The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

[Armenian]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

In this case, things are not going 100% their way concerning Turkey (they're greatest ally) and in true Azeri style, they bite the hand that feeds them. Lets hope they continue to be stupid.

Further proof that baku really is in panic mode

We should not be afraid of approaching Ankara with an open mind. There has been a serious/major geopolitical shift in the region and we as a nation need to adjust to it, lest we end up last in the line again. Had the recent warming in relations between Yerevan and Ankara been attempted before the recent crisis in the region, I would have been totally against it for reasons that I have previously outlined. The recent developments between Ankara and Yerevan would not have occurred had there not been a major crisis between the West and the Russian Federation and had Moscow not been able to crush the West's political agenda in Georgia. Let's make no mistake about it, this is the dawning of a new era in regional politics. As a result, Ankara is finally realizing that it needs better relations with Yerevan despite strong complaints from Turkish nationalists and Baku. Yerevan is also realizing that it has to at least be open to Ankara and seriously discuss issues at hand. None of this means that all issues are solved and there are no problems anymore. This is just an initial, or preliminary, trial stage. Moreover, and more importantly, none of this means that our Hai Dat or the status of Nagorno Karabagh will have to be compromised. There is no talk about abandoning Armenian Genocide recognition and there is no talk about pulling out of Nagorno Karabagh, and there won't be. I want to mention here that the Hai Dat, in particular, needs to be looked upon by all Armenians as a 'political tool' which we can use to the benefit of the Armenian Republic. Nonetheless, we need to better understand ourselves (better understand Armenia's strengths and weaknesses) as much as we need to better understand the enemy. Let's never underestimate the enemy and overestimate ourselves. Doing so, as we have experienced in the past, is suicidal. For small fledgling nations like us, there is a time to fight and there is a time to back down from a fight. We need to pick our fights in wisely. These are very complicated times in politics. We need to approach these matters in an unemotional manner, in a pragmatic manner and with Armenia's future in mind. I personally had a hard time watching the Turkish national anthem being sung in Yerevan, not to mention losing the game to them, but in the big geopolitical picture I am willing to swallow my pride (for Armenia's sake) and hope that our politicians in Yerevan don't screw this one up in the longterm.

[North Pole]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

Dollar Weakens as More U.S. Jobs are Lost

The holiday shortened week ended with the U.S. Dollar losing ground to most major currencies as Non-Farm Payrolls fell more than expected and the unemployment rate jumped to a 5-year high.
The larger than expected decline in Non-Farm Payrolls heightened concerns that the U.S. is headed toward a recession. The actual decline of 84,000 jobs was worse than pre-report estimates of 75,000 jobs. Traders are now pushing the date for a rate hike by the Fed well into 2009. The focus is now going to be on U.S. financial instruments to see if traders begin to price in the possibility of a rate reduction.

With the news that the U.S. economy is worsening, Forex traders may be forced to rethink their aggressive long Dollar positions initiated since July. Some traders are beginning to think that the decline in some currency pairs has been overdone to the downside. This may initially force position lightening like Friday's action, but may eventually grow into full blown short-covering rallies.

The EUR USD showed some strength on Friday in the wake of the weaker than expected U.S. Non-Farm Payroll Report and the spike in the Unemployment Rate. With some traders now talking about a possible rate cut by the Fed before the next rate hike, short EUR USD traders may begin to adjust positions. Do not be surprised by the start of a massive short-covering rally based on the negative news today.
Earlier in the week the European Central Bank left rates at 4.35% and ECB Bank President Trichet issued a somewhat dovish comment stating that the Euro Zone countries were in an "episode of weak activity." Trichet's comments should be interpreted as somewhat dovish, however, because they did not include any comments about future interest rate reductions. Reading further into his comments, one can conclude that he is still concerned about inflation when he stated "upside risks to price stability...prevail." His more dovish comment mentioned the downside risk to "growth." If the market begins to believe the ECB will leave rates steady while the Fed ponders a rate cut, the Dollar may come under tremendous pressure again as a lot of shorts may be blown out of their positions.

