Re: Georgian-South Ossetian conflict
It seems as if the fuc*ers in washington are hell bent on a world war.
U.S. planning to deploy 5000 troops in georgia
/PanARMENIAN.Net/ The U.S. is planning to deploy some 5000 troops in Georgia. For the purpose, Georgia can sign a military-political agreement like the one Russia concluded with South Ossetia and Abkhazia, KavkazCenter reports.
U.S. navy bases will be deployed in the ports of Batumi and Poti while air forces will be deployed near Gori and Marneuli. The details of the agreement will be discussed during Saakashvili’s the impending visit to the United States.
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Re: Georgian-South Ossetian conflict
Georgia and Ukraine 'shouldn't join Nato'
By Paul Reynolds
World affairs correspondent, BBC News website
Russian armour in South Ossetia: who started the war?
In a potentially significant swing of expert Western opinion, a leading British think tank has urged that Nato membership should not be granted to Georgia or Ukraine.
"The policy of Nato enlargement now would be a strategic error," said Dr John Chipman, Director General of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS).
"There is no case for accelerating membership for Georgia and Ukraine. There is a strong case for a pause," he said in remarks introducing the IISS's annual review of world affairs, the Strategic Survey.
Current Nato policy, decided at a summit meeting in Bucharest in April, is that both countries should become members eventually but no timetable has been set.
Who started the war?
The IISS intervention shows that following the war in Georgia, a debate is growing about whether a confrontational approach to Russia is the best one.
The IISS is critical of Georgia's actions during the conflict
The IISS is highly critical of Georgian actions - in contrast to the support Georgia has received from the US and some European countries, notably Britain. Naturally, if Georgia is faulted, then less blame can be put on Russia, whatever its reaction or, as some hold, its over-reaction.
Dr Chipman said that the "balance of evidence suggests that Georgia started this war".
Georgia has claimed that Russian forces had already started to enter South Ossetia by the time it acted. Russia has said that it responded to a Georgian attack.
Pressure seems to be growing for an international inquiry into the actual sequence of events.
The IISS position will undermine sympathy for Georgia and its leader President Mikhail Saakashvili.
Its analysis is that Georgia ignored American warnings not to go into South Ossetia and is therefore an unreliable partner at present.
'No give and take'
But the importance of the intervention goes beyond that, as it calls for a calmer approach to relations with Russia.
"There have been major errors of presentation of policy towards Russia. The US and Nato have in the past told Russia to accept whatever was happening. There was no give and take. We are disappointed at the way some Western leaders pushed the Cold War button after Georgia," said Dr Chipman. "We should not over-inflate the crisis."
He added: "The events of August 2008 do not signify fresh steps towards a new Cold War, because neither side wants one and the stakes are too low to warrant one."
Role for EU
Another IISS expert, Oksana Antonenko, reflected the IISS view that with a decline in US influence, the EU should be more active in formulating policy initiatives - but it lacked the means to do so.
She said it was good timing that France - a major, influential country -held EU presidency during the Georgia crisis.
"It highlighted the fact that EU institutions are highly incapable ones," she said.
"We urgently need a mechanism to stop the presidency from fluctuating between different member states."
We are disappointed at the way some Western leaders pushed the Cold War button after Georgia
John Chipman, IISS
The Lisbon Treaty does provide for a permanent presidency and a strengthened foreign policy representative, but it has not been ratified.
The IISS report came on a day when Nato defence ministers were meeting in London. There is some feeling in Nato that its priority should be to do more to reassure its existing members, especially those close to Russia, rather than rushing to bring in new members. And that is a view supported in the IISS report.
A great deal will depend on the views of the next American president. The Bush administration is all for pushing on with membership for Ukraine and Georgia, and the issue will be taken up again at Nato meetings in December.
A British official predicted that there would be no slowing of support for Georgia and no disposition to reward Russia.
But no quick decisions are likely in the current uncertain state of affairs.
