majority in
parliament. On July 22, 2007, the Turkish people voted again for the
Justice and Development party, which this time received 46.7 percent
of the vote, though it lost some seats in parliament due to the entry
of a third party.

During its first 4 1/2 years the Justice and Development government
was very successful, especially emerging from an economic crisis that
began in 2001. The government has maintained economic stability,
working jointly with the IMF. Due to their economic record, the
Turkish people decided to vote for them one more time.

The Justice and Development party today has decided to write a new
Turkish constitution, saying the existing constitution was written
by the military and people who were chosen by the military commanders.

Therefore, they are claiming to support the writing of a Turkish
civil constitution. This has a lot of support in Turkey from the
business world, from the NGOs, from the labor unions, from all walks
of life. However, the party has also decided to include a number of
questionable items in the new constitution, such as lifting the ban
on the turban, which is forbidden in Turkish universities. Lifting
the ban on the turban at universities began raising eyebrows. The
majority of Turkish society views the turban as a political symbol.



Turkish Relations with Syria

Turkey's relations with Syria have always been quite unsettled, due
to the fact that Syria was the home of the Kurdish PKK terrorists
until 1999. Then a Turkish military commander, Chief of the Turkish
Land Forces Gen. Atilla Ates, went to the Syrian border and said,
"You either deliver the terror group and its leader to us or we are
coming in to get them." The leader of the terror group was captured
and is in jail in Turkey today. Is there still a territorial dispute
between Syria and Turkey? According to the Syrians, there is, but
according to Turkey, there isn't. When compared to Syria, Turkey sees
Israel and the U.S. as its reliable allies.



Turkish Relations with Iran

There have been fears of Iran exporting radical Islam into Turkey
in the past, but on July 26, 2007, the Turkish Minister of Energy
signed an agreement with the Iranian government to transport natural
gas from Iran to Turkey.

Economic relations between Turkey and Iran are not always smooth. A
few years ago the major mobile phone carrier, Turkcell, was chosen
in a major tender as a carrier for Iran, jointly with the Iranian
government. Turkcell went through all the stages, and as they were
going to merge the system with their local Iranian partners, the
Iranian parliament stopped the joint venture, out of the blue.

Millions of dollars were wasted as a result. Something very similar
happened to a major airport logistics company in Turkey, Akfen Holding,
which was chosen by the Iranians to operate the Teheran airport. Just
before they started operations, the Iranian parliament failed to
confirm the joint venture and, again, a lot of money was wasted.

We in Turkey are more afraid of Iran being successful in Iraq than
we are of Iran launching missiles at Turkey. This is because having
an Iranian-influenced Iraq on our border is the more immediate problem.

Therefore, from the Turkish perspective, we must first prevent Iran
from coming into Iraq, and then we can deal with Iran itself. This is
the basic thinking of the Turkish people. However, three hours after
the September 6 incident involving Israel and Syria, the Iranian
government sent a warning to Turkey saying that if it was involved
in support of Israel and the United States, Turkey would not get
away unscathed.



Turkey and Israel

In 1999 after a major earthquake in Turkey, Israel was the first
nation to come to the rescue. They were looked upon as angels and
heroes by the victims of the earthquake and they saved many lives.

This has really touched the hearts of the Turkish people. We should
build on this positive relationship.

Turkey is becoming an energy corridor between the East and the West,
and we foresee building pipelines between Turkey and Israel for water
and natural gas. One day, the existing oil pipeline between Turkey
and Iraq may be extended to Israel as well.

There is a perception in certain circles in Turkey of a conspiracy:
that Israel tends to prefer its new friends, the Kurds, to its old
friends, the Turks. But Turks are doing business in Northern Iraq and
this is in the best interests of Israelis, Turks, and Kurds, to live
in peace. A lot of Turkish businesses are operating in northern Iraq
and have been doing so since 1990.



The Armenian Issue

The American Jewish lobby has always been on Turkey's side in the
American Congress, especially on the issue of blocking the Armenian
genocide allegations. A sudden change has led to disappointment in
Turkey. However, I think Turkey and Israel and the American Jewish
community today have more important matters to look into and cooperate
on rather than talk about allegations from 1915.

Our task is to cooperate today for today and tomorrow, and not to
discuss what happened in 1915. Just leaving it to the interpretation
of historians will suit us fine for the time being. This is not
the time to talk about the Armenian genocide when we have issues
like Iran going nuclear, chaos in Iraq, radical Islamism and terror,
and Turkish children dying from PKK terror every day. Maybe in a few
years we can get back to the issue of whether this was a genocide or
not, but we must now put it aside. Furthermore, the allegations are
stemming from some in the Armenian diaspora who have been making a
living on these allegations since 1952 when Turkey joined NATO.

Therefore, the allegations have become more of an issue of lobbying
rather than dealing with the facts.



Turks Unaware of Sunni-Shi'ite Division

Until the recent clashes between Sunni and Shi'ite Muslims, the
average Turk was not very knowledgeable about the separate sects
among the Islamic nation. Most Turks are Sunnis as is the government,
and they are not familiar with the separation of Sunnis and Shi'ites.

In Turkey, the only significant minority are the Alevis, who accept
some Shi'ite beliefs but would not describe themselves as Shi'ites.

Who is an Alevi and who is a Sunni was never an issue until after
2000. The previous administration of the Justice and Development
party had no Alevis among them, but this time they corrected this by
putting Alevis on the ballot as candidates. Iran is not exporting its
Shi'ism into Turkey, but it is exporting radical Islam into Turkey,
feeding it to the Sunni population. The Iranians have no bonds or
communication with the Turkish Alevis.

Some EU politicians tell us we have to recognize the Armenian genocide,
and that Turkey should give a little bit of its territory to all
these other nations too. First, the Europeans should deal with the
issue of Cyprus before they say anything to Turkey. Second, I will
vote against Turkey joining the EU. I would vote for Turkey being a
member of the customs union. Trade volume between Turkey and the EU
is obviously great. But I'm not sure about the idea of joining the EU.

I personally do not see a solution to the Palestinian-Israeli situation
unless Israel's borders are secure and the children of Israel live in
peace as well as the children of Palestinians. In addition, I do not
take it upon myself as a citizen of Turkey to help the Palestinians
when they've got closer brothers like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan.

* * *

Ms. Aydan Kodaloglu is a former advisor to the President of Turkey,
Turgut Ozal, and has been actively involved in U.S.-Turkish and
Israeli-Turkish relations. This Jerusalem Issue Brief is based on her
presentation at the Institute for Contemporary Affairs in Jerusalem
on September 25, 2007.

http://www.jcpa.org/JCPA/Templates/ShowPage.asp?DRIT=1&DBID=1&LNGID=1&TMID=111&FID=380&PID=0&IID=1940&TTL=Turkey:_Between_the_Iranian-Syrian_Axis,_Israel,_and_the_West

[Siamanto]

Re: Temporarily So Called Turkey and the World: Perceptions, Relations...

LATEST PROGRESS REPORT ARRIVES AS EU-TURKISH RELATIONSHIP WANING
Mandy Kirby

Global Insight
November 7, 2007

The annual European Union assessment of Turkey repeats its calls for
reform, but is Turkey losing interest?

A difficult situation over the 2007 dual presidential and parliamentary
elections processes was dealt with well by the Turkish government of
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, although the European Union (EU)
has criticised military intervention into its democratic processes,
in its latest annual progress report. Since being elected for the
first time in 2002, Erdogan's Justice and Development (AK) have been
associated with a reformist, EU-focused agenda, pushed off track
by election concerns. Now the time has come to move back to the
reform agenda, or Turkey risks being usurped by southern European
contenders. Already Croatia has overtaken Turkey and should achieve
membership around 2010, but Turkey risks seeing others slide in ahead,
with reports on other western Balkan countries also released yesterday
as well as the confirmation of Serbia's Stabilisation and Association
Agreement (SAA).

Global Insight Perspective Significance The European Union (EU) has
called for reform progress to be stepped up in its tenth annual report
on Turkey, calling for a hiatus on almost two years of foot-dragging
and lack of progress in the official Accession Partnership.