The GBP USD was under pressure all week as expectations are for the U.K. economy to enter a recession soon unless it is already there. A bad housing market and high unemployment continue to encourage selling of the Pound. The Bank of England decided this week to leave rates unchanged at 5%. It cited elevated inflation as the main reason for not cutting rates. It is clear that the BoE feels strongly about allowing the U.K. economy to pull itself out of its decline without any stimulus such as an interest rate cut. Most traders are not buying this chain of thought and are anticipating at least two rate cuts by the BoE before the end of the year. These cuts may total as much as 1.5%. More signs of a weaker U.S. economy or a rate cut by the Fed may slow down the decline in the Pound or trigger a much needed short-covering rally.
The USD CHF pushed higher this week. This buying was obviously not related to the carry-trade as the U.S. stock market fell sharply. Traders must feel that the U.S. economy is going to strengthen before the European economies turn around. The higher Dollar versus the Swiss could top out if the U.S. economy weakens further or if the U.S. credit crisis worsens. If those events take place, then look for traders to seek the safety of the Swiss Franc.
The USD CAD yo-yoed most of the week on conflicting economic data. Early in the week the Bank of Canada surprised long traders by keeping rates unchanged at 3% and hinting at no further rate cuts this year because the Canadian economy was operating near capacity. Lower crude oil and commodity prices pressured the Canadian Dollar most of the week, but on Friday a better than expected Canadian Unemployment report provided strength while the U.S. Unemployment report indicated more U.S. economic weakness. Watch for a possible top to develop in this pair as the U.S. economy is worsening. Although some of this weakness may spread to Canada, it is clear from the action by the Bank of Canada that the Canadian economy is a little stronger than the U.S. economy at this time. Furthermore, a weak U.S. stock market may encourage traders to seek shelter in Canada. The only negative to the Canadian economy at this time is weakening commodity prices - especially gold and crude oil.

READ MORE -- http://www.ibtimes.com/articles/2008...s-are-lost.htm

[Armenian]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

Although a year old, this essay is an accurate assessment of the current state of geopolitics.

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Russia's Window of Opportunity

All U.S. presidents eventually become lame ducks, though the lameness of any particular duck depends on the amount of power he has left to wield. It not only is an issue of the president’s popularity, but also of the opposition’s unity and clarity. In the international context, the power of a lame duck president depends on the options he has militarily. Foreign powers do not mess with American presidents, no matter how lame one might be, as long as the president retains military options. The core of the American presidency is in its role as commander in chief. With all of the other presidential powers deeply intersecting with that of Congress and the courts, the president has the greatest autonomous power when he is acting as supreme commander of the armed forces. There is a remarkable lot he can do if he wishes to, and relatively little Congress can do to stop him — unless it is uniquely united. Therefore, foreign nations remain wary of the American president’s military power long after they have stopped taking him seriously in other aspects of foreign relations.

There is a school of thought that argues that President George W. Bush is likely to strike at Iran before he leaves office. The sense is that Bush is uniquely indifferent to either Congress or public opinion and that he therefore is likely to use his military powers in some decisive fashion, under the expectation and hope that history will vindicate him. In that sense, Bush is very much not a lame duck, because if he wanted to strike, there is nothing legally preventing him from doing so. The endless debates over presidential powers — which have roiled both Republican and Democratic administrations — have left one thing clear: The courts will not intervene against an American president’s use of his power as commander in chief. Congress may cut off money after the fact, but as we have seen, that is not a power that is normally put to use. Yet for all this, Bush is a lame duck commander in chief. He has the inherent legal power, but his military power is so limited that any action he might take — in Iran, for example — would be shaped and constrained by those limitations, and therefore, unlikely to achieve a meaningful goal. The problem for Bush, of course, is that he is fighting two simultaneous wars, one in Iraq and one in Afghanistan. These wars have sucked up the resources of the U.S. Army to a remarkable degree. Units are either engaged in these theaters of operation, recovering from deployment or preparing for deployment. To an extraordinary degree, the United States does not have a real strategic reserve in its ground forces, the Army and the Marines. A force could probably be scraped up to deal with a limited crisis, but U.S. forces are committed and there are no more troops to scatter around.