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Re: Georgian-South Ossetian conflict
L’économie de l’Arménie a perdu 680 millions de dollars
mercredi17 septembre 2008, par Stéphane/armenews
Suite à la confrontation entre la Géorgie et la Russie, l’économie de l’Arménie a perdu 680 million de dollars, a déclaré Brad Sheriman, membre de la Chambre des représentants des Etats-Unis, indique 168 Jam soulignant le silence total des autorités arméniennes à ce sujet.
Ambassade de France en Arménie
From http://www.armenews.com/article.php3?id_article=44768
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In a nutshell, a US member of the house of representatives says Armenia lost 680 million dollars thanks to the Georgian-Russian conflict.Leave a comment:
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Re: Georgian-South Ossetian conflict
I've always found the taking of enemy flags in warfare interesting.
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Re: Georgian-South Ossetian conflict
Russia shows off the spoils of war in Georgia
By Shaun Walker in Moscow
Tuesday, 16 September 2008
The Russian army has put on display war trophies captured during the Georgia conflict at a museum in Moscow, in an attempt to reinforce its claim that the United States and the West were responsible for encouraging Georgia to attack its breakaway region of South Ossetia. After Moscow officially recognised South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent 10 days ago, the exhibition is another sign that, far from caving under Western criticism of its actions, Russia is keen to milk the propaganda spoils of the war.
The display, at The Central Museum of Armed Forces, displays weapons, uniforms and personal possessions belonging to Georgian soldiers killed or wounded during the fighting along with graphic photographs of the burnt and mutilated bodies of dead Georgian soldiers.
A museum guide, who was showing a group of Russians around the exhibit, paused at a display showing the personal photos of a dead Georgian soldier. One of them showed him having dinner with relatives, another had him in a comradely pose with a black man.
"Look, here's one of the Georgian soldiers with a black-skinned man, an African," said the guide. "We all know that there are a lot of Africans in the US Army, this was probably one of his instructors." Also on display are a set of textbooks entitled American Language Course, Level IV. The museum claims they were taken from a Georgian soldier in South Ossetia, though it might seem improbable that the soldier would take the bulky books with him to the battleground of Tskhinvali.
The museum itself is mostly devoted to the Soviet army, and its labyrinthine set of halls mainly cover the Second World War. A tank from that war stands on a plinth outside, and a 10ft-high bust of Lenin greets visitors as they walk into the main hall. Most of the exhibitions offer a very skewed and unrevised Soviet version of history – the section on the building of the Soviet army in the 1920s does not once mention Leon Trotsky, who was instrumental in organising the early Red Army but later fell out of favour with Stalin and was erased from Soviet history books. The Second World War section glosses over controversial aspects of the war, and Russia's long and costly conflicts in Afghanistan and Chechnya are hardly mentioned.
The same approach seems to have been taken for the Georgia exhibition. In a Soviet-style touch, there are more than a dozen photographs of President Dmitry Medvedev, and an array of his speeches and orders to the military during the conflict. A timetable of the war leaves out several important events. There is also a distinctly anti-Western tone to the exhibition, with several pieces of "Nato" equipment and army clothing on display, and a list of which Western countries had armed Georgia.
The graphic nature of some of the exhibits shows the depth of ill-feeling that has developed between Russia and Georgia after last month's conflict. Both sides have paraded their war gains in public – when the Georgians shot down four Russian pilots at the height of the conflict last month they paraded two bodies on national television, and The Independent was later given access to interview the two surviving pilots.
Russia is now taking its turn to display the spoils of the war which it unequivocally won. Moscow has been angry over the coverage that the conflict received in the West, and is insistent that the conflict was provoked by the Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili, with tacit backing from the West.
Last week Mr Medvedev said that Russia would "consistently and meticulously" re-equip its armed forces, which have a reputation of being poorly trained, underpaid and rife with bullying. "There is no doubt that our decision has been influenced by the events in the Caucasus," he said. "They have made this task one of the top priorities for the next few years."
From http://www.independent.co.uk/news/wo...ia-932006.htmlLeave a comment:
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Re: Georgian-South Ossetian conflict
Russian Troops and Abkhazian Separatists Keep Several Georgian Villages under Occupation
13.09.08 14:45
Georgia, Tbilisi, 13 September /corr. Trend News N.Kirskhalia/ Russian troops are not willing to withdraw from villages of Tsalendzi and Tsoros regions. The occupiers have only left Poti, Senaki and Khob regions so far, however, they are maintaining their presence in administrative border with Abkhazia.