Implications Despite calls for a wider debate by member-state France,
the report assumes that Turkey will pursue full membership rather
than any lesser alternative currently touted by some nervous at the
prospects of Turkish entry. The emphasis in any timetable though,
is on the medium-to-long term.

Outlook The report was clear that there is much to do for Turkey
to get back on track, after reform was wiped out by elections to
the parliament and presidency in 2007, and even IMF-mandated reforms
have stalled in parliament, such as the long-promised social security
reform. The damage in political relations between bloc members and
Turkey may leave bigger obstacles to surmount.

The EU carrot being dangled is the promise of two more negotiating
chapters being opened; consumer health and protection and Trans
European Networks (TENs). These relatively uncontroversial areas
sidestep the suspension of several chapters until some movement
on the Cyprus dispute. Turkey is no closer to moving towards the
opening of ports and airports and levelling trading relations with
the official government to a par with other member states. This
intransigence--argued on the basis that the island should reach a
settlement over its divide before such a deal is struck--has resulted
in eight key trade-related chapters being frozen until Turkey
conforms. Recently, Cyprus was angered by a co-operation document
between Turkey and the United Kingdom, which referred to the Turkish
Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) by name, even though Turkey is the
only country recognising it as such. Cypriot relations with the United
Kingdom have worsened considerably, and Cyprus remains obstructive
to EU efforts to "end the isolation" of the North. It appears time
will only entrench the divide between the two halves of the island.

No Escaping Penal Code Reform

Even though by being accepted as a candidate state, Turkey is deemed to
have met all the political objectives required, the EU has criticised
human rights and minority treatment, as well as the implementation
of the controversial penal code and Article 301, which has been used
to target journalists, writers and other artists perceived to have
insulted "Turkishness". Without this being addressed, progress will
stall and yesterday Enlargement Commissioner Ollie Rehn noted that no
chapters in the areas of Justice and Home Affairs would be opened until
action had been taken. The Turkish government has promised that it
will do so, but the timetable has slipped already to push the reform
into the major constitutional overhaul that will take up much of the
reform efforts in the coming year. Article 301 is the mere tip of
Turkish minority-rights issues, such as the treatment of religious
and ethnic minorities, though progress in human rights and women's
rights has been seen. The lack of independence in the judiciary is
also a concern, which the EU feels was highlighted by the behaviour
of the Constitutional Court during the presidential election crisis
earlier in 2007, resolved on a technicality.

New Hope for Progress?

The Foreign Ministry, now headed by chief EU negotiator Ali Babacan,
has pledged commitment to reform. Previously, while political relations
turned somewhat frosty with respective political institutions, on
a technical level, progress was good, smooth even, with Babacan at
the helm. Then he was simultaneously Economy Minister but managed
to juggle the roles with ease, and arguably now there is more logic
to his two roles, perhaps made easier by the scale of the landslide
re-election of Erdogan's AK party in July.

However, this may be a moot point. Turkey has visibly turned its
attention away from the EU, disillusioned by the obvious lack of
enthusiasm for its accession process; at the most optimistic of
estimates, the country will become a member in the middle of the next
decade, after the next EU financial perspectives have been agreed. In
essence, all discussions of Turkish membership outside of the EU
council of ministers are pointless until the next budget is debated.

Only then will it become clear whether Turkey is to be priced into
the 2013-2020 budget.

Instead, Turkey has looked to shape up relationships with its
regional peers. Disappointed also by a lack of co-operation with
the United States on combating terrorism, Turkey has looked at the
state of relations with countries such as Israel, generally speaking
a traditional ally, but with some wobbles of late, including over the
issue of a proposed U.S. bill to recognise as genocide the slaughter of
Armenians in 1915-1918 by Ottoman troops. Syria and Iran have become
much closer friends, promising further co-operation on fighting
terrorism. Always an issue of national import, it has become most
prominent on the agenda at present, and other concerns have largely
been swept aside until Turkey gains assurances from allies or takes
matters into its own hands. This has clouded its U.S. relations and
the Iraqi government has not proved itself strong enough to build
up relations. On the economic front, Turkey has had to address the
threat of cheaper labour from China, and has diversified its economy,
developing areas such as financial services and Islamic finance. The
large, youthful Turkish population and its economic potential should
be enormously attractive to the EU, but there is a very real risk
that Turkey will decide its future lies elsewhere. In the meantime,
it continues to pay lip-service to the quest of full EU membership,
much in the same way that the bloc does.

Outlook and Implications

The positive aspects emanating from the regular report are a renewed
commitment to full membership; the promise of new chapters being
opened; praise for Turkey's democratic performance during a trying
year; and the strong reform mandate which is available to the newly
re-elected Justice and Development government. The EU repeated
criticism of the high 10% parliamentary threshold which afforded AK
such a strong parliamentary majority, but which should be able to
address reform lag. Currently, only one negotiating chapter has been
nominally closed--science and research--and three of the 34 others
are in progress.

However, the tone of the report remains critical and the prospect of
membership so distant as to be blurry. Despite Babacan's assurances
of reform and the good technical relations, the politics of the
situation are pulling Turkey and the EU apart. Economically, both
sides can afford to maintain the status quo indefinitely, prolonging
the customs arrangement first agreed in 1995. The EU also knows it
can continue to find more areas for compliance, though dragging out
accession processes risks undermining the process, and may clash
with new debates on reform and enlargement in the bloc. It will make
economic sense to allow business to be as simple as possible with
a major trading partner. The chances are, though, that chances for
full membership are receding.

http://groong.usc.edu/news/msg210670.html

.......

BAN ON FREE SPEECH KEEPING TURKEY OUT OF EU
David Charter in Brussels

The Times/UK
November 7, 2007

A growing number of prosecutions against writers and academics
is damaging Turkey's case to become a fully fledged member of the
European Union, an annual assessment report said yesterday.

The country has made little progress in the past year and its failure
to end torture, improve minority rights or guarantee freedom of
expression were all highlighted as significant stumbling blocks to
EU membership.

Britain joined the European Commission in arguing that only the offer
of full membership would bring real reform inside Turkey, but President
Sarkozy Sarkozy of France, has led calls for the Muslim nation of 71
million to be offered only associate membership.

Olli Rehn, the Enlargement Commissioner, signalled a battle with those
who want to end Turkey's hopes of membership, however, declaring:
"Conditionality only works if the EU respects its own commitment to
the prospect of accession. Without this, we can always demand reforms
but this would be as if we were speaking to the wall."

Bush pledges US help for Turkey over Kurds crisis Population growth
would probably make Turkey the EU's largest member if it joins, as
it hopes, by 2020, and give the Community borders with Syria, Iran
and Iraq. But there are many hurdles yet to overcome, the European
Commission's progress check said.

One of the key demands was for the repeal of Article 301 of the Turkish
penal code, which makes it a crime to insult Turkish identity. The
article has been used to prosecute the Nobel prize-winning author
Orhan Pamuk and the murdered journalist Hrant Dink for commenting on
the killings of Armenians by Turks in the early 20th century.

The report cautioned: "The prosecution and conviction for the
expression of non-violent opinions under certain provisions of the
Turkish criminal code are a cause of serious concern. The number of
persons almost doubled in 2006 compared with 2005 and there was a
further increase in 2007. The Turkish legal system does not fully
guarantee freedom of expression in line with European standards."

Mr Rehn added: "It is not acceptable that writers, journalists,
academics and other intellectuals . . . are prosecuted for simply
expressing a critical but completely non-violent opinion."

Yielding to pressure from the EU Mehmet Ali Sahin, the Turkish Justice
Minister, said last night that a new Bill repealing Article 301 would
be put before Parliament in the coming days.

"Several drafts have been prepared in line with proposals by civic
groups. The Cabinet will discuss them at first opportunity, select one
and submit it to parliament," Mr Sahin told Anatolia news agency. Other
issues remain outstanding, however. The EU repeated demands that
Ankara normalise relations with Cyprus and honour a 2005 agreement
to open its ports and airports to the EU member.

The pace of reforms had slowed since Turkey's membership negotiations
opened two years ago. "Cases of torture and ill-treatment are still
being reported, especially during arrest and outside detention
centres," it added.

