War in The Middle East

[skhara]

Re: War in The Middle East

How come this article keeps showing up as a new post?

[Armenian]

Re: War in The Middle East

The US plans new military presence in Lebanon including big air installation close by Syrian border



The air base, according to DEBKAfile’s military sources, will be located at Kleiat in northern Lebanon roughly 75 air miles from Damascus, which these days doubles as a shared Syrian-Iranian military hub and Tehran’s eastern Mediterranean forward base. The American air installation will also lie 22 air miles from Tartous, Syria’s main naval base and the Russian Mediterranean fleet’s command center. And the aircraft posted there will be minutes away from the joint Syrian-Iranian arms and missiles industries at Homs and Hamma.

DEBKAfile’s source report the Bush administration’s drastic change of policy on Lebanon was settled in consultations at the Pentagon and National Security Council after the talks the chief of the US Central Command Adm. William Fallon held with Lebanese government heads on July 29. This new direction was confirmed after the Israeli air raid over Syria of Sept. 6.

It brings the American military back to Lebanon after a 25-year absence. In 1983, President Ronald Reagan pulled US troops out of the country after Syrian military intelligence orchestrated terrorist bombing attacks on the US embassy and Marines headquarters in Beirut, which left more than 300 soldiers, diplomats and CIA agents dead.

The first stage of construction will reactivate the small defunct air base at Kleiat as a joint US-Lebanese venture. Prime minister Fouad Siniora will explain that the four months of bloody fighting to crush the Fatah al-Islam revolt in the northern Nahar al-Bared camp demonstrated how badly the Lebanese army needs an operational air base in the region. US Air Force engineers and technicians have begun work on the new air field. At a later stage, it will be expanded for American military use.

Source: http://www.zimbio.com/Prime+Minister...anon+including

[Armenian]

Re: War in The Middle East

Smiting Syria With Suter



October 6, 2007: The most recent rumors, of what enabled the Israelis to slip past Syria's air defenses during the September 6th raid, describe a system that has been used in Iraq to detect transmissions from terrorist communications and zap IED detonation systems. This system is referred to as Suter, and such a program has been described in trade journals for several years now. The basic elements of Suter are powerful sensors, for detecting all manner of electronic emissions. This is coupled with some very fast computers, and a large database of known emitters. The computer software quickly identifies the emitters, and potential entry points into enemy communications networks. Suter transmitters can shut down some or all enemy emitters, just monitor them, or inject misleading information.

Naturally, with a system like this, the users don't want to discuss details. For once lots of details are known, systems like Suter are easier to defeat. To that end, within days of the September 6 attack, Russia had technical people in Syria, trying to figure out what Suter, or whatever, had done to the modern Russian early warning systems Syria was using. Iran was also demanding answers, and what the Russians told the Iranians initially was not pleasant. The Iranians won't say what the Russians told them, but the fall out was a lot of very unhappy Iranian military people. Some Russian techies are telling the Syrians and Iranians that the September 6th raid was actually a gift, because now more is known about what Suter can do, making it easier to defeat the system. That talk sounds more like damage control, because Suter has been described as a rapidly evolving system. The Russian air defense radars and computers may now be better able to deal with the September, 2007, version of Suter. But that advantage will fade quickly over the next few months as Suter continues to evolve.

Suter has been getting quite a workout in Iraq and Afghanistan, which doesn't make the Iranians or Syrians feel any better. The U.S. and Israel have been sharing a lot of counter-terrorism technology and tactics, and this would appear to be just another example.

Source: http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/hte.../20071006.aspx

[Armenian]

Re: War in The Middle East

Advanced Russian Air Defense Missile Cannot Protect Syrian and Iranian Skies



DEBKAfile’s military experts conclude from the way Damascus described the episode Wednesday, Sept. 6, that the Pantsyr-S1E missiles, purchased from Russia to repel air assailants, failed to down the Israeli jets accused of penetrating northern Syrian airspace from the Mediterranean the night before. The new Pantsyr missiles therefore leave Syrian and Iranian airspace vulnerable to hostile intrusion.

The Israeli plane or planes were described by a Syrian military spokesman as “forced to leave by Syrian air defense fire after dropping ammunition over deserted areas without causing casualties.” He warned “the Israeli enemy against repeating its aggressive action” and said his government reserved the right to respond in an appropriate manner. Western intelligence circles stress that information on Russian missile consignments to Syria or Iran is vital to any US calculation of whether to attack Iran over its nuclear program. They assume that the “absolute jamming immunity” which the Russian manufactures promised for the improved Pantsyr missiles was immobilized by superior electronic capabilities exercised by the jets before they were “forced to leave.”