The Air Force and Navy could be used against Iran, such as a naval blockage of Iran’s ports. But this assumes that foreign powers such as the Chinese, Russians or Europeans would respect the blockade. Would the United States be prepared to seize or sink third-power ships that run the blockade? In addition, for a blockade to work, Turkey, Armenia and Azerbaijan would have to collaborate and the Iraqi and Afghan border would have to be sealed. The United States has no troops for that mission. Airstrikes are, of course, a possibility, though air campaigns have not been particularly successful in forcing regime change historically — and there are no follow-on ground forces with which to invade. Most important, if the United States went after Iran, not only would the U.S. Army and Marines be tapped out, the United States would be throwing all of its chips on the table, with few reserves left. With all U.S. forces engaged in a line from the Euphrates to the Hindu Kush, the rest of the world would be wide open to second-tier powers. This is Bush’s strategic problem — the one that shapes his role as commander in chief. He has committed virtually all of his land forces to two wars. His only reserves are the Air Force and Navy. If they were sucked into a war in Iran, it would limit U.S. reserves for other contingencies. In all likelihood, the president will not attack Iran, gossip notwithstanding.

Thus, Bush is a lame duck commander in chief as well. Even if he completely disregards the politics of his position, which he can do, he still lacks the sheer military resources to achieve any meaningful goal without the use of nuclear weapons. But his problem goes beyond the Iran scenario. Lacking ground forces, the president’s ability to influence events throughout the world is severely impaired. Moreover, if he were to throw his air forces into a non-Iranian crisis, all pressure on Iran would be lifted. The United States is strategically tapped out. There is no land force available and the use of air and naval forces without land forces, while able to achieve some important goals, would not be decisive. The United States has entered a place where it has almost no room to maneuver. The president is becoming a lame duck in the fullest sense of the term. This opens a window of opportunity for powers, particularly second-tier powers, that would not be prepared to challenge the United States while its forces had flexibility. One power in particular has begun to use this window of opportunity — Russia. Russia is not the country it was 10 years ago. Its economy, fueled by rising energy and mineral prices, is financially solvent. The state has moved from being a smashed relic of the Soviet era to becoming a more traditional Russian state: authoritarian, repressive, accepting private property but only under terms it finds acceptable. It also is redefining its sphere of influence in the former Soviet Union and reviving its military.

For example, a Russian aircraft recently fired a missile at a Georgian village. Intentionally or not, the missile was a dud, though it clearly was meant to signal to the Georgians — close allies of the United States and unfriendly to Russian interests in the region — that not only is Russia unhappy, it is prepared to take military action if it chooses. It also clearly told the Georgians that the Russians are unconcerned about the United States and its possible response. It must have given the Georgians a chill. The Russians planted their flag under the sea at the North Pole after the Canadians announced plans to construct armed icebreakers and establish a deepwater port from which to operate in the Far North. The Russians announced the construction of a new air defense system by 2015 — not a very long time as these things go. They also announced plans to create a new command and control system in the same time frame. Russian long-range aircraft flew east in the Pacific to the region of Guam, an important U.S. air base, causing the United States to scramble fighter planes. They also flew into what used to be the GIUK gap (Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom) probing air defenses along the Norwegian coast and in Scotland.

Most interestingly, they announced the resumption of patrols in the Atlantic, along the U.S. coast, using Blackjack strategic bombers and the old workhorse of the Russian fleet, the Bear. (The balance does remain in U.S. favor along the East Coast). During the Cold War, patrols such as these were designed to carry out electronic and signal intelligence. They were designed to map out U.S. facilities along the Eastern seaboard and observe response time and procedures. During the Cold War they would land in Cuba for refueling before retracing their steps. It will be interesting to see whether Russia will ask Cuba for landing privileges and whether the Cubans will permit it. As interesting, Russian and Chinese troops conducted military exercises recently in the context of regional talks. It is not something to take too seriously, but then they are not trivial. Many of these are older planes. The Bear, for example, dates back to the 1950s — but so does the B-52, which remains important to the U.S. strategic bomber fleet. The age of the airframe doesn’t matter nearly as much as maintenance, refits, upgrades to weapons and avionics and so on. Nothing can be assumed from the mere age of the aircraft. The rather remarkable flurry of Russian air operations — as well as plans for naval development — is partly a political gesture. The Russians are tired of the United States pressing into its sphere of influence, and they see a real window of opportunity to press back with limited risk of American response. But the Russians appear to be doing more than making a gesture.

