Nagorno-Karabagh: Military Balance Between Armenia & Azerbaijan

[Federate]

Re: Nagorno-Karabagh: Military Balance Between Armenia & Azerbaijan

Some sh!tty news from the POW exchanges today.
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Azerbaijan sends 3 Armenian POWs to third country

March 17, 2011 | 13:53

Azerbaijan has sent three Armenian POWs to third country, Ashot Astabatsyan from Yerevan office of International Committee of Red Cross, told Armenian News-NEWS.am. However, he did not disclose the details.

Shahin Sailov, secretary of a working group at the Azerbaijani Commission on POWs, Missing Persons and Hostages, has announced that Armenian POWs Hrant Markosyan, Rafik Tevosyan and Vardan Sargsyan were sent to third country under their will and through mediation of the UN.

Today Armenia will hand in a POW, Anar Gajiyev, to the Azerbaijani side, Armen Kaprielyan, head of a working group at the Armenian Commission on POWs, Missing Persons and Hostages told Armenian News-NEWS.

At the moment three Armenian POWs - Ohan Harutyunyan, Gevorg Tovmasyan and Karen Harutyunyan - remain in Azerbaijan. There are also six civilians – Arthur Badalyan, and five members of one Armenian family: Yeghishe, Ruzanna, Alfred, Gayane, and Petros Gevorgyans.

http://news.am/eng/news/51707.html

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Armenia, Azerbaijan exchanged POW and civilian

March 17, 2011 | 15:40

On March 17, at 2:58 p.m. the Armenian side transferred Azerbaijani sergeant Anar Hajiyev to the Azerbaijani side. In its turn, the Azerbaijani side transferred Armenian civilian Arthur Badalyan to the Armenian side.

The sides exchanged the war prisoner and the civilian near Bash Karvend village with the assistance of the Yerevan and Stepanakert Offices of International Committee of Red Cross, NKR Commission on POWs, Missing Person and Hostages informed Armenian News-NEWS.am.

Badalyan was kidnapped in early 2009, but the Azerbaijani side had been refuting reports on his location in Azerbaijan till November 2010.

Upon the invitation of the President of the Russian Federation, the Presidents of Armenia, Russia and Azerbaijan met on March 5, 2011 in Sochi and discussed in detail the process and the prospects of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resolution.

1. To conclude in the shortest possible period of time the exchange of the prisoners of war,

2. To strive to solve all contentious issues through peaceful means and to conduct along the cease-fire line an investigation with the participation of the parties under the auspices of the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs and with the assistance of the Special Representative of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office regarding probable incidents.

The Presidents stressed the importance of their regular meetings on the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and agreed to continue them in the present format and further to the activities of the OSCE Minsk Group.

http://news.am/eng/news/51720.html

[Joseph]

Re: Nagorno-Karabagh: Military Balance Between Armenia & Azerbaijan

22 Azeri soldiers died in two months: analyst
14:06 17-03-2011

Azerbaijan`s armed forces lost 22 servicemen in January and February, an Azerbaijani analyst has said.



Jasur Mammadov, head of the military analysis center Doktrina, told a press conference Thursday that three of the servicemen were killed by Armenian troops, while the other 19 were non-combat deaths.

“Two of them were killed by a snow slide, two others were asphyxiated by carbon monoxide, one was killed in a car accident, three died of diseases, one committed suicide, one died for unknown reasons, while nine died due to violations of statutes.”

According to Mammadov, 14 Azerbaijani servicemen have been injured this year.

He noted that the number of deaths and injuries in the country’s military has surged in comparison with the same period of last year.

In 2010, 71 Azerbaijani military men died, including 17 who were killed in combat. Also, 71 servicemen were wounded last year, Mammadov said.

Azerbaijan has been locked in conflict with Armenia for two decades.

