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The responsibility of Britain for the Fate of Armenia
The 30 Betrayals of Armenia
1 The betrayal of 1878
Britain's foreign policy objectives in the region in the nineteenth century was geared to bolstering Turkish rule in Armenia.. The British Ambassador to Turkey, Sir A.H. Layard commented, that "Russian conquest of Armenia would be the greatest blow ever struck at the British Empire" (Dwight E Lee: "Great Britain and the Cyprus Convention policy of 1878"). Turkey's geographical position with regard to India and Russia was unique
Russian gains in 1877 of Batum, Kars and Ardahan horrified the British. The security of Armenians was enshrined in the Treaty of San Stefano signed by Turkey and Russia. British diplomacy suceeded in replacing the relevant clauses of this treaty by the Treaty of Berlin(13th july) and the Anglo Tturkish Cyprus convention of 1878(4th june). Article 61of the Treaty of Berlin had replaced Article 16 of the Treaty of San Stefano. The guarantees of Armenian security was no longer made to a powerful neighbour who could enforce them .Eventually both the Cyprus Convention and the Treaty of Berlin utterly failed Armenia.
"It was the action of this country which deprived Armenians of the Russian protection guarranteed by the Treaty of San Stefano" James Bryce,MP for Aberdeen reminded parliament during the 1894-96 massacres
In 1918 a FO memorandum maintained that Britain was "bound, perhaps juridically and certainly morally" by article 61 of the Berlin Treaty. David Lloyd George admitted in 1938 (in "The Truth about Peace Treaties") " Had it not been for our sinister intervention, the great majority of the Armenians would have been placed, by the Treaty of San Stefano in 1878, under the protection of the Russian flag.... The action of the British government led inevitably to the terrible massacres of 1895-97 ,1909 and worst of all to the holocausts of 1915
2 The betrayal of 1894-96
During this time when 300.000 Armenians were massacred, despite widespread unease in Britain, nothing was done to force the Sultan to end the massacres. According to Gladstone, the British government had shrunk from "duty and honour." The Duke of Argyll concluded that the massacres were the terrible consequences of Britain's selfish folly. That these holocausts were but the necessary price to be paid for a policy essential to British national interests was an "abominable" and an "immoral" doctorine which had plunged this country into a "national humiliation". Britain was under the heaviest national obligations arising out of her active and repeated interventions in favour of the Ottoman government.These obligations were "patent and undeniable"
Public meetings organised to protest against atrocities in Armenia were discouraged by the government. (the Bishop of Manchester had been told the government did not look favourably on such meetings.)
3 The betrayal of 1909.
The British government did not intervene either when 30,000 were massacred in Adana.
4 1913 warnings ignored
Fears of widespread massacres of Armenians were expressed by Dr C.A.Gates, one of the principals of Robert College, a missionary College in Turkish Armenia A member of the Foreign Office staff minuted the dilemma of the British government: "What Dr Gates says is probably quite true, but it is impossible to prevent massacres in Armenia except by the occupation of those provinces by Russian troops, which is undesirable for other reasons".A Scheme of reforms for the Eastern Provinces was initiated by Russia at this time. When the Turkish government asked for 17 British advisers and inspectors for these provinces, Sir Edward Grey, the Foreign secretary refused the request. However he maintained that the only policy to which Britain could become a party was "one directed to avoid the collapse and partition of Asiatic Turkey" The excuse used for this was the feelings of Moslem subjects in India.
When the Archbishop of Cantebury wrote to Grey about the peril in which Armenians believed themselves to be , the latter replied that he was "glad to be able to say that this state of alarm was not warranted" While in the pre war period humanitarians in Britain pressed for the effective improvement of the condition of the Armenians, the Foreign Office would, for alleged national interests, do no more than make representations as an aquit de conscience
Turkey enters the war driven by their pan Turkish aspirations
In August 1914 Turkey secured a secret deal with Germany, wherby Turkey would enter any conflict in return for a correction in her Eastern border which would bring into direct contact with the Moslems of Russia. Separating Turkey from the Moslems of Russia was the mass of the Armenian people, on whose behalf protestations of the European powers had irritated Turkey for so long. Their land and property might now be used to placate the thousands of discontented Moslems who had become refugees from the Balkan wars.
5 Britain uses the genocide for war propoganda
After the genocide began in 1915 the government made use of this to stimulate the war effort. It was Lord Bryce who brought the genocide to public notice. The Foreign Office responded with the publication of the "Blue Book" in 1916.