Chale, Pochkho, Muzhava, Pakhulani, Chkhoushi villages, as well as Kanti village in Sachkher region are under occupation. Besides Russian troops, armed formations of Abkhazian separatists are still in this territory.
The separatists announced that they do not intend to leave these territories and will form their headquarters in Pochkho village, for taking full control of Inguri power station.
Russians and Abkhazians intend to apply special admission procedure in order to restrict movement of local residents in this region.
In Eastern Georgia, Russian troops and Ossetian separatists are controlling Ahalgor region. Their position in Karaleti, located at the entrance of the region continues functioning.
Large-scale military operations took off in self-proclaimed South Ossetian republic on 8 August night. Georgian troops entered Tsinkhvali. Later Russian forces seized Tsinkhvali and drove Georgian troops into Georgian territory.
On 12 August, Russian President Dmitriy Medvedev announced his decision to wrap up operations destined to drive Georgia into peace.
Decision was made to deploy peacekeeping forces of Russia and international observers.
Baboon source http://news.trendaz.com/index.shtml?...293800&lang=ENLeave a comment:
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Re: Georgian-South Ossetian conflict
Second Georgian policeman killed in Abkhazia
TBILISI (Reuters) - A Georgian policeman was shot and killed on Saturday near rebel Abkhazia, the second such incident this week involving Georgia's Russian-backed breakaway regions, the Georgian interior ministry said.
The policeman was hit when shots were fired from an Abkhaz village at a Georgian police checkpoint in Ganmukhuri, near the de facto border with Abkhazia, ministry spokesman Shota Utiashvili said.
"He had very serious wounds and died on the way to hospital," he said.
The incident prompted the interior minister to send elite troops to the area.
"After the killing of a Georgian policeman in western Georgia today, the interior minister made a decision to replace policemen there with special forces. They will be deployed at the de facto border with Abkhazia," Utiashvili said.
The self-styled government of Abkhazia -- which Russia recognised as an independent state together with South Ossetia after a brief war with Georgia last month -- denied any involvement, the Russian news agency Interfax reported.
"The Abkhaz side has nothing to do with this. This is most likely the result of internal Georgian wrangling," Ruslan Kishmariya, deputy to the regional president, told Interfax.
Earlier this week Georgia accused Russia of violating a ceasefire deal after a Georgian policeman was shot dead near a Russian checkpoint near South Ossetia.
Russia and separatist authorities in South Ossetia denied any involvement in that killing.
From http://uk.reuters.com/article/topNew...36325820080913Leave a comment:
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Re: Georgian-South Ossetian conflict
Recently released photo of a Russian Su-25 attack plane damaged by a Georgian MANPADS (Man Portable Air Defense System), probably a Russian made IGLA-1 (SA-16)
Same aircraft from a different angle
Another Russian Su-25 that sustained even heavier damage, but the pilot still managed to bring the plane back to its base.
The Russian forces captured at least one complete batallion of Georgian SA-11 (BUK-M1) air defense systems.
The anti-air missile system is to be taken to Russia.
Other SAM "trophies"
"Under new management"Last edited by ZORAVAR; 09-12-2008, 09:44 PM.Leave a comment:
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Re: Georgian-South Ossetian conflict
More photos of Georgia's Soviet made, very modern SA-11 (BUK-M1) SAM system. These were delivered by Ukraine recently.
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Re: Georgian-South Ossetian conflict
The following is an article that has just been published in "MOSCOW DEFENSE BRIEF". A serious military journal. The chief editor is MIKHAIL BARABANOV. The website is www.mdb.cast.ru
The article is written by a well known air-defense expert, SAID AMINOV. Aminov has his own website (in Russian): www.pvo.su
ZORAVAR
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Georgia's Air Defense in the War with South Ossetia
Georgian BUK-M1 (SA-11) anti-aircraft missile complex supplied by Ukraine.
The Georgian air-defense system represents a symbiosis of what it inherited from the collapse of the Soviet Union and new acquisitions from former Warsaw Pact and Soviet successor states.
