The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

[Armenian]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

Saakashvili Lashed at Russia for World Order Revision

Abkhazia downs two more Georgian spy planes: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IlZCnS5gGvc

Russia’s actions in the conflict regions of Georgia are the aggressive attempt to revise Europe’s and world order, said Georgia’s President Mikhail Saakashvili. It is the most aggressive attempt to do it after the end of the cold war, Saakashvili specified. The world community won’t swallow deployment of illegal foreign contingent, the shift of weapons there, the attempts to explode the situation, Saakashvili threatened, pledging that Georgia will take definite legal and political steps, coordinating them with its friends and ensuring strong support and response. When speaking of global support, Saakashvili evidently meant Washington. U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Matthew Bryza, for instance, doubted the need of stationing such sophisticated military hardware to ensure peace in the region and urged Russia to withdraw additional military forces from Abkhazia. Russia’s Foreign Ministry rebuffed by calling Bryza’s statement at least ill-defined. “It should be stated that M. Bryza shows the lack of knowledge of the real situation and events in the conflict area, and choosing my words carefully, his judgment as a result had little in common with reality,” said the ministry’s spokesman Boris Malakhov. In the RF Foreign Ministry, they emphasized the absence of any military component in the actions of Russia, saying that the matter at stake is exclusively the protection of social and economic and humanitarian interests of Abkhazia’s residents, which the government of Georgia has failed to ensure for over 15 years.

Source: http://www.kommersant.com/p-12517/Saakashvili_conflict/

Abkhazia downs two more Georgian spy planes

Two more unmanned drones have been hit over Georgia's breakaway republic of Abkhazia, according to the republic's Defence Minister. Georgia denies the claims, saying none of its drones have flown over the territory during the last few days. Abkhazian Foreign Minister, Sergey Shamba, confirmed two unmanned drones have been hit today “over territory of the breakaway republic not far from the unofficial border between Georgia and Abkhazia”. “The remains will soon be found and displayed as a testimony of the breach. Big pieces were seen falling from the sky in the area,” he said. It brings to seven the number of Georgian spy jets that have been reportedly shot down after breaching the unofficial border with Abkhazia. Tension grew as Georgia's President Mikhail Saakashvili claimed two weeks ago that drones will continue to fly over the region. Georgia's relations with Moscow have deteriorated following Georgian claims a Russian plane shot down one of its unmanned jets in April. Russia denied the allegations and provided evidence to the UN that it was not involved in the incident. Moscow accused Tbilisi of stirring up tension. So far, it's the only drone incident that Georgia has acknowledged. Now Saakashvili is demanding that the EU investigate it. “We also ask to investigate illegal movements of Russian peacekeepers in the conflict zone. We want the EU to be more actively involved in settling the issue. It’s evident that Russia is not a legitimate participant in the settling process as it is a side in the conflict,” he added. Meanwhile, according to Abkhazia’s Defence Ministry, all the shot down planes were Israeli made Hermes 450 unmanned aerial vehicles, which Georgia bought between 2006 and 2008. President Saakashvili has said Georgia bought 40 such drones.

Source: http://www.russiatoday.ru/news/news/24643

Georgia notifies CIS of withdrawal from air defense agreement

Georgia's Foreign Ministry has announced its withdrawal from a 1995 CIS unified air defense agreement signed by a number of former Soviet republics, including Russia. Tbilisi officially notified the Foreign Ministry of Belarus, as the depository of the document, of its decision on Wednesday. Georgia will cease to comply with the agreement 12 months after Belarus receives the notification. The CIS is an alliance of former Soviet republics and the unified air defense system includes Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Ukraine. The Georgian ministry officially notified Russia on May 5 that it would withdraw from a bilateral air defense agreement of April 19, 1995. A Georgian deputy defense minister said earlier his country saw no practical benefit from the treaty with Moscow. The move came amid rising military tensions between Russia and Georgia over the breakaway Georgian republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Russia has said that Georgia is planning a military operation in the republics, while the international community has expressed concern over Russia's buildup of peacekeeping troops in the disputed areas. Georgia had previously withdrawn from the CIS Defense Ministers Council, although it formally remained in the CIS unified air defense system. According to Russian military experts, Georgia's withdrawal will not disrupt the operation of the unified air defense system, as Georgia is not a key chain in the missile defense security system. Political analysts however noted a political element to Tbilisi's withdrawal from the agreement as Georgia continues its efforts to move closer to NATO and away from the CIS.

Source: http://en.rian.ru/world/20080514/107355629.html

[North Pole]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

Russia’s Zenit wins UEFA Cup!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!


Zenit St Petersburg 2-0 Rangers




BBC SPORT | Football | Europe | Zenit St Petersburg 2-0 Rangers






FC Zenit St Petersburg have won the UEFA Cup. They beat Glasgow Rangers of Scotland 2-0 in a thrilling final in Manchester.

VIDEO FROM RUSSIA TODAY - RussiaToday : Sports : Russia's Zenit wins UEFA Cup

Zenit St Petersburg: Malafeev, Aniukov, Krizanac, Shirokov, Sirl, Tymoschuk, Zyryanov, Denisov, Faitzulin (Kim 90), Tekke, Arshavin.
Subs Not Used: Contofalsky, Radimov, Dominguez, Ricksen, Ionov, Gorshkov.

Booked: Malafeev.

Goals: Denisov 72, Zyryanov 90.

Rangers: Alexander, Broadfoot, Weir, Cuellar, Papac (Novo 77), Hemdani (McCulloch 80), Whittaker (Boyd 86), Ferguson, Thomson, Davis, Darcheville.
Subs Not Used: Graeme Smith, Adam, Dailly, Faye.

Att: 47,500

Ref: Peter Frojdfeldt (Sweden)



Striker Igor Denisov scored the first in the 72nd minute. Konstantin Zyryanov made sure of the victory in the dying seconds. It's Zenit’s first major European trophy and the second time a Russian club has won the tournament.


Meantime, eight fans have reportedly been arrested, though their nationality has not yet been made public.

Up to ten thousand Russian fans travelled to the UK for the clash, while a hundred thousand Rangers supporters headed south to Manchester.