Syria took delivery in mid-August of 10 batteries of sophisticated Russian Pantsyr-S1E Air Defense Missile fire control systems with advanced radar, those sources report. They have just been installed in Syria. Understanding that the Pantsyr-S1E had failed in its mission to bring down trespassing aircraft, Moscow hastened Thursday, Sept 6, to officially deny selling these systems to Syria or Iran and called on Israel to respect international law. This was diplomatic-speak for a warning against attacking the Russian-made missiles batteries stations where Russian instructors are working alongside Syrian teams. Western intelligence circles maintain that it is vital for the US and Israel to establish the location and gauge the effectiveness of Pantsyr-S1E air defenses in Syrian and Iranian hands, as well as discovering how many each received.

They estimate that at least three or four batteries of the first batch of ten were shipped to Iran to boost its air defense arsenal; another 50 are thought to be on the way, of which Syria will keep 36. The purported Israeli air force flights over the Pantsyr-S1E site established that the new Russian missiles, activated for the first time in the Middle East, are effective and dangerous but can be disarmed. Western military sources attribute to those Israeli or other air force planes superior electronics for jamming the Russian missile systems, but stress nonetheless that they were extremely lucky to get away unharmed, or at worst, with damage minor enough for a safe return to base.

The courage, daring and operational skills of the air crews must have been exceptional. They would have needed to spend enough time in hostile Syrian air space to execute several passes at varying altitudes under fire in order to test the Pantsyr-S1E responses. Their success demonstrated to Damascus and Tehran that their expensive new Russian anti-air system leaves them vulnerable. Washington like Jerusalem withheld comment in the immediate aftermath of the episode. After its original disclosure, Damascus too is holding silent. Western intelligence sources believe the Syrians in consultation with the Russians and Tehran are weighing action to gain further media mileage from the incident. They may decide to exhibit some of the “ammunition” dropped by the Israeli aircraft as proof of Israel’s contempt for international law. A military response may come next.

Pantsir-S1 or Panzir (“Shell" in English) is a short-range, mobile air defense system, combining two 30mm anti-aircraft guns and 12 surface-to-air missiles which can fire on the move. It can simultaneously engage two separate targets at 12 targets per minute, ranging from fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters, ballistic and cruise missiles, precision-guided munitions and unmanned air vehicles. It can also engage light-armored ground targets. The Pantsyr S1 short-range air defense system is designed to provide point defense of key military and industrial facilities and air defense support for military units during air and ground operations.

The integrated missile and gun armament creates an uninterrupted engagement zone of 18 to 20 km in range and of up to 10 km in altitude. Immunity to jamming is promised via a common multimode and multi-spectral radar and optical control system. The combined missile and artillery capability makes the Russian system the most advanced air defense system in the world. Syria and Iran believe it provides the best possible protection against American or Israeli air and missile attack. Stationed in al Hamma, at the meeting point of the Syrian-Jordanian and Israeli borders, the missile’s detection range of 30 km takes in all of Israel’s northern air force bases.

Source: http://www.debka.com/

[Armenian]

Re: War in The Middle East

I recently happened to come by a new book that is definitely worth reading. The seemly counterproductive and destructive policies of the Western world, specifically that of the United States, will only make better sense once those policies are placed within a proper political perspective. Many around the world today are utterly perplexed that the US government is pursing policies that are detrimental to the well being of the United States without taking into serious consideration the absolute clout that certain special interest groups have within the halls of power. Books such as the following will help you see American politics is a better light for it will help you will see the driving mechanisms behind the foreign policy making apparatus' of Washington DC.

Armenian

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The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy



The two authors are prominent political scientists with impeccable credentials, hailing from Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government and the University of Chicago. Among other issues they try to prove that a small group of mostly xxxish intellectuals and government members succeeded, to push the U.S. into a disastrous war because they cared more about the security of Israel than the security of their homeland. Since their conclusions about Israel and its negative influence on American foreign policy are in some areas too academic and will awaken much anxiety, resentment and fury in certain quarters, Walt and Mearsheimer have a point.