During the war the Armenian question had served a purpose for the government-to show the people that they were fighting for justice and against evil, and to encourage the war effort, and also to encourage American help in the war..Asquith and Baldwin stated in 1924 that the Blue Book "was used for Allied propoganda in 1916-17 and had an influence upon the ultimate desicion of President Wilson to enter the war" By 1918 the Armenian question had fulfilled its function and would be of no more use.
The Armenian genocide was also used by the British government to counter charges that Britain was fighting an imperialistic war with a view to annexations.Britain had to devise war aims which would show that British policy was not completely based on imperialist greed
6 Promise of the Allies(unkept):
The declaration of 24th may 1915 "The governments of Britain France and Russia will hold the members of the Ottoman government personaly responsable for the massacres,which they called " New Crimes against Humanity and Civilization"
7 Rejection by the British government of requests for Relief :
There was a request by the Russian Ambassador for a half share of one million francs for relief of Armenian Refugees in 1915 in Syria and Mesopotamia. The source of the fund should be kept secret to avoid the danger of fresh violence against Armenians.. The minutes written in the Foreign Office reveal:"The whole object of making such a donation would be the effect in the USA etc and it would be valueless if kept secret". A more senior official addedd "I should be disinclined to make any donation for the benefit of Armmenians in Turkey without publicly stating that we are doing it" The reply to the Ambassador was that it did not affect "British Narional interests" in such a way as to justify a grant from public funds.The treasury had before in august september 1915 refused to contribute towards Armenian relief.
8 Rejection of Armenian help in 1915
In 1915 the military authorities in Britain consistently refused to provide arms and training to Armenian volunteers in the diaspora
The Armenians of Egypt wanted authorisation of the British government,arms that could be spared, permission to congregate in Cyprus, assistance in transport and a small allied contingent (to be under British conbtrol). Volunteers were to come from Egypt, Bulgaria, Rumania Greece America and Argentina. Grey and the Foreign Office were against the use of Egypt as a base for Armenian volunteers (out of consideration for Moslem feeling). The war office always rejected the idea of the use of Armenian irregulars for a landing or rising in Cilicia. The commander in chief of the Armed Forces in Egypt, General Maxwell, did not share this view.
On 7 september 1915 the French Admiral on the Syrian coast cabled the High Commisioner in Cyprus that 6,000 Armenians were bravely fighting near the Bay of Antioch. They had asked for the removal of 5,000 their old men, women and children to Cyprus so that the able bodied men could copntinue fighting. The High Commisioner refused, and General Maxwell asked the Minister of War to help. Grey, the Foreign Secretary, opposed accepting Armenian refugees to Cyprus or Egypt because they had Moslem Communities. So in 1915. even refuge to the famillies of those fighting at Jebel Musa was only grudgingly given.
In 1917 however it was the British authorities who tried to recruit Armenian manpower in the Caucasus. All proposals to form Armenian volunteer groups under British direction were rejected.
The Collapse of the Russian army in 1917 precipitating British Pledges for Armenian independence.
This worried the allies that Germany would transfer troops to the Western Front,and Baghdad, the strategic base might comne under threat.The collapse of the Russian Caucasian front might also open the valuable oil reserves of Baku to the Central Powers when shortage of oil was tending to weaken their war machine in Europe. The military balance in the Middle East might easily be tipped against Britain. The foremost concern was the provision of military support for troops in North Persia and Mesopotamia.
On 15th october 1917, General Barter, Head of the British Mission at the Russian General HQ informed the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS) that the difficulty of getting military support for General Maude in Mesopotamia might be solved. His staff officer, after making extensive enquiries in the Caucasus had come to the conclusion that the only really loyal troops in the Caucasus were the Armenians. Of the 150,000 Armenians fighting in the Russiuan armies, only 35,000 were on the Caucasus front.General Barter gained the agreement of the CIGS and the war cabinet discussed the question on 23rd october 1917. They authorised the Sec.of State for Foreign Affairs to concert with the US government to bring diplomatic pressure on the Russian government to deploy Armenian troops serving on the Eastern Front to the Caucasus, and allow for the recruitment and formation of Armenian units for service on the Caucasian front.Meanwhile discipline broke down in Russia and fighting stopped..