The Russians are trying to redefine the global balance. They are absolutely under no illusion that they can match American military power in any sphere. But they are clearly asserting their right to operate as a second-tier global power and are systematically demonstrating their global reach. They may be old and they may be slow, but when American aircraft on the East Coast start to scramble routinely to intercept and escort Russian aircraft, two things happen. First, U.S. military planning has to shift to take Russia into account. Second, the United States loses even more flexibility. It can’t just ignore the Russians. It now needs to devote scarce dollars to upgrading systems along the East Coast — systems that have been quite neglected since the end of the Cold War. There is a core assumption in the U.S. government that Russia no longer is a significant power. It is true that its vast army has disintegrated. But the Russians do not need a vast army modeled on World War II. They need, and have begun to develop, a fairly effective military built around special forces and airborne troops. They also have appeared to pursue their research and development, particularly in the area of air defense and air-launched missiles — areas in which they have traditionally been strong. The tendency to underestimate the Russian military — something even Russians do — is misplaced. Russia’s military is capable and improving.

The increased Russian tempo of operations in areas that the United States has been able to ignore for many years further pins the United States. It can be assumed that the Russians mean no harm — but assumption is not a luxury national security planners can permit themselves, at least not good ones. It takes years to develop and deploy new systems. If the Russians are probing the Atlantic, Pacific and Arctic again, it is not the current threat that matters, but the threat that might evolve. That diverts budget dollars from heavily armored trucks that can survive improvised explosive device attacks, and cuts into the Air Force and Navy. The Russians are using the window of opportunity to redefine, in a modest way, the global balance and gain some room to maneuver in their region. As a result of their more assertive posture, American thoughts of unilateral interventions must decline. For example, getting involved in Georgia once was a low-risk activity. The risk just went up. Taking that risk while U.S. ground forces are completely absorbed in Iraq and Afghanistan is hard for the Americans to justify — but rather easy for the Russians.

This brings us back to the discussion of the commander in chief’s options in the Middle East. The United States already has limited options against Iran. The more the Russians maneuver, the more the United States must hold what forces it has left — Air Force and Navy — in reserve. Launching an Iranian adventure becomes that much more risky. If it is launched, Russia has an even greater window of opportunity. Every further involvement in the region makes the United States that much less of a factor in the immediate global equation. All wars end, and these will too. The Russians are trying to rearrange the furniture a bit before anyone comes home and forces them out. They are dealing with a lame duck president with fewer options than most lame ducks. Before there is a new president and before the war in Iraq ends, the Russians want to redefine the situation a bit.

Source: http://www.stratfor.com/russias_window_opportunity

[Armenian]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

Russia plans to sell $6.1 bln worth of weaponry in 2008

Russian arms exports may reach at least $6.1 billion by the end of 2008, a senior official at Rosoboronexport, Russia's largest state arms exporter, said on Friday. Russia has doubled annual arms exports since 2000 to $7 billion last year, becoming the world's second-largest exporter of conventional weapons after the United States. "We expect our arms exports to reach at least $6.1 billion this year," Mikhail Zavaliy said. Russia exports arms to about 80 countries. Among the key buyers of Russian-made weaponry are China, India, Algeria, Venezuela, Iran, Malaysia, and Serbia. The most popular types of weaponry bought from Russia are Sukhoi and MiG fighters, air defense systems, helicopters, battle tanks, armored personnel carriers, and infantry fighting vehicles. Russia also maintains traditionally strong positions in the sales of small arms, anti-tank and air-defense missile systems. Zavaliy said that combat aircraft remain the key component of Russia's arms sales, followed by naval weaponry. Experts believe, though, that the priority may shift toward naval equipment in the near future. The Rosoboronexport official also said that the competition between Russia and the United States on the global arms market could become more intense following the recent conflict between Georgia and Russia over South Ossetia. "In the light of the recent events I believe that the U.S. could act more aggressively on the global arms market, although we are used to Washington's attempts to 'play without rules," Zavaliy said. In the past, Washington imposed sanctions on Rosoboronexport and other Russian companies several times, including over the sale of TOR-M1 air defense systems to Iran, despite the fact that the deals did not contradict any international agreements.