The book is based on their article, "The Israel Lobby," and was originally published in the London Review of Books in March 2006, it was one of the most controversial articles in recent memory and provoked both howls of outrage and cheers of gratitude for challenging what had been a taboo issue in America: the impact of the Israel lobby on U.S. foreign policy. Their argument is not exactly new. It is well known in Washington that a "kosher nostra," consisting of the usual suspects like Paul Wolfowitz, Donald Rumsfeld, Douglas Feith, defense expert Richard Perle (who just loves his nickname `Prince of Darkness'), and perhaps two dozens of other neocons, have been twisting facts to overthrow Saddam Hussein since years, reaching back to the Reagan administration.

The basic argument is that the extraordinarily high degree of economic, military and diplomatic support given to Israel by the United States cannot be explained or justified by the notion that Israel functions as a strategic asset to the U.S., or that Israel as the "only democracy" amidst a sea of authoritarian neighbors is deserving the special favors, particularly of gigantic military aid, for its "shared interests and values". In fact, the authors claim, Israel is more a liability than an asset.

There is no question that during the Cold War, there was logic behind the strategic-value argument. In a clever scheme, the Soviets had significantly increased their sea power in the Mediterranean during the Arab-Israeli conflict - the Six Day War in June 1967 - to show their support for the Arab states. During that crisis the Soviet Mediterranean "Eskadra" numbered up to about seventy units, some of which were in Port Said and Alexandria to prevent Israeli attacks. In my opinion (shared by a number of security professionals at the time), the entire war had been provoked by the Soviets in the first place to gain a strategic advantage over the West and to demonstrate on a grand scale their willingness and capability to influence major events in the area. After that war the "Eskadra" had rapidly expanded and in the late 1970s comprised of more than ninety ships, including over a dozen destroyers and nearly two dozen subs - outnumbering NATO's backbone, the American 6th fleet.

However, the Soviet menace has disappeared and the enemy which the U.S. supposedly needs Israel's help to combat, is Islamic terrorism. But the U.S. favor shown to Israel at the expense of the Palestinians only makes us more not less vulnerable to terrorism. So if neither "shared values" nor "strategic assets" can explain the overwhelming U.S. support of Israel, what else is there? The power of the Israel lobby has brought about a situation in which it is impossible for elected officials to question support for Israel. This has led the U.S. to make critical mistakes. The authors argue that the U.S. would not have attacked Iraq, were it not for the influence of the Israel lobby.

What is perhaps most significant and remarkable about this book is that it got published. Could it be that there is still hope for reasonable, open debate about the right courses of action in the Middle East? The authors have been and will continue to be vilified as anti-Semitic or worse. They are owed a debt of gratitude for having the courage to stand up and to refuse to be silenced.

"Now that the cold war is over, Israel has become a strategic liability for the United States. Yet no aspiring politician is going to say so in public or even raise the possibility, because the pro-Israel lobby is so powerful." write Mearsheimer and Walt. Then they go on to credit the lobby with preventing talks with Syria and with moderates in Iran, and inhibiting the United States from denouncing Israel's 2006 war in Lebanon.

"The Israel Lobby" is a brand new welcome addition to the ever increasing controversies of biased U.S. foreign policies. My only disappointment with this book is that the authors haven't interviewed the people who are being lobbied or those doing the lobbying. Although I wouldn't question the meticulous research that has been presented, the fact that there is a missing piece suggests that you should read this book with a "grano salis".

Source: http://www.amazon.de/Israel-Lobby-U-...ews/0374177724

[Armenian]

Re: War in The Middle East

Hezbollah Regains Strength in Lebanon



BAFLAY, Lebanon — When 30,000 U.N. and Lebanese troops deployed across southern Lebanon at the end of last year's Israel-Hezbollah war, the Islamic militant group's presence shrank in the zone bordering Israeli and its influence seemed likely to diminish as well. But more than a year later, Hezbollah appears to again be solidly entrenched across Lebanon's south — looking, in fact, as if its fighters never really left but merely went underground.

The Shiite militia's banners hang everywhere, boasting of the "divine victory" over Israel and thanking its chief sponsor, Shiite-majority Iran, for helping with post-war reconstruction. Villagers report the militia's recruitment of young men is booming and its popularity is firm. A few things are different. Hilltop posts near Israel once held by Hezbollah are now controlled by the Lebanese army. And U.N. peacekeepers are helping the army establish its authority and maintain a buffer zone between the Litani River and the border — from three to 18 miles deep at various points — that is supposedly free of Hezbollah fighters. But Hezbollah appears to be in a strong position north and south of the Litani, both politically and militarily. And the group — whose name means Party of God — says it would be ready to fight again should Israel attack.