Six Armenian battalions just formed in the Caucasus refused to be sent to the Persian front in october until the political status of Armenia was decided upon.. While the War cabinet and the British military authorities wanted the Armenians to fight in northern Persia,Mesopotamia and the Caucasus, these Armenians were naturally anxious to safeguard the prospects of their own homeland.They did not know what objectives they were being asked to fight for.At the Foreign Office it was the view of Lord Robert Cecil and Sir Ronald Graham that there was little prospect of inducing the Armenians to make any further efforts unless the future of Armenia was guaranteed by the Western Powers.It is in this context that the pledges on Armenian Independence given by Balfour and Lloyd George are to be uderstood.
9 British war Pledges(unfulfilled)
Pledge by Asquith in the Guildhall in 1916 Asquith stated that the British government was "resolved" that after the war there would be an era of "liberty" for the Armenians.
In 1917 Balfour began mentioning the freedom of Armenia as a war aim.Lloyd George had mentioned this on 29th june 1917 in Glasgow and in the House of Commons in december 1917."Mesopotamia and Armenia would never be restored to the tyrrany of the Turk" In bringing in the liberation of Armenia, a land where Britain had no territorrial interests, and tying it in to the liberation of a strategically important , oil rich Mesopotamia, the British leaders could confuse the issues, silence critics who accused them of fighting an imperialist war, and could give notions of idealism and humanity to their war aims. At the same time,in the winter of 1917-18 Britain secretly considered making a separate peace with Turkey. Lloyd George was quite willing to abandon the Caucasus, including Armenia, in order to acheive peace with Turkey.
In july 1918, Balfour in the Commons , Lloyd George replying to Manchester Armenians and Lord Cecil writing to Bryce all pledged a future liberated Armenia.A Pledge by Balfour in a telegram to Aneurin Williams, referred to Lord Cecil's letter published in the press on 3 october 1918 which "reaffirmed" the "government's intention to liberate Armenia"
These pledges were according to Lloyd George "intended to have a propoganda effect". During a supreme war Council meeting he said "nobody was bound by a speech"
A few weeks before his death, Lord Bryce wrote about the threat of extinction of the Armenians:"of the nation which the Allies caused to fight for them and have now deserted"
In the nineteenth century Britain had strongly resented Russian presence in Armenia as a threat to her position in the Persian Gulf. Once Britain had gained control of Lower Mesopotamia, the importance of Armenia would become superfluous
The Archbishop of Cantebury had jotted down the main points of a major speech he was to make in the House of Lords together with the war-time statements made by Lloyd George. One sentence reads " My fear is that the story of these horrors and our promises may be forgotten in resettlement"
Contribution of Armenians to the war Lord Cecil recognised that Armenian forces took over from the Russians for five months, february till june 1918 on the Caucasian Front, and delayed the advance of the Turks,thus rending an important service to the British Army in Mesopotamia. In fact few Russians were fighting on the Turkish Eastern Front after the spring of 1917, and the Armenians fought alone, sustained only by the "Pledges" of British Politicians for a future free Armenia
10 The betrayal of the The Mudros Armstice(30th october 1918) .
This Armstice did not contain conditions on Armenia.
It left the six Armenian villayets under the sovereignty of Turkey.
No provision was made for the repartiation of Armenian refugees and deportees to their homes.
There was no occupation of statregic points by the Allies and no provision for the release of women and children.
There was no disarming of the Turkish army.
It would have been possible to gain concessions surely from the Turks, as 3 out of 4 proposals for peace from Turkish sources included concessions on Armenia.The armstice was hastily signed in order to ensure that the victorious fleet sailing into Constantinople would be commanded by a British rather than a French admiral!
In order to secure the Dardanelle straits, Palestine and Mesopotamia for Britain, concessions were given to the Turks over Armenia.
The draft terms of the armstice were discussed in six war cabinet meetings. The British priorities were set: there was no mention of Armenia at all.Almost all the concesions made at Mudros were at the expense of the Armenians.The conditions were set which eventually enabled the Turks to gain complete control of Armenia and even gain part of "Russian" Armenia.
Balfour wrote the Supreme Council 's reply to the Turkish delegation in july 1919. He characterised the "calculated atrocity" of the wartime Turkish massacres as equalling or exceeding "anything in recorded history". Lord Curzon, his successor as foreign secretary agreed that Turkish rule over the subjrect races should no longer be allowed.
Oliver Baldwin the Prime Minister's son who served in the Armenian army in 1920-21 maintained that the 1920 Turkish Armenian war was a continuation of the Great War broken out afresh as a result of Britain's weakness in her dealings with Turkey.