Source: http://en.rian.ru/russia/20080905/116580478.html

Russia may push forward with S-300 sales to Iran

Russia may proceed with plans to sell advanced S-300 air defense systems to Iran under a secret contract believed to have been signed in 2005, a Russian analyst said on Monday. Commenting on an article in the Sunday Telegraph newspaper saying Russia is using the plans as a bargaining chip in its standoff with America, Ruslan Pukhov, director of Moscow-based Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, said: "In the current situation, when the U.S. and the West in general are stubbornly gearing toward a confrontation with Russia after the events in South Ossetia, the implementation of a lucrative contract on the deliveries of S-300 [air defense systems] to Iran looks like a logical step." The U.S. and Israel were alarmed by media reports, which started circulating as early as 2005, on the possible delivery of S-300 surface-to-air missiles to Iran, as these systems could greatly improve Iranian defenses against any air strike on its strategically important sites, including nuclear facilities.

The advanced version of the S-300 missile system, called S-300PMU1 (SA-20 Gargoyle), has a range of over 150 kilometers (over 100 miles) and can intercept ballistic missiles and aircraft at low and high altitudes, making the system an effective tool for warding off possible air strikes. The issue was again raised in December last year when Iranian Defense Minister Mostafa Mohammad Najjar said Russia had agreed to deliver to Iran an unspecified number of advanced S-300 air defense complexes under a previously signed contract. However, Russia's Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation said the issue of the delivery of S-300 air defense missile systems to Iran was not a subject of current or past negotiations. Israeli defense sources, however, said in July that Iran was expected to take delivery of Russian S-300 air defense systems by the end of 2008. Pukhov said: "This may be true. While Russia and the West were on good terms, the contract could have been 'frozen' for the time being. But now may be the perfect time to move forward with the fulfillment of the S-300 contract."

According to the Russian analyst, S-300 missiles and previously delivered Tor-M1 missiles would help Iran build a strong network of long- and medium-range 'defensive rings' to thwart any attempts to destroy key nuclear facilities in the country. Moscow supplied Iran with 29 Tor-M1 air defense missile systems in late January under a $700-million contract signed in late 2005. Russia has also trained Iranian Tor-M1 specialists, including radar operators and crew commanders. "Anyone attempting to threaten Iran with aerial bombardment would have to consider the possibility of strong and effective resistance," the expert said. Meanwhile, Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Hassan Qashqavi denied on Monday reports that Tehran had bought S-300 air defense systems from Russia. "Our missile and technical capability completely depends on the efforts of Iranian scientists," he said.

Source: http://en.rian.ru/russia/20080901/116446535.html

[Angessa]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

I am surprised you did not report this.

Putin saves TV crew from Siberian tiger

http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20080902/od_nm/putin_tiger_dc

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q7F0M8NZ7JU&feature=related

This was not a really big deal in Russia( more had to do with environmental support) But in western media and citizens they pose it as propaganda attempt and way to ignore Russia genocide agianst Georgia and are war crimes.

[Armenian]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

We Armenians should not be afraid of approaching Ankara with an open mind. There has been a serious/major geopolitical shift in the region and we as a nation need to adjust to it, lest we end up last in the line again. Had the recent warming in relations between Yerevan and Ankara been attempted before the recent crisis in the region, I would have been totally against it for reasons that I have previously outlined. The recent developments between Ankara and Yerevan would not have occurred had there not been a major crisis between the West and the Russian Federation and had Moscow not been able to crush the West's political agenda in Georgia. Let's make no mistake about it, this is the dawning of a new era in regional politics. As a result, Ankara is finally realizing that it needs better relations with Yerevan despite strong complaints from Turkish nationalists and Baku. Yerevan is also realizing that it has to at least be open to Ankara and seriously discuss issues at hand. None of this means that all issues are solved and there are no problems anymore. This is just an initial, or preliminary, trial stage. Moreover, and more importantly, none of this means that our Hai Dat or the status of Nagorno Karabagh will have to be compromised. There is no talk about abandoning Armenian Genocide recognition and there is no talk about pulling out of Nagorno Karabagh, and there won't be. I want to mention here that the Hai Dat, in particular, needs to be looked upon by all Armenians not only as a form of revenge but also and primarily as a 'political tool' used for Armenia's benefit. Nonetheless, we need to better understand ourselves (better understand Armenia's strengths and weaknesses) as much as we need to better understand the enemy. Let's never underestimate the enemy and overestimate ourselves. Doing so, as we have experienced in the past, is suicidal. For small fledgling nations like us, there is a time to fight and there is a time to back down from a fight. We need to pick our fights wisely. These are very complicated times in politics. We need to approach these matters in an unemotional manner, in a pragmatic manner and we need to approach it with Armenia's future in mind. I personally had a hard time watching the Turkish national anthem being sung in Yerevan, not to mention losing the game to them, but in the big geopolitical picture I am willing to swallow my personal pride for Armenia's sake and hope that our politicians in Yerevan don't screw this one up.