It commended the Turkish Government for solving a constitutional
crisis before President Gul was elected this year, but said that the
military still exerted "significant political influence".

In the southeast of the country: "Turkey needs to create the conditions
for the predominantly Kurdish population there to enjoy full rights
and freedoms."

Mr Rehn would not be drawn on the consequences for Turkey's membership
ambitions if it invaded Iraq to quash Kurdish separatists.

Wider community

EU enlargement candidate countries Croatia The former Yugoslav Republic
of Macedonia Turkey

Potential candidates Albania Bosnia and Herzegovina Montenegro Serbia
Kosovo (under United Nations Interim Administration Mission)

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article2821160.ece

[Siamanto]

Re: Temporarily So Called Turkey and the World: Perceptions, Relations...

RUSSIA: CONVERGENCES AND FRACTURES IN RUSSIAN-TURKISH RELATIONS
Translation by Michela Mogavero

Equilibri.net

http://uk.equilibri.net/article/8276/Russia__Convergences_and_fractures_in_Russian-Turkish_relations

Nov 22 2007
Italy

Moscow and Ankara have not shared a border for almost twenty years.

Throughout the course of history the borderline has been drawn again
and again due to the contentions between the Ottoman and Tsarist
Empires, the definition of the Turkish State by the Lausanne Treaty and
the border between Atlantic Turkey and the Soviet Union, under high
surveillance throughout the Cold War, which no longer exists on the
geographic and political map. Despite this, its historic, political
and strategic potential has not elapsed. The heirs of these Empires,
historically enemies, continue to articulate and clash with their own
strategies on the same issues. These include Central Asia, Caucasus,
the Balkans, the Middle East, the handling of minority groups and the
construction of Eurasian communications. In a region which is exposed
to international interferences, the result is a convergence which is
solely apparent.

Vera Ragone

Equilibri.net (22 November 2007)

Politically commercial partners and economic competitors

Russia and Turkey, even if demonstrating some mutual reservations,
have shown themselves to be interlocutors. The systemic changes in
these years have decreased the reciprocal threat. From a commercial
point of view, Russia is Turkey's second partner, after Germany:
many Turkish businessmen are searching for investment opportunities
in Russia. Turkey is instead in 14th place in the list of Russia's
commercial partners. This position should be seen from a historical
perspective, marked by the absence of previous commercial relations
and a more recent economy: an economic and financial crisis occurred
in Turkey in 2001 which made inflation rates rise to 65%. The Turkish
market is a significant recipient of Russian exports and this obviously
has political implications.

In the last years, Russia and Turkey have shown apparent convergence
on some interests. The war in Iraq and the increasing American
interference in the Caucasus are prudently regarded by both countries
and in the case of Russia, they are regarded with growing irritation.

The Kurds, located in the prominent wealthy Northern part of Iraq,
are a pivotal point in the US geopolitical agenda and a source of
concern for the internal stability of Turkey. The same instability
within the area interrupted the economic and strategic dialogue
between Russia and Iraq before the conflict.

The Caucasus is another precariously balanced area. The unresolved
Chechnya conflict, Abkhazia's and Ossetia's independence goals in
Georgia and the frozen Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia
and Azerbaijan are rich soil for open negotiations which remain
unresolved. Both Russia and Turkey are keen to maintain the current
climate, to continue with their mediation but US interests in the
area throw up difficulties for stability.

However, their common intolerance towards US interference does
not indicate the convergence of their foreign policies. First of
all, the extent to which the American presence within the area is
perceived is different. For Turkey, the US' accommodating stance
towards the Kurds is a problem on a regional level and meanwhile
positive relations with the US are desired and reinforced. Russia,
on the other hand, puts itself forward as a challenger for the US'
systemic unipolarity; the clashes within the region hold a certain
weight from an international relations point of veiw.

Another useful point from which to analyse Russian-Turkish relations
regards the interests at the base of some objectives, which despite
appearing common, are in fact opposite. An example of this divergence
is in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the Azeran region, now exclusively
inhabited by Armenians, which proclaimed its independence from
Azerbaijan during the fall of the Soviet Union. It is in both the
countries interests to keep the conflict in a state of paralysis,
as it has been since 1994. However, Russia primarily sides Armenia,
while Turkey supports Azeran's point of view, with which it has a
commercial embargo over Armenia. Both Russia and Turkey are members
of the Minsk Group, an organization created by Osce to resolve the
conflict. Even if Russia has a major influence over the question,
no steps have been taken towards cooperation.

Another influential area which has been contended is Central Asia.

There are many historical and cultural links between ancient Turkistan
and Turkey. Yet, the ex Soviet Republics of Central Asia still
resent the imposed development of colonial inspiration throughout the
Communist period and the economic link with the Russian Federation
is dominant as regards relations with Turkey.

Turkey has no resources to attract these countries and it doesn't
represent an alternative centre for economic development. However,
it has assumed the role, in the last years, as an important mediator
between Central Asia and the Western World.

The new energy routes

Turkey depends on Russia for more than 65% of its hydrocarbon
imports. At the same time, Ankara is putting itself forward as an
alternative area for the transit of energetic supplies towards the
EU. This is an appropriate role considering its proximity to more
than 70% of the worldwide oil and gas resources and it uses this to
negotiate its entrance into the EU; its position, between the Caspian
and the Middle-Eastern area allows it to coordinate with the EU on
its energetic security policy and it constitutes a pivotal point for
the diversification of energetic supply.

However, the growing need for resources sows the seeds for dependence
on Russia. The Blue Stream gas pipeline, built in 2002 and officially
opened in 2005, directly connects Russian Izobilnoye to the port of
Samsun and then to Ankara. Its capacity is about 16 billion cubic
metres per year and only a quarter of this capacity is currently
exploited.

Turkey's desire to diversify its own suppliers and its idea of becoming
a preferred area of transit towards the EU are pushing the country
to distance itself from Moscow and to promote the development of the
energetic supply network from East to West. As a consequence there
exists the Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan pipeline and its twin project for the
construction of the South Caucasus Pipeline, under development since
2004. Both of these are meant to be extended on the other side of the
Caspian Sea, in Turkmenistan e Kazakhstan. Access will be difficult
to obtain without some form of compensation for Russia.

Another route of development has been undertaken by Turkey towards
Teheran. Last July a memorandum was signed with Iran regarding the
possibility of transporting gas to Europe via Iran and Turkey and
allowing Turkish Petroleum to withdraw gas in Iran, casting off
American advice and ousting the Russian monopoly.Blue Stream-2,
the project conceived for the extension of Blue Stream to Eastern
Europe, has failed. The negative response from Turkey has not been an
obstacle for Russian projects. Russia has found another way to reach
the European core by way of an agreement with Bulgaria, avoiding
the congested Bosporus. In this way Turkey has been excluded from
a European supply route. The alternative of the Turkish route is
clear, but realized only in part. However, there still remains a
certain amount of mitigation as to Russia's influence over European
energetic security.

The Turkish counterweight to the Russian centripetal force plays a
role, even if it is not dominant, with a desire to have a monopoly
over resources and Russian energetic transport. The part played by
Turkey is advantageous for the UE and it bears a huge weight in the
negotiation for its entrance into the EU, something which has been
intermittently considered since 1963. As well as this, EU-Russian
relations are not affected by its relations with Turkey. The two run
along parallel tracks, without interfering with one another.

Conclusion

Quite simply, Russia and Turkey are not heading towards any direct
cooperation as to their foreign politics. Both countries have
highly competitive policies even if there are no signs of direct
confrontation and in some circumstances, important agreements have
been reached. The two countries are considered to be on a perfectly
level playing field. It is considered a remote possibility that the
two will work together in total agreement. However, Turkey does
not have the same influence as Russia. It follows an independent
strategy in the area whose results are concrete cards in the hands
of the Western countries. In this way, Ankara acts in the East and
looks towards the West.

[Siamanto]

Re: Temporarily So Called Turkey and the World: Perceptions, Relations...

National Observer - Australia and World Affairs
December 22, 2007

Europe's Turkish Conundrum.

by Poprzeczny, Joseph
Pg. 51(6) No. 73 ISSN: 1442-5548



Is the 71-million-strong, nominally secular, Turkish state suited to
become a fully-fledged member of the European Union (EU)? That is a
question which increasing numbers of European politicians and voters
are asking themselves and will continue to ask over coming years,
with many already concluding in the negative.

