Regional geopolitics

[Vrej1915]

Re: Regional geopolitics

[Vrej1915]

Re: Regional geopolitics

Kurdish militias close in on two major ISIS cities in Syria –
Map update
By Chris Tomson -
10/03/2016

Just 12 months ago, ISIS seemed unstoppable as they launched a major offensive on the predominately Kurdish city of Kobane (Ayn al-Arab). During early 2015, fighters loyal to the Islamic State managed to captured some 50% of the city and all surrounding villages. Despite waves of ISIS suicide bombers sent to Kobane, Kurdish fighters of the People’s Protection Units (YPG) remarkably managed to fight back and recapture the city in March of 2015; this victory must also be credited to the US airforce which relentlessly bombed ISIS fighters in Kobane while kindly aiding the YPG with supplies and ammunitions.

After ISIS was defeated at Kobane in northern Syria, their commanders shifted attention to Hasakah further east; the aforementioned city was (and still is) split-controlled between the Syrian Arab Army and Kurdish militants. Thereby, just 8 months ago, the Islamic State launched a massive offensive on Hasakah city. Although the frontline shifted back and forth, ISIS was eventually fully repelled 6 months ago. Since then, Kurdish fighters of the YPG and newly formed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) have pushed south towards Raqqah and Deir Ezzor. These provincial capitals represent the only major cities claimed by ISIS in Syria while in fact some 40% of Deir Ezzor remains under government control due to ongoing resistance of the Syrian Arab Army’s Major General Issam Zahreddine and his soldiers of the 104th Airborne Brigade of the Republican Guard.

For now, it seems Kurdish forces keep advancing almost daily towards these predominately ISIS-held cities from the north while government troops are pressing on from the west. As such, ISIS must now prioritize between several important frontlines while also battling the Iraqi Army in the neighbouring country. With an estimate decrease of 25% in terms of ISIS territory over the past year, their commanders will now face a considerable task in repelling various hostile factions from making encroachments upon Islamic State lands. As to add insult to injury, both the US Airforce and Russian Airforce seems more determined than ever to defeat ISIS once and for all. Map credits to IUCA Analysts.

https://www.almasdarnews.com/article...ia-map-update/ | Al-Masdar News

[Azad]

Re: Regional geopolitics

European Parliament - Greek's parliamentarian opinion on turkey blackmailing EU with illegal immigration.

[Vrej1915]

Re: Regional geopolitics

[Haykakan]

Re: Regional geopolitics

The Political Consequences of Iran snd Azerbaijan's Energy Agreements

By Zaur Shiriyev via Jamestown.org
March 10, 2016


On February 23, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev visited Tehran,
where he met with his Iranian counterpart, Hassan Rouhani. Notably,
the two presidents signed 11 memoranda of understanding (MoU) across
several areas of cooperation, including energy, the economy and
transport (IRNA, February 23). But the timing of the visit seems to
hold particular importance as well: following the lifting of
international sanctions on Iran, all three South Caucasus countries
want to benefit from this new regional economic environment through
intensive cooperation. And this is clearly also true for Azerbaijan.
So although few details are publicly available regarding the newly
signed MoUs between Iran and Azerbaijan, reports of these agreements
nevertheless reveal the contours of Baku's cooperation with Tehran, as
well as how regional competition is playing out in this regard.

One key bilateral accord signed by Aliyev and Rouhani was the
framework agreement on coordination of railway networks, which deals
with the completion of the North`South transport corridor linking
Astara (Azerbaijan) with Rasht and Qazvin (Iran). This railway will
ultimately connect Iran and Azerbaijan with Russia. For Azerbaijan,
the economic benefits are one key factor. According to estimates, the
transit distance and delivery times of goods will be three times
lower, and the price of delivery through this corridor will become
more competitive (Trend, February 29). But it is also important to
note the geopolitical significance of this agreement; the North`South
transport corridor essentially undermines any possible economic
argument for building railway links between Iran and Armenia. The
overall cost of the proposed Iranian-Armenian railroad project is
close to Armenia's entire annual state budget (see EDM, February 2,
2015). The North`South transport corridor not only bypasses Armenia
but also connects with Russia, thereby eliminating the possibility of
reopening the Russian-Georgian railway though Abkhazia, which Moscow
has pushed for. The latter route would create competition for the new
east`west railway line from Baku to the Turkish city of Kars, running
through Tbilisi (the BTK railroad).

During President Aliyev's visit to Tehran, another important agreement
was signed on the construction and operation of hydroelectric power
plants. However, in public, the emphasis was placed on the other
aspect of energy cooperation, namely the agreement to develop a
bilateral "oil swap" mechanism (Presstv.ir, February 27). In fact,
this type of oil swap between Iran and Azerbaijan has only worked
once, during the 2008 Russian-Georgian war. When Baku's westward
export route (the Baku`Tbilisi`Ceyhan oil pipeline--BTC) was
temporarily closed, Azerbaijan exported crude oil through Iran's port
in Neka, on the Caspian Sea; in exchange Iran supplied oil to
Azerbaijan's foreign customers via the Persian Gulf. However, setting
up a new oil swap mechanism offers little benefit to Baku in the
longer term, given there are currently no obstacles to Azerbaijan's
exports to the West. Nevertheless, one Azerbaijani official has
suggested that one possible "oil swap" agreement could involve
supplying Iran with gasoline and, in exchange, buying naphtha and
liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) from the Islamic Republic (Reuters,
February 23).