[Joseph]

Re: Nagorno-Karabagh: Military Balance Between Armenia & Azerbaijan

22 Azeri soldiers died in two months: analyst
14:06 17-03-2011

Azerbaijan`s armed forces lost 22 servicemen in January and February, an Azerbaijani analyst has said.



Jasur Mammadov, head of the military analysis center Doktrina, told a press conference Thursday that three of the servicemen were killed by Armenian troops, while the other 19 were non-combat deaths.

“Two of them were killed by a snow slide, two others were asphyxiated by carbon monoxide, one was killed in a car accident, three died of diseases, one committed suicide, one died for unknown reasons, while nine died due to violations of statutes.”

According to Mammadov, 14 Azerbaijani servicemen have been injured this year.

He noted that the number of deaths and injuries in the country’s military has surged in comparison with the same period of last year.

In 2010, 71 Azerbaijani military men died, including 17 who were killed in combat. Also, 71 servicemen were wounded last year, Mammadov said.

Azerbaijan has been locked in conflict with Armenia for two decades.

So with the tally Armanen has taken, if you include March, they have lost 35 troops this year.

[Karabed]

Re: Nagorno-Karabagh: Military Balance Between Armenia & Azerbaijan

Mensoian: Aliyev’s Karabagh Dilemma

These are difficult days for Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev. In fact, he has been experiencing difficult days ever since his military forces were decisively defeated in their attempt to prevent the former Karabagh autonomous region from becoming a free and independent political entity. A Russian-brokered ceasefire between Armenia and Azerbaijan brought this war to a close and established the de facto independence of the Nagorno Karabagh Republic. Since then negotiations have been ongoing between Yerevan and Baku under the mediating efforts of the Minsk Group—created in 1992 and co-chaired by France, Russia, and the United States—by the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe, now known as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).During the intervening years, Aliyev has failed to fashion a solution favorable to Azerbaijan, while Artsakh (Karabagh and the liberated territories) has successfully developed a sustainable economy and a democratic form of governance. In its assigned role as mediator, the Minsk Group continues to subvert the principles of self-determination and remedial secession. Instead, the principle of territorial integrity favorable to Azerbaijan’s interests serves as the basis for negotiations. This is an absolutely unacceptable precondition because it precludes any consideration of de jure independence for Artsakh.During the period 1989-90, the government of Azerbaijan sponsored pogroms against the Armenian population in the cities of Sumgait, Kirovobad (now Ganja), and Baku. These pogroms, properly defined as massacres, were responsible for the deaths of hundreds of Armenians and the forced exodus of tens of thousands of Armenians from Azerbaijan.

Having failed in its efforts to deter the Karabaghtsis, Azerbaijan committed its military to a full-scale assault on Karabagh. Since the ceasefire in 1994, numerous breaches have occurred along the agreed Line of Contact (LoC) by Azeri probing units or deadly sniper fire. Unfortunately, both sides have suffered unnecessary casualties by these wanton acts.

During the ceasefire, while negotiations were ongoing, the Azerbaijan government shamelessly continued its long-standing policy to eradicate cultural artifacts attesting to Armenian occupation of the region centuries before Azerbaijan existed. Perhaps the most egregious occurred in 2005 when the government sponsored the senseless destruction of thousands of khatchkars (hand-carved Armenian stone burial monuments), some dating back to the 6th century, in the ancient Armenian cemetery of Julfa (Jugha) in Nakhitchevan.

Against this background, a reasonable assessment is that no acceptable common ground exists for a negotiated settlement. For Azerbaijan, the resumption of hostilities may be the less preferred but most likely alternative. However, there are serious obstacles and inherent dangers if this course of action is adopted.

In his efforts to achieve a settlement favorable to Azerbaijan, Aliyev wishes to recast the Karabagh issue as an Armenian irredentist movement. This assumption would fit in well with his specious claim of territorial integrity that underlies all principles contained in the Madrid Proposals, which set the parameters for the negotiations. The issue is not, as Aliyev wishes to frame it, that Armenia wants to reclaim its historic territory of Artsakh; rather, the Armenians of Artsakh legitimately exercised their right to be a free and independent political entity.

