The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

[Armenian]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

Fortunatley there isn't almost anyone here that really reads these threads other than your own "team" and maybe myself and a couple others ...

Sip Jan, when you first wrote this comment of yours about two-and-a-half months ago this thread had something like 9,000 views. Well, less than two-and-a-half months later it now has over 31,000 views. That's an average of 293 views a day or around 2,200 views per week. In fact, this thread, which according to you no one cares about, is perhaps the fastest growing thread on this discussion board. If, as you claim, only several individuals - "my team" - here visits this thread several times per day then this thread must receive at most around 15-30 visits a day.

So Sip, where is the remaining 250+ views a day coming from?

I'm afraid when you first made that comment you - achkov tvir

[Armenian]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

Iran-China-Russia coalition emerging



A “Chinese-Russian-Iranian coalition” which forms the basis of a global counter Anglo-American alliance is emerging, writes Global Research. "America and Britain, the Anglo-American axis, have engaged in an ambitious project to control global energy resources. As a result of the Anglo-American drive to encircle and ultimately dismantle China and Russia, Moscow and Beijing have joined ranks and the SCO has slowly evolved and emerged in the heart of Eurasia as a powerful international body, according to Global Research. Referring to "arrogance of the Bush Administration," Global Research wrote:" The Chinese and Russians also called for the establishment of a more equitable economic and political global order instead of What American leaders and officials called the “New World Order” but the Chinese and Russians consider a “Unipolar World.”

Iran, India, Pakistan, and Mongolia are all SCO observer members. The observer status of Iran in the SCO is misleading. Iran is a de facto member. The observer status is intended to hide the nature of trilateral cooperation between Iran, Russia, and China so that the SCO cannot be labeled and demonized as an anti-American or anti-Western military grouping, noted Global Research. Also," Iran and the [Persian] Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) are also planning on starting the process for creating an Iranian-[Persian] GCC free trade zone in the Persian Gulf. There are also discussion about the eventual creation of a single market between Iran, Tajikistan, Armenia, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria. "

Source: http://www.presstv.ir/detail.aspx?id...onid=351020101

[Armenian]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

Russia strengthening positions as Armenia’s major economic counteragent

The Russian and Armenian Prime Ministers certified in Moscow that the trade and economic cooperation between Armenia and Russia has approached the level peculiar for military-political relations, Russian Ambassador to Armenia, Nikolay Pavlov said.

“Russia is strengthening positions as Armenia’s major economic counteragent. The trade index is growing, serious programs of industrial cooperation are being developed,” he said.

“The commodity turnover between our states has increased over 70 per cent against the last year’s index. Both sides are interested in further development of bilateral trade. The Prime Ministers agreed on delivery of Armenian building materials for construction of Olympic facilities in Sochi,” he noted.

“Export of Armenian building materials to Russia will become an impulse for establishing efficient execution of the Kavkaz-Poti ferry line,” Amb. Pavlov said, Novosti Armenia reports.

Source: http://www.panarmenian.net/news/eng/?nid=23590

[Armenian]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

Red October: Russia, Iran and Iraq



The course of the war in Iraq appears to be set for the next year. Of the four options we laid out a few weeks ago, the Bush administration essentially has selected a course between the first and second options -- maintaining the current mission and force level or retaining the mission but gradually reducing the force. The mission -- creating a stable, pro-American government in Baghdad that can assume the role of ensuring security -- remains intact. The strategy is to use the maximum available force to provide security until the Iraqis can assume the burden. The force will be reduced by the 30,000 troops who were surged into Iraq, though because that level of force will be unavailable by spring, the reduction is not really a matter of choice. The remaining force is the maximum available, and it will be reduced as circumstances permit.

Top U.S. commander in Iraq Gen. David Petraeus and others have made two broad arguments. First, while prior strategy indeed failed to make progress, a new strategy that combines aggressive security operations with recruiting political leaders on the subnational level -- the Sunni sheikhs in Anbar province, for example -- has had a positive impact, and could achieve the mission, given more time. Therefore, having spent treasure and blood to this point, it would be foolish for the United States not to pursue it for another year or two.