Earlier in the day, Russian supporters made their presence felt. The streets of Manchester in northern England were packed with Zenit fans who managed to get their visas in time. The visas were issued free due to a special dispensation from the British.

For those who came without match tickets, there was always the big screens dotted around the city. Manchester’s authorities set up special fan zones where the match was shown outdoors.

Meanwhile, all the sport bars in St Petersburg were completely booked up way in advance of the fixture. Cafes and restaurants installed large plasma screens to attract more customers.

Local bookmakers reported a surge in betting, with most of the cash going on a Zenit win.

Russia's Prime Minister was among those watching in Russia. Earlier in the day Vladimir Putin told journalists about his plans for the evening.

"I will definitely watch it. I have an appointment with Constitutional Court Chairman Zorkin later in the day but after that, of course, we'll watch the game. I hope our side wins," he said.

RussiaToday : Sports : Russia's Zenit wins UEFA Cup

[North Pole]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

Majestic Zenit triumph in Manchester

First goal -
YouTube - ????? ????? ???? 2008. ????? - ?????????. ??? ???????? 1:0

Second goal -
YouTube - ????? ????? ???? 2008. ????? - ?????????. ??? ???????? 2:0

Zenit vs Rangers - 2008 UEFA Cup Final
YouTube - Zenit vs Rangers - 2008 UEFA Cup Final

May 15, 2008

Russian champions win UEFA Cup

FC Zenit St Petersburg have won the UEFA Cup. They beat Scottish side Glasgow Rangers 2-0 in the final in Manchester to claim the first major European trophy in the club's history.

VIDEO - RussiaToday : Sports : Russian champions win UEFA Cup


uefa.com*-*UEFA Cup*-*Fixtures & Results*-*Match Specific

[skhara]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

Saakashvili Lashed at Russia for World Order Revision

How dare Russia?

I say this particular armo, can eat xxxx and die.

[Armenian]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

Let's place Vladimir Putin in a proper historic perspective by comparing him to his predecessors:

The West loved Gorbachev because he killed the Russian Bear.

The West loved Yeltsin even more because he allowed scavengers to devour what had remained of the Russian Bear.

The West now hates Putin because he has resurrected the Russian Bear.

The following article highlights what the West misses so much. They had it so good with Yeltsin the Drunk in the 1990s...

Armenian

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The Legacy of Boris Yeltsin - Corruption, crony capitalism, and Russia's near-demise

Communism wounded Russia, grievously, almost irreparably – and Yeltsinism delivered the death blow. The legacy of Boris Yeltsin, who presided over what Paul Klebnikov described as "one of the most corrupt regimes in history," is, quite literally, the death agony of the Russian nation. As David Satter pointed out in the Wall Street Journal: "Between 1992 and 1994, the rise in the death rate in Russia was so dramatic that Western demographers did not believe the figures. The toll from murder, suicide, heart attacks and accidents gave Russia the death rate of a country at war; Western and Russian demographers now agree that between 1992 and 2000, the number of "surplus deaths" in Russia–deaths that cannot be explained on the basis of previous trends–was between five and six million persons."

The Yeltsin era was marked by a precipitous fall in living standards, but some prospered. Given privileged access to "privatized" state property, the clique around Yeltsin amassed fantastic wealth. The one who perhaps profited the most was Boris Berezovsky, whose methods were described by Klebnikov: "Using his access to the highest officials of the Russian government and his reputation as a close friend of the Yeltsin family, Berezovsky hammered away at the privatization projects that would put key state industries in his grasp."

Yeltsin's clique, which included his daughter, was known as "the Family" – not as in "family values," or the Partridge Family, but as in the Russian equivalent of The Sopranos. The rule of the commissars had been succeeded by the reign of the gangsters, criminal elements who seized control of the national economy and engineered a complete takeover of the state apparatus, not for any ideological motive or ostensibly "patriotic" purpose, but simply to enrich themselves. Their strategy made use of the "shock therapy" approach to privatizing the economy as advocated by Harvard professor Jeffrey Sachs. The process was set up to favor Yeltsin's courtiers, who paid rock-bottom prices in a rigged auction. The industrial base of the Russian economy was sold off for a song: the whole process amounted to a spree of looting such as hadn't been seen since the sack of Rome.

Yeltsin didn't seem to notice, which is hardly surprising, since he was drunk for most of his tenure in office. And in Yeltsin's Russia, vodka was the only commodity that was cheap and plentiful. If this was an effort to calm the roiling currents of post-Soviet politics and anesthetize the populace while the oligarchs made off with the nation's assets, it didn't entirely accomplish that goal. There was an anti-Yeltsin upsurge in 1993, and the Duma threatened to impeach the Russian president: in response, Yeltsin declared the parliament dissolved and sent in his tanks to take the building, which was ringed by tens of thousands of anti-Yeltsin demonstrators.

This is the guy who is now being hailed as a great democrat and admirable leader by the Clintons, two of the old crook's biggest enablers. Bill Clinton and his cronies funneled billions in American "aid" to Yeltsin 's kleptocracy, most of which disappeared down a rabbit hole and eventually wound up in the oligarchs' foreign bank accounts. Putin is routinely blamed for the Chechen war, yet this too is part of the Yeltsin legacy. It was Yeltsin who started that war, invading Chechnya in 1994 to protect the interests of certain criminal gangs in Moscow and other major Russian cities, who had a falling out with their Chechen brethren in the homeland. Describing the group around Yeltsin who pushed for war, Gen. Aleksandr Lebed bitterly declared: "This is not the party of war. This is the party of business."

Having consolidated its hold on power, the Yeltsin clique, with Berezovsky's funding and support, proceeded to divvy up the spoils, including cementing their domination of the "private" media. Organized crime networks replaced the state security services as centers of power, with Berezovsky and his fellow oligarchs at the apex of it all. Using strong-arm tactics and engaging in not a few assassinations, the oligarchs – Berezovsky, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, Vladimir Gusinsky, and Leonid Nevzlin, among others – drove rival gangs out of business and established their economic and political supremacy. The oligarchy decimated the economy, demoralized the Russian people, and dissolved the rule of law in the acid of corruption and criminality. Is it any wonder that Yeltsin's death is hardly being mourned in Russia? I would venture a guess that more than a few cups are being raised to his demise.