However, beyond the oil swap deal, there are a number of more
promising aspects. The State Oil Company of Azerbaijan (SOCAR) reached
several MoUs with the National Iranian Oil Company and the
Tehran-based Ghadir Investment Company, outlining the scope of joint
exploration in the Caspian. The Iranian North Drilling Company (NDC),
which specializes in the implementation of projects in the Caspian
Sea, subsequently declared its interest as well (Azernews.az, February
25). This is important because the NDC is conducting drilling
activities in the offshore Sardar-e Jangal oil and gas field.
Discovered in 2012, the Sardar-e Jangal field is situated between
Azerbaijani and Turkmenistani territorial waters, not in the Iranian
zone (IranOilGas Network, January 27, 2015; Eurasianet.org, June 19,
2012). Regardless, Iran has been using its political and military
muscle to explore this new oil and gas field, which might contain 10
billion barrels of crude oil potential.

Along with Sardar-e Jangal, Iran and Azerbaijan are also in dispute
over ownership of the Araz-Alov-Sharg fields, following a
confrontation in 2001. Since then, there have been several
unsuccessful attempts to reach a solution. Tehran sees those fields as
disputed and closed for exploration pending the resolution on the
legal status of the Caspian Sea. Therefore, the ball is in Iran's
court; it needs to redraw its "red line" on linking the exploration of
disputed oil and gas fields and reaching an ownership agreement with
Azerbaijan. Without such an agreement on ownership, it suits Tehran to
agree to a joint venture, which will effectively help legalize Iran's
claims to these two fields. For Azerbaijan, given its current economic
struggles and its need for additional gas supplies (see EDM, January
22, February 1, March 4), this kind of cooperation offers substantial
benefits.

Looking at the broader regional context of the Azerbaijani president's
visit to Iran, two important developments play to Russian interests
even more than Iran's. On the one hand, Russia is using the
Azerbaijani-Iranian transport talks as a pretext to propose a
trilateral meeting of their foreign ministers (APA, February 29). This
type of trilateral ministerial-level format is something of a Turkish
foreign policy trademark in the region. Thus given the current
standoff in Russian-Turkish relations, coupled with Tehran's own
anxiety toward Ankara, this development appears to be a joint
initiative by Moscow and Tehran, potentially aimed at weakening
Turkey's active diplomacy in the South Caucasus. Baku has little room
for maneuver in this respect.

On the other hand, Azerbaijan's position on the Syrian intervention is
becoming an important question. Until now, Baku showed no urgency to
join any of the antiterrorist coalitions operating in the
region--including those headed by Saudi Arabia and supported by
Turkey. During President Aliyev's visit to Iran, the Syrian question
was also discussed. A day later, Putin and Aliyev talked about the
Syrian issue by telephone (News.az, February 25). All this suggests
that Tehran and Moscow are both hoping that Baku will not align itself
with the Saudi-Turkish position or, at worst, will take a position of
non-interference.

The Azerbaijani head of state's recent visit to Iran and the resulting
new MoUs promise to bring economic benefits in the near future.
However, the developments before and after the visit demonstrate that
wider state interests are in play. Clearly, both Tehran and Moscow are
seeking to use economic projects to strengthen their political
ambitions in the region.

https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__oilprice.com_Latest-2DEnergy-2DNews_World-2DNews_The-2DPolitical-2DConsequences-2DOf-2DIran-2DAnd-2DAzerbaijans-2DEnergy-2DAgreements.html&d=CwIFaQ&c=clK7kQUTWtAVEOVIgvi0NU5BOUHhpN0H8p7CSfnc_gI&r=LVw5zH6C4LHpVQcGEdVcrQ&m=5pSJL1uxHtGRNByV1Y_-tJueEItn9jhbktnOwrY5ED4&s=ujiw1yQeMo16w_w6N3-bHGZOFBw9omAXOJzmNh0zVKA&e=

[londontsi]

Re: Regional geopolitics

European Parliament - Greek's parliamentarian opinion on turkey blackmailing EU with illegal immigration.

LOL ..... I love this

.

[Joseph]

Re: Regional geopolitics

European Parliament - Greek's parliamentarian opinion on turkey blackmailing EU with illegal immigration.

Cool! I'd like to see the continued rise of right wing movements in Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia, etc. They are fed up with Muslims and especially Turks. Islam is backward and thwarts progress and leads to perpetual war.

[Azad]

Re: Regional geopolitics

Cool! I'd like to see the continued rise of right wing movements in Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia, etc. They are fed up with Muslims and especially Turks. Islam is backward and thwarts progress and leads to perpetual war.

Most Muslims know better these days not to venture permanently into Eastern Europe. Back in the 80's Greece used to be very well balanced country with comfortable lives till they joined Europe. Overnight the country got flooded with criminal Albanians, the country became a slave to the EU bankers and we all know what is going on now with migrations and Greece.

[Haykakan]

Re: Regional geopolitics

Most Muslims know better these days not to venture permanently into Eastern Europe. Back in the 80's Greece used to be very well balanced country with comfortable lives till they joined Europe. Overnight the country got flooded with criminal Albanians, the country became a slave to the EU bankers and we all know what is going on now with migrations and Greece.

Good point you make regarding the bankers.

[Vrej1915]

Re: Regional geopolitics