Armenian

************************************

Turkey: An Historic Presidential Day Trip

Summary

The president of Turkey is planning a day trip to Armenia, the first such trip by a leader of Turkey since the time of the Ottomans. There is a lot of baggage in this relationship, and improving relations will be no easy task. It may help that Armenia, a Russian client state, could be interested in getting back on Washington’s good side, and Turkey could offer an introduction.

Analysis

Turkish President Abdullah Gul said he will make a day trip Sept. 6 to Armenia where he will meet for a few hours with Armenian President Serge Sarkissian. Later the two will attend a soccer match. Gul’s visit to Armenia will be the first by the leader of Turkey since the days of the Ottoman Empire, which collapsed in the early 1920s. Normally such contact between Ankara and Yerevan would not be taking place. In fact, Turkey would be very happy to isolate Armenia for reasons ranging from a deep historical bitterness over claims of genocide to Armenia’s status as a client of Russia and friend of Iran to Yerevan’s hostile relations with Azerbaijan. Turkey’s tightest ally is Azerbaijan for historical, ethnic and geographic reasons (geographic because Azerbaijan brackets Armenia and checks Russian and Iranian expansion). Turkey stays chummy with Georgia for similar reasons, but Georgia is primarily only important as a connection to Azerbaijan. The fact that Azerbaijan ships loads of oil and natural gas to Turkey (and to world markets through Turkey) is just geopolitical gravy. In short, other than a border with Iran, Armenia’s borders are completely locked down economically and politically with Turkey, Azerbaijan and Georgia.

Russia’s invasion of Georgia threw all of this out the window. In the process of invading Georgia, Russia demonstrated that it could sever Turkey’s connection to Azerbaijan without breaking a sweat. An alternative to Georgia is required. Iran can be ruled out almost immediately. It is a regional power in its own right and is perfectly pleased to stand by and let Turkish power in the Caucasus suffer. That leaves Armenia — and only Armenia. Options for bringing Armenia into a more productive relationship are also limited. Turkey has been in a bit of a geopolitical coma since the Ottoman period and simply is out of practice in terms of threatening or invading neighbors, so outright conquering Armenia is out of the question. Turkey’s internal turmoil — between the Islamic-lite ruling party and the military-backed secularists — also precludes anything (such as a military campaign) that would require unflinching national unity. Ergo Gul’s attending a soccer match to at least attempt the difficult task of normalizing relations.

Stratfor does not mean to belittle the obstacles facing any Armenian-Turkish response — people do not blithely toss around words like genocide for amusement, and Armenia and Azerbaijan contest control of Azerbaijan’s Nagorno-Karabakh enclave — but it is not only Turkey that is eyeing better relations. Armenia used to boast one of the strongest foreign lobbies in the United States, a feature that sent vast amounts of American aid Armenia’s way. But this policy twist was only possible as long as Washington thought Armenia was a backwater state. As Azerbaijani oil output increased and Russian power resurged, Washington took a greater and greater interest in Caucasus policy. Realizing Russia had a firm hold politically, socially, economically and militarily in Armenia, Armenia’s influence with the United States withered. So while Armenia is legitimately thrilled that its security guarantor — Russia — is becoming more active, Yerevan also knows that Russian protection is dependent on the Kremlin’s attention span. If Armenia is to survive in the pressure cooker that is the Caucasus, it will have to find a way to better manage its neighborhood. The best way to do that, as Armenia knows from experience, is to get on Washington’s good side. That is rather hard for a Russian client state to do. It is much easier if you can get an American ally to make the introduction. Turkey anyone?