And this despite Turkey having been a NATO member since 1952, ongoing
commercial ties with the EU and its predecessor, the European Common
Market (ECM), plus a sizeable Turkish minority living within the EU's
borders, especially Germany's, since the 1960s. Not widely knownis
that Turkey was the first country outside the ECM's six foundation
members to seek membership in 1960. When it realized this would
nothappen, it gained associate status in 1963, following Israel.

It is perhaps also worth recalling that when Turkey was at the centre
of the powerful Ottoman Empire, its formidable armies besieged Vienna
twice--in 1529 and 1683--first under Sultan Suleiman I (the
magnificent) and then under Grand Vizier Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa
Pasha. The intention, in 1683 at least, was to establish an Islamic
fiefdom that stretched across central Europe--the lands of
present-day Austriaand Bavaria.

If the Hussars of Poland's King Jan III Sobieski (1629-1696) hadn't
arrived in the nick of time to help rout the Ottomans outside
Vienna's walls, Europe would now be Islamised in part or in whole
from theAtlantic to the Polish-Russian border, and resemble, on a
larger scale, multi-ethnic present-day Bosnia-Herzegovina, with
Muslims in the majority. Instead, Austria's Habsburgs, through the
military genius of French-born Prince Eugene of Savoy (1663-1736),
who fought with Sobieski outside besieged Vienna, steadily rolled
back the 200year Ottoman advance into the heart of Europe, southwards
towards Belgrade.

Thereafter, Austria's Holy Roman Empress Maria Theresa (1717-1780)and
her son Joseph II (1714-1790) fostered costly ongoing colonisation
programmes to re-Europeanise or re-Christianise Hungarian and
northern Balkan lands which were largely depopulated and Islamised,
as Spain had been until the late fifteenth century. It was only in
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that Turkey was finally
forced out of all of Greece, the spiritual home of Western art,
literature and philosophy, and out of neighbouring lands which it had
held for centuries.

The EU's final decision on Turkey, whether for full membership or a
special status, which may involve referendums in all member
states,therefore promises to be a truly historic one since it could
be viewed as an accommodation of two earlier Turkish attempts to
enter Europe, even if under markedly different terms and
circumstances. Althoughthere is nothing happening in Turkey today to
suggest the likelihoodof anything resembling the 1529 and 1683
attempted entries into Europe, there are nevertheless a range of
disturbing features that make Europeans uneasy.

TENSIONS IN MODERN TURKEY

In highlighting some of these it must be stressed that Turkey
conducted a national election on 25 July that received widespread
acclamation from unbiased observers. Even so, it would be myopic to
ignore several other proclivities within modern Turkish society,
especially its political landscape. The first is that the majority
party that forms Turkey's new government is the Islamic-rooted
Justice and Development Party (AKP), which strengthened its hold on
the parliament. The AKP--a 17-group coalition--is headed by
Istanbul's former mayor, long-time Islamist Recep Tayyib Erdogan,
whose family is descended from Georgian immigrants. (Interestingly,
the iconic Kemal Ataturk, who stamped secularism upon Turkey in the
1920s and earlier had commanded a division against the ANZACS at
Gallipoli, was born in Greece.)

Erdogan set about remoulding the AKP into a broadly-based,
centre-right entity that is ostensibly seeking EU membership. He has
argued that Turkey's established secularist parties had failed to
manage theeconomy effectively, especially during the crises of the
late 1990s and early 2000s. In July, the AKP boosted its vote from 34
to 47 per cent with a voter turnout of 81 per cent, up from 79 per
cent in 2003. Most attribute this success as due to Erdogan's
competent economic management record, which followed precepts laid
down by the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

The next-largest party, the People's Republic Party (CHP), which
seeks to preserve a secular or European-style Turkey, won 112 seats,
or just over 20 per cent. After that, with 70-seats, came the
ultra-nationalist National Action Party (MHP), which strongly opposes
Turkey's entry into the EU. According to Middle East expert Amir
Tahiri:

"Instead, it preaches a milder version of the classical
pan-Turkism--the idea that Turkic nations should unite under Ankara's
leadership and create a new 'superpower'. The pan-Turkists believe
that Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and
Chinese Turkestan (Xinjiang) should join Turkey to create the 'broad
Turkic space' that would also include Finland and Hungary, two
European nationsthat they regard as of Turkish origin. The 'broad
Turkic space' could also be extended to northern Iraq, where a few
hundred thousand Turkmen live, and northwest Iran that is home to
some 15 million Azeri speakers. In a sense, the surprise return of
the pan-Turkists is a reaction to fears that the AKP is harboring
pan-Islamist ambitions."

The MHP's nationalism is therefore based on a quasi-historical
fantasy that claims common Turkish ancestry for a disunited but
raciallyhomogeneous set of peoples living in a diverse number of
countries, two of which are EU members. One of the party's
ideological tracts reads:

"Turks, do not have any friend or ally other than other Turks. Turks!
Turn to your roots. Our words are to those that have Turkish ancestry
and are Turks.... Those that have torn down this nation [referring to
the Ottoman Empire] are Greek, Armenian and xxx traitors, and
Kurdish, Bosnian and Albanians.... How can you, as a Turk, tolerate
these dirty minorities? Remove, from within, the Armenians and Kurds
and all Turkish enemies."

As well as such revanchistes, Turkey's new parliament now has 27
Kurdish politicians who won as independents, signalling that Ankara
also faces a continued Kurdish nationalism on top of a racially-based
Turkic nationalism. Also worth noting is the fact that all this
occurred in the context of an expanding economy, the only one in the
Islamic world that is generating jobs--so much so that Turks have
virtuallyceased seeking employment in Europe and oil-rich Middle
Eastern states.

SECULARISM AND ISLAMISM

Although the 2007 election was the first in Turkish political history
in which an incumbent prime minister and his party were re-elected,
standing over Erdogan is the military, the ultimate protector of the
1920s transforming revolution that Ataturk led in order to infuse
secularism into a hardly willing Islamic nation--though even the
officer class presumably harbours quite a few members who silently
favourErdogan.

Just as one swallow does not make a spring, one democratic election
has not transformed Turkey into an ongoing democracy. Any bid to
further Islamise Turkey must inevitably confront both the
pan-Turkists on the right, militant atheists on the far left,
secularists across the middle, and the military overseeing all.
Moreover, if Erdogan misjudges his Kurdish problem, he'll find
himself confronting not just 27Kurdish parliamentarians (who on
entering parliament swore their oath in Kurdish, causing much upset
amongst the Turkic majority), but also the long-time rebellious and
battle-hardened separatist Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), which is
not averse to terrorist tactics. Thus,below the surface of
institutions such as a parliament, beyond the control of the
governing majority, outside the democratic framework ofparliamentary
elections, and underneath the expanding economy, an array of
turbulent and contradictory currents flow.

Could, or more pertinently, should, Europe be expected to accommodate
all or even some of these?

SUSPICIONS ABOUT AKP'S INTENTIONS

Overriding these uniquely Turkish problems is the full gamut of the
Islamisation question, in other words, the stances being taken by the
AKP on one side and the CHP, plus the military, on the other. The
crucial point, which Erdogan's AKP coalitionists no doubt realise,
isthat, even though they attracted 47 per cent of the vote, the
majority--53 per cent--of Turks voted otherwise, including for some
ardent anti-Islamic political entities. And amongst the leadership of
those representing that other Turkey--the 53 per cent--great
suspicion about the AKP prevails.

The AKP is seen as a party that has embarked on a transformationist
path, and many of those in its 17 groups are perceived by its enemies
as wishing slowly to remove the secularist or Kemalist facets
thathave been adopted over the past 80 years. Put bluntly, the AKP is
seen, rightly or wrongly, as a purposive party that is secretly
seekingto restore the Caliphate so as to transform Turkey into a
second, but rival Sunni, not Shiite, Iran. If the frequently voiced
suspicions (admittedly self-serving) of those who head up the 53 per
cent of Turks opposed to Erdogan are correct, then Turkey's destiny
will certainly fall well short of the kind of state that would
qualify for EU membership.