Understanding the Yeltsin legacy and its catastrophic effect on Russia is key to grasping the Putin phenomenon. Although the former KGB officer who rose from obscurity to become the most formidable Russian leader since Peter the Great owes his present job to Yeltsin, the Yeltsin clique didn't fare so well at the hands of their fallen leaders' designated successor. Putin turned against "the Family" and drove most of the oligarchs out of power and into exile, where they are even now scheming to make a comeback. The ersatz "privatizations" arranged under the previous regime were overturned, to a large extent, and the "entrepreneurs" of the Russian Mafia were reined in, if not eliminated entirely, to the point where they no longer threatened the state's monopoly on coercion. The reintegration of formerly state-controlled assets into the "private-public" arrangements mapped out by the Putin administration is widely seen in the West as evidence that Russia is "backsliding." Similarly, the takeover of major mass-media outlets by pro-Putin businessmen is cited as proof that Putin represents a new "authoritarianism." Yet all that has happened is the passing of power from the oligarchs to the latter-day czarists of Putin's United Russia party.

Gregory Yavlinsky, the liberal parliamentary leader, had this to say about Yeltsin's regime: "The government that was formed was without any clear ideology. It was neither red, nor white, nor green. It was based solely on personal greed. You got a system that was corporatist, oligarchic, and based on monopolized property rights and semi-criminal relationships."

With the oligarchic and semi-criminal elements purged by Putin, what remains is the corporatist structure, which is now in different hands. Railing at the Russian president from their posh places of exile in Londongrad, Switzerland, and the French Riviera, the oligarchs' indictment of Putin boils down to one principal complaint: they are no longer in power. Flush with cash, and intent on revenge, exiled oligarchs such as Berezovsky pour their money into phony "human rights" front groups that regularly denounce Russia's "reversion" to authoritarianism. Some, like Andrew Illarionov of the Cato Institute, go so far as to accuse Russia of launching a military bid to regain its lost empire and advise the West to "consider itself in a new Cold War-like era."

The goal of this rather motley crew is to restore Yeltsinism without Yeltsin, but the oligarchs and assorted "dissenters" – ranging from Eduard Limonov and his National Bolsheviks to Illarionov and chess-champion-turned-politician Gary Kasparov – have little support outside the editorial offices of Western newspapers and U.S. government agencies engaged in "democracy promotion." The "color revolutions" that occurred in former Soviet satellites such as Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan have faded to black, and Putin's popularity in Russia has so far foiled the oligarchs' attempts to subvert the country from within. Berezovsky has to content himself with calling for the violent overthrow of the Russian government from his palatial London headquarters, hoping that the professional regime-changers in Washington and London will lend a sympathetic ear and, perhaps, some material support.

In the meantime, however, with the ill-gotten gains of several oligarchs stashed in Swiss bank accounts and sloshing around Londongrad and Washington, there are plenty of think-tank presidents who wouldn't mind getting a cut of that particular action. Expect the propaganda assault on Putin's Russia to get more vociferous and the drumbeat to "do something" about the rising "threat" of Russia to get louder and more serious. Yeltsin's legacy to Russia – poverty, privation, and a renewed adversarial stance by the West – is the "gift" that just keeps on giving.

Source: http://www.antiwar.com/justin/?articleid=10867

Godfather of the Kremlin:
The Decline of Russia in the Age of Gangster Capitalism

Mr. Paul Klebnikov makes a rather unusual declaration at the beginning of his book by stating that what is about to be read may be difficult to believe. As this work is non-fiction the comment would seem misplaced. However once the reading has begun it not only proves to have been appropriate, but is a fact you will keep reminding yourself of. The Author relates what is arguably the greatest theft in History, and if he had decided to change some detail, he could have had an outstanding novel. That the events he relates actually took place makes for a reading experience no novel can compete with. I have been following Mr. Klebnikov's stories in Forbes, since December of 1996 when he introduced Mr. Boris Berezovsky as Russia's Godfather. That first article in Forbes brought the wrath of Mr. Berezovsky to bear on Forbes and the Author, but he continued with his research and lived to write this book. Whatever his personal motivation was, and continues to be, is remarkable. This man worked for years on the home field of a variety of people who were capable of removing him from the living, with a glance, and without any fear of consequence to themselves.

The dysfunctional, amoral, nothing is out of bounds world, that was Boris Yeltsin's Russia, truly is difficult to get your mind around. Some minor details that will prepare you for the real story; when Gorbachev was still in power the government budget received 25% of its revenues from where, from the Government monopoly on Vodka! The ruble of Gorbachev was worth approximately one U.S. dollar. At the close of 1992 one dollar would cost 415 rubles, and when Yeltsin finally left office in an alcoholic haze, if you wanted a dollar you needed 28,000 rubles! The "Voucher Auctions" that took place in 1993 and 1994 would not have been condoned much less implemented by a student with a semester or two of Economic study. Gazprom, which owns one third of the planet's Natural Gas, was "auctioned" for $250 million dollars, the truer value, if valued as a Western Company, would have had its gas reserves alone valued at between $300 and $700 BILLION. These numbers do not take into account that the company was basically a monopoly supplier to the entire former Soviet Union, and much of Western Europe as well.

To put a more familiar face on these numbers, at the very lowest estimate, you could have bought Exxon and had $12 billion left over, at the high end you could have bought General Electric, the most valuable company as I write, and since you might be thirsty after the effort, you could pick up Coca Cola with the change left from the GE purchase. You will learn how Mr. Berezovsky privatized the cash flows of companies like Aeroflot, companies he did not own, and by using little money, if any at all, and if he needed any the seller, The Government would supply it. He was not the only man to take advantage of Yeltsin and his hand picked group of incompetents but he surely was the master at the game.

This book will leave you stunned. How much to buy the election for Yeltsin, read the book, how often Yeltsin was sober, the facts will alarm you, how Tanya his beloved daughter who knew nothing that qualified her for Government, became the power behind her Father, often doing the bidding of Mr. Berezovsky, who are you ready for this, was appointed to the Government by good old Yeltsin himself. The wholesale rape of Russia's assets is worse than any damage that Russia has ever been through. Those who dared to challenge the system of "Kleptocracy" were easy to identify, they were either already buried, were bleeding, or about to be assassinated. You played by the rules of thieves or you were removed, it was that simple.

