Announcement

**Gavur** · 07-27-2005, 04:43 PM

2.1. The Armenians

Although the Greek-Orthodox patriarchate receives more attention in the West, mostly due to its role in church affairs beyond Turkey, actually the Armenians form the largest remaining Christian community in Turkey. In 1976 approximately 42.000 Armenians (Gregorian church) lived in Istanbul. Many Armenians live or have a summer residence on one of the princess islands, Kinali, which is inhabited by 90% Armenians.

There are 35 Churches and Chapels and a Patriarchate in Istanbul. In addition there are 6 Catholic and 2 Protestant Armenian churches in Istanbul. They both comprise only a small group and hold less than 10.000 believers combined, but they maintain churches and schools in Turkey as well.[17]

There are two Armenian dailies, Jamanak (1.200 copies), written Armenian, with two pages using the Turkish alphabet for Armenian. Marmara (1.200-2.000) is the other daily. Their number of copies is so low, because many Armenians do not read and sometimes do not even speak Armenian anymore.[18] Generally the Armenian community is in a precarious situations in regards to their identity. They are a relatively small group in a state which is perceived by Armenians elsewhere as their greatest enemy. An empirical study among the Armenian community of Istanbul in regard to their identity shows this division. While generally a majority of those asked view themselves predominantly as Armenian, a significant group defined themselves rather as Turks. Those were mostly the younger and better-educated members of the community: �It appears that, having discovered the distinction between the in-group and the out-group, the younger generation of Turkish-Armenians have developed a weaker in group identity and a stronger out-group identity.�[19] This conclusion points to a possible decrease and even disappearance of the Armenian community through assimilation. The Armenian community of Turkey is also in conflict with many other Armenian communities in the Diaspora or in Armenia over the relationship with Turkey. This deepens the identity crisis of the Armenian community in Turkey.

The pressure on the Armenian community to assimilate also points to a general observation in respects to homogenising tendencies in Turkey. The Kemalist Republic conflicts with the Armenians and other non-Muslim communities for two reasons. First of all there is the secularisation, which � as mentioned � threatens to deplete the religious minorities of the prime identifying characteristics. While the majority of Sunni as sufficient strength in numbers to retain their identity either through other criteria than religion or through informal religious networks, minorities cannot gather a similar cohesion. Secondly the nationalist nature of the Turkish republic constitutes a major problem for the non-Muslim minorities. This is because nations tend to endorse the majorities language, religion and perception, all of which contradict or at least differ from the those of most of these minorities. Furthermore most non-Muslim minorities tend to have a different ethnic or national background than the majority of Turks. So also from this perspective their position is highly volatile. This dual assimilatory pressure, religious through secularisation and ethnic through nationalism, has recently been reinforced by the revival of Islam. This revival as has been pointed out previously originate in a somewhat moderate level from the state and a more radical form from the Islamists. As stated in the introduction the two non-Muslim minorities, Armenians in particular, find their treatment put into the context of Turkish foreign policy.

Due to the tense relationship between Turks and Armenians, the Armenian Church is forced to show particular loyalty to the Turkish Republic (i.e. supporting and participating in the celebrations of Atat�rk in 1981) Generally the situation of the Armenian church is better than that of the Orthodox. The times were difficult in the 70s when the ASALA, an Armenian terrorist group attacked Turkish embassies. No Armenians were accepted for civil service, the pressure on schools, church and people increased. In the nineties the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaidjian put Armenians again in an awkward position. After some heavy attacks on Nagorno-Karabach by Armenia even the instruction in Armenian was temporarily banned in schools. Attacks against Armenian churches and misrepresentation of Armenians remain commonplace in Turkey. Frequently attempts were undertaken by the government to connect the PKK with Armenians. This aims at inflating the role of Armenians and in order to construct a conspiracy theory against the Turkish state. Since Armenians are the largest non-Muslim group in Turkey, they are a prime target of religious and nationalist propaganda.[20] Here again the rhetoric of the secular Nationalist and Islamist coincides. Interestingly enough the vocal support of Erbakan for the Turks in Cyprus and the Azeris against Armenian coincides rather with a Turkish nationalist agenda than a pure Islamist programme: �The Islamists in power in Turkey are instinctively averse to both Greeks and Armenians. As deputy prime minister in 1974, Erbakan wanted Turkish troops to occupy all of Cyprus. In the electoral campaign that preceded the 1995 election, he made the bizarre claim that the Operation Provide Comfort...for the protection of Iraqi Kurds, was really meant to allow the creation of a Greater Armenia, as the British occupation of Palestine after World War I had provided a cover for the creation of Israel.� [21] Consequently, one has to perceived opposition between Secularists and Islamists, at least in regards to religious minority.