The 30 Betrayals of Armenia
1 The betrayal of 1878
Britain's foreign policy objectives in the region in the nineteenth century was geared to bolstering Turkish rule in Armenia.. The British Ambassador to Turkey, Sir A.H. Layard commented, that "Russian conquest of Armenia would be the greatest blow ever struck at the British Empire" (Dwight E Lee: "Great Britain and the Cyprus Convention policy of 1878"). Turkey's geographical position with regard to India and Russia was unique
Russian gains in 1877 of Batum, Kars and Ardahan horrified the British. The security of Armenians was enshrined in the Treaty of San Stefano signed by Turkey and Russia. British diplomacy suceeded in replacing the relevant clauses of this treaty by the Treaty of Berlin(13th july) and the Anglo Tturkish Cyprus convention of 1878(4th june). Article 61of the Treaty of Berlin had replaced Article 16 of the Treaty of San Stefano. The guarantees of Armenian security was no longer made to a powerful neighbour who could enforce them .Eventually both the Cyprus Convention and the Treaty of Berlin utterly failed Armenia.
"It was the action of this country which deprived Armenians of the Russian protection guarranteed by the Treaty of San Stefano" James Bryce,MP for Aberdeen reminded parliament during the 1894-96 massacres
In 1918 a FO memorandum maintained that Britain was "bound, perhaps juridically and certainly morally" by article 61 of the Berlin Treaty. David Lloyd George admitted in 1938 (in "The Truth about Peace Treaties") " Had it not been for our sinister intervention, the great majority of the Armenians would have been placed, by the Treaty of San Stefano in 1878, under the protection of the Russian flag.... The action of the British government led inevitably to the terrible massacres of 1895-97 ,1909 and worst of all to the holocausts of 1915
2 The betrayal of 1894-96
During this time when 300.000 Armenians were massacred, despite widespread unease in Britain, nothing was done to force the Sultan to end the massacres. According to Gladstone, the British government had shrunk from "duty and honour." The Duke of Argyll concluded that the massacres were the terrible consequences of Britain's selfish folly. That these holocausts were but the necessary price to be paid for a policy essential to British national interests was an "abominable" and an "immoral" doctorine which had plunged this country into a "national humiliation". Britain was under the heaviest national obligations arising out of her active and repeated interventions in favour of the Ottoman government.These obligations were "patent and undeniable"
Public meetings organised to protest against atrocities in Armenia were discouraged by the government. (the Bishop of Manchester had been told the government did not look favourably on such meetings.)
3 The betrayal of 1909.
The British government did not intervene either when 30,000 were massacred in Adana.
4 1913 warnings ignored
Fears of widespread massacres of Armenians were expressed by Dr C.A.Gates, one of the principals of Robert College, a missionary College in Turkish Armenia A member of the Foreign Office staff minuted the dilemma of the British government: "What Dr Gates says is probably quite true, but it is impossible to prevent massacres in Armenia except by the occupation of those provinces by Russian troops, which is undesirable for other reasons".A Scheme of reforms for the Eastern Provinces was initiated by Russia at this time. When the Turkish government asked for 17 British advisers and inspectors for these provinces, Sir Edward Grey, the Foreign secretary refused the request. However he maintained that the only policy to which Britain could become a party was "one directed to avoid the collapse and partition of Asiatic Turkey" The excuse used for this was the feelings of Moslem subjects in India.
When the Archbishop of Cantebury wrote to Grey about the peril in which Armenians believed themselves to be , the latter replied that he was "glad to be able to say that this state of alarm was not warranted" While in the pre war period humanitarians in Britain pressed for the effective improvement of the condition of the Armenians, the Foreign Office would, for alleged national interests, do no more than make representations as an aquit de conscience
Turkey enters the war driven by their pan Turkish aspirations
In August 1914 Turkey secured a secret deal with Germany, wherby Turkey would enter any conflict in return for a correction in her Eastern border which would bring into direct contact with the Moslems of Russia. Separating Turkey from the Moslems of Russia was the mass of the Armenian people, on whose behalf protestations of the European powers had irritated Turkey for so long. Their land and property might now be used to placate the thousands of discontented Moslems who had become refugees from the Balkan wars.
5 Britain uses the genocide for war propoganda
After the genocide began in 1915 the government made use of this to stimulate the war effort. It was Lord Bryce who brought the genocide to public notice. The Foreign Office responded with the publication of the "Blue Book" in 1916.