I have read many metaphors in other places that compare the Mafiyas' in Russia today to the Robber Barons of this Country of a century or more ago. Anyone who puts forth this argument is painfully ignorant of History. It is true that the men who carried the sobriquet Robber Baron were not individuals whose paths you would have wished to cross, for as businessmen they were ruthless. That is where the comparison ends, for the bottom line is that they built this country, and while there were times violence took place it is only the inept that would compare it to the thousands murdered, and the millions who died as the result of Russia being taken apart and given away. Russia was eviscerated with the Government's consent and its participation, and the consequences to the citizenry at large had not been as premeditative in their design or as destructive since Stalin. I liked this quote from a top Russian Official, "it is very difficult to determine whether it's incompetence or embezzlement".

Source: http://ftrreading.blogspot.com/2006/...f-kremlin.html

[North Pole]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

Let's place Vladimir Putin in a proper historic perspective by comparing him to his predecessors:

The West loved Gorbachev because he killed the Russian Bear.

The West loved Yeltsin even more because he allowed scavengers to devour what had remained of the Russian Bear.

The West now hates Putin because he has resurrected the Russian Bear.

The following article highlights what the West misses so much. They had it so good with Yeltsin the Drunk in the 1990s...

Armenian

You are correct - the situation changed in Russia, and business community has noticed it.

From Bloomgerg:

The world's biggest banks are advising their clients to load up on Russian rubles




May 5 (Bloomberg) -- The world's biggest banks are advising their clients to load up on rubles in a bet that one of the first things Dmitry Medvedev may do after he's sworn in as Russia's president this week is to allow a stronger currency.

Merrill Lynch & Co., Goldman Sachs Group Inc. and Deutsche Bank AG predict gains of as much as 4 percent in the next six months. They say pressure will mount on the central bank to let the ruble appreciate to stem inflation even if it risks damping profits of oil and energy exporters, which according to Merrill Lynch fund more than half of the federal budget.

The last time Bank Rossii, which must submit proposed changes in monetary policy to the government, allowed the ruble to strengthen was in August, when the inflation rate was 8.5 percent. It's now 13.3 percent, five times the average of the Group of Seven industrialized nations. Two interest-rate increases this year failed to restrain consumer prices, and Russia ``isn't ruling out'' letting the ruble gain, Bank Rossii Deputy Chairman Alexei Ulyukayev said April 24.

``Ruble appreciation will continue to be a key anti- inflation tool given the limited domestic monetary instruments the central bank has at its disposal,'' said Ramin Toloui, a senior vice president at Newport Beach, California-based Pacific Investment Management Co., which manages more than $800 billion. ``That favors continued ruble appreciation.''

The central bank sets the price of the ruble against a so- called currency basket made up of 0.55 dollars and 0.45 euros.

It let the currency appreciate against the basket three times last year by a total of about 1.3 percent. The ruble was at 36.7684 per euro and 23.7601 per dollar at 9:18 a.m. in New York.

Surging Growth

Russia, the world's biggest energy exporter, has expanded an average of about 7 percent a year since President Vladimir Putin, 55, took office in 2000. During that time, the price of oil has risen almost fivefold to a record $119.93 a barrel. The economy will grow 6.6 percent this year, more than five times the 1.2 percent average of the G-7, according to Merrill Lynch.

Medvedev, 42, and the central bank are faced with the challenge of maintaining growth while stemming inflation. Consumer prices have surpassed the government's target every year since 2003.

Bringing down the inflation rate ``is one of our biggest priorities,'' Putin said during his annual press conference on Feb. 14. Putin will become responsible for the economy when he assumes the role of prime minister on May 8, the day after Medvedev's inauguration.

`Doing Everything'


READ MORE - http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?p...refer=currency

"5", Saint Sophia Cathedral in Velikiy Novgorod



"500", Peter the Great



"1000", Monument to Yaroslav I the Wise




"1000", Church of Precursor in Yaroslavl



"5000", Head of the monument to Muravyov-Amursky



The original symbol of the Ruble used throughout the 17th century. Comprised of the Russian letters "Ð" and "Ó".




A non-official ruble sign that is beginning to be used throughout Russia. This image shows the sign in many different fonts.

Today is THE time to invest in Russia.
Investing in today's Russia is like investing in McDonald's in 1950s or in Microsoft in 1980s.

[Armenian]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

To place the above information about the Russian Ruble in a better perspective, I want to post the following article I read several days ago:

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A Challenge for the U.S.: Sun Rising on the East

What a difference five years — and one war — make!

In a 2003 article in Newsweek, written on the eve of the invasion of Iraq, Fareed Zakaria — a columnist for the magazine and the editor of its international edition — wrote: “It is now clear that the current era can really have only one name, the unipolar world — an age with only one global power. America’s position today is unprecedented.” He went on to declare that “American dominance is not simply military. The U.S. economy is as large as the next three — Japan, Germany and Britain — put together,” adding that “it is more dynamic economically, more youthful demographically and more flexible culturally than any other part of the world.” What worries people around the world above all else, he wrote, “is living in a world shaped and dominated by one country — the United States.” In his new book, “The Post-American World,” Mr. Zakaria writes that America remains a politico-military superpower, but “in every other dimension — industrial, financial, educational, social, cultural — the distribution of power is shifting, moving away from American dominance.” With the rise of China, India and other emerging markets, with economic growth sweeping much of the planet, and the world becoming increasingly decentralized and interconnected, he contends, “we are moving into a post-American world, one defined and directed from many places and by many people.”

For that matter, Mr. Zakaria argues that we are now in the midst of the third great tectonic power shift to occur over the last 500 years: the first was the rise of the West, which produced “modernity as we know it: science and technology, commerce and capitalism, the agricultural and industrial revolutions”; the second was the rise of the United States in the 20th century; and the third is what he calls “the rise of the rest,” with China and India “becoming bigger players in their neighborhoods and beyond,” Russia becoming more aggressive, and Europe acting with “immense strength and purpose” on matters of trade and economics. Many of this volume’s more acute arguments echo those that have been made by other analysts and writers, most notably, the New York Times columnist Thomas L. Friedman on globalization, and Jimmy Carter’s national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, on America’s growing isolation in an increasingly adversarial world. But Mr. Zakaria uses his wide-ranging fluency in economics, foreign policy and cultural politics to give the lay reader a lucid picture of a globalized world (and America’s role in it) that is changing at light speed, even as he provides a host of historical analogies to examine the possible fallout of these changes.