It is unclear how much Hezbollah, which is labeled a terrorist group by the United States but not by the European Union, has been able to beef up its missiles pointed toward Israel and other weaponry. The Israeli government has complained arms have been smuggled from Syria, and U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has urged Syria and Iran to cooperate with Lebanese authorities to prevent weapons shipments into the country. Villagers across the south point to various places they say are arms depots for Hezbollah, but it was not possible to verify their statements.

In the village of Barflay, about 10 miles north of the border, a middle-aged woman pointed to a low building nestled in trees and brush. "That one there is the party's warehouse for weapons," said the woman, who asked that her name not be used for her safety. Hezbollah boasts that it is both everywhere and nowhere, meaning it is hard to tell who is a civilian and who is a fighter. "Hezbollah is not from Mars. They are the people of this land," said Hussein Ayoub, a 40-year-old Shiite in the nearby village of Selaa. Ayoub said he lost six cousins last year when Israeli planes bombed two houses in Selaa.

"They are among us, even if we don't see them," interjected his uncle, Ahmed Ayoub. Last year's 34-day conflict between Israel and Hezbollah ended on Aug. 14 with a U.N. Security Council resolution authorizing up to 15,000 U.N. peacekeepers to help 15,000 Lebanese troops extend their authority throughout south Lebanon. Despite the resolution, Hezbollah remains the only force trusted by most of the majority Shiite population of the South, and respected — or feared — by most of the minority Christians and Sunni Muslims.

When six Spanish U.N. peacekeepers were killed in a June attack, the U.N. and Lebanese army had to rely on Hezbollah's cooperation to investigate. Their findings have not been released, but Lebanese intelligence officials believe the attackers were al-Qaida-inspired militants from a Palestinian refugee camp — and not Hezbollah fighters, as the U.N. first suspected. Villagers say Hezbollah is still recruiting men aged between 16 and 19. Those who agree to join receive basic training for about a month. Those who show resilience and have skills get more training and remain with the guerrilla group at an attractive salary — a big inducement in a place where many youths are unemployed.

Residents in southern Lebanon have been saying for years that rich Shiite supporters of Hezbollah — many who made money as traders in Africa — have been buying land from Christians and Sunnis near the Israeli border, boosting the guerrilla group's control. They say the purchases have accelerated recently. The chance of another war haunts the south. On the anniversary of the end of last year's war, Hezbollah leader Sheik Hassan Nasrallah warned of a "big surprise" should Israel attack again. Many took that to mean the militia had gotten a new delivery of anti-aircraft missiles.

The talk of Hezbollah recruitment and training also indicates the militia is preparing for another conflict, with both ordinary people and Hezbollah supporters saying the fighting will be initiated by Israel, not the Lebanese militiamen. The last war began on July 12, 2006, after Hezbollah fighters crossed into Israel, killing three soldiers and seizing two others. Israel then invaded southern Lebanon and bombarded the country. More than 1,000 Lebanese — mostly civilians_ were killed; 158 Israelis, 119 of them soldiers, also died. Hezbollah's yellow flags dominate southern Lebanon, as they did before the war. Posters and murals of its fallen fighters — set against a background of red tulips, a symbol of martyrdom — adorn walls and utility poles along the mountain roads.

A poster of Iran's spiritual leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei greets visitors to the main village square in Srifa, about six miles from Israel's border. Twelve Hezbollah fighters and 17 from allied groups were killed in Israeli airstrikes, along with seven civilians. One of the Hezbollah dead was Abbas Amin Dakroub who was hiding with about 70 relatives and neighbors in a bomb shelter near his home when Srifa was struck in the early days of the war. Dakroub's cousin, Hassan Ahmed, 23 — whose job is helping organize Hezbollah rallies — survived. "I'm with the resistance," he announced proudly. "I was in the same bomb shelter. It was the highest death toll of fighters in one attack."

He said none of the young Hezbollah men in Srifa fought last year because Israel only attacked with bombs and artillery, never sending ground forces into his town. "I was here, but not as a fighter," Ahmed said, speaking with a tinge of regret. In Marwaheen, a Sunni Muslim village along the border, a huge banner with the message "Death to Israel" covers the front of a two-story house belonging to the Abbas family. Twenty-three from the village were killed by an Israeli missile as they tried to flee in a pickup truck on July 15 after the Israelis warned villagers through loudspeakers to evacuate or face shelling.