During the war the Armenian question had served a purpose for the government-to show the people that they were fighting for justice and against evil, and to encourage the war effort, and also to encourage American help in the war..Asquith and Baldwin stated in 1924 that the Blue Book "was used for Allied propoganda in 1916-17 and had an influence upon the ultimate desicion of President Wilson to enter the war" By 1918 the Armenian question had fulfilled its function and would be of no more use.
The Armenian genocide was also used by the British government to counter charges that Britain was fighting an imperialistic war with a view to annexations.Britain had to devise war aims which would show that British policy was not completely based on imperialist greed
6 Promise of the Allies(unkept):
The declaration of 24th may 1915 "The governments of Britain France and Russia will hold the members of the Ottoman government personaly responsable for the massacres,which they called " New Crimes against Humanity and Civilization"
7 Rejection by the British government of requests for Relief :
There was a request by the Russian Ambassador for a half share of one million francs for relief of Armenian Refugees in 1915 in Syria and Mesopotamia. The source of the fund should be kept secret to avoid the danger of fresh violence against Armenians.. The minutes written in the Foreign Office reveal:"The whole object of making such a donation would be the effect in the USA etc and it would be valueless if kept secret". A more senior official addedd "I should be disinclined to make any donation for the benefit of Armmenians in Turkey without publicly stating that we are doing it" The reply to the Ambassador was that it did not affect "British Narional interests" in such a way as to justify a grant from public funds.The treasury had before in august september 1915 refused to contribute towards Armenian relief.
8 Rejection of Armenian help in 1915
In 1915 the military authorities in Britain consistently refused to provide arms and training to Armenian volunteers in the diaspora
The Armenians of Egypt wanted authorisation of the British government,arms that could be spared, permission to congregate in Cyprus, assistance in transport and a small allied contingent (to be under British conbtrol). Volunteers were to come from Egypt, Bulgaria, Rumania Greece America and Argentina. Grey and the Foreign Office were against the use of Egypt as a base for Armenian volunteers (out of consideration for Moslem feeling). The war office always rejected the idea of the use of Armenian irregulars for a landing or rising in Cilicia. The commander in chief of the Armed Forces in Egypt, General Maxwell, did not share this view.
On 7 september 1915 the French Admiral on the Syrian coast cabled the High Commisioner in Cyprus that 6,000 Armenians were bravely fighting near the Bay of Antioch. They had asked for the removal of 5,000 their old men, women and children to Cyprus so that the able bodied men could copntinue fighting. The High Commisioner refused, and General Maxwell asked the Minister of War to help. Grey, the Foreign Secretary, opposed accepting Armenian refugees to Cyprus or Egypt because they had Moslem Communities. So in 1915. even refuge to the famillies of those fighting at Jebel Musa was only grudgingly given.
In 1917 however it was the British authorities who tried to recruit Armenian manpower in the Caucasus. All proposals to form Armenian volunteer groups under British direction were rejected.
The Collapse of the Russian army in 1917 precipitating British Pledges for Armenian independence.
This worried the allies that Germany would transfer troops to the Western Front,and Baghdad, the strategic base might comne under threat.The collapse of the Russian Caucasian front might also open the valuable oil reserves of Baku to the Central Powers when shortage of oil was tending to weaken their war machine in Europe. The military balance in the Middle East might easily be tipped against Britain. The foremost concern was the provision of military support for troops in North Persia and Mesopotamia.
On 15th october 1917, General Barter, Head of the British Mission at the Russian General HQ informed the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS) that the difficulty of getting military support for General Maude in Mesopotamia might be solved. His staff officer, after making extensive enquiries in the Caucasus had come to the conclusion that the only really loyal troops in the Caucasus were the Armenians. Of the 150,000 Armenians fighting in the Russiuan armies, only 35,000 were on the Caucasus front.General Barter gained the agreement of the CIGS and the war cabinet discussed the question on 23rd october 1917. They authorised the Sec.of State for Foreign Affairs to concert with the US government to bring diplomatic pressure on the Russian government to deploy Armenian troops serving on the Eastern Front to the Caucasus, and allow for the recruitment and formation of Armenian units for service on the Caucasian front.Meanwhile discipline broke down in Russia and fighting stopped..