Aliyev constantly threatens military force to retake Karabagh if peaceful means fail. And what plausible scenario could these peaceful means yield that would encourage the Karabaghtsis to relinquish their lands or their freedom? Unfortunately, the Minsk co-chairs seem unable or unwilling to curb Aliyev’s strident rhetoric and bellicose posturing.

To support his threat to use military force, Aliyev has committed Azerbaijan to expanding and modernizing its military establishment. According to a recent briefing report by the International Crisis Group, Azerbaijan’s already substantial appropriations for its military will increase by nearly 45 percent between 2010 and 2011 to $3.1 billion. This is about 20 percent of Azerbaijan’s total domestic budget. For 2011, Armenia has budgeted about $405 million. However, these numbers alone cannot be used to quantify the military hardware that can be purchased. The terms of sale, the items purchased, and the supplying nations are important determinants.

This stockpiling of tanks, personnel carriers, self-propelled artillery, rocket launchers, helicopter gunships, and fighter aircraft represents only one factor in determining Azerbaijan’s military capability (see “Assessing Azerbaijan’s Military Threat to Retake Karabagh, Part I,” the Armenian Weekly, March 27, 2010; and Part II, April 3, 2010).

While it may be preferable, it is not required that tanks engage tanks on the battlefield or that aircrafts engage aircrafts. It is known that Armenia possesses the respected Russian S-300 upgraded surface-to-air missile system. This is a potent defense against Azeri launched missiles and aircraft operating at low altitudes. Rocket launchers; anti-tank mine fields that channel movement along any sector of the front where tanks can be effectively deployed en masse; anti-aircraft weapons, etc. can be extremely effective weapons as, obviously, are the tanks, artillery, and aircraft that the Karabagh Defense Force can also deploy.

Unless Aliyev and his command staff are convinced that a full-scale offensive, unmindful of potential casualties, can defeat the Karabagh Defense Force and occupy Stepanakert-Shushi and also occupy the Lachin Corridor within 5-7 days of the first shot being fired, it would be a fool’s errand to commence hostilities. To carry it one step further, Azerbaijan would have already committed its military to retaking Karabagh if it believed victory could be guaranteed within a matter of days before an expected ceasefire could take effect.

Azerbaijan must take into consideration that within the first few hours following the resumption of hostilities, the Karabagh Defense Force would engage any number of predetermined targets as well as launching surgical strikes against strategic objectives. Which targets and the severity of the response would be commensurate with the threat posed.

The terrain offers significant advantages to the Karabagh Defense Force, which has had ample opportunity to construct appropriate in-depth defensive positions along its frontier. The northern sector embraces mountainous terrain with average elevations of 2,000 meters or more. Any action along this sector by Azerbaijani units stationed at Ganja would be more in the nature of a diversionary tactic.

The eastern frontier stretches about 125 km. in length (as the proverbial crow flies) from Yevlakh in the north to the Arax River in the south. To the east lies the floodplain of the Kura River. This would be the staging area for any attack launched along the central or southern sectors of this front. If Aliyev has visions of several hundred tanks advancing westward toward Karabagh across this floodplain engaging Karabagh units, reminiscent of the now classic World War II tank battles during the North African campaign or at Kursk or Smolensk during the German invasion of the Soviet Union, he is mistaken. There is no imperative for Karabagh to engage Azerbaijan on the Kura River floodplain. In any action, it would not be unexpected for Azerbaijan to suffer disproportionate losses in men and material compared to the defending Karabagh Defense Force.

Once Azerbaijan commences hostilities, it will be under pressure to achieve its objectives within a matter of days. This is necessary because a prolonged conflict would not be in the best interests of the neighboring states. This includes Russia, Iran, and Georgia, as well as Turkey. Although geographically removed, neither the United States nor Western Europe would benefit from a protracted war.