The second argument addresses the consequence of withdrawal. U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice summed it up in an interview with NBC News. "And I would note that President [Mahmoud] Ahmadinejad said if the United States leaves Iraq, Iran is prepared to fill the vacuum. That is what is at stake here," she said. We had suggested that the best way to contain Iran would be to cede Iraq and defend the Arabian Peninsula. One reason is that it would release troops for operations elsewhere in the world, if needed. The administration has chosen to try to keep Iraq -- any part of it -- out of Iranian hands. If successful, this obviously benefits the United States. If it fails, the United States can always choose a different option.

Within the region, this seems a reasonable choice, assuming the political foundations in Washington can be maintained, foundations that so far appear to be holding. The Achilles' heel of the strategy is the fact that it includes the window of vulnerability that we discussed a few weeks ago. The strategy and mission outlined by Petraeus commits virtually all U.S. ground forces to Iraq, with Afghanistan and South Korea soaking up the rest. It leaves air and naval power available, but it does not allow the United States to deal with any other crisis that involves the significant threat of ground intervention. This has consequences.

Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki attended a meeting of the Iranian-Russian Joint Economic Commission in Moscow over the weekend. While in the Russian capital, Mottaki also met with Russian Atomic Energy Chief Sergei Kiriyenko to discuss Russian assistance in completing the Bushehr nuclear power plant. After the meeting, Mottaki said Russian officials had assured him of their commitment to complete the power plant. Iran's top nuclear negotiator, Ali Larijani, said, "With regards to the Bushehr power plant, we have reached good understanding with the Russians. In this understanding a timetable for providing nuclear fuel on time and inaugurating this power plant has been fixed." While the truth of Russian assurances is questionable -- Moscow has been mere weeks away from making Bushehr operational for the better part of the last three years, and is about as excited about a nuclear-armed Iran as is Washington -- the fact remains that Russian-Iranian cooperation continues to be substantial, and public.

Mottaki also confirmed -- and this is significant -- that Russian President Vladimir Putin would visit Tehran on Oct. 16. The occasion is a meeting of the Caspian Sea littoral nations, a group that comprises Russia, Iran, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. According to the Iranians, Putin agreed not only to attend the conference, but also to use the visit to confer with top Iranian leaders.

This is about the last thing the United States wanted the Russians to do -- and therefore the first thing the Russians did. The Russians are quite pleased with the current situation in Iraq and Iran and do not want anything to upset it. From the Russian point of view, the Americans are tied down in an extended conflict that sucks up resources and strategic bandwidth in Washington. There is a similarity here with Vietnam. The more tied down U.S. forces were in Vietnam, the more opportunities the Soviets had. Nowadays, Russia's resources are much diminished compared with those of the Soviets -- while Russia has a much smaller range of interest. Moscow's primary goal is to regain a sphere of influence within the former Soviet Union. Whatever ambitions it may dream of, this is the starting point. The Russians see the Americans as trying to thwart their ambitions throughout their periphery, through support for anti-Russian elements via U.S. intelligence.

If the United States plans to stay in Iraq until the end of the Bush presidency, then the United States badly needs something from the Russians -- that they not provide arms, particularly air-defense systems, to the Syrians and especially the Iranians. The Americans need the Russians not to provide fighter aircraft, modern command-and-control systems or any of the other war-making systems that the Russians have been developing. Above all else, they want the Russians not to provide the Iranians any nuclear-linked technology. Therefore, it is no accident that the Iranians claimed over the weekend that the Russians told them they would do precisely that. Obviously, the discussion was of a purely civilian nature, but the United States is aware that the Russians have advanced military nuclear technology and that the distinction between civilian and military is subtle. In short, Russia has signaled the Americans that it could very easily trigger their worst nightmare.