The AKP is suspected by its enemies of having embarked on what
hasbeen described as a "slow or silent purge" of Turkish
institutions, with Islamists taking control of all the "commanding
heights". The fact that July's election was sparked by the AKP
attempt to elevate itsforeign minister, Abdullah Gul, to the
presidency is significant. MrGul's nomination not only triggered a
political crisis but also a warning from the military that it could
intervene. Secularists rejectedGul's bid to gain the presidency
because of his career in the pro-Islamist Welfare Party and the fact
that his wife, like Erdogan's wife,wears the headscarf--an extremely
divisive symbol in Turkey.

But that is just the tip of what secularists believe is a far larger
Islamic iceberg that is threatening the nation. The AKP's
supposed"transformationism" is seen as being embedded in covert or
highly conspiratorial politics. Taheri put it as follows:

"There is plenty of evidence that the party is engaged in a
silentpurge of its political opponents, and placing its cadres in
control of the machinery of state and the state-controlled public
sector of the economy. Over the past four years, many judges of
secularist persuasion have been pushed into retirement, or demoted,
and replaced by AKP sympathizers. A slow purge has also hit the
nation's educational apparatus, with an unknown number of those "not
Islamic enough" replaced by individuals close to the party. A similar
change of personnel has been taking place within the armed forces
that have always acted as guarantors of the secular republic. As far
as appointments to key posts in the public sector of the economy are
concerned, the AKP has gone beyond the limits of normal grace and
favour or even straight nepotistic politics."

The AKP's bosses have been acting like the nomenclatura of the
Chinese Communist Party that has promoted a "privatised" economy by
frequently favouring relatives and friends to man the new class of
capitalists. Such crony-capitalism, which helps enrich the party in
campaigning and propaganda, alongside family members and ideological
pals, is common to both. "The joke in Ankara is that while the IMF
sets the policies that produce prosperity in Turkey, it is the AKP
that distributes the fruits," Taheri says.

TURKEY'S FUTURE

Turkey has, after nearly half a century of close association with
Europe and Western institutions, such as the IMF, NATO, and the
WorldBank, been greatly helped to elevate itself towards what Ataturk
andhis heirs, particularly those within the military, sought. It is
up to the AKP to continue along that path if it is really seeking
modernity, and all that that means.

However, if the "transformationism" its enemies perceive is
reallythere strongly beneath all the disclaimers, if the party has
really set out to construct something that has more in common with,
say, Tehran, than Europe, then unanimity will inevitably emerge
across European electorates in the view that the Erdogan-created
Turkey has no place in the EU. Time will tell.

Meanwhile the question remains: does Erdogan and do those heading the
AKP's 17-segment coalition aspire to something resembling what
Ataturk's heirs and over half the electorate desire, or do they
secretly wish to associate themselves far more with the ideological
aspirations, though of course not the same military aims and methods,
that marked the reigns of Suleiman I and Mustafa Pasha?

ABOUT THE AUTHOR:

JOSEPH POPRZECZNY is a Perth-based freelance journalist and
historical researcher. He is author of Odilo Globocnik, Hitler's Man
in theEast (2004).


http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Europe's+Turkish+Conundrum.-a0168619625

[Siamanto]

Re: Temporarily So Called Turkey and the World: Perceptions, Relations...

1 of 2


FORUM 18 NEWS SERVICE, Oslo, Norway

http://www.forum18.org/

The right to believe, to worship and witness
The right to change one's belief or religion
The right to join together and express one's belief

================================================
Thursday 29 November 2007
TURKEY: WHAT CAUSES INTOLERANCE AND VIOLENCE?

The trial in Malatya of those accused of murdering three Protestants has
drawn attention again to the question of what causes such intolerance and
violence. Güzide Ceyhan, a Turkish Protestant, in a personal commentary for
Forum 18 News Service <http://www.forum18.org>, identifies three trends
behind the murders: disinformation by public figures and the mass media;
the rise of Turkish nationalism; and the marginalisation of smaller groups
>From Turkish society. All three trends feed off each other, and all of
Turkey's smaller religious communities - those within Islam and
Christianity, as well as Baha'is and Jehovah's Witnesses - are affected by
them in various ways. Many Turkish people - of all religions and none - are
committed to furthering democracy and human rights, while civil society is
growing stronger. But for the fundamental right of all Turkish citizens to
freedom of thought, conscience and belief to be truly protected, a human
rights-based approach is indispensable.



TURKEY: WHAT CAUSES INTOLERANCE AND VIOLENCE?

By Güzide Ceyhan

After speaking at the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly on 3
October, Turkey's newly-elected President Abdullah Gül insisted to
journalists that members of various religions live in harmony in Turkey. He
called the murders of Hrant Dink, an Armenian Turkish journalist, and Fr
Andrea Santoro, a Catholic priest, "politically-motivated killings", but
did not discuss the recent murders of three Christians in Malatya.

Fr Santoro - an Italian - was murdered in his church in Trabzon in
February 2006 (see F18News 9 February 2006
<http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=724>). Dink was murdered in
Istanbul in January 2007. April 2007 saw the murders in Malatya of the
three Protestant Christians - two ethnic Turks, Necati Aydin and Ugur
Yuksel, and one German, Tilmann Geske (see F18News 10 July 2007
<http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=990>). These three attacks
have resulted in the murder of five people not belonging to the Sunni
Muslim majority. This causes Turkey's smaller religious communities to view
their future with fear and insecurity.

Turkey has many different religious communities. They include Alevi
Muslims (the largest religious minority, with perhaps 17 million people);
Islamic brotherhoods (the Sunni Nakchibendis, Mevlevis and others as well
as the Shi'ite Bektashis); new Islamic movements (such as the Nurcus and
Suleymancis); Protestant Christians; Catholic Christians; Armenian
Apostolic Christians; Syriac Orthodox Christians; Greek Orthodox
Christians; Georgian Orthodox Christians; Jehovah's Witnesses; and Baha'is
(see F18News 10 July 2007
<http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=990>).

Intolerance against various groups varies over time. The experience of the
community I know best, my own small 3,000-strong Protestant community,
illustrates the problems that these communities face. In the case of the
Protestants, these ultimately resulted in the Malatya murders. Other
communities also suffer intolerance and violence. Because many Protestants
are converts from an Islamic background, theirs is a very good "test case"
to examine how far tolerance in Turkey can accommodate true religious
freedom.

What is the source of the intolerance that has fuelled violence against
Christians? I think three trends can be identified:

1. disinformation about Christianity in statements by public figures and
through the media;

2. the rise of Turkish nationalism;

3. and the implicit and explicit approval both of the marginalisation of
Christians from Turkish society and also of actions - including murders -
against them.

All three trends feed off and interact with each other.



1. Disinformation

Disinformation about Christianity was highlighted in the European
Commission's latest progress report on Turkey, released on 6 November. In
the "human rights and the protection of minorities" section, under "freedom
of religion", the Commission notes the continuing depiction of missionaries
by both the authorities and the media as "a threat to the integrity of the
country and non-Muslim minorities as not being an integral part of Turkish
society". And it adds: "To date, use of language that might incite hatred
against non-Muslim minorities has been left unpunished." (The report is
available at
<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2007/nov/turkey_progress_reports_en.pdf>.)

Such disinformation - particularly around the topic of conversion to
Christianity - is widespread in both the national and local media. The
lawyer of the Turkish Kurtulus (Salvation) Protestant Churches, Orhan Kemal
Cengiz, told Bianet (a respected independent journalism network) soon after
the Malatya murders that although "missionary activity" is not a crime in
Turkey, politicians and the media have by constant repetition invented such
a crime. Individuals then decide to punish this "crime" (see
<http://www.bianet.org/2007/04/19/94817.htm>).

The submission of the Prosecutor in the trial of the alleged killers of
the three Christians in Malatya, which began on 23 November 2007, is a case
in point. The Prosecutor's submission makes much of the missionary
activities of the victims, not the actions of the accused. Cengiz, the
lawyer representing the victims, complained that "they are trying to
demonstrate that missionary activity is 'unjust provocation' which might
then decrease any sentence," Milliyet newspaper reported on 20 November.
The newspaper also reported that Cengiz thinks that this claim, along with
the Prosecutor providing much information on the victims' activity, "opens
the door to new attacks".