Historically, the Caucasus has been a political tinder-box. Given its low flashpoint no one can predict with any degree of certainty how Azerbaijan’s military adventurism would impact the region and possibly beyond. The Chechen rebel Doku Umarov continues to elude Russian efforts to apprehend him. A conflict could encourage him to ramp up his terrorist activities. Who can predict with certainty what Daghestan or any one of the other Muslim states on the north slope of the Caucasus Mountains might do, or how many Umarovs might be encouraged to act.

Georgia still has Russian ambitions to fear. If Turkey bolsters its forces along the Armenian frontier (which it will), then Russia can be expected to respond by increasing its forces in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This could put pressure on Georgian President Mikheil Saaskavilli and possibly encourage or empower his political opponents. What political mischief might take place in Ajaria? Would Iran view Turkish occupation of Nakhitchevan as a provocation?

Turkey, which has the most to gain from an Azerbajani victory, is not free to respond however it may please. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has a Kurdish minority of some 20 million to consider. His efforts to neutralize the influence of the military and other secular conservative elements are still a work in progress. Ankara has to be concerned not to provoke Russia, which may use any pretext to extend its influence further south, possibly into Georgia. Recently, in August 2010, Russian and Armenia signed a protocol to their 1995 bilateral defense treaty which upgrades the mission of the Russian forces presently headquartered in Gyumri, Armenia, and anoints Moscow as the guarantor of Armenia’s territorial integrity.

Neighboring Iran, where no more than 50 percent of the population is ethnically Persian, has its share of internal problems. There are the politically restless Baluchis along its southeastern border with Pakistan. How the majority Azeri population in the northwest would respond is problematic. An Azerbaijani victory could destabilize this border region. In the oil-rich province of Khuzestan, the majority Arabs are unhappy because they do not benefit from the wealth being produced. And then there is a restless population of students and professionals who could seize this opportunity to stage larger and more violent protests for Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to institute reforms.

Not to be overlooked are the repercussions a prolonged war will have on the international oil market and the economies of industrial nations if oil reaches $150, possibly $400, a barrel. The area of conflict may be small geographically, but the political and economic ramifications are enormous.

Will any one or more of these scenarios occur? It is because no one can predict with any degree of certainty what may occur that motivates the expected call for an immediate ceasefire. It is to be expected that Azerbaijan, with Turkish connivance, will seek to impede emplacement of a ceasefire in hopes it can achieve its military objectives first.

It is highly unlikely that Azerbaijan can defeat the Karabagh Defense Force in a protracted war and even less likely that it can gain a victory within a required timeframe of 5-7 days. Failure will have serious internal political consequences for Aliyev. Embarrassed or disgruntled senior officers may decide that a change in leadership is required. The deterioration of morale among enlisted personnel and junior officers can be expected if army units have sustained heavy losses in men and equipment.

Unlike the Karabaghtsis who view the resumption of hostilities as a war for survival, what is it that motivates the Azeri soldier? Is he engaged in a war for survival or is he being asked to sacrifice his life to gain a piece of land for a corrupt government whose president enriches himself and his coterie at their expense?

Aliyev understands fully that negotiations will not yield the solution he desires or that a resumption of hostilities will guarantee him the success he so desperately wants. This is the Karabagh dilemma confronting President Ilham Aliyev.

[arakeretzig]

Re: Nagorno-Karabagh: Military Balance Between Armenia & Azerbaijan

http://news.am/eng/news/51750.html
Azerbaijani POW refuses to return to his country

March 17, 2011 | 17:44

Azerbaijani prisoner of war Roman Huseynov refuses to return to Azerbaijan, Spokesman for Armenian Defense Ministry David Karapetyan informed Armenian News-NEWS.am. The Armenian side will transfer the Azeri war prisoner when he is psychologically ready to return to his country. For this reason, at the moment no repatriation is being organized, Karapetyan said.