The Iranians, fairly isolated in the world, are being warned even by the French that war is a real possibility. Obviously, then, they view the meetings with the Russians as being of enormous value. The Russians have no interest in seeing Iran devastated by the United States. They want Iran to do just what it is doing -- tying down U.S. forces in Iraq and providing a strategic quagmire for the Americans. And they are aware that they have technologies that would make an extended air campaign against Iran much more costly than it would be otherwise. Indeed, without a U.S. ground force capable of exploiting an air attack anyway, the Russians might be able to create a situation in which suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD, the first stage of a U.S. air campaign) would be costly, and in which the second phase -- battle against infrastructure -- could become a war of attrition. The United States might win, in the sense of ultimately having command of the air, but it could not force a regime change -- and it would pay a high price.

It also should not be forgotten that the Russians have the second-largest nuclear arsenal in the world. The Russians very ostentatiously announced a few weeks ago that their Bear bombers were returning to constant patrol. This amused some in the U.S. military, who correctly regard the Bear as obsolete. They forget that the Russians never really had a bomber force designed for massive intercontinental delivery of nuclear devices. The announcement was a gesture -- and reminder that Russian ICBMs could easily be pointed at the United States.

Russia obviously doesn't plan a nuclear exchange with the United States, although it likes forcing the Americans to consider the possibility. Nor do the Russians want the Iranians to gain nuclear weapons. What they do want is an extended conflict in Iraq, extended tension between Iran and the United States, and they wouldn't much mind if the United States went to war with Iran as well. The Russians would happily supply the Iranians with whatever weapons systems they could use in order to bleed the United States a bit more, as long as they are reasonably confident that those systems would not be pointed north any time soon.

The Russians are just as prepared to let the United States have a free hand against Iran and not pose any challenges while U.S. forces are tied down in Iraq. But there is a price and it will be high. The Russians are aware that the window of opportunity is now and that they could create nightmarish problems for the United States. Therefore, the Russians will want the following: In the Caucasus, they want the United States to withdraw support for Georgia and force the Georgian government to reach an accommodation with Moscow. Given Armenian hostility to Turkey and closeness to Russia, this would allow the Russians to reclaim a sphere of influence in the Caucasus, leaving Azerbaijan as a buffer with Iran.

In Ukraine and Belarus, the Russians will expect an end to all U.S. support to nongovernmental organizations agitating for a pro-Western course. In the Baltics, the Russians will expect the United States to curb anti-Russian sentiment and to explicitly limit the Baltics' role in NATO, excluding the presence of foreign troops, particularly Polish. Regarding Serbia, they want an end to any discussion of an independent Kosovo. The Russians also will want plans abandoned for an anti-ballistic-missile system that deploys missiles in Poland.

In other words, the Russians will want the United States to get out of the former Soviet Union -- and stay out. Alternatively, the Russians are prepared, on Oct. 16, to reach agreements on nuclear exchange and weapons transfers that will include weapons that the Iranians can easily send into Iraq to kill U.S. troops. Should the United States initiate an air campaign prior to any of this taking effect, the Russians will increase the supply of weapons to Iran dramatically, using means it used effectively in Vietnam: shipping them in. If the United States strikes against Russian ships, the Russians will then be free to strike directly against Georgia or the Baltic states, countries that cannot defend themselves without American support, and countries that the United States is in no position to support.

It is increasingly clear that Putin intends to reverse in practice, if not formally, the consequences of the fall of the Soviet Union. He does not expect at this point to move back into Central Europe or engage in a global competition with the United States. He knows that is impossible. But he also understands three things: First, his armed forces have improved dramatically since 2000. Second, the countries he is dealing with are no match for his forces as long as the United States stays out. Third, staying out or not really is not a choice for the United States. As long as it maintains this posture in Iraq, it is out.