In news reports which started before the trial (which will resume on 14
January 2008), some parts of the mass media are continuing to attack the
murder victims, not the murders. Ihlas News Agency, a major video news
agency, persistently linked the lawyers for the victims with the legal
defence of both suspects from the PKK terrorist organisation, as well as
Hrant Dink's son who has been accused of "insulting Turkishness" under
Article 301 of the Criminal Code. Ihlas also gave prominence to a statement
From one of the accused that one of the murder victims said that
"Christianity and the Bible were good and praised the PKK. I became angry
at what he said." The Bianet news agency noted on 24 November that this
kind of reporting was dangerous, as it was "putting the lawyers into the
dart board."

Mustafa Aydin, retired Head of the Interior Ministry's intelligence
agency, the Security Directorate, also pointed to the increasing
sensitivities over missionary activity. In an interview in the weekly news
magazine Aksiyon just after the murders, he blamed statements about
missionaries - by people without due authority which are then picked up by
the media - that are "unnecessary, exaggerated and even have negative
intent" (see <http://www.aksiyon.com.tr/detay.php?id=27272>).

Scores of television programmes have negatively covered Protestants,
particularly those who have converted from Islam to Christianity. The
popular TV series "Kurtlar Vadisi" ("Valley of Wolves") recently depicted
missionaries as people who buy the faith of poor families and offer them a
new religion. Professor Zekeriya Beyaz, Dean of Marmara University's
[Muslim] Theology Faculty, takes the same line in his many articles and
talks on missionaries and Christians. (Professor Beyaz is also
controversial in some Muslim circles, because of his support for Turkey's
university headscarf ban. For this, he himself has been the victim of a
knife attack.) Speaking on Star TV's programme "What's Happening There?" in
September 2007, he complained that "missionaries are making all our young
people Christians and are opening unlawful churches under the protection of
the law".

In Turkey, it is a fairly new phenomenon that people have experienced
their fellow-Turks and foreign missionaries actively sharing non-Muslim
beliefs such as Christianity. This has had a significant impact on Turkish
society. In the 1980s, Turkish Protestants were a mere handful of people,
becoming more numerous only in the past 20 years. But instead of seeing
this change in society as a topic that needs unbiased investigation and
reporting (which my fellow Turkish Protestants would welcome), Turkey's
media has reacted with suspicion, hostility and stereotyping.

This societal change is commonly portrayed as the result of a plan by
foreign missionaries with a number of alleged motives: to deceive those
ignorant of Islam and those who are financially vulnerable and to weaken
the national loyalty of Turkish citizens so as to ultimately divide the
country. These alleged purposes are widely disseminated in publications and
on scores of websites. In one of many examples of this, the Istanbul
newspaper Üsküdar Gazetesi published a book of allegations called "Dikkat
Misyoner Geliyor" ("Beware, Missionary coming"). Media coverage has mostly
been sensationalist and has not given those accused the opportunity to
respond. Disturbingly, the media has published the addresses of places of
worship and names, putting individual Protestants at physical risk.

The government's Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) has also viewed
the growing number of converts as a concern (see F18News 26 July 2006
<http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=817>). The Diyanet has the
mission "to engage in activities related to worship and ethics of Islamic
Religion and enlighten people on religion and management of worship
places". The Diyanet prepares and distributes Friday sermons to all
mosques. Mosques under its control are the only ones allowed in Turkey, and
these sermons are the only Friday sermons allowed in Turkey. (The Diyanet
also runs mosques outside Turkey, in countries such as Germany.) In March
2005 a Friday sermon was distributed to all imams on the dangers of
missionary activity, which described it as "a scheme of foreigners to steal
the faith of the young".

Echoing this thinking, a day after the murders in Malatya, Niyazi Güney, a
senior official in the Justice Ministry, remarked to Turkish
parliamentarians that "missionary work is even more dangerous than
terrorism and unfortunately is not considered a crime in Turkey". He
repeated this view in the Milliyet newspaper. Terrorism - which remains a
great threat in Turkey - and missionary activity are thus seen as
connected. And almost any manifestation of Christian belief - including
gatherings in church buildings - is seen by those who hold these views as
"missionary activity". I am fearful of what this approach implies for the
safety of Christians in Turkey.

Missionary activity has also been on the agenda of the National Security
Council (MGK), which is chaired ex officio by President Gül and also
comprises the Chief of the General Staff, the commanders of all the
branches of the Turkish Armed Forces and several government ministers. In a
February 2005 evaluation of current and future challenges to Turkish
security, the MGK drew attention to "a need for social activities that will
prevent the spreading of organisations and ideologies that will have an
impact on Turkey's unity". It suggested that "abusive missionary activities
should not be permitted". What exactly was meant by "abusive missionary
activity" was not defined.

[Siamanto]

Re: Temporarily So Called Turkey and the World: Perceptions, Relations...

2 of 2


FORUM 18 NEWS SERVICE, Oslo, Norway

http://www.forum18.org/

The right to believe, to worship and witness
The right to change one's belief or religion
The right to join together and express one's belief

================================================
Thursday 29 November 2007
TURKEY: WHAT CAUSES INTOLERANCE AND VIOLENCE?

.....

2. Nationalism

The second factor fuelling violent attacks, nationalism, has always been
strong in Turkey. This has risen in recent years, sparked, some Turkish
observers think, by increased terrorist attacks by the separatist Kurdistan
Worker's Party (PKK) and the socio-economic effects of globalisation. The
rise in votes gained by the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), from 8.3 per
cent in the November 2002 parliamentary elections to 14.3 per cent in the
July 2007 parliamentary elections, is a marker of this (see F18News 28 June
2007 <http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=983>).

The current rise in nationalism has some extremely alarming
characteristics. There is the expectation that every Turkish citizen will
have ultra-nationalist "feelings". Nationalist discourse seems to define a
Turk as only someone who is a Sunni Muslim Turkish nationalist.
Nationalists see themselves as called to defend Turkey against "threats"
>From "others", who are frequently Turks who do not fit the nationalist
stereotype. This approach alienates those defined as "others".

One victim of this approach has been the Alevi community, who are Turkish
and Muslim but not Sunni. An illustration of this was a 9 October judgement
of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) on Hasan and Eylem Zengin v.
Turkey (Application nr. 1448/04) (see
<http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight= 1448/04&sessionid=3585479&skin=hudoc-en>).
In the case, brought by Alevis, the ECHR noted that "the Government have
recognised, however, in the 'religious culture and morals' lessons, the
religious diversity which prevails in Turkish society is not taken into
account." The classes are optional for those who are recorded on their
identity cards as being either xxxs or Christians (see F18News 26 July 2006
<http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=817>).

The ECHR is becoming increasingly important in defending freedom of
thought conscience and belief in Turkey (see F18News 18 January 2007
<http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=901>).

A related nationalist strand also sees violence as acceptable, if used
against "others" labelled as a threat to Turkey. References to the 1919-23
War of Independence are used to claim that "extraordinary measures" are
still necessary against "threats". The person accused of Hrant Dink's
murder was pictured standing in front of the Turkish flag, with a quote
>From Mustafa Kemal Atatürk: "Extraordinary times call for extraordinary
measures." Protestant Christians' religious beliefs are often perceived as
a "threat" which has the alleged purpose of weakening national identity, as
being a Sunni Muslim is considered an indispensable part of this identity.
Ultimately, Protestants are seen as having the aim of destroying the unity
of the state. A July 2007 survey by the nationalist Turkish Education Union
claims that 54 per cent of people consider that "missionaries" are the
biggest threat to Turkey (see
<http://www.turkegitimsen.org.tr/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=627>).



3. Marginalisation

The third factor fuelling violent attacks (closely connected with
disinformation and nationalism) is the approval - both implicit and
explicit - of the marginalisation of Christians in Turkish society. As
noted above, this has even led to the approval of murders. Although state
officials were careful to condemn the Malatya murders, one could detect the
"yes, these killings are horrible but these missionaries had it coming"
attitude from some officials' statements and media comments. (See F18News 9
February 2006 <http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=724> for
comments after Fr Santoro's murder and F18News 10 July 2007
<http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=990> for comments after the
murders of the three Protestants.)