The irony of the “rise of the rest,” Mr. Zakaria notes, is that it is largely a result of American ideas and actions: “For 60 years, American politicians and diplomats have traveled around the world pushing countries to open their markets, free up their politics, and embrace trade and technology. We have urged peoples in distant lands to take up the challenge of competing in the global economy, freeing up their currencies, and developing new industries. We counseled them to be unafraid of change and learn the secrets of our success. And it worked: the natives have gotten good at capitalism.” But at the same time, he goes on, America is “becoming suspicious of the very things we have long celebrated — free markets, trade, immigration and technological change”: witness Democratic candidates’ dissing of Nafta, Republican calls for tighter immigration control, and studies showing that American students are falling behind students from other developed countries in science and math.

While readers might take recent signs like recession at home, a falling dollar abroad and a huge trade deficit as suggesting that the American economy is in trouble, Mr. Zakaria asserts that the United States (unlike Britain, which was undone as a world power because of “irreversible economic deterioration”) can maintain “a vital, vibrant economy, at the forefront of the next revolutions in science, technology, and industry — as long as it can embrace and adjust to the challenges confronting it.” As Mr. Zakaria sees it, the “economic dysfunctions in America today” are the product not of “deep inefficiencies within the American economy,” but of specific government policies — which could be reformed “quickly and relatively easily” to put the country on a more stable footing. “A set of sensible reforms could be enacted tomorrow,” he says, “to trim wasteful spending and subsidies, increase savings, expand training in science and technology, secure pensions, create a workable immigration process and achieve significant efficiencies in the use of energy” — if only the current political process weren’t crippled by partisanship, special-interest agendas, a sensation-driven media, ideological attack groups and legislative gridlock.

As for the United States’ role in a world that is rapidly shifting from unipolarity into a far messier and more dynamic system, Mr. Zakaria suggests that it should become a kind of “global broker,” forging close relationships with other major countries, while exchanging the peremptory, directive-issuing role of a superpower for “consultation, cooperation, and even compromise” — in short, repudiating the sort of cowboy unilateralism favored by the current Bush administration and embracing a behind-the-scenes power derived from “setting the agenda, defining the issues and mobilizing coalitions.” The central strategic challenge for American diplomacy in the years to come, Mr. Zakaria says, concerns China: how to deter its aggression and expansionism, while at the same time accommodating its legitimate growth. He suggests that in a world in which “the United States is seen as an overbearing hegemon,” China might well seek to position itself as “the alternative to a hectoring and arrogant America,” gradually expanding its economic ties and enlarging its sphere of influence.

“How will America,” he asks, “cope with such a scenario — a kind of cold war but this time with a vibrant market society, with the world’s largest population, a nation that is not showcasing a hopeless model of state socialism or squandering its power in pointless military interventions? This is a new challenge for the United States, one it has not tackled before, and for which it is largely unprepared.” There are some curious gaps and questionable assertions in this book. While President Bush’s controversial No Child Left Behind program has put increased emphasis on test-taking, and college applicants worry about their SAT scores in what Forbes magazine calls “a test-crazed era,” Mr. Zakaria writes: “Other educational systems teach you to take tests; the American system teaches you to think,” adding that “American culture celebrates and reinforces problem solving, questioning authority, and thinking heretically.”

He skims lightly over the critical role that the Iraq war played in shaping America’s current problems on the world stage (he himself supported the effort to oust Saddam Hussein and wrote in March of 2003 that the war “will look better when it is over” and weapons of mass destruction are found). And in sharp contrast to Qaeda experts like the former C.I.A. officer Michael Scheuer (who argue that the Iraq war has served as a recruitment tool for Osama bin Laden) and a new State Department report (which notes the growth of Qaeda affiliates in the Middle East, North Africa and Europe, and the growing ability of al Qaeda itself to plot attacks from Pakistan), Mr. Zakaria contends that “over the last six years, support for bin Laden and his goals has fallen steadily throughout the Muslim world.” Such dubious assertions distract attention from the many more convincing arguments in this book and the volume’s overall take on the United States’ place in a rapidly changing global landscape — a provocative and often shrewd take that opens a big picture window on the closing of the first American century and the advent of a new world in which “the rest rise, and the West wanes.”

Source: http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/06/bo...341&ei=5087%0A

[Armenian]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

An interesting analysis that can help one place current geopolitical situations around the world in a better perspective.

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The Rise of the Rest



It's true China is booming, Russia is growing more assertive, terrorism is a threat. But if America is losing the ability to dictate to this new world, it has not lost the ability to lead.

Fareed Zakaria NEWSWEEK


Americans are glum at the moment. No, I mean really glum. In April, a new poll revealed that 81 percent of the American people believe that the country is on the "wrong track." In the 25 years that pollsters have asked this question, last month's response was by far the most negative. Other polls, asking similar questions, found levels of gloom that were even more alarming, often at 30- and 40-year highs. There are reasons to be pessimistic—a financial panic and looming recession, a seemingly endless war in Iraq, and the ongoing threat of terrorism. But the facts on the ground—unemployment numbers, foreclosure rates, deaths from terror attacks—are simply not dire enough to explain the present atmosphere of malaise.

American anxiety springs from something much deeper, a sense that large and disruptive forces are coursing through the world. In almost every industry, in every aspect of life, it feels like the patterns of the past are being scrambled. "Whirl is king, having driven out Zeus," wrote Aristophanes 2,400 years ago. And—for the first time in living memory—the United States does not seem to be leading the charge. Americans see that a new world is coming into being, but fear it is one being shaped in distant lands and by foreign people.