This is Putin's moment and he can exploit it in one of two ways: He can reach a quiet accommodation with the Americans, and leave the Iranians hanging. Conversely, he can align with the Iranians and place the United States in a far more complex situation than it otherwise would be in. He could achieve this by supporting Syria, arming militias in Lebanon or even causing significant problems in Afghanistan, where Russia retains a degree of influence in the North. The Russians are chess players and geopoliticians. In chess and geopolitics, the game is routine and then, suddenly, there is an opening. You seize the opening because you might never get another one. The United States is inherently more powerful than Russia, save at this particular moment. Because of a series of choices the United States has made, it is weaker in the places that matter to Russia. Russia will not be in this position in two or three years. It needs to act now.

Therefore, Putin will go to Iran on Oct. 16 and will work to complete Iran's civilian nuclear project. What agreements he might reach with Iran could given the United States nightmares. If the United States takes out Iran's nuclear weapons, the Russians will sympathize and arm the Iranians even more intensely. If the Americans launch an extended air campaign, the Russians will happily increase the supply of weapons even more. Talk about carpet-bombing Iran is silly. It is a big country and the United States doesn't have that much carpet. The supplies would get through.

Or the United States can quietly give Putin the sphere of influence he wants, letting down allies in the former Soviet Union, in return for which the Russians will let the Iranians stand alone against the Americans, not give arms to Middle Eastern countries, not ship Iran weapons that will wind up with militias in Iraq. In effect, Putin is giving the United States a month to let him know what it has in mind.

It should not be forgotten that Iran retains an option that could upset Russian plans. Iran has no great trust of Russia, nor does it have a desire to be trapped between American power and Russian willingness to hold Iran's coat while it slugs things out with the Americans. At a certain point, sooner rather than later, the Iranians must examine whether they want to play the role of the Russian cape to the American bull. The option for the Iranians remains the same -- negotiate the future of Iraq with the Americans. If the United States is committed to remaining in Iraq, Iran can choose to undermine Washington, at the cost of increasing its own dependence on the Russians and the possibility of war with the Americans. Or it can choose to cut a deal with the Americans that gives it influence in Iraq without domination. Iran is delighted with Putin's visit. But that visit also gives it negotiating leverage with the Americans. This remains the wild card.

Petraeus' area of operations is Iraq. He may well have crafted a viable plan for stabilizing Iraq over the next few years. But the price to be paid for that is not in Iraq or even in Iran. It is in leaving the door wide open in other areas of the world. We believe the Russians are about to walk through one of those doors. The question in the White House, therefore, must be: How much is Iraq worth? Is it worth recreating the geopolitical foundations of the Soviet Union?

Source: http://www.stratfor.com/products/pre...ected=Analyses

[Armenian]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

Concerning the recent rumors about the establishment of a new Russian military base in Armenia...

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Establishment of Russia’s 2nd Military Base in Armenia will Complicate Critical Situation in Region: Azerbaijani Defense Ministry



Azerbaijan, Baku / corr Trend I.Alizade / Representative of the Press Service of Azerbaijan’s Defense Ministry, Ilgar Verdiyev, said on 25 September that the establishment of Russia’s 2nd military base in Armenia will lead to complications of the critical situation in the region. Representatives from Russia’s Defense Ministry are on a visit to Armenia. During their visit to the Armenian capital, they will meet with senior officials from the Government and the Defense Ministry of the country. According to certain information, the talks will focus on the establishment of Russia’s 2nd military base in Armenia.

Russia’s 102nd military base is currently located in Gurmi in Armenia. Military expert, retired colonel-lieutenant Uzeyir Jafarov considers that the establishment of Russia’s 2nd military base in Armenia will not be very simple. According to him, currently such a step by the Russian side does not seem realistic. “It will cause protest among countries of the region. In addition, establishment of the military base will be an expensive project. Moreover, opening a military base envisages implementing a number of political procedures,” he said.