Six Armenian battalions just formed in the Caucasus refused to be sent to the Persian front in october until the political status of Armenia was decided upon.. While the War cabinet and the British military authorities wanted the Armenians to fight in northern Persia,Mesopotamia and the Caucasus, these Armenians were naturally anxious to safeguard the prospects of their own homeland.They did not know what objectives they were being asked to fight for.At the Foreign Office it was the view of Lord Robert Cecil and Sir Ronald Graham that there was little prospect of inducing the Armenians to make any further efforts unless the future of Armenia was guaranteed by the Western Powers.It is in this context that the pledges on Armenian Independence given by Balfour and Lloyd George are to be uderstood.
9 British war Pledges(unfulfilled)
Pledge by Asquith in the Guildhall in 1916 Asquith stated that the British government was "resolved" that after the war there would be an era of "liberty" for the Armenians.
In 1917 Balfour began mentioning the freedom of Armenia as a war aim.Lloyd George had mentioned this on 29th june 1917 in Glasgow and in the House of Commons in december 1917."Mesopotamia and Armenia would never be restored to the tyrrany of the Turk" In bringing in the liberation of Armenia, a land where Britain had no territorrial interests, and tying it in to the liberation of a strategically important , oil rich Mesopotamia, the British leaders could confuse the issues, silence critics who accused them of fighting an imperialist war, and could give notions of idealism and humanity to their war aims. At the same time,in the winter of 1917-18 Britain secretly considered making a separate peace with Turkey. Lloyd George was quite willing to abandon the Caucasus, including Armenia, in order to acheive peace with Turkey.
In july 1918, Balfour in the Commons , Lloyd George replying to Manchester Armenians and Lord Cecil writing to Bryce all pledged a future liberated Armenia.A Pledge by Balfour in a telegram to Aneurin Williams, referred to Lord Cecil's letter published in the press on 3 october 1918 which "reaffirmed" the "government's intention to liberate Armenia"
These pledges were according to Lloyd George "intended to have a propoganda effect". During a supreme war Council meeting he said "nobody was bound by a speech"
A few weeks before his death, Lord Bryce wrote about the threat of extinction of the Armenians:"of the nation which the Allies caused to fight for them and have now deserted"
In the nineteenth century Britain had strongly resented Russian presence in Armenia as a threat to her position in the Persian Gulf. Once Britain had gained control of Lower Mesopotamia, the importance of Armenia would become superfluous
The Archbishop of Cantebury had jotted down the main points of a major speech he was to make in the House of Lords together with the war-time statements made by Lloyd George. One sentence reads " My fear is that the story of these horrors and our promises may be forgotten in resettlement"
Contribution of Armenians to the war Lord Cecil recognised that Armenian forces took over from the Russians for five months, february till june 1918 on the Caucasian Front, and delayed the advance of the Turks,thus rending an important service to the British Army in Mesopotamia. In fact few Russians were fighting on the Turkish Eastern Front after the spring of 1917, and the Armenians fought alone, sustained only by the "Pledges" of British Politicians for a future free Armenia
10 The betrayal of the The Mudros Armstice(30th october 1918) .
This Armstice did not contain conditions on Armenia.
It left the six Armenian villayets under the sovereignty of Turkey.
No provision was made for the repartiation of Armenian refugees and deportees to their homes.
There was no occupation of statregic points by the Allies and no provision for the release of women and children.
There was no disarming of the Turkish army.
It would have been possible to gain concessions surely from the Turks, as 3 out of 4 proposals for peace from Turkish sources included concessions on Armenia.The armstice was hastily signed in order to ensure that the victorious fleet sailing into Constantinople would be commanded by a British rather than a French admiral!
In order to secure the Dardanelle straits, Palestine and Mesopotamia for Britain, concessions were given to the Turks over Armenia.
The draft terms of the armstice were discussed in six war cabinet meetings. The British priorities were set: there was no mention of Armenia at all.Almost all the concesions made at Mudros were at the expense of the Armenians.The conditions were set which eventually enabled the Turks to gain complete control of Armenia and even gain part of "Russian" Armenia.
Balfour wrote the Supreme Council 's reply to the Turkish delegation in july 1919. He characterised the "calculated atrocity" of the wartime Turkish massacres as equalling or exceeding "anything in recorded history". Lord Curzon, his successor as foreign secretary agreed that Turkish rule over the subjrect races should no longer be allowed.
Oliver Baldwin the Prime Minister's son who served in the Armenian army in 1920-21 maintained that the 1920 Turkish Armenian war was a continuation of the Great War broken out afresh as a result of Britain's weakness in her dealings with Turkey.
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