Look around. The world's tallest building is in Taipei, and will soon be in Dubai. Its largest publicly traded company is in Beijing. Its biggest refinery is being constructed in India. Its largest passenger airplane is built in Europe. The largest investment fund on the planet is in Abu Dhabi; the biggest movie industry is Bollywood, not Hollywood. Once quintessentially American icons have been usurped by the natives. The largest Ferris wheel is in Singapore. The largest casino is in Macao, which overtook Las Vegas in gambling revenues last year. America no longer dominates even its favorite sport, shopping. The Mall of America in Minnesota once boasted that it was the largest shopping mall in the world. Today it wouldn't make the top ten. In the most recent rankings, only two of the world's ten richest people are American. These lists are arbitrary and a bit silly, but consider that only ten years ago, the United States would have serenely topped almost every one of these categories.

These factoids reflect a seismic shift in power and attitudes. It is one that I sense when I travel around the world. In America, we are still debating the nature and extent of anti-Americanism. One side says that the problem is real and worrying and that we must woo the world back. The other says this is the inevitable price of power and that many of these countries are envious—and vaguely French—so we can safely ignore their griping. But while we argue over why they hate us, "they" have moved on, and are now far more interested in other, more dynamic parts of the globe. The world has shifted from anti-Americanism to post-Americanism.

I. The End of Pax Americana

During the 1980s, when I would visit India—where I grew up—most Indians were fascinated by the United States. Their interest, I have to confess, was not in the important power players in Washington or the great intellectuals in Cambridge. People would often ask me about … Donald Trump. He was the very symbol of the United States—brassy, rich, and modern. He symbolized the feeling that if you wanted to find the biggest and largest anything, you had to look to America. Today, outside of entertainment figures, there is no comparable interest in American personalities. If you wonder why, read India's newspapers or watch its television. There are dozens of Indian businessmen who are now wealthier than the Donald. Indians are obsessed by their own vulgar real estate billionaires. And that newfound interest in their own story is being replicated across much of the world.

How much? Well, consider this fact. In 2006 and 2007, 124 countries grew their economies at over 4 percent a year. That includes more than 30 countries in Africa. Over the last two decades, lands outside the industrialized West have been growing at rates that were once unthinkable. While there have been booms and busts, the overall trend has been unambiguously upward. Antoine van Agtmael, the fund manager who coined the term "emerging markets," has identified the 25 companies most likely to be the world's next great multinationals. His list includes four companies each from Brazil, Mexico, South Korea, and Taiwan; three from India, two from China, and one each from Argentina, Chile, Malaysia, and South Africa. This is something much broader than the much-ballyhooed rise of China or even Asia. It is the rise of the rest—the rest of the world.

We are living through the third great power shift in modern history. The first was the rise of the Western world, around the 15th century. It produced the world as we know it now—science and technology, commerce and capitalism, the industrial and agricultural revolutions. It also led to the prolonged political dominance of the nations of the Western world. The second shift, which took place in the closing years of the 19th century, was the rise of the United States. Once it industrialized, it soon became the most powerful nation in the world, stronger than any likely combination of other nations. For the last 20 years, America's superpower status in every realm has been largely unchallenged—something that's never happened before in history, at least since the Roman Empire dominated the known world 2,000 years ago. During this Pax Americana, the global economy has accelerated dramatically. And that expansion is the driver behind the third great power shift of the modern age—the rise of the rest.

At the military and political level, we still live in a unipolar world. But along every other dimension—industrial, financial, social, cultural—the distribution of power is shifting, moving away from American dominance. In terms of war and peace, economics and business, ideas and art, this will produce a landscape that is quite different from the one we have lived in until now—one defined and directed from many places and by many peoples. The post-American world is naturally an unsettling prospect for Americans, but it should not be. This will not be a world defined by the decline of America but rather the rise of everyone else. It is the result of a series of positive trends that have been progressing over the last 20 years, trends that have created an international climate of unprecedented peace and prosperity.

I know. That's not the world that people perceive. We are told that we live in dark, dangerous times. Terrorism, rogue states, nuclear proliferation, financial panics, recession, outsourcing, and illegal immigrants all loom large in the national discourse. Al Qaeda, Iran, North Korea, China, Russia are all threats in some way or another. But just how violent is today's world, really? A team of scholars at the University of Maryland has been tracking deaths caused by organized violence. Their data show that wars of all kinds have been declining since the mid-1980s and that we are now at the lowest levels of global violence since the 1950s. Deaths from terrorism are reported to have risen in recent years. But on closer examination, 80 percent of those casualties come from Afghanistan and Iraq, which are really war zones with ongoing insurgencies—and the overall numbers remain small. Looking at the evidence, Harvard's polymath professor Steven Pinker has ventured to speculate that we are probably living "in the most peaceful time of our species' existence."

Why does it not feel that way? Why do we think we live in scary times? Part of the problem is that as violence has been ebbing, information has been exploding. The last 20 years have produced an information revolution that brings us news and, most crucially, images from around the world all the time. The immediacy of the images and the intensity of the 24-hour news cycle combine to produce constant hype. Every weather disturbance is the "storm of the decade." Every bomb that explodes is BREAKING NEWS. Because the information revolution is so new, we—reporters, writers, readers, viewers—are all just now figuring out how to put everything in context.

We didn't watch daily footage of the two million people who died in Indochina in the 1970s, or the million who perished in the sands of the Iran-Iraq war ten years later. We saw little of the civil war in the Congo in the 1990s, where millions died. But today any bomb that goes off, any rocket that is fired, any death that results, is documented by someone, somewhere and ricochets instantly across the world. Add to this terrorist attacks, which are random and brutal. "That could have been me," you think. Actually, your chances of being killed in a terrorist attack are tiny—for an American, smaller than drowning in your bathtub. But it doesn't feel like that.

The threats we face are real. Islamic jihadists are a nasty bunch—they do want to attack civilians everywhere. But it is increasingly clear that militants and suicide bombers make up a tiny portion of the world's 1.3 billion Muslims. They can do real damage, especially if they get their hands on nuclear weapons. But the combined efforts of the world's governments have effectively put them on the run and continue to track them and their money. Jihad persists, but the jihadists have had to scatter, work in small local cells, and use simple and undetectable weapons. They have not been able to hit big, symbolic targets, especially ones involving Americans. So they blow up bombs in cafés, marketplaces, and subway stations. The problem is that in doing so, they kill locals and alienate ordinary Muslims. Look at the polls. Support for violence of any kind has dropped dramatically over the last five years in all Muslim countries.