According to Jafarov, Russia considers its key task is to expand and strengthen the military base in Gurmi. The military expert considers the establishment of Russia’s 2nd military base in Armenia as dangerous to Azerbaijan. “Official Baku should sharply criticize this issue,” he said. According to him, the Azerbaijani side should not consider it as an internal affair of any country. “Firstly the interest and security of the region should be ensured. The actions of the Russian side may cause tension in the region taking into consideration the non-settlement of the Armenian-Azerbaijani Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. It is possible to forecast sufficient seriousness of this tension,” Jafarov said.

The military expert highlighted Azerbaijan’s possibilities to stand against it. Official Baku should raise this issue at an international level with a requirement of the grounds for the need of Russia to establish a 2nd military base in Armenia. “The Azerbaijani side should raise a serious question with OSCE. Because, Russia, as a member of the OSCE Minsk Group, has undertaken several obligations in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict settlement, but takes steps in complicating the situation in the region. Official Moscow should explain this,” Jafarov said. The Chairman of the Karabakh Liberation Organization, Akif Nagi, said that through its actions, Russia expands its military opportunities in the South Caucasus and demonstrates its force to countries of the region. “The Azerbaijani side should seriously protest to Russia, who is a co-chair of the OSCE Minsk Group,” he said.

The conflict between the two South Caucasus countries started in 1988 due to Armenian territorial claims against Azerbaijan. Armenia has occupied 20% of Azerbaijani lands including the Nagorno-Karabakh region and its seven surrounding districts. Since 1992 to the present time, these territories have been under Armenian occupation. In 1994, Azerbaijan and Armenia signed a cease-fire agreement at which time active hostilities ended. The co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group ( Russia, France and USA) are holding peaceful negotiations.

Source: http://news.trendaz.com/cgi-bin/read...023395&lang=EN

[Armenian]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

Russia vows more arms for bigger peacekeeping role



DUSHANBE (Reuters) - Russia promised on Saturday to sell more weapons at cheaper prices to its ex-Soviet allies in exchange for their playing a bigger role in peacekeeping operations in the region, including conflict-torn Georgia. The deals on peacekeeping and the sale of Russian military hardware were among more than 20 documents signed by the leaders of the Moscow-dominated Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) during a summit in the Tajik capital, Dushanbe.

"CSTO members will now get special equipment at domestic Russian prices," Russian President Vladimir Putin told reporters after the summit. The grouping, which includes Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, has grown more active in the past few years as new rifts have appeared in Moscow's relations with the West. Russia, alarmed at peaceful pro-Western revolutions in Ukraine and Georgia, has stepped up security cooperation with the leaders of Belarus and some Central Asian states. Russia's security umbrella is also seen as an important survival instrument by Belarussian President Alexander Lukashenko and Uzbek President Islam Karimov, blamed by the West of crushing democratic freedom at home.

MORE PARTICIPATION

Moscow, which alone carries the peacekeeping burden of the broader Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), which groups 12 former Soviet countries, said during the meeting it wants more active participation by its allies.

"The CIS peacekeeping force is now deployed in (Georgia's breakaway region of) Abkhazia, but it is 100 percent Russian," Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov told reporters. "We have always wanted more states to take part in this work."

Under the agreement signed at the summit, each CSTO member state will allocate a detachment for a peacekeeping force that could be used should a joint decision be made to launch a mission. Lavrov said the agreement was not drafted with any specific country in mind. But the declaration drew attention to conflicts on the fringes of the CSTO member states.

"We are concerned by a conflict potential which has been accumulating in the immediate proximity of the CSTO zone of responsibility," it said. "This is fraught with the creation of new division lines and mutual suspicions."

CSTO Executive Secretary Nikolai Bordyuzha did not rule out that Abkhazia and another Georgian breakaway region, South Ossetia, could be options for a joint peacekeeping mission. "The use of the peacekeeping force in Abkhazia and South Ossetia is possible if all sides involved in the conflict agree," he told a news conference ahead of the summit. Pro-Western Georgia wants to win back control of the two provinces, which broke away in the early 1990s, and blames Russian peacekeepers for backing separatists. Georgia, which is seeking NATO membership, wants the Russian peacekeepers to be replaced by a neutral force.