Marwaheen, one of six Sunni villages along the border, sits on a mountain ridge, divided from Israel by a green valley. A military post on a nearby hill signals who is in charge of this embattled region. It was an Israeli position during Israel's occupation of south Lebanon, then Hezbollah held it, and today it's controlled by the Lebanese army. Although Marwaheen is now protected by the army, some Sunni villagers still speak of Hezbollah with admiration. "Hezbollah is a resistance movement, while Israel is the occupier and aggressor," said Hussein Ghannam, 58. Still, he said he favored a peace treaty with Israel provided it was not "tantamount to submission" but respected everyone's rights.

Source: http://ap.google.com/article/ALeqM5g...16yAAD8S1VDJO1

[Armenian]

Re: War in The Middle East

Israel, Syria: Upgrades and an Unchanged Air Defense Dynamic



Summary

Russia reportedly has sent technicians to help Syria upgrade its air defense network following the Israeli air force (IAF)'s Sept. 6 use of a new electronic warfare system to penetrate Syrian airspace. While the existence of both the new Israeli system and the Russian assistance are quite possible, neither alters the fundamental dynamic between the IAF and the Syrian air defense network.

Analysis

The Israeli air force (IAF) employed a new electronic warfare system in its Sept. 6 raid on Syria, and Russia afterward sent technicians to help upgrade the Syrian air defense network, London daily The Times reported Oct. 2. Neither of these plausible possibilities would alter the fundamental dynamic between the IAF and the Syrian air defense command. With 60,000 troops, the Syrian air defense command is larger than the country's navy and air force combined. The country is covered by some 150 surface-to-air missile batteries, with the heaviest concentrations along the Israeli border, along the Mediterranean coast and at Damascus. Reportedly, minor reshuffling has occurred lately to improve coverage of Syria's borders with Turkey and Iraq. But despite its scale, the Syrian air defense system has largely faded to obsolescence. The bulk of Damascus' strategic defensive systems were delivered by the mid-80s, and the Arab nation's source of meaningful air defense assets evaporated with the Soviet Union.

The core of the Syrian air defense system remains the SA-2 and SA-3. The SA-2 was first fielded more than half a century ago, and the SA-3 just few years later. Syria's longest-range air defense asset is the SA-5 "Gammon" (a design that is more than 40 years old). This system was soundly defeated by U.S. electronic countermeasures (ECM) and anti-radiation missiles in Libya in 1986. But systems can be upgraded, of course. Russia offers all manner of hardware and software upgrades (some of which might now be under way) and even Ukraine and Serbia peddle equipment and upgrades relevant to the Syrians' network. Meanwhile, Syria has certainly not remained idle in the past decade. Damascus learned much not only from the devastating air campaign against Iraq in 1991 but also from the subsequent interactions of the remnants of Iraqi air defenses and U.S. and British enforcement of the two no-fly zones imposed on Iraq after Desert Storm.

Though there are certainly air defense lessons for Damascus to learn, Syrian air defense has nothing like the integration, sophistication, command and control, or readiness that Iraq demonstrated before Desert Storm, and the quality of personnel is just as important. The alertness of a Bosnian Serb SA-6 crew brought down a U.S. F-16 in 1995 and the ingenuity of a Serbian SA-3 crew in 1999 brought down the only F-117 Nighthawk stealth fighter ever lost to hostile fire. Neither Syria's exercises nor its responsiveness to repeated IAF incursions exemplify this kind of training or readiness. Overall, the Syrian military is plagued by much more fundamental issues like nepotism, corruption and a garrison mentality.

Many of the weaknesses of the Syrian air defense network also inescapably are linked to the hardware itself. The SA-2, SA-3 and SA-5 systems are either static or extremely difficult to move, making them easy to avoid, easy to target with electronic countermeasures and easy to kill. Both the radars and the missiles themselves are susceptible to modern ECM and decoys (and Israeli upgrades far outpace any upgrades Syria has been able to make). The missile batteries also must be in active mode and radiating to have any kind of lethality, but his is when they are most vulnerable to anti-radiation missiles. The SA-6 -- which Syria also fields in great numbers -- is mobile, but it suffers from these other vulnerabilities. Syria has attempted to compensate for its air defense system's obsolescence through density, concentrating these systems in key areas with heavily overlapping coverage.

The sheer density of Syrian defenses in key locations means its air defenses cannot be dismissed out of hand. But density and other half-measures are crude counters in the era of GPS-guided and standoff munitions. Illustrating this point, the IAF repeatedly has overflown Latakia and might have penetrated the dense network along the Mediterranean coast twice Sept. 6. Syria probably could bring down a handful of Israeli warplanes in a full-scale IAF onslaught. But Syria lacks the equipment, integration and technology to oppose that onslaught effectively, meaning it does not act as a deterrent to an Israeli attack. Modern air defense does not come cheaply no matter how one approaches the matter. Both the United States and Israel ensure first and foremost through superior airpower. Neither country has been in a position where its air superiority has been challenged meaningfully in decades. Moreover, multiple successful campaigns of suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) have lent validity to -- if not credence to the superiority of -- the concept of airpower-based air defense.