Related to this is the use made by some Muslims in Turkey of the Koran to
glorify the killing of so-called "apostates". Those who murdered the three
Christians in Malatya mutilated their victims in ways reminiscent of the
language of Sura 8:12 of the Koran.

Turkish history indicates that groups stigmatised as "unacceptable" or
"threats to the nation" can very quickly become the victims of violence by
other citizens. Istanbul's Armenian and Greek communities suffered from the
July 1955 pogrom, while in 1993 Alevi Muslims in Sivas suffered in a bomb
attack which left 37 people dead. Sadly, such stigmatising is still
happening. Turkish citizens of Kurdish origin are now being unlawfully
stigmatised as PKK sympathisers. Turkish citizens who are Protestant, as an
October 2007 statement from the Alliance of Protestant Churches noted,
suffered "scores of threats or attacks" on congregations and church
buildings in 2006.

"The perpetrators have not been found. At times, the security authorities,
acknowledging that there is such a threat, advised the use of private
security companies," the statement continues. It is surely right for the
Alliance of Protestant Churches to point out that "this is unacceptable
when the State should be guaranteeing freedom of religion and the security
of individuals and property."

The need for a human rights-based approach

There is much to be concerned about within Turkish society. But despite
this, Turkey has made genuine efforts to implement its national and
international commitments to protecting human rights in general and freedom
of religion and belief in particular. Turkey has great potential to become
a well-functioning, stable democracy and has made significant progress in
complying with human rights commitments. Many Turkish people - of all
religions and none - are committed to furthering democracy and human
rights, while civil society is growing stronger. It would be simply untrue
to say that individuals who do not conform to Sunni Muslim Turkish identity
experience constant hardship.

Fundamental human rights are protected to a great extent, although
challenges remain in providing consistent daily protection of those rights
for all. Steps must be taken to ensure that President Gül's statement in
Strasbourg becomes Turkish reality. The first step must be to understand,
disseminate information on and train officials - at all levels - on what
the right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief actually
means.

Freedom of religion and belief, as understood in international human
rights law, means among other things the right to have and change one's
belief and manifest such belief in worship, teaching, practice and
observance. It can only be restricted under certain clearly defined
circumstances and criteria. Establishing places of worship, teaching one's
belief to the followers of the belief, sharing one's beliefs with those of
different beliefs, and engaging in humanitarian assistance are all
protected by the right to freedom of religion and belief. Yet as we have
seen, in Turkey such activities are viewed with suspicion and hatred. This
fundamental right of all Turkish citizens - whatever their religion or
belief (including such beliefs as atheism) - is threatened by
disinformation, nationalism and the marginalisation of minorities.

A human rights-based approach to these problems is an indispensable part
of the solution. If this approach is put into concrete action, there will
be genuine cause to hope that President Gül's statement on living together
in harmony will become a reality for the members of all Turkey's smaller
religious communities. (END)

- Güzide Ceyhan, a Turkish Protestant, contributed this commentary to
Forum 18 News Service <http://www.forum18.org>. Commentaries are personal
views and do not necessarily represent the views of F18News or Forum 18.

PDF and printer-friendly views of this article can be accessed from
<http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=1053>. It may freely be
reproduced, redistributed or quoted from, with due acknowledgement to Forum
18 <http://www.forum18.org>.

More analyses and commentaries on freedom of thought, conscience and
belief in Turkey can be found at
<http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php?query=&religion=all&country=68>.

A printer-friendly map of Turkey is available at
<http://www.nationalgeographic.com/xpeditions/atlas/index.html?Parent=mideast&Rootmap=turkey>.
(END)

© Forum 18 News Service. All rights reserved. ISSN 1504-2855
You may reproduce or quote this article provided that credit is given to
F18News http://www.forum18.org/

[Siamanto]

Re: Temporarily So Called Turkey and the World: Perceptions, Relations...

IN SEARCH OF HUMANISM IN TURKEY
The Globe - By Khalid Khayati

Kurdish Aspect, CO

http://www.kurdishaspect.com/doc111407KK.html

Nov 14 2007

What reasons lie behind the exclusionary behavior of the Turkish state?

Political commentator Khalid Khayati discusses Turkey's "paranoia,
nationalistic hate sentiments, and phobia vis-a-vis other people
and other cultures that were perceived as deviant and harmful to
the state."

Where are the Kurds in Istanbul?

At the end of 2003 in Istanbul, I was attending a conference on
immigration that was organized by a number of Swedish and Turkish
universities, research institutions, and the Swedish consulate in
Istanbul. At the conference, several researchers from both Turkey
and EU countries presented a number of research papers addressing
the different aspects of contemporary immigration and its various
implications for Turkey, as this country has always been considered
a turning plate for hundred of thousands of immigrants and refugees
who wanted in one way or another to go to Western countries.

The most striking was that during this two-days-long conference,
not a single allusion was made to the Kurds. In the same way, West
European researchers, completely aware about the rule of the play
and the constraint of official Turkish sociology, remained reluctant
to pronounce any word that would sound Kurdish as they knew perfectly
well that the larger part of those refugees and immigrants who entered
Turkey legally and illegally from the neighboring countries were
Kurds. Likewise, the scholars were conscious of several international
reports about the devastation of more than 3,000 Kurdish villages
by the Turkish army during the armed conflict with the PKK that
had its apogee in 1990s and the followed forced displacement of 3
million Kurds who in a way became internal refugees and immigrants
in Turkey. However, treating the issue of immigration in such a way
without evoking the Kurds is more or less the same as talking about
cutting a tropical forest without mentioning the forest itself.

Another striking example that can be evoked in this context is to
see how Kurdishness is excluded from the heart of the city of Istanbul.

In the most frequented part of the city, thousands of small and large
shops, restaurants, and recreation offices offer their services and
items to tourists from all over the world and address them in almost
all existing languages. One can perceive shop windows displayed,
for instance, in Greek, Russian, Persian, English, Arabic, French,
Serbo-Croatian, Bosnian, Albanian, Ukrainian, German, Spanish, Italian,
etc., while finding a sign of Kurdishness and Kurdish language in the
tourist areas of Istanbul is almost impossible; this in spite of the
fact that unofficial figures acknowledge the presence of a powerful
Kurdish community in the city of approximately 2 million people.

In this respect, one can pose a couple of questions, such as the
following: What is the reason behind such exclusionary behavior of the
Turkish state? Is a creation of a so "fake" nation that important that
one is ready to pay with real lives and genuine cultures? In any state
of cause, the absence of the humanism in the Turkish initial project
of nation-building paved the way instead for paranoia, nationalistic
hate sentiments, and phobia vis-a-vis other people and other cultures
that were perceived as deviant and harmful to the state.

The act of ethnocide and zero-tolerance vis-a-vis critical voices

Excluding the "others" and particularly the Kurdish language and
culture from the country's public spaces is not uniquely a matter
for politic and culture. This is about a pure act of ethnocide or,
as Abbas Vali says, about a stolen history that has been pursued by
the Turkish state since the establishment of the modern Turkish state
by Mustafa Kamal Ataturk in 1923. In 1924, Kurdish language was banned.

Following that, almost all other cultural and symbolic manifestations
of Kurdish life were prohibited. The names and appellations of the
Kurdish cities, towns, villages, rivers, mountains, springs, ways,
lakes, etc., have, through different legislations, been changed into
Turkish. The Turkish state, reluctant in all situations to mention
the word of Kurd, began to call the Kurdish people "mountain Turks."

In other words, the creation of a modern and homogenous Turkish
state has not only suppressed the ethnic and cultural differences in
the Anatolia but also the traditional political and administrative
organization of the society.

In such a furious climate, there were not so many voices that could
talk in favor of the Kurds.

For instance, Ismail Beşikci was the first, and for a long time,
the only Turkish intellectual to publicly criticize Turkey's official
ideology and politics for being considerably harmful vis-a-vis Kurds.