Source: http://ca.today.reuters.com/news/New...mber=0&summit=

[Armenian]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

Putin's hold on the Russians



BBC News profiles Vladimir Putin, whose presidency has seen Russia make a bold bid to justify its place among the world's most powerful nations.

His face may not adorn the rouble, but Vladimir Putin's image is very much stamped on 21st-Century Russia and its citizens are only too aware that the money lining their pockets was largely minted under his presidency. After the hungry, often desperate years of the Yeltsin era, it is a prosperity few Russians may stop to question. But his critics believe that it has come at the cost of some post-communist democratic freedoms. Mr Putin rapidly ascended the political ladder in 1999 when Boris Yeltsin first made him prime minister, then acting president in his place. The former Federal Security Service (ex-KGB) director's talents and instincts continue to show through: to his admirers he represents order and stability, to his critics - repression and fear.

PUTIN IN THE KREMLIN

2000: Putin elected president in first round; Kursk submarine disaster; restoration of Soviet national anthem with different words
2003: General election gives Putin allies control over parliament
2004: Putin re-elected by landslide in February; a year of Chechen attacks on civilian targets culminates in Beslan
2005: Mikhail Khodorkovsky, Russia's richest man, jailed for tax evasion
2006: Russia briefly cuts gas supplies to Ukraine in January; St Petersburg hosts G8 events
2007: Putin likens US foreign policy to Nazi Germany's and threatens to target missiles at EU states in response to US anti-missile plans Independent media and civil society have struggled under his rule and he has taken a consistently hard line in the Chechen conflict.

Yet he strikes a chord with those who remember the chaos of the 1990s, when basic machinery of state such as the welfare system virtually seized up and the security forces looked inept. Investor confidence has climbed back since the nadir of the 1998 rouble devaluation, and economic recovery, buoyed by high prices for oil and gas exports, has helped restore a sense of stability not known since communist times.

Political opposition is weak, partly because of a genuine feel-good factor but also because his rule has discouraged democratic debate. In the 2000 election, he took 53% of the vote in the first round and, four years later, was re-elected with a landslide majority of 71%. The 2004 ballot result "reflected [Mr Putin's] consistently high public approval rating", outside (OSCE) observers noted, but also talked of the contest's "dearth of meaningful debate and genuine pluralism".

Black belt

Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin became a KGB spy after graduating from university, and served in East Germany. He enjoys a macho image, helped by election stunts like flying into Chechnya on a fighter jet in 2000, and his possession of a black belt in Judo.

PUTIN BASICS

Born 7 October 1952 in Leningrad (now St Petersburg)
Studied law and economics before joining the KGB
Served as KGB agent in East Germany 1985-90
Married, two daughters
Speaks German and English
Sound bite: "I'd like the Russian public to see me as the person they've hired for this job"

He has been described as a workaholic by his wife and mother of his two daughters, Lyudmila. For many Russian liberals, Mr Putin's KGB past is disturbing, with its authoritarian associations. A decade after Boris Yeltsin famously offered Russia's regions "their fill of sovereignty", Mr Putin brought in a system of presidential envoys seen by some as overseers for elected governors. Putin allies control much of the media and his rule has seen creeping controls over foreign-funded non-government organisations, which largely focus on exposing human rights abuses.

The man who sent troops back into Chechnya as prime minister in 1999 has kept it under Moscow's control through military force, direct or proxy, and strict non-negotiation with the rebels. The price has been increasingly violent attacks by the separatists, which reached a horrifying level in 2004 with the Beslan school seizure. Mr Putin's patriotic rhetoric and evident nostalgia for the USSR - he once famously called its collapse "the greatest geopolitical catastrophe" of the 20th Century - play well with much of the public. But the flip side may be a disturbing rise in nationalism, taking its most sinister form in hate crimes directed at ethnic minorities such as African foreign students.