**Gavur** · 07-27-2005, 04:44 PM

2.2. Jews

Only a few (1945: 76.965, 1985: 24.000) of the large number of Jews from Ottoman times are left in Turkey today, mainly due to migration to Israel. The overwhelming share of the live in Istanbul, furthermore there are some 1.500 Jews in Izmir (10 synagogues) and 130 in Antakya.

Some Jews still speak Ladino, a Spanish dialect common to sephardic Jews, the dominant branch of Judaism in Turkey. Today mostly Turkish is spoken. There is a Jewish Hospital and High School in Turkey today. The primary school is attended by 300 pupils, secondary school by 250. Turkish is language of instruction, with strong additional Hebrew. There is only one weekly newspaper for the Jewish community. It has eight pages in Turkish and one in Ladino.

There are 16 synagogues in Istanbul today, some date form the 15th century.[22] Similar to the Armenian community, the Turkish state has �internationalised� the Jewish community. In the case of the Jewish community it has always assure to send prominent members of the Turkish Jewish community to international bodies. Jews were especially helpful when it came to improve the reputation of Turkey abroad and to ease international actions taken against the country. [23]

The internal cohesion of the Jewish community is high. There is a functioning network for protecting the weak, helping for a job and education. As the Armenians the Jews use the Princess islands as a meeting ground and have summer houses. The main bond of the community is no longer the religious activities, but rather the social network. The secularisation has generally reduced the religiosity of the Jewish community.[24] Since the Jewish community was more Westernised and economically more successful than the majority of the Turkish state, they could be seen as the frontrunner of the ideals the Kemalist state was striving for. At the same time the community remained separate from the majority, despite the secularisation of the state.[25] Aron Rodrigue in his description of the development of the Jews in Turkey comes to the conclusions that �even though the juridical millet disappeared, the Jews� millet identity remained intact.�[26]

The community is very strong today and makes itself heard in Israel-Turkish relations and has repeatedly protected Turkey from accusations of THE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE. Due to good relations to Israel and Jews organisations around the world the situation of Jews in Turkey is probably the best in the Muslim world. This relationship is nevertheless problematic as well. It makes the Jewish community extremely vulnerable to possible conflicts between the countries.

Furthermore opponents of the state of Israel are quick to identify the Jews in Turkey very closely with the state. In 1986 a massacre occurred in the Neve Shalom synagogue. Although Arab terrorist were accused, this was never firmly established and Turks as perpetrators are likely.

Furthermore the protection of Turkey in the case of the Armenian genocide is morally very questionable. Tying their own survival to the unconditional support of the state puts the Jewish community in a vulnerable position, internally, as well as towards the outside.[27] On the view of the Jews in Turkey the perspective of the Secular state and the Islamist is probably the most divergent. While Kemalists have sought to capitalise on the good treatment of Jews in Turkey relations with other countries, the United States and Israel in particular, the Islamist clearly take a hostile position towards Jews and Israel.[28] The party president Necmettin Erbakan and leading members, as well as publications, do not limit their tirades to Israel, but take on a generally hostile tone towards all Jews. The Milli Gazete[29] describes the Jews as a �Nation condemn in the Qur�an.� The Verfassungsschutz of the German state Nordrhein-Westfalen, observing radical organisations, is noting a general increase in the anti-Semitism content of the publications close to Refah.[30] The Welfare Party declared support for Human Rights seems cynical when recalling that a member of parliament and its human rights committee from Refah Partisi deplored the fact that Hitlers had failed in eliminating all the Jews.[31] Thus Jews, while being the best protected minority by the secular state, are at the same time the prime target of radical Islamist. As long as the conflict between Israel and some of its neighbours and more Islamist groups of the Palestinian populations continues, the Jewish population will remain very vulnerable to Islamists in Turkey. Especially the close ties of the secular state with Israel and the role of Turkish Jews in this connection has infuriated Islamist and made them probably more hostile towards the Jewish population than in other countries.