During Soviet times, the 19th Tbilisi Air-Defense Army of the Soviet Air-Defence Troops was deployed in Georgia (reduced to an Air-Defense Corps in 1991). It included three SAM brigades in Tbilisi, Poti, and Echmiadzin, armed with S-75 (SA-2) and S-125 (SA-3) SAM systems, a separate SAM regiment armed with S-75 SAM systems (SA-2, deployed in Gudauta, Abkhazia), and a separate SAM regiment near Tbilisi, equipped with S-200 (SA-5) long-range SAM systems, as well as two radar brigades. However, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, some of the Soviet Armed Forces, including air defense, did not fall under Georgian jurisdiction, but remained under Russian control. During the early 1990s, all of the aforementioned air-defense divisions on Georgian territory were dismantled and their equipment transferred to Russia for scrapping. Nonetheless, Georgian forces seized some air-defense equipment from the Russian military, including at least one S-75 and two S-125 SAM battalions, as well as a few P-18 Spoon Rest radars. These systems were put into service to form the base of the air defenses of the Georgian armed forces. The Georgians used the S-75 SAM battalions in the war with Abkhazia in 1992-1993 and shot down a Russian Su-27 fighter near Gudauta on March 19, 1993.
The S-75 battalion was removed from service in Georgia, but the two S-125 Neva-M low- to high-altitude SAM systems battalions was deployed in Tbilisi and Poti (a total of seven quadruple rail launchers) and those in service with the Georgian Air Force had been modernized by Ukrainian specialists by 2005.
Georgian Army received several short-range air-defense systems in the first half of the 1990s from the arsenals of the former Soviet Army located in Georgia but transferred to Russian jurisdiction. These included KS-19 100-mm anti-aircraft guns, S-60 57-mm anti-aircraft guns, ZU-23-2 twin 23-mm anti-aircraft guns, ZSU-23-4 Shilka quad 23-mm self-propelled anti-aircraft gun systems, Strela-2M (SA-7), Strela-3 (SA-14), and Igla-1 (SA-16) man-portable SAM systems (MANPADS). However, a significant proportion of these arms was lost by Georgia during its unsuccessful war with Abkhazia. Some of the ZU-23-2 anti-aircraft guns were mounted on MT-LB armored multipurpose tracked vehicles.
With Mikhail Saakashvili's assumption of power in 2003, Georgia began the rapid development of its military capacities with the aim of acquiring the means to regain the separatist Abkhazian and South Ossetian regions. To neutralize Russia's potential to interfere in its operations against Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Georgia began to purchase modern air-defense systems.
First, Georgia acquired a 9К37М1 Buk-M1 (SA-11) battalion of low- to high-altitude self-propelled SAM systems composed of three batteries (each battery includes two self-propelled launcher mounts and one self-propelled loader-launcher) from Ukraine in 2007. These were delivered together with 48 9М38М1 surface-to-air missiles.
Georgia noted this transfer in its official report for 2007 to the UN Register of Conventional Arms. Other than Russia and Ukraine, only Finland, Cyprus, and Egypt possess Buk systems in several different versions. The Russian army is currently acquiring the latest version, the Buk-M2 (SA-17), and a large export contract of Buk-M2E to Syria is in the pipeline. According to subsequent internet reports from Ukraine, the Buk-M1 systems were delivered by sea to Georgia on June 7, 2007. In July 16, 2008, photos of Georgian Buk-M1 systems used during tactical training in Western Georgia dating from August 2007 appeared on the Internet. According to a Ukrainian source, on June 12, 2008, another battery of Buk-M1 systems was delivered to Georgia.
Second, Ukraine delivered eight self-propelled launcher vehicles 9К33М2 Osa-AK (SA-8B) low-altitude SAM systems (two batteries) and six (ten, according to some sources) 9К33М3 Osa-АKM self-propelled launcher vehicles update SAM systems. The Buk-M1 and Osa-AK/AKM systems were deployed by the Georgian Air Force in Gori, Senaki, and Kutaisi.