Due to geopolitical realities, the Soviet Union was far more focused on land-based air defense for the entire Cold War. Moscow constructed a formidable air defense network that the United States and NATO took extremely seriously. But this system came at a massive cost. Syria's network was only possible through the sponsorship of the Soviets, who armed Syria to counter U.S. sponsorship of Israel. Following a humiliating defeat of Syria by the IAF in which the Israelis completely dominated the air and the electromagnetic spectrum in 1982, the Soviets shipped coveted long-range SA-5s to Damascus.

Today, Moscow is selling only multiple-launch equipment for the SA-18 man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS) and some 50 truck-mounted Panstyr-S1E close-in air defense systems (for which the United Arab Emirates is known to have spent nearly $750 million, or roughly half Syria's entire annual defense budget). Most other rumors concerning Syrian acquisitions involve this category of systems. While capable and dangerous, these systems have extremely limited range and cannot provide Damascus with a meaningful air defense capability. Even in the cramped Golan Heights, the threat they pose would be to low-flying close-air-support aircraft and helicopters. Syrian cannot win a war with that kind of coverage.

Today's equivalent to Soviet support in the early 1980s would be Moscow shipping modern S-300 batteries to Damascus in an immediate and unequivocal response to the Sept. 6 IAF incursion. Syria is desperate for the S-300 system, and rumors of its delivery have circulated for nearly a decade without corroboration, but it is unclear whether Syria can afford even a single battery, much less sufficient numbers for a systemic upgrade. This purchase would require both a seller and a generous financier. Instead, the most active role Russia is rumored to be playing involves sending some technicians to help upgrade the system.

The problem for Syria is that today's Kremlin differs from the Soviet Kremlin. If Russia had the resources the Soviets enjoyed, Moscow might consider it. But production is limited, and many considerations surround air defense exports. Ultimately, the neglect that Syrian air defense acquisition and modernization have suffered in the last decade cannot easily be undone. Russian technicians -- even exceptionally well-funded and well-equipped ones -- cannot fundamentally alter the dynamic between Syria's air defense network and the IAF. Syria occupies the unfortunate position of being the only military power openly hostile toward Israel and directly contiguous to the xxxish state -- which of course continues to enjoy U.S. sponsorship and all the technological advantages such sponsorship entails. Even with Soviet sponsorship, Syria repeatedly failed to hold up in the face of the IAF (even when its equipment was more current), and that is not a dynamic that will change soon.

Source: http://www.stratfor.com/products/pre....php?id=296117

[Armenian]

Re: War in The Middle East

Here is the Syrian claim:
http://www.roadstoiraq.com/2007/09/2...eli-warplanes/

There are two official stories regarding the incident. It's just that having observed the Arab-Israeli conflict for many years I have seen Arabs make boastful, almost fantastic, statements about their military prowess every time they get humiliated. I guess it's a way of comforting their apprehensive population. I hope this time Syria is telling the truth, but we will not know what really happened there for some time. I have a feeling, however, that the IAF operation was either a training mission for the up-coming aggression against Iran or an attack against a strategic target in Syria.

[skhara]

Re: War in The Middle East

Here is the Syrian claim:

http://www.roadstoiraq.com/2007/09/24/syria-more-details-about-the-israeli-warplanes/

[Armenian]

Re: War in The Middle East

Armenian,

Any personal opinions/speculations on this "raid" by Israel on Syrian targets?

I'm exposed to the same news information as anyone else. I don't have much to say about the issue other than I believe, more-or-less, what Washington and Tel Aviv are claiming about the incident in question. It is very conceivable that having received credible intelligence information regarding some sort of an arms shipment to Syria the Israelis wanted to teach Damascus a hard lesson. The lesson namely being: Geopolitically Syria is vulnerable, it is not Iran; Syria better not even attempt to think about nuclear weapons nor any other weapon that can threaten the military supremacy Israel enjoys; Israel can successfully attack Syria at will and destroy whatever it is that it needs to destroy; Syria's anti-aircraft systems will not be able to effectively stop Israeli and/or American air power; etc.

Thanks for your help here. I'm back.