Source: http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/tur...ntial_day_trip

Additional perspective:

Turkey in tight spot between Russia and NATO

NATO-member Turkey is treading a fine line between its loyalty to the alliance and its economic interests in its Black Sea neighbor Russia, with some fearing Ankara could find itself at the frontline of a new Cold War. Evidence of Turkey's dilemma in the standoff between the West and Russia over its action against Georgia was on display last week, when two U.S. ships sailed through the Istanbul Strait on their way to the Black Sea. Russia has accused the West of stirring tensions with a NATO naval build-up in the Black Sea following a brief war between Russia and Georgia. A close U.S. ally which aspires to join the European Union, Turkey is the passage way to the sea. During the Cold War, Turkey was NATO's southern flank, an isolated bulwark on Soviet frontiers. But since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has become Turkey's top trade partner, supplying the majority of Turkey's energy needs. "(Current tensions) put Turkey in a very tight spot because it is under pressure from Russia and its Western allies," said Wolfango Piccoli, an analyst at the political risk consultancy Eurasia Group. "Turkey is again a frontline state like in the Cold War, but the difference now is that its dependency on Russia is much bigger," he said. Turkey fears it is already feeling signs of a possible fallout with Moscow affecting their $38 billion trade. Ankara has protested to Russia over trade restrictions as 10,000 Turkish trucks are being held at various Russian border crossings. Russia says inspections on Turkish trucks are due to a new customs law, but Turkish officials see darker motives. Turkish businesses are concerned Turkey could lose $3 billion in the short term if the delays continue, and Turkey's Foreign Trade Minister responded to the move in harsh terms. "If you harass us, we will you," Turkish newspapers reported Foreign Trade Minister Kursad Tuzmen as telling Russian officials.

ENERGY CARD

Turkey, which neighbors Georgia, has kept a low profile since the outbreak of a brief war between Moscow and Tbilisi earlier this month. Unlike its Western allies, it has refrained from condemning Russian actions. But NATO members may want a more strident supporter on its eastern frontline. "(Turkey) must act like a NATO member ... if it wants its place in Trans-Atlantic relations. It became a member years ago, and that means Turkey has to support the steps that NATO takes," a high-level U.S. official was quoted by Sabah daily as saying. Analysts have also said the United States may want Turkey to change the terms of the Montreux Convention, which regulates shipping traffic through the Bosphorus Strait in Istanbul. Turkey's dependence on Russian gas and coal, however, may make it difficult for Ankara to take those steps. Last year Russia provided more than 60 percent of Turkey's imported natural gas through two pipelines as well as 56.4 percent of Turkey's thermal coal, used in the country's power and booming construction sectors. Turkey asked Russian state-owned gas company Gazprom to increase its supplies to Turkey after Iran turned off its gas to Turkey to meet its own domestic needs last year. Potential problems with Russian gas or coal supplies would create large problems for Turkey in the winter. "On the pipeline there may arise 'technical problems' which means we have real problems ... that means for industry, for consumers, your economy will be harmed," said energy analyst Necdet Pamir. Turkey has worked hard since the fall of the Soviet Union to become an energy hub delivering Caspian gas and oil to European markets, and the country often boasts of its important geostrategic position. But if tensions continue to build in the Caucasus, Turkey may not find its position so appealing.

"Turkey's geostrategic importance can sometimes be a liability and this case is an example," said Piccolli.

http://www.reuters.com/article/reutersEdge/idUSLS62310420080828?pageNumber=1&virtualBrandChannel=0

[meline]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

Armenian, what do you think of the so-called "Caucassus platform for stability and cooperation" launched by Turkey. To me it sounds like a noxious diplomatic move, but I would like to hear more opinions on the matter. Thanks

[RSNATION]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

Armenian, what do you think of the so-called "Caucassus platform for stability and cooperation" launched by Turkey. To me it sounds like a noxious diplomatic move, but I would like to hear more opinions on the matter. Thanks

It won't amount to anything but was more or less brought about by Turkey's fear of Russia; utopian. Armenia can play this one out to see what its worth. Maybe something will come of it but like I said, they should sit back and see how it plays out.