Third, Ukraine sold Georgia two modern 36D6-M radars that were deployed in Tbilisi and Savshevebi near Gori. The 36D6-М is a mobile, 3-D air surveillance radar, developed by the Iskra company in Zaporizhzhya, Ukraine. The 36D6-M radar is a deep modernization of the ST-68U (19Zh6) Tin Shield radar, taken into service in 1980 and used with the S-300P (SA-10) SAM system. The 36D6-M radar has a range of up to 360 km.
Fourth, Ukraine delivered at least one Kolchuga-M passive electronic monitoring radar system, capable of passively detecting modern aircraft, including those using stealth technology. According to information published recently in Ukraine, it is possible that another four Kolchuga-M and one Mandat electronic warfare systems, all produced in Donetsk at the SKB RTU and the Topaz Company, were delivered to Georgia in May of 2008. Earlier, Ukraine was severely criticized by the United States for having sold Kolchuga systems to China, Iraq, and Iran.
Fifth, the Ukrainian company Aerotekhnika upgraded the obsolete Georgian P-18 Spoon Rest radars to the P-180U version, which amounts to a qualitatively new and modern 2-D air surveillance radar system. At the time when it attacked South Ossetia, the Georgian Air Force had four P-180U radars deployed in Alekseyevka (near Tbilisi), Marneuli, Poti, and Batumi.
In 2006, company Aerotekhnika united Georgian military and four civilian air-traffic-control radars and the Kolchuga-M system into a single Air Sovereignty Operations Center (ASOC) early warning and command control tactical system. The central command center of the ASOC was located in Tbilisi, and as of 2008 was connected to a NATO Air Situation Data Exchange (ASDE) through Turkey, which allowed Georgia to receive data directly from the unified NATO air-defense system.
According to the Russian Defense Ministry, Ukraine either delivered or planned to deliver 50 9K310 Igla-1 (SA-16) man-portable SAM systems and 400 9М313 surface-to-air missiles, with missile seekers, upgraded by the Ukrainian Arsenal plant.
Several East European states also participated in the renewal of the Georgian air defense system. According to the Russian Defense Ministry, Bulgaria delivered 12 ZU-23-2М twin 23-mm anti-aircraft guns and 500 9М313 surface-to-air missiles for Igla-1 man-portable SAM systems. According to the UN Register of Conventional Arms, Poland delivered 30 Grom man-portable SAM systems (a improved Igla-1) and 100 surface-to-air missiles, and it is possible that such deliveries took place in 2008 as well. Reports have circulated that Georgia acquired Soviet era man-portable SAM systems from other countries as well.
Finally, there are reports that Georgia acquired one battery of the new Israeli Spyder-SR short-range self-propelled SAM system in 2008. The Spyder-SR SAM system, developed by Rafael company, uses Python 5 and Derby air-to-air missiles in a surface-to-air role. There has been no official confirmation of any such deliveries to Georgia, but Jane's Missiles & Rockets magazin cited a Rafael representative to report that the “Spyder-SR has been ordered by two export customers, one of whom now has the system operational.”
The Russian Ministry of Defense also reported that the Georgian Army acquired the Skywatcher army air-defense early-warning and command control tactical system produced by the Turkish Aselsan Company in 2008.
Thus, by the time Georgia invaded South Ossetia, its air defenses had acquired significant capability to detect, locate, and destroy air targets. The Georgian forces that advanced into South Ossetia were the equivalent of about a large division (nine light infantry and five tank battalions, up to eight artillery battalions, plus special forces and Ministry of the Internal Affairs troops), were protected by an air defense echelon that included one Buk-M1 SAM system battalion, up to three Osa-AK/AKM SAM system batteries, a large number of man-portable SAM systems, as well as a few С-60 57-mm anti-aircraft guns, ZU-23-2 twin 23-mm anti-aircraft guns, and ZSU-23-4 Shilka quad 23-mm self-propelled anti-aircraft gun systems. Thus, the air-defense system of Georgian attack groups was about the equivalent of a best frontline Soviet divisions during the late 1980s - early 1990s.