Wielding clout

Mr Putin has gradually eased liberals out of government, often replacing them with harder-line allies or neutrals seen as little more than yes-men. Yeltsin-era "oligarchs" like Boris Berezovsky and Vladimir Gusinsky - businessmen who grew rich in the chaos of the first privatisations - have ended up as fugitives living in exile abroad. Mikhail Khodorkovsky, once head of oil giant Yukos and Russia's richest man, is now in jail for tax evasion. Mr Putin's Kremlin is accused of abusing its huge energy clout, allegedly punishing fellow ex-Soviet states like Ukraine with price hikes when they lean to the West. Further abroad, Mr Putin allied himself with Washington's "war on terror", comparing Chechen separatists to al-Qaeda, but he also opposed the invasion of Iraq and caused consternation in the US by inviting Hamas to Moscow for talks after their Palestinian election victory.

The biggest diplomatic test may still lie ahead, as Iran defies the US with a nuclear programme based largely on Russian technology. Mr Putin is due to leave the Kremlin by 2008 since by law he cannot stand for a third consecutive term. Rather like Boris Yeltsin in 1999, he has no obvious successor but, unlike Russia's first elected president, he has no convincing rival yet. And, following revelations that he is considering a bid for the position of prime minister, it seems Mr Putin may continue to play a central role in Russian politics for years to come.

Source: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/667749.stm

[Armenian]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

Russia Enters the Race for Africa's Riches



Russians take their place alongside the Chinese in a battle for resources to fuel their growing empires.

Oct. 15, 2007 issue - Late on a Friday night at the Simba Saloon in downtown Nairobi, music by the Kenyan pop sensation the Boomba Clan is playing, and the ties are coming off. At the bar, banker types in expensive suits swap news of the latest bank IPOs and mineral concessions, the must-have gossip in Africa's biggest boomtown. Some of the conversations are in English. Some are in Chinese. And increasingly, many of them are in Russian, as Moscow begins to give both the West and Beijing a run for their money in the race for Africa's riches.

Today, emerging-market giants are fighting for oil, gas and metal ore in Africa as energetically as 19th-century European colonialists grabbed land on the continent. Recently, the Chinese have been the most aggressive, with more than 700 companies active in 50 countries, according to Standard Bank of South Africa. China is now Africa's second largest aid donor and trading partner, behind the United States, with trade up fourfold to $40 billion since 2000. But Russia, the second most active emerging-market power in the area, is gaining. While trade with Africa is only $3 billion a year (up threefold since 2000), Russian companies flush with cash have sunk over $5 billion into buying up African assets since 2000— and that's not counting $3.5 billion of oil exploration deals that will come online before the end of the decade. China, meanwhile, has put $6.64 billion into Africa over the same period, a large part of it through the China Development Bank—but much of that money has been sunk into infrastructure projects like telecommunications, electric power, water conservancy, transportation, agriculture more properly described as development aid. Pushed by the profit motive, and by a Kremlin eager to build economic empires, Russian businessmen are heading south. Africa, like Russia in the early 1990s, is full of basket-case economies with great mineral wealth—and the Russians reckon they know how to deal with those conditions.

Russia has strongly encouraged its companies to buy assets around the world because it suits President Vladimir Putin's philosophy of restoring his country's international position. Recent energy deals in Algeria have gone hand in hand with $4 billion in arms sales from Moscow. Russian businesses interested in South Africa have gotten a boost from a deal Putin made with President Thabo Mbeki to expand nuclear cooperation. Last September Putin made a whistle-stop tour of Africa, with several top Russian oligarchs in tow—including Viktor Vekselberg, who pledged to invest $2 billion in metal and mining projects in Africa, adding to holdings that include vast Kalahari manganese reserves he has owned since 2004. "I want to see Russia regaining its close partnership with Africa," Putin said, waxing lyrical about Soviet influence on the continent.