Let's talk about GUAM. How's that one working out?!?!?!

[meline]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

It won't amount to anything but was more or less brought about by Turkey's fear of Russia; utopian. Armenia can play this one out to see what its worth. Maybe something will come of it but like I said, they should sit back and see how it plays out.

Let's talk about GUAM. How's that one working out?!?!?!

I agree with you. We can play them and see what we can gain. As far as GUAM goes, it's Georgia (a failed state), Ukraine (a state totally dependent on Russia for gas supplies), Azerbaijan (a hostage to both Turkey and Russia) and Moldova (???).

[Armenian]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

Armenian, what do you think of the so-called "Caucassus platform for stability and cooperation" launched by Turkey. To me it sounds like a noxious diplomatic move, but I would like to hear more opinions on the matter. Thanks

In short, Russia's recent crushing of Georgia changed the whole geopolitical character of the region and beyond, and has also resulted in elevating Armenia's political status in the Caucasus. Armenia today is in a very unique position. Until recently, Turkey received most of its energy supplies from Azerbaijan via crucial western funded pipelines in Georgia. These pipelines are now out of service as a result of the war and their future, as well as the future of Georgia itself, seem uncertain because Moscow would like to monopolize the distribution of Central Asian energy assets as well as finally drive out western interests from the region. As a result of the short but intense war against Tbilisi, Moscow now fully controls the political and economic climate in the Caucasus.

Therefore, Moscow war against Georgia has in effect severed Turkey's easy access to Central Asian energy, and it has also negatively effected Ankara's trade with Russia. It's important to note here that Russia and Turkey have a very lucrative multi-billion dollar annual trade. Naturally, Ankara desperately needs reliable access to oil and gas as well as its lucrative trade with Russia. So, Turkey is being compelled to turn its back on Washington and look to Russia for survival as it seeks an alternative land route to Russia and eastward. Since Iran is a major regional player and a serious competitor to Turkey, not to mention under constant threat of a war, Ankara will not put itself in a position where it has to depend on Tehran. In essence, by default, this leaves Armenia as the only nation in the region that securely holds the eastern gates. And since Ankara cannot threaten Armenia militarily due to the strong Russian presence in the country, Ankara is in a sense forced to approach Yerevan with a peace proposal.

Signs that Moscow is fully behind (or actively supporting) the warming of relations between Yerevan and Ankara are quite clear. It perfectly fits Moscow's regional agenda. It seems as if Moscow is attempting to drive a wedge between the West and Turkey and one of the tools they seem to be using is Armenia, with the others being energy supplies and trade. Remember that Serj Sargsyan reached his hand out to Ankara right after his meetings with Medvedev and during a public speech while in Moscow last month. Moreover, Turkey proposed the Caucasus union/pact in the immediate aftermath of the war in Georgia, a war during which Ankara indirectly supported Russia's actions. Moreover, Washington, Turkish nationalists and Azeris are signaling their displeasure about Ankara's proposal. Moreover, Moscow has been clearly signaling that it is in favor of the proposal and is now in fact all for the opening of the Armenian-Turkey border - this after years of remaining silent about it.

Due to the war in Georgia and due to the high tensions in the Black Sea region, Ankara and Moscow have found that Armenia would be a good and logical alternative route for their trade. Eventually, due to geographic reasons, they will attempt to drag Azerbaijan into this as well. I don't believe any of this will have a negative impact on the status of Nagorno Karabagh. Nonetheless, they are currently trying to prepare the playing field in Armenia.

How well will Yerevan use this unique situation for Armenia's benefit, we don't yet know. It's best to pray and remain hopeful.

Anyway, I have covered this topic in the following posts:

http://forum.armenianclub.com/showpost.php?p=202959&postcount=2360

http://forum.armenianclub.com/showpost.php?p=203137&postcount=2371

http://forum.armenianclub.com/showpost.php?p=203314&postcount=2392

http://forum.armenianclub.com/showpost.php?p=203476&postcount=2431

http://forum.armenianclub.com/showpost.php?p=203493&postcount=2433