The confrontation with Georgia's air-defense system proved to be a serious trial for Russia's military aviation, especially since it seems that its capabilities were initially underestimated. Meanwhile, Georgia's air defenses reportedly relied on data received from the Kolchuga-M passive electronic monitoring radar systems, minimizing the use of active radar, while the Georgian Buk-M1 and Osa-AK/AKM self-propelled SAM systems used ambush tactics. This made it more difficult to defeat the Georgian air-defense systems. According to unofficial reports, the Georgian Buk-M1 SAM systems shot down four Russian aircraft on the first day of battle on August 8: three Su-25 Frogfoot attack planes and one Tu-22M3 Backfire long-range bomber.
Moreover, according to unofficial sources, Russia lost another three airplanes (one Su-24MR Fencer E reconnaissance plane on August 8, one Su-24M Fencer frontal bomber on August 10 or 11, and one Su-25 attack plane on August 9) as well as perhaps one Mi-24 attack helicopter.
Both Su-24 were probably shot down by Georgian Osa-AK/AKM SAM systems or man-portable SAM systems, and the Su-25, according to several reports, fell victim to friendly fire from a MANPAD wielded by Russian servicemen. Aсcording to the Sukhoi Company, three Russian Su-25s also was hit by Georgian SAM and MANPAD missiles but was able to return safely to base. For their part, Russian Army air-defense forces claimed shot down three Georgian Su-25 attack planes.
From the crews of the downed planes, two Russian pilots (of the Su-24MR and the Tu-22M3) were taken hostage, and exchanged for Georgian prisoners on August 19. According to unofficial reports, another five Russian pilots (of the Su-25 shot by friendly fire, the navigator of the Su-24MR, and three crew from the Tu-22M3) died.
At the time of writing, the Russian Defense Ministry officially recognized the loss of only three Su-25 attack planes and one Tu-22M3 long-range bomber, and considered them defeated by Buk-M1 SAM systems. The training of Georgian personnel in the use of the Buk-M1 SAM systems took place in Ukraine, and Ukrainian military instructors may have supervised their use in combat.
Although the Russian press and even high-level Russian military officials have made statements about the possible transfer of S-200 long range SAM systems and modern Tor (SA-15) low-to-medium altitude self-propelled SAM systems, such reports have not been confirmed.
One can conclude that following the unpleasant surprise arising from Georgia's effective use of Soviet-made SAM systems on August 8, the Russian armed forces threw all of the resources at their disposal against Georgia's SAM and radar systems. Both S-125M SAM battalions, the majority of Georgia's military and civilian radars, as well as the most part Buk-M1 and Osa-AK/AKM SAM systems were destroyed. It would appear that the only remaining threat to Russian planes and helicopters in the last days of combat came from Georgian MANPADs.
Russian forces were able to seize five Osa-AKM self-propelled launch vehicles, a few ZU-23-2 anti-aircraft guns and a few ZSU-23-4 Shilka self-propelled anti-aircraft gun systems as trophies from the retreating Georgian forces. Near Gali and Senaki, Abkhaz and Russian forces captured minimum one Buk-M1 battery, as witnessed by published photos. According to one unofficial source, Russian forces were able to capture or destroy almost all of the self-propelled launcher mounts for the Georgian Buk-M1 SAM systems.
The war in South Ossetia marked the first time when air power faced off against new-generation SAM systems, like the Buk-M1, which were brought into service in the 1980s. In all previous military campaigns, such as the War in Vietnam, the Arab-Israeli Wars of 1967, 1973, and 1982, combat actions in Chad and Libya in the 1980s, the NATO campaigns in the former Yugoslavia of 1994 and 1999, and the Wars in the Persian Gulf of 1991 and 2003, the air-defense systems in question were all designed in the 1950s and 1960s (this excludes, of course, the use of modern MANPADs). Moreover, in Georgia, the Russian Air Force for the first time in its history fought against modern air-defense systems, and relatively modern and numerous SAM systems at that.
This unprecedented experience of Russian aviation over a territory protected by a range of air-defense systems will be studied in detail, and should serve as a stimulus for the cardinal modernization of the Russian armed forces. It is obvious that the Russian Air Force must devote greater attention to the suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD), including the renewal of tactics, electronic weapons and increased military training in this area.Leave a comment:
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