Militant groups have reconstituted in certain areas where they exploit a particular local issue or have support from a local ethnic group or sect, most worryingly in Pakistan and Afghanistan where Islamic radicalism has become associated with Pashtun identity politics. But as a result, these groups are becoming more local and less global. Al Qaeda in Iraq, for example, has turned into a group that is more anti-Shiite than anti-American. The bottom line is this: since 9/11, Al Qaeda Central, the gang run by Osama bin Laden, has not been able to launch a single major terror attack in the West or any Arab country—its original targets. They used to do terrorism, now they make videotapes. Of course one day they will get lucky again, but that they have been stymied for almost seven years points out that in this battle between governments and terror groups, the former need not despair.

Some point to the dangers posed by countries like Iran. These rogue states present real problems, but look at them in context. The American economy is 68 times the size of Iran's. Its military budget is 110 times that of the mullahs. Were Iran to attain a nuclear capacity, it would complicate the geopolitics of the Middle East. But none of the problems we face compare with the dangers posed by a rising Germany in the first half of the 20th century or an expansionist Soviet Union in the second half. Those were great global powers bent on world domination. If this is 1938, as some neoconservatives tell us, then Iran is Romania, not Germany.

Others paint a dark picture of a world in which dictators are on the march. China and Russia and assorted other oil potentates are surging. We must draw the battle lines now, they warn, and engage in a great Manichean struggle that will define the next century. Some of John McCain's rhetoric has suggested that he adheres to this dire, dyspeptic view. But before we all sign on for a new Cold War, let's take a deep breath and gain some perspective. Today's rising great powers are relatively benign by historical measure. In the past, when countries grew rich they've wanted to become great military powers, overturn the existing order, and create their own empires or spheres of influence. But since the rise of Japan and Germany in the 1960s and 1970s, none have done this, choosing instead to get rich within the existing international order. China and India are clearly moving in this direction. Even Russia, the most aggressive and revanchist great power today, has done little that compares with past aggressors. The fact that for the first time in history, the United States can contest Russian influence in Ukraine—a country 4,800 miles away from Washington that Russia has dominated or ruled for 350 years—tells us something about the balance of power between the West and Russia.

Compare Russia and China with where they were 35 years ago. At the time both (particularly Russia) were great power threats, actively conspiring against the United States, arming guerrilla movement across the globe, funding insurgencies and civil wars, blocking every American plan in the United Nations. Now they are more integrated into the global economy and society than at any point in at least 100 years. They occupy an uncomfortable gray zone, neither friends nor foes, cooperating with the United States and the West on some issues, obstructing others. But how large is their potential for trouble? Russia's military spending is $35 billion, or 1/20th of the Pentagon's. China has about 20 nuclear missiles that can reach the United States. We have 830 missiles, most with multiple warheads, that can reach China. Who should be worried about whom? Other rising autocracies like Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states are close U.S. allies that shelter under America's military protection, buy its weapons, invest in its companies, and follow many of its diktats. With Iran's ambitions growing in the region, these countries are likely to become even closer allies, unless America gratuitously alienates them.

[...]

Source: http://www.newsweek.com/id/135380/output/print

[Armenian]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

Naturally, oil plays an immense factor in all this...

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Portrait of an Oil-Addicted Former Superpower

How Rising Oil Prices Are Obliterating America's Superpower Status

Nineteen years ago, the fall of the Berlin Wall effectively eliminated the Soviet Union as the world's other superpower. Yes, the USSR as a political entity stumbled on for another two years, but it was clearly an ex-superpower from the moment it lost control over its satellites in Eastern Europe. Less than a month ago, the United States similarly lost its claim to superpower status when a barrel crude oil roared past $110 on the international market, gasoline prices crossed the $3.50 threshold at American pumps, and diesel fuel topped $4.00. As was true of the USSR following the dismantling of the Berlin Wall, the USA will no doubt continue to stumble on like the superpower it once was; but as the nation's economy continues to be eviscerated to pay for its daily oil fix, it, too, will be seen by increasing numbers of savvy observers as an ex-superpower-in-the-making. That the fall of the Berlin Wall spelled the erasure of the Soviet Union's superpower status was obvious to international observers at the time. After all, the USSR visibly ceased to exercise dominion over an empire (and an associated military-industrial complex) encompassing nearly half of Europeand much of Central Asia. The relationship between rising oil prices and the obliteration of America's superpower status is, however, hardly as self-evident. So let's consider the connection.

Dry Hole Superpower

The fact is, America's wealth and power has long rested on the abundance of cheap petroleum. The United States was, for a long time, the world's leading producer of oil, supplying its own needs while generating a healthy surplus for export. Oil was the basis for the rise of the first giant multinational corporations in the U.S., notably John D. Rockefeller's Standard Oil Company (now reconstituted as Exxon Mobil, the world's wealthiest publicly-traded corporation). Abundant, exceedingly affordable petroleum was also responsible for the emergence of the American automotive and trucking industries, the flourishing of the domestic airline industry, the development of the petrochemical and plastics industries, the suburbanization of America, and the mechanizationof its agriculture. Without cheap and abundant oil, the United States would neverhave experienced the historic economic expansion of the post-World War II era. No less important was the role of abundant petroleum in fueling the global reach of U.S. military power. For all the talk of America's growing reliance on computers, advanced sensors, and stealth technology to prevail in warfare, it has been oil above all that gave the U.S. military its capacity to "project power" onto distant battlefields like Iraq and Afghanistan. EveryHumvee, tank, helicopter, and jet fighter requires its daily ration of petroleum, without which America's technology-driven military would be forced to abandon the battlefield. No surprise, then, that the U.S. Department of Defense is the world's single biggest consumer of petroleum, using more of it every day than the entire nation of Sweden.