**Gavur** · 07-27-2005, 04:53 PM

3. The Islamisation of Turkey and the prospects for Religious Minorities

As has been documented with all three minorities, in particular with the Alevis, the governments of Turkey since the coup in 1980 have abandoned the �pure� path of Kemalism and instead attempted to include Sunni Islam into the national concept. This is to be seen as an attempt to broaden the legitimacy of the state and its governments, or as Eric Rouleau, the former French ambassador to Turkey puts it: �Under the current constitution, promulgated by the military government, the teaching of religion (i.e. Islam) is compulsory in all school �to cement national unity,� in the words of General Kenan Evren, head of the military coup d��tat of 1980. In practice, the principle of secularism, or separation of church and state, has been replaced by a system that places Islam under control of a secular government � a compromise between Kemalism and Ottomanism.�.[32]

Turning briefly towards possible future developments in regards to the treatment of minorities, let us turn to the position of the Islamist Refah Partisi on the groups discussed here. The motto of the Welfare Party is �Human rights and Liberties in Turkey.�[33] In regards to religious minorities in Turkey this slogan borders on cynicism. The words and deeds of the Refah and its politicians in respect to all the minorities discussed here paint a bleak picture.[34] Most prominent is the usage of anti-Semitism, as mentioned in the previous chapter.

While hostility towards Jews is very strongly developed, other religious minorities became targets of Islamist as well. The district mayor of the seat of the Greek-Orthodox patriarchate in Istanbul, a member of Refah, for example has threatened to make a �triumphant entry into the Ecumenical Patriarchate through the sealed gate,� which was closed since a patriarch was hanged there in 1821.[35]

In regards to the Alevi it just has to be recalled how the Refah mayor of Sivas encouraged the demonstration against the Alevi conference in 1993 which lead to the death of 37 Alevis. Since Alevis are considered heretics in Sunni Islam, their position is more vulnerable than the Judeo-Christian minorities, since they right to exist as such is not questioned by conventional interpretations of Islam, unlike the Alevis.

The outlook for minorities in case of a rule by the Welfare party is bleak. While their positions has been insecure and under constant pressure from the state, it is still much better than what can be expected from a rule by Refah.

There is little hope in the current political spectrum for improvement of the treatment of Minorities. Alevis have the best chances, since they are the largest and best integrated minority in Turkey. This nevertheless only applies in a continuation of secular politics. In a more Islamist state their position will be under threat, not only because of the religion, but also because of their vocal support for the secular Kemalist state. The religious minorities, with the exception of the Alevis, are very small in number and thus are under constant threat of assimilation. The fact that they receive relatively much attention from abroad is mainly due to their continuing harassment by the state. Only when the state embarks on a more tolerant view of minorities and a more inclusive concept of Turkish nationhood, these minorities will become less visible and better integrated into mainstream Turkish society. Prospects for this to happen are, as mentioned, not very good.

**Gavur** · 07-27-2005, 07:00 PM

European Court of Human Rights finds Turkey guilty

European Court of Human Rights finds Turkey guilty in Gazi/�mraniye incidents
Wednesday, July 27, 2005

The court rules that police officers shot directly into a crowd at both demonstrations and killed a total of 17 people, awarding compensation to victim's families

ANKARA - Turkish Daily News

The European Court of Human Rights has found the Turkish government to be responsible for the death of 17 people during incidents that took place in the Gazi and �mraniye districts of Istanbul in 1995.

The tragic events unfolded after a group of unidentified people opened fire from a taxi on five cafes situated close to one another in the Gazi neighborhood in a drive-by shooting that killed one person and injured several others. The attackers then killed the taxi driver and fled. A large demonstration was subsequently held in the neighborhood on March 12, 1995 by thousands of people who threw stones and coins at police barricades.

This bloody demonstration saw 15 people shot dead and 276 injured. Two further people were also killed during a second demonstration in �mraniye three days later.

The Turkish government argued that during the incidents in Gazi security forces verbally warned the demonstrators and then used water cannons and batons in an attempt to disperse the crowd. However, pleaded the government, this failed to work and a group of gunmen started shooting indiscriminately and recklessly from within the crowd, and as a result 15 people were shot and killed. The government argued that ballistic reports revealed that none of the bullets recovered from the bodies of the victims could be matched to any of the registered firearms of the security forces.

The court rejected the government's explanation and ruled that police officers had, in fact, fired directly into the crowd and caused the deaths of all 15 people.

The court also found police officers had done the same at the second demonstration in which two more people were fatally shot.

The manner in which the Turkish criminal justice system operated in response to the tragic events of March 1995 failed to establish the full accountability of state officials, the court decreed, adding that it concluded that there had been a violation of Article 2 (the right to life) of the European Convention on Human Rights concerning the failure of the authorities to provide a prompt and adequate investigation into the circumstances surrounding the killing of the applicants' relatives.

The court said no effective criminal investigation could be considered to have been conducted in accordance with the European convention.

The court awarded 30,000 euros compensation to each of the 22 applicants, all of whom are relatives of the victims.

**Hovik** · 07-27-2005, 07:17 PM

Definately a short bus rider