As Armenian News-NEWS.am reported earlier, the Armenian side transferred Azerbaijani war prisoner Anar Hajiyev to the Azerbaijani side.

It is noteworthy war prisoners refuse to return to Azerbaijan as criminal charges will be instituted against them if they return to the country.

Can you blame the guy? you just know he's gonna get his ass kicked there. Armenian prison must be paradise compared to Azeri one.

[burjuin]

Re: Nagorno-Karabagh: Military Balance Between Armenia & Azerbaijan

[burjuin]

Re: Nagorno-Karabagh: Military Balance Between Armenia & Azerbaijan

[burjuin]

Re: Nagorno-Karabagh: Military Balance Between Armenia & Azerbaijan

[Aralez]

Re: Nagorno-Karabagh: Military Balance Between Armenia & Azerbaijan

Unless Aliyev and his command staff are convinced that a full-scale offensive, unmindful of potential casualties, can defeat the Karabagh Defense Force and occupy Stepanakert-Shushi and also occupy the Lachin Corridor within 5-7 days of the first shot being fired, it would be a fool’s errand to commence hostilities. To carry it one step further, Azerbaijan would have already committed its military to retaking Karabagh if it believed victory could be guaranteed within a matter of days before an expected ceasefire could take effect.

What about a Yom Kippur type strike for a political and not a strategic victory?

I see peace as impossible but total war as unlikely because the current situation is a crutch that helps the turk oligarchs stay in power. For now, the oil money keeps their people quiet and their armament plans are not complete, but when the money runs out they will need a bigger distraction.

The situation now is like the Israelis and Egyptians before the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. The Egyptians were trying to bleed the Israelis with commando raids to lower public morale. Egypt had the time and spies to plot how to destroy the Israeli Bar-Lev line of forts on the Suez. While the Israelis were prepared for a war of national survival, the Egyptians only wanted a political victory, and if they could hold any of the Sinai when the UN stopped the war, they would have a political victory.

I do not think that the turks will make war until they have a bigger advantage. They need heavy fighting vehicles like armored personnel carriers made from old T-55 tanks that they claim to be planning to build. Maybe also, in a few years, they will be able to buy Altay tanks. They will need to be sure that they can defend their oil platforms from missile attack with fully operational S-300 systems. They will need to have Armenian defenses mapped out with their drones, and they will have to make careful plans to overcome all obstacles using tools like the Skif missile that can be fired from behind cover to destroy a bunker.

Then they will make a short war, 2 or 3 days, to try and take some place like Aghdam. The international community will stop the war to prevent damage to oil supplies and the Azeris will have a political victory to prop up their regime. No need to take the Lachin Corridor to make their hold over their people strong again. That would even be bad because it would take away the great distraction.

Their problem is that weapon superiority only makes it possible to survive more mistakes than they could make if they only had weapon equality. They can still make enough mistakes to lose a war if they have weapon superiority. There was a good study of the first Gulf War where the possible outcomes were compared if the Iraqis had made fewer mistakes and the Gulf Alliance more mistakes. If the Iraqis had made an effort to understand their opponents and counter them the war would have been much harder for the Gulf Alliance:

Victory Misunderstood: What the Gulf War Tells Us about the Future of Conflict

[Tigranakert]

Re: Nagorno-Karabagh: Military Balance Between Armenia & Azerbaijan

Aralez, you made some good points.

The Turks have a long-term vision or goal. They always say, it does not matter if we lose the first ten wars, if we only win the last. This means, even if they will not win the next war, again hundreds of thousands of Armenians would flee Armenia and we would begin all over with the recovery of our country. We already have a negative population flow, there are by realistic estimates just over 2 million Armenians left in Armenia, and this is actually the minimum to survive. It means, we can not deal with any more wars again in the future. What will be the consequence? 1.5 million Armenians remaining surrounded by an ever growing "Turkic" population.