From the end of World War II through the height of the Cold War, the U.S. claim to superpower status rested on a vast sea of oil. As long as most ofour oil came from domestic sources and the price remained reasonably low, the American economy thrived and the annual cost of deploying vast armies abroad was relatively manageable. But that sea has been shrinking since the 1950s. Domestic oil production reached a peak in 1970 and has been in decline ever since -- with a growing dependency on imported oil as the result. When it came to reliance on imports, the United States crossed the 50% threshold in 1998 and now has passed 65%. Though few fully realized it, this represented a significant erosion of sovereign independence even before the price of a barrel of crude soared above $110. By now, we are transferring such staggering sums yearly to foreign oil producers, who are using it to gobble up valuable American assets, that, whether we know it or not, we have essentially abandoned our claim to superpowerdom. According to the latest data from the U.S. Department of Energy, the United States is importing 12-14 million barrels of oil per day. At a current price of about $115 per barrel, that's $1.5 billion per day, or $548 billion per year. This represents the single largest contribution to America's balance-of-payments deficit, and is a leading cause for the dollar's ongoing drop in value. If oil prices rise any higher -- in response, perhaps, to a new crisis in the Middle East (as might be occasioned by U.S. air strikes on Iran) -- our annual import bill could quickly approach three-quarters of a trillion dollars or more per year. While our economy is being depleted of these funds, at a moment when credit is scarce and economic growth has screeched to a halt, the oil regimes on which we depend for our daily fix are depositing their mountains of accumulating petrodollars in "sovereign wealth funds" (SWFs) -- state-controlled investment accounts that buy up prized foreign assets in order to secure non-oil-dependent sources of wealth. At present, these funds are already believed to hold in excess of several trillion dollars; the richest, the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA), alone holds $875 billion.

The ADIA first made headlines in November 2007 when it acquired a $7.5 billion stake in Citigroup, America's largest bank holding company. The fund has also made substantial investments in Advanced Micro Systems, a major chip maker, and the Carlyle Group, the private equity giant. Another big SWF, the Kuwait Investment Authority, also acquired a multibillion-dollar stake in Citigroup, along with a $6.6 billion chunk of Merrill Lynch. And these arebut the first of a series of major SWF moves that will be aimed at acquiring stakes in top American banks and corporations. The managers of these funds naturally insist that they have no intention of using their ownership of prime American properties to influence U.S. policy. In time, however, a transfer of economic power of this magnitude cannot help but translate into a transfer of political power as well. Indeed, this prospect has already stirred deep misgivings in Congress. "In the short run, that they [the Middle Eastern SWFs] are investing here is good," Senator Evan Bayh (D-Indiana) recently observed. "But in the long run it is unsustainable. Our power and authority is eroding because of the amounts we are sending abroad for energy=80¦."

No Summer Tax Holiday for the Pentagon

Foreign ownership of key nodes of our economy is only one sign of fading American superpower status. Oil's impact on the military is another. Every day, the average G.I. in Iraq uses approximately 27 gallons of petroleum-based fuels. With some 160,000 American troops in Iraq, that amounts to 4.37 million gallons in daily oil usage, including gasoline for vans and light vehicles, diesel for trucks and armored vehicles, and aviation fuel for helicopters, drones, and fixed-wing aircraft. With U.S. forces paying, as of late April, an average of $3.23 per gallon for these fuels, the Pentagon is already spending approximately $14 million per day on oil ($98 million perweek, $5.1 billion per year) to stay in Iraq. Meanwhile, our Iraqi allies, who are expected to receive a windfall of $70 billion this year from the rising price of their oil exports, charge their citizens $1.36 per gallon for gasoline. When questioned about why Iraqis are paying almost a third less for oil than American forces in their country, senior Iraqi government officials scoff at any suggestion of impropriety. "America has hardly even begun to repay its debt to Iraq," said Abdul Basit, the head of Iraq's Supreme Board of Audit, an independent body that oversees Iraqi governmental expenditures. "This is an immoral request because we didn't ask them to come to Iraq, and before they came in 2003 we didn't have all these needs."

Needless to say, this is not exactly the way grateful clients are supposed to address superpower patrons. "It's totally unacceptable to me that we are spending tens of billions of dollars on rebuilding Iraq while they are putting tens of billions of dollars in banks around the world from oil revenues," said Senator Carl Levin (D-Michigan), chairman of the Armed Services Committee. "It doesn't compute as far as I'm concerned." Certainly, however, our allies in the region, especially the Sunni kingdoms of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) that presumably look to Washington to stabilize Iraq and curb the growing power of Shiite Iran, are willing to help the Pentagon out by supplying U.S. troops with free or deeply-discounted petroleum. No such luck. Except for some partially subsidized oil supplied by Kuwait, all oil-producing U.S. allies in the region charge us the market rate for petroleum. Take that as a striking reflection of how little credence even countries whose ruling elites have traditionally looked to the U.S. for protection now attach to our supposed superpower status. Think of this as a strikingly clear-eyed assessment of American power.

As far as they're concerned, we're now just another of those hopeless oil addicts driving a monster gas-guzzler up to the pump -- and they're perfectly happy to collect our cash which they can then use to cherry-pick our prime assets. So expect no summer tax holidays for the Pentagon, not in the Middle East, anyway. Worse yet, the U.S. military will need even more oil for the future wars on which the Pentagon is now doing the planning. In this way, the U.S. experience in Iraq has especially worrisome implications. Under the military "transformation" initiated by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in 2001,the future U.S. war machine will rely less on "boots on the ground" and ever more on technology. But technology entails an ever-greater requirement for oil, as the newer weapons sought by Rumsfeld (and now Secretary of Defense Robert Gates) all consume many times more fuel than those they will replace. To put this in perspective: The average G.I in Iraq now uses about seven times as much oil per day as G.I.s did in the first Gulf War less than two decades ago. And every sign indicates that the same ratio of increase will apply to coming conflicts; that the daily cost of fighting will skyrocket; and that the Pentagon's capacity to shoulder multiple foreign military burdens will unravel. Thus are superpowers undone.

[...]

Source: http://www.tomdispatch.com/post/1749...ica_out_of_gas

[Azad]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

I still believe the Dollar has some weight to it, where it can not be replaced by any other currency yet. The most important factor in having a monetary unit as a trade measurement is the political stability of the country that backs it. The economic backing of that currency by the host country is as important. Unfortunately we have MAJOR problems that needs to be faced and fixed very soon. The US is in desperate need of a nationalistic leader without threatening the rest of the world. We need our Putin ... soon.