While the Chinese are staking ground in Africa mainly to power their burgeoning cities and manufacturing sector, Russians see the deals differently. Russia is the world's largest energy exporter, and has plenty of its own metals and minerals. But rich Russian companies want to extend their global reach while they have the money, and with oil topping $80 a barrel in recent weeks, the time is now. There's another motive too, analysts say: moving empires beyond the reach of the Kremlin serves as insurance against future political changes in Russia.

Over the last three years, four top Russian metal companies—Norilsk Nickel, Rusal, Renova and Alrosa—have invested more than $5 billion in sub-Saharan Africa alone. Russian oil giants Lukoil, Rosneft and Stroytransgaz have signed major exploration deals in Algeria, Nigeria, Angola and Egypt worth more than $3 billion. Earlier this year, Lukoil snapped up 63 percent of a field off the Ivory Coast in a production-sharing agreement with the Nigerian owners. That came shortly after a $2.2 billion Chinese deal in the same area.

While the Chinese are focused almost solely on buying commodities, the Russians have that in mind and more. Economic growth in sub-Saharan Africa is expected to hit 6.7 percent this year, and the region's debt burden has fallen from 80 percent of GDP a decade ago to about 30 percent. Economic reform is gaining momentum in places like Zambia and Kenya, and countries like South Africa, Kenya and Nigeria now boast a growing consumer class. The Russians see that, and are fast expanding from oil into financial services, telecommunications and retail. "Africa is ready for the kind of huge growth we saw in the former Soviet Union—from retail to telecoms to manufacturing," says Roland Nash, a strategist at the Moscow-based investment firm Renaissance Capital. "It just needs an injection of capital and expertise."

Russian banks, which have learned at home how to navigate a treacherous market, are fast outpacing Western private equity investors such as the Washington-based Emerging Capital Partners and even South African hedge funds. It's a Russian investment house, Renaissance Capital, that is pioneering services that will soon allow billions of dollars in outside money to be channeled into sub-Saharan African businesses (ex-South Africa). Last year Renaissance organized the biggest IPO in African history—a $350 million sale of stock in Access Bank of Nigeria, which pushed the bank's value to $2 billion. And a new Africa Fund launched by Renaissance this month is expected to reach its $1 billion cap by spring—making it as large as the total of five funds put together since 2000 by Emerging Capital Partners, previously the largest private equity investors. "We're at the beginning of a major transition," says Steven Jennings, CEO of Renaissance. "We've been in Russia and the CIS since 1992—we know about early-stage capital markets. There is a different culture in Africa, of course—but the challenges of imperfect legal systems and so on are the same."

It's not clear that Russia and China will be better or worse for Africa than the earlier Western arrivals turned out to be. South Africa has been a model for sustainable growth in the region, but South African corporations eager to expand throughout the continent may be winnowed out by Chinese or Russians who can pay cash for practically any asset they fancy. China in particular is building railways and roads, which conveniently run mainly to mining areas. What's more, critics say soft loans could lead to a new cycle of dependency—this time tying African nations to the purse strings of emerging-market powers. "Even interest-free loans need to be repaid," says Sanusha Naidu of the Centre for Chinese Studies at South Africa's Stellenbosch University. "And African governments, which finally have money to use following the writing off of their debt by Western donors, might find themselves reburdened."

Local leaders reply that they've been receiving Western aid and following Western business and development models for decades without seeing returns. "They feel that countries such as Russia, China, India and Brazil can bring something new to the table," says Naidu. Certainly they can bring plenty of cash. As the ties come off on the dance floor, and xxxxtails worth two weeks' wages of a Kenyan laborer are split, it's unclear what else the new conquerors will make of Africa's future.

Source: http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21162105/site/newsweek/

[axel]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

Are you familiar with the cyrillic alphabet???

[Armenian]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

Are you familiar with the cyrillic alphabet???

I don't know Russian, but if you are referring to the poster it says - "Glory to the Great [Stalin crossed out] Putin."