The price he paid for his moral and intellectual courage and conviction
was high: All his books were banned after he spent more than 10 years
writing them and for defending the Kurdish cause.

Even today, opinions critical of the strongly nationalistic line
are regularly prosecuted. For example, the famous Article 301 of the
Turkish penal code, which is perceived as being contrary to ideas of
freedom of speech, states: "A person who explicitly insults being a
Turk, the Republic, or Turkish Grand National Assembly, the penalty
to be imposed shall be imprisonment for a term of six months to three
years," and, "When insulting being a Turk is committed by a Turkish
citizen in a foreign country, the penalty to be imposed shall be
increased by one third."

It also states: "Expressions of thought intended to criticize shall
not constitute a crime."

Some critical voices say that Turkey may abandon or modify Article 301,
after the embarrassment suffered by high-profile cases.

Nationalists within the judicial system who are not inclined to
work for an EU accession process have used Article 301 to initiate
trials against people like Nobel Prize-winning Turkish novelist Orhan
Pamuk, the Turkish novelist Elif Shafak, and the late Hrant Dink. In
an interview, Pamuk stated: "Thirty-thousand Kurds and a million
Armenians were killed in these lands and nobody dares to talk about
it." Professor Shafak wrote a book dealing with the Armenian Genocide
entitled "The Bastard of Istanbul." In this regard, the destiny of
Hrant Dink was the most tragic one.

Hrant Dink, who was editor-in-chief of the bilingual Turkish-Armenian
newspaper Agos, was best known for his opinions on methods toward a
Turkish-Armenian reconciliation and on human and minority rights in
Turkey, with a special emphasis on the rights of the Armenian minority.

He was often critical of both Turkey's denial of the Armenian Genocide
and of the Armenian Diaspora's campaign for its international
recognition. Regarding his statements, Dink was prosecuted three
times for denigrating Turkishness and received numerous death threats
from Turkish nationalists who accused him of treachery. Hrant Dink
was assassinated in Istanbul on January 19, 2007, allegedly by Ogun
Samast, an ultra-nationalist Turk.

The need of humanism

In October 2005, the European Union opened membership talks with
Turkey, the first time a predominately Muslim nation has been
considered for inclusion in the European confederation. Turkey's
bid to join the European Union turned a corner with the opening of
the long-awaited accession negotiations. The terms of accession and
Turkey's long-term prospects for EU membership remain unclear.

As a response to the process of accession, Ankara has in recent
years implemented political and economic reforms intended to appease
EU members opposed to its inclusion. But these reforms have been
considered inadequate for Turkey's EU accession as many people continue
to distrust the commitment of the Turkish state to democracy and human
rights and its ability to reach European standards in issues such as
gender equality, political freedom, religious freedom, and minority
rights, especially regarding the Kurdish population, non-Muslims,
particularly Christians, journalists, and homosexuals.

Today, Turkey is going through a very sensitive period in its
history. More than any other country in the Middle East, it needs the
assistance of democratic nations to manage this fragile transitory
phase of its historical and political existence. Let us paraphrase
Martin Luther King and say the people of Turkey have a dream; the
dream of a nation where Ismail Beşikci is not obliged to spend 10
years of his life in prison for defending the Kurdish cause; a nation
where Orhan Pamuk one more time stays in his beloved Istanbul to
create his masterworks; a nation where Hrant Dink has come back to
life and writes freely in his Agos; a nation where the language and
culture of others are recognized and promoted; and a nation where
even the case of the PKK is considered a human affair and solved
through peaceful methods. The new Turkish nation is a multicultural
and multiethnic nation that is no longer intimated by its past, as
the past is informed and recognized. In the new nation, humanism is
the most important guideline of society.



.........

[Siamanto]

Re: Temporarily So Called Turkey and the World: Perceptions, Relations...

DEBATING TURKEY AND THE EU
Tulin Daloglu

Washington Times, DC
Dec 4 2007

ANKARA, Turkey. -- In the past two years, the suburbs of Paris have
twice witnessed violent clashes between non-native French citizens and
the police. Whether religious and cultural differences or poverty,
unemployment and racial discrimination are the root causes of
these incidents is open to debate. But what's interesting is that
in September 2006, before he was elected president, Nicolas Sarkozy
visited Washington and argued that then the first French riot stood
as one of the reasons he opposes Turkey's European Union membership.

"[I] have often been asked about the place of Muslims in France,
because of concern in the United States," Mr. Sarkozy said at an
event organized by the French-American Foundation. "My dear friends,
let's be consistent. What's the point of worrying about our ability
to integrate Muslims in France or in Europe if at the same time,
and just as forcefully, the United States asks us to accept Turkey
in Europe? Even if you consider that we have a problem with Islam,
in which case, you have to give us time to find the ways and means
to create a European Islam and reject an Islam in Europe. But don't
then give equal support to the integration of a country like Turkey,
with 75 million inhabitants. Consistency is part of the relations
between Europe and the United States." Indeed, Mr. Sarkozy's point
of view is shared by many Europeans.

It's true that Turkey is becoming more Muslim than European -
particularly since the Islamic-rooted Justice and Development Party
(AKP) took power in 2002. Since then, 2006 the Pew Global Attitudes
poll found out that 51 percent of Turks define themselves first as
Muslim. Being religious is not the problem, but there is a lack of
sincere debate about what exactly scares people when they are faced
with Islamic practices taking a role in governmental life. If freedom
of religion is measured by allowing headscarves in governmental
buildings, would it also consider new interpretations of those
practices by others? Or whether AKP's understanding of secular
government is consistent with European secular rule?

Mr. Sarkozy is right to say that he needs time to "find the ways
and means to create a European Islam." But it is also a fact that
Europeans allowed political Islam in Turkey to make headscarves the
one and only problem with freedom of religion; now, it's time they
look deeper into the issue. Turkey's most trusted public opinion
survey group, KONDA, led by Tarhan Erdem, yesterday announced the
results of a new survey that shows a significant rise in numbers of
covered women. According to this survey, in the last four years,
there are a million more Turkish women wearing headscarfwhile the
ones with turban, which is a sign of political Islam has quadrupled.

Unfortunately, Turkey's secular and liberal elites have denied the
role of religion in public life in such a way that they have created
a huge mess by not investing in theological education to allow an
open-minded approach to matters - understanding what Islam means in
the modern world, rather than a strictly literal interpretation.

There are a limited number of those theologians, but they are not
enough to change a traditionalist mindset.

AKP's insistence on traditionalist practices like the headscarf
stands as proof that it refuses to allow open debate on religious
interpretations. Mr. Sarkozy may have strange bedfellows with respect
to his concerns about Turkey's EU membership; secular Turks may also
be worried about their future.

If the AKP is proud that Turkey has opened accession talks with EU on
its watch, it is now disinterested in moving forward with reforms of
governmental institutions. The European Commission reported "limited
progress" in Turkey's political reform process.

According to the Pew Global Attitudes poll, the EU's favorability
rating in Turkey dropped from 58 percent in 2004 to 27 percent in
2007. There are a number of thorny issues in Turkey's relations with
the EU - including Cyprus, the Armenian genocide allegations and the
Kurdish dilemma. Yet not all of the EU's issues are related to those
matters. And while the AKP is determined to keep Turkey on track to
join the EU, it is sending a number of paradoxical signals. These
raise concerns, as the AKP is a relatively new party and it is almost
impossible to judge how its rule will affect Turkey. The Turkish
scenery, however, looks in absolute chaos for the time being.

Against all the odds it seems that Mr. Sarkozy understands that
Turkey's Westernization process is not only limited to its borders
and its politicians' responses; it is very much a European project.

Yet he may take a more constructive approach in dealing with Turkey.

Still, although Mr. Sarkozy said he would end Turkey's accession
talks with the EU when he was elected, he has done no such thing. Yet
he continues to express his opposition loud and clear, which is
only fair it represents the sincere opinion of some of the European
population. But the outgoing and the incoming EU presidents, Portugal
and Slovenia, continue to express full support to Turkey's membership.

Tulin Daloglu is a freelance writer.

http://washingtontimes.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20071204/EDITORIAL/112040005/1013/editorial&template=nextpage